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A recognition by senior management that 
incidents will happen and that they must play 
a full and active part in the incident 
management process 
Ease of making a report, recognising if 
reporting incidents is difficult 
individuals will be less likely to submit 
them. This may particularly affect the 
reporting of near misses. 
Rapid, useful, accessible and 
intelligible feedback to the reporting 
community 
Incident analysis that considers root 
causes and wider systems/ processes, 
not just the initial impact assessment. 
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ABSTRACT 
There is a perception amongst security professionals that the true scale of information 
security incidents is unknown due to under reporting. This potentially leads to an 
absence of sufficient empirical incident report data to enable informed risk assessment 
and risk management judgements. As a result, there is a real possibility that decisions 
related to resourcing and expenditure may be focussed only on what is believed to be 
occurring based on those incidents that are reported. There is also an apparent shortage 
of research into the subject of information security incident reporting.  
This research examines whether this assumption is valid and the potential reasons for 
such under reporting. It also examines the viability of re-using research into incident 
reporting conducted elsewhere, for example in the healthcare sector.  Following a 
review of what security related incident reporting research existed together with 
incident reporting in general a scoping study, using a group of information security 
professionals from a range of business sectors, was undertaken. This identified a strong 
belief that security incidents were significantly under-reported and that research from 
other sectors did have the potential to be applied across sectors. A concept framework 
was developed upon which a proposal that incident reporting could be improved 
through the identification of Critical Success Factors (CSF’s). A Delphi study was 
conducted across two rounds to seek consensus from information security professionals 
on those CSF’s.  
The thesis confirms the concerns that there is under reporting and identifies through a 
Delphi study of information security professionals a set of CSF’s required to improve 
security incident reporting. An Incident Reporting Maturity Model was subsequently 
designed as a method for assisting organisations in judging their position against these 
factors and tested using the same Delphi participants as well as a control group. The 
thesis demonstrates a  contribution to research through the rigorous testing of the 
applicability of incident reporting research from other sectors to support the 
identification of solutions  to improve reporting in the information security sector. It 
also provides a practical novel approach to make use of a combination of CSF’s and an 
IRMM that allows organisations to judge where their level of maturity is set against 
each of the four CSF’s and make changes to strategy and process accordingly.  
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Chapter 1 The Real World Problem – From Cyberspace to Security 
Incident Reporting 
1.1  Introduction 
In the field of Information Security there is a common perception amongst practitioners 
and academics, (Baker, Rees and Tippett, 2007; Gordon, Loeb et al, 2003; Hagen, J, 
2009; Parker, 2010) that the true number and type of information security incidents is 
unknown, the perception is that this is largely due to under reporting.  Without an 
accurate empirical knowledge of incident numbers, the true likelihood of a particular 
type, or group of, incidents occurring is unlikely to be known, therefore adversely 
affecting any risk calculation, irrespective of the methods used.  This results in the 
potential for accuracy and value of risk assessments to be put into question.  This in turn 
could result in resources and the associated hard to come by budgets, being directed at 
mitigating the wrong risks.  
 “It is important an organisation has the best possible information on risks in 
order to decide whether or not to invest (scarce) resources in countermeasures 
and if so how much.” (Birch and McEvoy, 1992, p.44).   
Parker (2010) describes the problem with risk assessments as they cannot be measured 
accurately due to unknown threats and vulnerabilities.  Is this a problem peculiar to the 
information security industry or does the same under reporting issue appear elsewhere?  
This chapter will introduce the background to the perceived problems regarding the 
reporting of incidents and the potential impact on information sharing and risk analysis 
associated with a lack of empirical incident data.   
1.2  The Value of Information in Today’s Society 
In today’s world information is ubiquitous and, increasingly for individuals, 
organisations and nations, seen as an asset which has value (Horne, 1995; Moody and 
Walsh, 1999; Keohane and Nye, 1998).  This could be monetary, intellectual property, 
customer information, personal information and many others forms.  It may be the case 
that information has always been considered of value, as evidenced by the need to 
protect it through early iterations of cyphers and encryption in Egyptian times, as well 
as Caesar cyphers and biblical cyphers (Singh, 1999).  Such widespread information 
availability has inevitably resulted in those who are not entitled to access it trying to do 
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so. Whether they are competitors, criminals or nation states the value of such 
information to those not entitled to see it becomes an attraction. The need to protect it is 
clear.  
The main difference between then and today is the sheer volume of information 
available and the numerous methods and devices that access that information.  An ever 
increasing proportion of that information is now stored, processed and accessed via 
technology and users increasing acceptance of these methods of accessing it (Venkatesh 
et al, 2012).  The reliance upon that technology, and the skills to support it, has become 
commonplace (Lockridge, Brandon and Barnett, 2011) but not necessarily providing the 
necessary skills, user friendly instructions and support for its users who have to interact 
with it (Parasuraman, 2000).   
Terms such as “the cloud” (NIST, 2011) “bring your own device – BYOD” (Caldwell, 
Zeltmann and Griffin, 2012) and ‘smart phone’ (Power, 2013) are part of everyday 
language.   A collective noun ‘Cyberspace’ (Pollitt, 1998) commonly describes the 
widespread use and reliance upon computer networks.  It is possible to consider 
cyberspace as an increasing element of a new engine of economic growth and, to some 
extent, a contributory factor to the modern industrial revolution as described by Jenson, 
(1993).   By default, other derivatives of cyber such as cybercrime and cyber security 
have now become everyday terms.  Cyber is now of great interest, and concern, to 
governments and nation states, many having introduced cyber strategies.  ENISA (2012) 
has published a list of countries that now have a strategy which includes the UK, US, 
Germany, France, Estonia and many others.   
There is a potential  overlap in the use of the term cyber and the focus of this research, 
which is information security incidents. For example; cybercrime incidents relate to 
reported crimes. To commit a cybercrime may  involve the exploitation of a security 
vulnerability to achieve a criminal gain. The use of such a vulnerability may be an 
information security incident, but the cybercrimes that result are not.  In a similar vein 
cyber threats can include attacks on digitally-controlled physical systems with no 
resultant access to or risk to information.  These cyber risks are outside the scope of  
this thesis in relation to information security risk management and assessment. 
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The real or perceived threat to nations, critical infrastructures, organisations and citizens 
from cyber-attacks, cybercrime and concerns about the prospect of cyber warfare has 
led to calls for greater collaboration amongst nations to tackle the problem. This has 
resulted in the growth in Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTS) in a number 
of countries and initiatives which aim to encourage real time sharing of Cyber threats 
such as in the UK - CiSP - the Cyber-security information Sharing Partnership.  To 
counter the threats to information in cyberspace, and to exploit the benefits the internet 
can bring, requires a greater understanding of the threats and risks.  Unfortunately, with 
the growth of technology there are those who seek to exploit that information for 
financial gain and organised crime,   
“If there is a single cross-cutting issue that has changed the landscape for serious 
and organised crime and our response against it, it is the growth in scale and 
speed of internet communication technologies.”  Great Britain, National Crime 
Agency (2014)    
It is of note that in recent years there has been an increase in regulation and legislation 
intending to tackle the protection of information and in some cases the mandation of 
reporting incidents, where Room (2009) suggests that the current cycle of development 
of security law began in 2003 with mandatory reporting in the state of California. He 
later suggests,  
“one of the inevitable consequences of the regulatory bear market will be greater 
instances of conflict between the regulators and the regulated.”  (Room, 2009, 
p.376).  
This puts pressure on organisations to try to undertake business activity against a 
changing regulatory landscape. There is a need therefore, for companies and 
organisations, to know what is happening to their data assets and the possible security 
incidents that could lead to breaches.  Although high-profile events involving 
cyberspace are reported in the media, for example: TK Maxx in 2007 “Hackers target 
TK Maxx customers” (BBC, 2007);   Sony in 2014  “Sony Pictures computer system 
hacked in online attack” (Taylor, 2014); in 2015 Talk Talk, “TalkTalk customer data at 
risk after cyber-attack on company website” (Johnston,  2015) , and major data losses 
such as the UK HMRC data loss in 2008; it is strongly suspected many others are not.  
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Regulatory oversight requires information to assure the governance of managing risk, 
leading to the need for more precise metrics and risk management models (Davenport 
and Harris, 2010).  This regulatory oversight is set to be increased with the soon to be 
introduced General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) which 
relates to personal data incidents, the mandated reporting of incidents within certain 
timeframes and a considerable uplift in fines. 
Due to the uncertain nature of the true scale of information security incidents through 
under reporting, there is a subsequent lack of sufficient empirical data to make reasoned 
judgements for risk assessment and risk management. In the face of the increasingly 
recognised cyber threat, nations wishing to collaborate and or share incident information 
are potentially being hampered by this lack of data. 
This chapter begins with a description of the research problem – the apparent lack of 
research in the area of information security incident reporting and the issue that there is 
no recognised definition of a security incident.  It continues by suggesting how that gap 
may be addressed by re-using research elsewhere to the benefit of information security 
which in turn demonstrates the contribution to knowledge.  It outlines the scope of the 
research, the aims and goals together with a selection of the existing literature that 
highlights the problem.  It concludes with the research approach and structure of the 
thesis.   
1.3  The Research Problem 
There is a perception that the true scale of information security incidents is unknown 
due to under reporting.  This potentially leads to an absence of sufficient empirical data 
to enable informed risk assessment and risk management judgements.  There is also an 
apparent shortage of research in the area of information security incident reporting. To 
test the validity of these concerns a confidential scoping study was undertaken in 2011 
and this is set out in detail in Chapter 4.  This scoping study examined the perceptions 
and experiences of a number of information security professionals from a range of 
sectors. The results identified a firm belief amongst them that security incidents were 
significantly under-reported, thereby potentially denying the opportunity for analysis of 
a wider pool of information on the causes, vulnerabilities and human factors which led 
to these incidents. 
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A particular problem is that of understanding what a security incident is.  Identifying 
that a security incident has occurred has to happen before it can be reported. It could be 
argued that not all incidents can be of direct use to an overall cyber security strategy, 
but few attacks are totally technical.  Many require elements of social engineering and 
the targeting of key employees can ensure an easier method of breaching the defences of 
an IT system. Security incidents involving the loss of an ID or door entry pass, the 
misplacing of a relevant technical document or inappropriate actions of disgruntled 
employee, if not reported, can provide the elements of a combination of factors that 
could lead to a successful cyber security attack. 
One of the challenges is there is no nationally or internationally recognised incident 
classification criterion.  Even the recognised ISO standard for managing security 
incidents, BS ISO/IEC 27035 (2011) does not include a definition of an incident.  
Within the standard it states;  
“Organisations should ensure that information security incidents are 
documented in a consistent manner, using appropriate standards for 
incident categorisation and classification, and sharing, so that metrics are 
created from aggregated data over a period of time. This provides valuable 
information to aid the strategic decision making process when investing in 
information security controls.” (British Standards Institute 2011, p.4)  
  
On further examination of this statement phrases such as “incidents documented in a 
consistent manner” may be acceptable if only collated and used locally but do not add 
value when any sharing of incident information is required. The scoping study in 
Chapter 4 identified the existence of a number of locally used incident definitions. This 
is likely to cause difficulty when these local reports are used for wider incident data 
sharing. Likewise, where the standard continues in the same vein regarding 
categorisation and classification it really exposes the standard as a unilateral one.   
This is not to criticise the current focus of the standard but there needs to be more 
consistency and common classification if the wish for wider industry sectors and 
governments to be able to truly understand the information risks they are facing.  This 
“strategic decision making process” (British Standards Institute 2011, p.4) will remain 
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aspirational until there is some consensus, whether voluntary or regulatory, on incident 
categorisation and classification.  
 
The recent issue of BS ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016 gives a high level definition of a security 
incident as  
“one or multiple related and identified information security events (referring to 
their definition of an event – occurrence indicating a possible breach of 
information security or failure of controls) that can harm an organisations assets 
or compromise its operations.” (British Standards Institution, 2016, p.2) 
As a result of differing definitions the ability to compare and contrast incident data may 
be flawed from the outset. Chapter 2 examines the issue of a lack of a common security 
incident definition in more detail as well as offering a new definition and one that was 
used in the Delphi and Validation Studies described in chapter 5 and 6. This provided 
participants with a common definition upon which to base their interpretation of an 
incident when completing their questionnaires.  
 
If the real, or near real, picture of the likelihood of certain types of information security 
incident is not known, there is the danger that those which are reported are given higher 
prominence simply because that is the only information upon which to work on.  For 
example, electronically gathered incident reports from audit logs or Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) are automatically generated and therefore more readily visible. These 
incident logs, because they are tangible, can be used to justify risk based decisions. The 
absence of a wider perspective of the true nature of the type and volume of incidents, 
and near misses, may give undue prominence to the electronic log indicators and may 
mask the real threat.  Information security incidents that rely upon staff to report are 
equally important in assessing risk.  
 
Early research into information security risk and the relationship between managing 
information risk and applying countermeasures was reported by Birch and McEvoy 
(1992). They recognised that the value of information stored on the information systems 
exceeds that of the value of the technology used to store and process it.  In a similar 
vein Willcocks and Margetts (1993) conducted studies into risk assessment and 
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information systems but there was little in their research relating to security incidents.   
One of the earliest papers on the subject of information security incidents was by 
Blakely, McDermott and Geer (2002), they refer to the lack of information regarding 
security incidents and made the comparison that information security is now somewhat 
in the same position as the healthcare industry was 100 years ago.  In medicine about 
100 years ago some basic medical facts were known, certain treatments and medicines 
worked but many did not and there was no real data collection but over time the 
situation improved.  However, despite having such a head start over information 
security, papers, such as “An Organisation with a Memory” (Great Britain, Department 
of Health, 2000) show that incident reporting in the healthcare sector is not all it should 
be with many barriers to reporting adverse patient incidents being identified. It was 
these barriers that were used in the scoping study in Chapter 4 to ascertain if there was 
any potential for them to be recognised as relevant to the information security sector. 
One of the earliest theses that made reference to information security, the links to 
security culture and the relationship with individuals was Dhillon (1995) who suggested 
that within organisations, the formal and informal systems are often not appreciated in 
the analysis and design of information systems.  Dhillon (1995) identified that users 
often interpret the formal work requirements in a local way and then play out the 
processes to suit the informal element of their environment. This can lead to the centre 
of an organisation falsely believing that corporate policies are adhered to across the 
whole organisation. For example a policy may be in place that states staff must report 
incidents but not followed for those same local reasons.   In reality, the adoption of local 
practices to support a colloquial view win through, often putting central policy at risk 
(Lipsky, 1980). 
Other research refers to the issue of there being a need for information on security 
incidents but true analysis is hampered by lack of data.   Parker (2009) proposes that 
security risk assessments should in fact come with a health warning that they are likely 
to be “incomplete and subjective”. (2009, p.33).  The situation has obviously not 
improved in his perception as previously Parker (2006) in his paper “Making the case 
for balancing risk based security” referred to the problem of there not being enough 
valid data to make risk assessment a straightforward and successful method.   He argues 
that although there should be efforts made to improve incident reporting, he does not 
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suggest how and expresses doubts this will be achieved;   this thesis aims to propose a 
method that can do this.  Soderburg, Grankvist, Brulin and Wallin (2009) observed that 
despite it being mandatory to report all incidents that relate to patient safety, as required 
by the National Board of Health and Welfare in Sweden, this did not occur.    A number 
of reasons were given by respondents for not reporting including;  
“lack of time, a complicated reporting procedure, no one else reports incidents 
and the belief that the reporting of an incident would not make any difference.” 
Soderburg, Grankvist, Brulin and Wallin (2009, p.733) 
Dalkey (1969, p.2) refers to there being a spectrum of inputs; ranging from speculation 
through to knowledge. In between lies opinion which he believes is the flattering name 
for the collective “products of judgement, wisdom, insight and similar intellectual 
processes”.  In this Spectrum of Inputs, the lower the probability of truth could relate to 
the number of security incidents where the view of this research is this could result in 
more speculation as opposed to true knowledge.  Using Dalkey’s model (Figure 1-1), 
the perceived lack of empirical evidence on security incidents would suggest that risk 
assessments and risk management judgements on countermeasures may be more based 
on speculation and opinion rather than evidenced knowledge. This leads to the 
possibility that the probability of truth as outlined in Dalkey’s model could be 
considered as low.  
Spectrum of Inputs
SPECULATION              OPINION                KNOWLEDGE
PROBABILITY 
OF TRUTH
Figure  1-1  Based on Dalkey, N (1969, p.3) Spectrum of Inputs 
The process of risk analysis based on a lack of information is commented on by 
Baskerville (1991) who describes it as professional interpretivistic knowledge.  He 
 9 
 
outlines his position on the weaknesses of the positivist philosophical use of risk 
analysis as opposed to his view of the more important element of interpretive use to 
which risk analysis can be deployed.  In particular where it takes into account the 
professional and contextual understanding of a particular information system and its 
controls.  He examines the potential for risk analysis not to be considered in the same 
vein as other analysis methods that have empirical statistics available but places it in an 
interpretive position.  Baskerville (1991) proposes that a professional security 
practitioner has values and also ‘a priori’ knowledge that can interfere with empirical 
observations.  A situation also identified by Hubbard and Evans (2010) where they refer 
to people judging risks often ignoring facts and basing their judgement on memories.  
When this inference is in play it could be argued the risk analysis is interpretive.   He 
strongly argues that there is a place for risk analysis, despite the lack of empirical 
figures to populate any method of calculation, and that the professional experience of 
those charged with risk analysis should be recognised more.   
He suggests that improving the volume of evidence related to reported incidents could 
damage the ‘priori knowledge’ element of risk analysis.  
“Improving the positivist scientific accuracy of the statistical representation 
simultaneously reduces the interpretive scientific accuracy.” (Baskerville, 1991, 
p.756)    
However, he also recognises that the lack of empirical evidence makes the findings of 
many risk analysis processes difficult to prove or disprove. This perceived lack of data 
could put at risk the increasing push to share incident and threat information between 
communities of interest potentially resulting in an interpretative approach to decision 
making but without sufficient data to have real confidence in the validity of the 
outcome. Those incidents that are reported, although providing some basis for risk 
assessment and management, may contain unknown biases that could affect any such 
assessments. 
1.4  Research Approach - A Conceptual Framework 
The proposed research will use a conceptual framework (Figure 1-2) to articulate the 
various components relating to information, information risk and risk management.   It 
will be used to illustrate the suggested relationship between possessing information, the 
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requirement to use or exploit that information, the understanding of information risk, 
risk management, the potential consequences of a loss or compromise (an incident) and 
sanctions (regulatory, legislative, reputational) against which an organisation’s “risk 
appetite” (Drew, 2007)  is formed and finally the main focus of this research - incident 
reporting. 
When things go wrong and data is lost, stolen or compromised the occurrence of such a 
security incident should trigger a review of the event, thereby enabling a valuable input 
into the benefit versus sanction element within the conceptual framework.  This is 
important as such a review should enable the organisation to learn and understand the 
real causes of the incident. If that review is superficial it may be difficult to identify the 
true cause.  However, an end to end root cause analysis (O’Connor (NASA) 2005, p.5; 
see Glossary), in the form of ‘double loop learning’ (Argyris, p.116, 1997) is more 
likely to discover the true cause(s).   Lukic, Margaryan and Littlejohn (2010) refer to 
double loop learning as important due to its ability to “surface latent and systemic 
causes that might be contributing to incidents at a later stage”. (2010, p.431)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  1-2  Information Conceptual Framework (area of focus within dotted lines) 
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This thesis will suggest the process set out in the framework is hampered by barriers to 
reporting.  In public enquiry reports into previous disasters for example; the Bradford 
Football Club fire in 1995 (Popplewell, 1985), the sinking of Herald of Free Enterprise 
1987 (Sheen, 1988) and the Kings Cross Underground fire 1987 (Fennell, 1988), the 
cause(s) of the particular disaster was the culmination of a number of smaller events, 
design and or management deficiencies which, if individually had been identified 
reported and tackled, the disaster(s) may either never had occurred or at least had less 
severe consequences.  
Many of these minor incidents, although different in nature, were often not reported. 
Toft and Reynolds (1999) propose that disasters are incidents created by people 
operating within complex systems and where the causes are not acted upon, similar 
accidents can and do occur. In the case of the Bradford fire Mr Justice Popplewell in his 
enquiry report highlighted that many of the safety related recommendation were in fact 
identified in previous reports into other football related disaster but had not been put in 
place.  
“I too shall argue for these and related measures. It is to be hoped they will be 
more vigorously pursued by the appropriate bodies than in the past.” 
(Popplewell, 1985, p.17)  
This is similar to the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model as proposed by Reason (1990) where 
safeguards may be by-passed or fail due to the coming together of a number of factors 
which, when combined, lead to a break in a safety mechanism. 
The next major incident may not be a fire or a shipping disaster but a failure of one or 
more elements of Critical National Infrastructure facilities resulting in civil unrest and 
or harm.  It is possible to postulate that the inevitable subsequent enquiry may highlight 
a lack of incident reporting as a cause?   The question is not if, but when, a major 
disaster will occur involving a failing of a system or systems as a result of an unreported 
singular or series of information security incidents.  As technology appears destined to 
continue to be integrated in our everyday lives, for example the proposed advent of 
smart cities (Smartcities Council, 2015: see Glossary), this is potentially more likely.  
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1.5  The Research Contributions 
It is apparent from the literature review in Chapter 2 that the amount of research into the 
reporting of security incidents is limited.   Critical to managing risk is to understand and 
have confidence in the level of protection against known vulnerabilities and accurate 
data relating to the types of adverse security incidents that have occurred and are still 
occurring.  Knowledge of trends and emerging threats is key to this.  However, without 
sufficient trusted data, such decisions can never be truly fully informed.   There is also a 
real concern over the ability to identify and classify incidents to provide a true analysis 
of the number of type of incidents actually occurring.  Examination of the literature 
relevant to incident reporting so far has identified there are gaps in research in the area 
of security incident reporting, though this will be further examined in chapter two. It has 
also identified a lack of standard taxonomies for security incidents and information 
security risk.  
This research aims to add value to academic knowledge by investigating the subject of 
security incident reporting which appears not to have been  studied in depth. It will 
examine the potential re-use of research on the subject conducted elsewhere such as in 
healthcare studies into patient safety and the adverse incidents that can lead to harm as 
well as aviation and other safety industries.  These research findings aim to be of 
relevance to the information security field and, to test this, it is proposed to study the 
applicability of this research by data collection from information security professionals. 
A method to improve incident reporting will be proposed through the identification of 
the Critical Success Factors involved and set these in a Maturity Model that can be 
applied by organisations in an iterative, non-prescriptive and contextual manner that 
may improve the level reporting of security incidents.  
Thereby increasing the pool of data to enable improved analysis and lead to better 
informed risk based decisions. It will examine the relationship and importance of 
information security incident reporting to the ability of organisations and nations to 
share information in their quest to improve overall cyber security.  
Through the use of a scoping study, followed by a full scale Delphi study and 
subsequent validation study the research will aim to identify a range of Critical Success 
Factors believed necessary to improve the reporting of security incidents.  It will also 
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outline the apparent lack of consistency of information risk, incident definitions and 
classification including the subsequent challenges this places upon professionals tasked 
with implementing the growing number of information sharing initiatives. Although not 
a key part of the research an information security risk and security incident definition 
has been proposed.   The incident definition was created to ensure consistency in 
understanding of the term for the purposes of the Delphi and Validation studies. 
Figure 1-3 suggests where the Critical Success Factors and an Incident Reporting 
Maturity Model could fit into the conceptual framework. The aim is to enable 
organisations to adopt the Maturity Model as part of their information handling and 
incident management process. The outcome may potentially improve security incident 
reporting. This improvement in the volume of incident data may in turn enable better 
informed analysis for future risk assessment and management. 
INFORMATION  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  1-3  Showing the Conceptual Framework Incorporating Critical Success Factors and 
Security Incident Maturity Model 
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1.6  Research Scope and Goals 
The subject of information security, incidents, analysis, risk assessment, risk 
management is wide and becoming more complex as the world is increasingly 
becoming a digital one, relying upon digital communications, and data storage in every 
aspect of life.  There is a danger that this research could try and examine many of the 
above aspects which would not be manageable.   
Instead it focusses on the reporting of incidents, the purpose of reporting, and will try to 
identify what information security incident reporting Critical Success Factors are 
required to be in place to bring about a change in incident reporting that ultimately 
benefits the need to share.   It will refer to information sharing, but not in depth, as there 
is more research and activity in this space.  The reason for this light touch reference is to 
demonstrate the inextricable relationship between accurate reporting and the sharing of 
the product of such reports.   
The research goals are: 
(1) To test whether the assumption that not all information security incidents are 
being reported is correct. 
(2) To examine whether research on incident reporting conducted in other 
sectors, such as healthcare, can be applied to the information security sector. 
(3) To identify the Critical Success Factors that may be applicable to 
information security incident reporting. 
(4) To propose an information security Incident Reporting Maturity Model that 
could be applied by organisations and may improve the flow of incidents that are 
reported.  
The potential outcome of these goals being to increase the levels of reporting leading to 
sufficient incident data that could facilitate more accurate analysis of the likelihood and 
causes of those incidents.  This in turn may encourage more grass root reporting that 
ultimately would feed through the local processes into the regional/sector and ultimately 
assist in improving national information sharing initiatives.  
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The above lead to the thesis title.    
‘Identifying the Critical Success Factors to improve Information Security 
Incident Reporting’:   
The research sub questions to support the overall research question and provide a 
valuable contribution to the furtherance of research in information security incident 
reporting are: 
(1) Is the perception that not all information security incidents are reported a 
correct one? 
This is a key element to the research and, if confirmed, what follows is to identify the 
possible reasons for this under reporting.  Assuming this is a correct assumption this 
leads to question 2;  
(2) Are the reasons for low reporting similar to those identified in other 
research such as the healthcare and safety industries? 
This will identify research already conducted elsewhere and examine whether any 
findings can be applicable to information security.  The results can then be tested by 
conducting surveys through questionnaires on representatives of the information 
security profession. This in turn will enable the information security profession to make 
use of such findings to improve reporting in their sector. 
 (3) Is it possible to identify the Critical Success Factors required to improve 
information security incident reporting? 
The identification of Critical Success Factors should enable a greater degree of focus on 
what is important and more likely to achieve results thereby improving the 
identification of methods to deploy to enable better reporting. 
(4) Can a security Incident Reporting Maturity Model be developed that would 
enable an iterative approach to its deployment whilst taking account of any 
methods already in place? 
This will give information security professional a greater degree of knowledge in what 
activities and reporting mechanisms to deploy that may improve the level of reporting.  
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It is recognised that within the scope of this research there is not sufficient time to 
identify if the adoption of a Maturity Model has any significant effects.  The result is 
focussed on the question of reusing previous research to identify the CSF’s required to 
produce such a Maturity Model. 
1.7  Research Limitations due to the Sensitivity of the Subject 
The research subject focusses on sensitive issues and in engaging with security 
professionals, asking for their honest opinions regarding the true situation in respect of 
their organisations incident reporting systems and effectiveness may result in a 
reduction in participants or less than candid responses, a situation recognised by Kotulic 
and Clark (2004) and Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt (2014). The identification of a 
company or organisation that has suffered from a security breach or information loss or 
where their processes for identifying the same are weak or inadequate would be a 
serious concern for those charged with their security. Any research undertaken needs to 
be cognisant of this and provide assurances to participants that any information 
provided will be handled appropriately to ensure strict confidentiality for those 
providing responses to any surveys, interviews or other forms of research.  A fuller 
discussion of this can be found in the Chapter 3 methodology ethics section. 
1.8  Research Design and Thesis Structure 
The research will be set out in seven stages 
Stage 1. To understand if the perceived problem of a lack of reporting of 
information security incidents is supported by literature.  
The literature reviewed in the introductory chapter already provided evidence that it was 
of concern to a number of authors and researchers studying information security, but no 
specific research on why could be identified.   
Stage 2. Identify the appropriate research methodology. 
Due to the apparent lack of qualitative empirical evidence the conceptual framework (as 
illustrated in figure 1-3) research paradigm of this thesis will encompass interpretative 
methods and also utilise qualitative data primarily through the use of questionnaires. 
However, that will not prevent the acquisition of quantitative data as a result of studies 
undertaken.  
 17 
 
This included the use of qualitative and quantitative research using a scoping study 
questionnaire and a Delphi study to identify the opinions of information security 
professionals. 
Stage3. A scoping study of a number of information security professionals was 
undertaken to test the initial assumption that there was indeed a problem with 
security incident reporting.  
The scoping study questionnaire used a mix of interpretative and some qualitative 
analysis of the questionnaire text responses. Its main aims were to identify the 
understanding of a number of information security professionals their perception and 
experience of incident reporting.  The opportunity was also taken to test whether initial 
findings from research in the healthcare sector could be considered as valid to be used 
by those professionals and the sector as a whole.   The scoping study achieved its aims 
in confirming the belief there was under reporting and that findings from healthcare 
relating to adverse patient reporting were relevant and could be considered for re use.    
Stage 4. Subsequent to the analysis of the scoping study the results were 
socialised in a series of presentations to information security professionals at 
security seminars and conferences.  
The purpose was to examine the responses of information security professionals in both 
the public and private sector to identify if any adverse reaction or comment to those 
results was made.  There was considerable support for the research, a firm belief the 
findings were truly reflective of incident reporting concerns.  
Even as recently as July 2017 at a CISO conference in Barcelona the findings were 
presented to the audience and during the presentation they had the opportunity to 
anonymously provide an answer to the question “how confident are you that your staff 
know how to report strange activity or a potential security incident?” the choices being 
very confident, fairly confident or low confidence.  Using an in-conference confidential 
on line poll the result was 22% very confident, 50% fairly confident and 28% low 
confidence (see appendix 18). This indicates that amongst security professionals there 
are still concerns regarding the reporting of incidents. 
Stage 5. Identify the critical success Factors to improve the reporting of security 
incidents through the use of a Delphi study 
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Having socialised the research findings so far the next stage was to propose a method 
that could identify which of the findings would be of the most use to organisations to 
improve the reporting of incidents. It is often the case that when a report publishes its 
findings, whether it is the result of a disaster or significant event or one commissioned 
to resolve a problem, the valuable content is not always taken up in practice as 
organisational cultures are resistant to change (Perrow, 2007; Schein, 1992).  The 
elements identified in the research that could influence and potentially improve incident 
reporting may be able to form the basis of a series of Critical Success Factors (CSF’s).  
These Critical Success Factors could be considered to be a vehicle to identify what was 
essential for an organisation to focus on should it wish to improve the reporting of 
incidents.    
To gain consensus from a wide community of information security professionals a 
Delphi study was considered an appropriate method. The study would set out the 
potential CSF’s identified from healthcare and other research and, using a Likert scale, 
the iterative Delphi process would gain consensus to what elements were considered as 
critical to improving incident reporting. A wide range of information security 
professionals will be invited to participate ranging from those belonging to the main 
professional body, the Institute of Information Security Professionals – the IISP, 
Information Asset Owner’s in government, members of CiSP and other recognised 
communities of interest. Respondents were given the opportunity to add other factors if 
they felt warranted inclusion and consideration by the wider Delphi group.    
Stage 6. Consideration will be given to conducting a validation survey to test the 
findings of Delphi study   
This enables the testing of the Delphi findings amongst the original participants to 
ensure any potential researcher bias has not influenced the outcome of the analysis of 
the Delphi results. It also tested the potential use of the identified CSF’s within an 
Incident Reporting Maturity Model that could be applied by organisations to improve 
their information security incident reporting.   It is intended that the Maturity Model is 
offered as a potential tool to assist in improving incident volume reporting using a non-
proscriptive, iterative, contextual approach. 
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The use of a control group not previously involved in the studies provided an additional 
check that the findings are not at odds with security professionals who did not 
participate in the original Delphi study. 
Stage 7. Review the outcome of Critical Success Factors and proposed Incident 
Reporting Maturity Model. 
The analysis of the outcome of the validation study will identify if it is a realistic option 
for organisations to use to improve security incident reporting.  
The research design is summarised in Figure 1-4. 
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Stage 1 Literature 
Review 
Chapter 2 
Stage 3 . Scoping Study 
Chapter 4 
Stage 4 Test findings of 
study – presentations, 
workshops with peers 
Stage 5 Delphi Study to 
identify CSF’s 
Chapter 5 
Stage 6 Based on 
CSF’s develop a 
proposed Incident 
Reporting Maturity 
and conduct Validation 
study 
Chapter 6  
Analysis of findings of the 
scoping Study 
Analysis of Validation study 
of IRMM using Delphi 
participants and a control 
group 
Analysis of findings from the 
Delphi study rounds to 
understand and identify 
consensus re CSF’s  
Stage 7 Review the outcome of Critical Success Factors 
and proposed Incident Reporting Maturity Model. 
 
Stage 2 Methodology 
Chapter 3 
Overview of: 
1. Scoping study,    
2. Delphi study         
3. Validation study 
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The Thesis is organised in the following manner;  
Chapter 1: Introduction      
The introduction of the problem – the increasing reliance on cyberspace and the 
perceived lack of the reporting of information security incidents and its consequences to 
support the understanding of the information risk in cyberspace. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review      
Presents a review of the literature relevant to the subject from the information security 
sector and other sectors, such as healthcare, where there appears to be more research on 
incident reporting.   
Chapter 3: Methodology       
Sets out the overall research methodology outlining the pragmatic approach of a mix of 
positivism and interpretivist paradigms through the use of qualitative and quantitative 
questions through surveys, a Delphi study and validation study.    
Chapter 4:  Scoping Study    
This sets out the detailed methodology and approach for the incident reporting scoping 
study and examines the results.  
Chapter 5: Delphi Study      
This sets out the reasons, detailed methodology and approach for the Delphi study and it 
examines the results and consensus of the participants in relation to the Critical Success 
Factors identified to improve security incident reporting.  
Chapter 6: Validation Study      
This sets out the approach to the validation study to test the findings and researcher 
analysis of the Delphi study and propose an Incident Reporting Maturity Model. This 
uses the original Delphi respondents as well as a control group formed of eligible 
security professionals not previously involved in any of the previous surveys to judge 
their views of the findings.  
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusion   
This sets out a summary of the research, the conclusions and recommendations 
including the contribution to research and lessons learnt. 
1.9  Summary 
This chapter set out the research problem against the context of the growing use and 
value attached to information in today’s world.  The assumption made was that 
information security incidents are being under-reported and that research in this area is 
limited.   It proposed a series of studies that involve security professionals that would 
seek to ascertain if the assumption of under reporting of security incidents was valid. If 
so, whether research into incident reporting in other sectors could have the potential to 
be re-used in the information security arena and to identify what the CSF’s to reporting 
are; with a proposed  Incident Reporting Maturity Model that could be used by 
organisations to judge their levels of maturity against those factors.   
It set out the stages of research that were intended to tackle the research goals. It also 
introduced the conceptual framework which breaks down the components of 
information and which forms the basis of the literature review which is explained in 
more detail in chapter 2.    
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Chapter 1 set out the context for this research, particularly the concerns surrounding the 
perception that information security incidents were under-reported.  This assumed under 
reporting and the  subsequent potential adverse effect on the amount of empirical data 
available to support informed information risk analysis and risk management decision 
making could result in an a more interpretative approach to the available data.  In turn 
this could adversely affect the confidence in the validity of these decisions.   
A conceptual framework illustrates where incident reporting is situated in the wider 
information space with the sections relating to that framework indicated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2-1  The Conceptual Framework  
 
Information 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 R
is
k
 
In
fo
rm
atio
n
 R
isk
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Benefit 
Risk Appetite 
(Confidentiality, 
Integrity, 
Availability)                 
Analysis 
Sanction 
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 S
ec
u
ri
ty
 R
is
k
 In
fo
rm
atio
n
 E
x
p
lo
itatio
n
 
Information 
Security Incident 
Incident Reporting 
 24 
 
The concept framework is used to structure the literature relating to the relationship 
between possessing information, the requirement to use or exploit that information, the 
understanding of information risk, the potential consequences of a loss or compromise 
(an incident) and sanctions (regulatory, legislative, reputational).  It is against these that 
the risk appetite
 
is formed and finally the risk management process. Should the 
information risk management fail and an incident occurs, this should in turn create a 
review of the whole process, providing the incident is reported in the first place. Each of 
the framework sections are described in more detail together with the identified 
literature.  
In the literature review the structure of the framework is followed except that 
‘Information Risk’ and ‘Information Security Risk’ are grouped together. ‘Information 
Exploitation’ which is the actual use, storage, analysis, and publication etc. of the 
information that is in the possession of an organisation. 
2.2  Key Security Incident Reporting Papers 
Early research into information security risk and the relationship between managing risk 
and applying countermeasures was reported by Birch and McEvoy (1992). They 
recognised that the value of information stored on the information systems exceeds that 
of the value of the technology used to store and process it, but this is not always 
understood by the business.  In a similar vein, Willcocks and Margetts (1993) conducted 
studies into risk assessment and information systems but there was little in their 
research relating to the outcome of risk management on security incidents.   One of the 
earliest papers on the subject of information security incidents was by Blakley, 
McDermott and Geer (2002) who commented on the lack of information regarding 
security incidents and made the comparison that information security is now somewhat 
in the same position as the healthcare industry was in the 19
th
 century to where it is 
now. More recently Lagazio, Sherif and Cushman, (2014, p.66) in their study of 
financial crime in the finance sector report that “underreporting is a major issue”.                                           
Hove and Tarnes (2013) also report that the Norwegian CERT (Computer Emergency 
Response Team), despite an increase in security incident reports, believe there is a large 
number that are unreported or at least not discovered. They continue in that in their 
three case studies of large organisations to understand security incident management, a 
common identified theme was the belief of those responsible for dealing with incidents 
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that there is under reporting and that many employees do not report due to not knowing 
what or how to make such reports. Some employees do not see the value of reporting 
and some “do not want to acknowledge potential mistakes they made.” (Hove and 
Tarnes, 2013, p.82).    It is not necessarily just individuals who do not report Lagazio, 
Sherif and Cushman (2014, p.64) suggest organisations also under report; 
“while the banking and cards sub sector claim that the number of cyber security 
incidents is very low, the financial advisory services sub sector argues that cyber 
incidents happen on a consistent basis”   
They offer possible reasons for this including under reporting and the value of such 
losses to large companies is negligible therefore implying there is no need to report 
them.  “Even a few hundred incidents contribute to negligible losses” (2014, p.64). 
One reason that there appears to be a lack of research is possibly due to the subject 
matter itself; Kotulic and Clark in their paper “Why aren’t there more information 
security research studies” (2004) found it extremely difficult to get organisations to 
respond to or take part in research. In their study, they found extreme reluctance to 
participate with 42 out of 43 organisations contacted refusing to take part in a field 
study and that the original 5 companies that took part in a scoping study declined to 
participate further.  Others such as Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt (2014, p.100) obtained 
a higher response in their survey managing a 15.2% response and put this down to the 
sensitive domain of security and the unwillingness to give out information and possibly 
survey fatigue. 
Other research suggests potential reasons why incidents might not be reported. Choo 
(2011) suggests that organisations that have been victims of a cybercrime incident may 
be unwilling to report the incident due to a number of reasons which include the 
incidents not being of a serious nature, a low chance of prosecution and adverse 
publicity that would follow any reporting made public. It can be the case that where 
incidents are reported it is often not the company affected that initially reports it, the 
report will come from elsewhere (Tonsel, Line and Jaatun, 2014).  
Parker (2009), when referring to business crimes in his paper on positive and negative 
security methods proposed that “business managers will find reasons not to report bad 
news, often looking to blame others.”  (2009, p.31). He continues that many security 
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professionals present security risk in negative terms.  In other words, something bad 
will happen, data can be lost, viruses can infect.  This is in contrast to presenting the 
same risks but describing mitigations as benefits and competitive edge.  Could it be that 
one reason people are reluctant to report incidents is the whole security concept is 
viewed as negative?   
However, outside of the information security sector much of the research appears to be 
found in the healthcare sector. Papers, such as the ‘An Organisation with a Memory’ 
(Great Britain, Dept. of Health, 2000) which examined incident reporting research 
across aviation, safety and healthcare, show that incident reporting in the healthcare 
sector is not all it should be, with many barriers to reporting adverse patient incidents 
being identified. Its aim was to identify the key factors involved in organisational 
failure and learning from mistakes. It was these barriers that are used in the scoping 
study, discussed in chapter 4, to ascertain if there was any potential for them to be 
recognised as relevant to the information security sector. 
Amongst the Dept. of Health paper’s findings was a recommendation to create a 
national system to collate adverse incidents and enable their analysis. It also suggested 
this information could be used at a local level as well as nationally.  The main point 
being many incidents were similar in nature and could have been prevented, if only the 
previous events been recorded, thereby enabling the lessons of those  experiences to be 
learnt. Other research in healthcare regarding incident reporting includes Mahajan 
(2010) and Haines et al (2008).   
Outside of health care a number of reports have been commissioned following high- 
profile data losses including the Burton (2008) report into the loss of MOD personal 
Data and the Poynter (2008) review into security at HM Revenue and Customs.  These 
reports made detailed reference to the circumstances surrounding high-profile data loss 
incidents in the UK but did not specifically consider the issue of incident reporting in 
general.  
The need for research into security incident reporting was identified as was the potential 
to reuse that conducted in healthcare research particularly that which identified barriers 
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to reporting. This review will examine the available relevant research and by using the 
conceptual framework to place that research in the appropriate framework flow.  
2.3  Literature Review Approach 
The following sections provide a brief overview of the conceptual framework 
components before leading into more detail under each concept heading. It will describe 
the literature identified relating to each element of the Conceptual Framework. There 
will inevitably be some crossover of subjects and therefore some of the literature can be 
relevant under more than one heading. Firstly though is a description of the literature 
review approach. 
When trying to identify existing literature surrounding the research subject of ‘security 
incident reporting’ the following approach was used to understand what literature was 
available. A traditional approach to the literature review of searching against key words 
was initially undertaken. The initial ‘Scopus’ search on the three parameters of 
‘incidents’ AND ‘security’ AND ‘reporting’ only brought 18 responses of which 14 
related to healthcare.  Further analysis of the papers identified then gave other potential 
papers and literature to review.  It transpired that little appeared to have been conducted 
into the subject of security incident reporting and that, although there was literature 
relating to security incidents, this was more related to after the event as opposed to the 
reporting of them.   As a result, the focus of the review was to identify if research in 
other sectors could be applied in the information security sector. The review developed 
to understanding where contributions from other sectors could be used to “improve 
current knowledge” (Jesson, Matheson and Lacey, 2011, p.15) as to why there may be 
under reporting of security incident. A wider scan of similar incident reporting topics, 
such as within the healthcare sector on ‘adverse patient incidents’ or events reporting 
was undertaken, even this search sourced limited research.   
An adverse patient incident, also known as a patient safety incident, is defined as    
“Any unintended or unexpected incident that could have led or did lead to harm 
for one or more patients receiving NHS-funded healthcare” (NHS 
Commissioning Board, 2015, p.88)  
This apparent lack of research was supported by one particular report, the Department 
of Health ‘An Organisation with a Memory’ (2000) which recognised that research in 
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the healthcare sector on ‘adverse events’ is limited and one of its recommendations was 
the need for further research in this area. The apparent limitations in the depth and 
amount of research undertaken in the subject of security incident reporting identified 
that this research topic could be of value and contribute to the increasing interest in the 
subject of cyber security and information assurance.  
In addition to conducting research on published literature and papers, another 
recognised method of understanding whether there was a concern regarding reporting 
was to engage with professionals and practitioners at relevant conferences and other 
research networks (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2003). As a result, although this 
research initially intended to focus on the subject of incident reporting, it soon became 
apparent the problem appeared to be surrounding the issue of under-reporting. This 
research identified knowledge gaps and potential opportunities to consider a more 
refined research question based on the potential reuse of research already in existence in 
sectors other than information security. The outcome supports the view of Collis and 
Hussey (2009) that a preliminary review of research can assist in providing context for 
identifying the research question which has been developed in chapter 1.   
2.4  The Literature Review of the Conceptual Framework Elements 
In the following sections each of the elements of the conceptual framework are 
examined in more detail  
2.5  Information Risk and Information Security Risk 
Ultimately the use of any information should factor in the risk of a compromise to its 
confidentiality, integrity and or availability. These three terms set in their security 
context are defined as; 
“Confidentiality: Property that information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorised individuals, entities or processes 
Integrity: Property of accuracy and completeness 
Availability: Property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an 
authorised entity” 
(British Standards Institute ISO/IEC 27000:2014)  
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These three elements are often referred as CIA.   An incident is the manifestation of a 
risk which has a number of definitions.  The UK Health and Safety Executive define 
risk as;  
“A risk is the likelihood that a hazard will actually cause its adverse effects, 
together with a measure of the effect.”    UK Health and Safety Executive 
(2013).   
Whereas, elsewhere there are different definitions. The section will demonstrate there 
appears to be a lack of common definition and propose a working definition of 
information risk. The growing recognition of the value of information is now beginning 
to be recognised in state organisations and private companies and individuals (Horne, 
1995; Moody and Walsh, 1999; Keohane and Nye, 1998).   Although it covers 
information risk this research section is more focussed on information security risk, and 
recognises the real threat to that information from cyber-crime and attacks as a national 
security issue has grown as a result of greater use of the internet. 
“If there is a single cross-cutting issue that has changed the landscape for serious 
and organised crime and our response against it, it is the growth in scale and 
speed of internet communication technologies.” (National Crime Agency, 2014)    
Ultimately the use of any information has to factor in the risk of a compromise to its 
Confidentiality, Integrity and or Availability.    
Information security professionals may face uncertainty when assessing risk though 
analysis or assessment.  This is partly due to the apparent lack of empirical data to 
provide confidence in potential likelihood of a risk, evidenced by way of past 
occurrence. This makes for a real difficulty in making a proper assessment as. Parker 
(2006, p.3), when referring to risk assessment and analysis suggests “there is not 
enough valid data to make risk assessment a straightforward and successful method”. 
However, he continues this is not a reason to abandon such assessments. In the absence 
of known facts situational awareness and contextual knowledge of the business 
environment come into play. This is illustrated in Baskerville’s (1991, p.756) assertion 
for the professionals need for the “a priori approach”, or previous experience, and 
understanding within the context of the environment they work in. Currently security 
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professionals do not appear to have a choice other than to use their contextual ‘a priori’ 
skill. 
Adams (2003, p.2) proposes there are three kinds of risk that are perceived; through 
science such as a known disease; those perceived directly such as falling from a tree and 
thirdly virtual risk where it is not known or cannot be agreed up on.  As illustrated in 
figure 2-2. 
 
Figure  2-2  Adams (2003, p.2) Three Types of Risk 
Information security risk could potentially fit across all three. Those perceived through 
science equating to the threat from cyber criminals using known vulnerabilities, 
computer viruses and other malware. Those perceived directly where information is 
compromised through known experience such as deliberate compromise by disgruntled 
staff; or important papers lost on a train or a CD going missing in the post.  The virtual 
risk could equate to the real types and volumes of incidents are not known therefore it 
cannot accurately be quantified.  It is these perceived but not necessarily experienced 
cyber security risks that could be considered virtual risks and therefore can be argued as 
adding to that element of the unknown.  
Perceived 
through 
science 
Virtual risk Perceived 
directly 
e.g. Cholera; need a 
microscope to see it 
and a scientific training 
to understand 
e.g. climbing a 
tree, riding a 
bike, driving a car 
Scientists do not 
know or cannot 
agree; e.g. BSE v 
vCJD, global 
warming, low 
level radiation, 
pesticide 
residues, HRT, 
mobile phones, 
passive smoking, 
stock market….. 
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Hurtzburg (2007) suggests a typology of risk perceptions characterised in cartoon form 
relating to the cultural theory of groups; these being Fatalists, Hierarchists, 
Individualists and Egalitarian.  He describes each group with risk in mind as; 
Fatalists “Perhaps most of the people most of the time, having little control over 
the forces that buffet their lives.” 
Egalitarians “Precautionary – if you cannot prove something to be safe you 
should assume it is dangerous.2 
Hierarchists “Institutional risk managers. They make rules and enforce the 
rules” often through knee jerk reactions to an event and have become risk 
averse, examples being Health and Safety Inspectors” 
Individualists “More optimistic – if you can’t prove it is dangerous assume it is 
safe.”  (Hurtzburg, 2007, p.4) 
Hurtzburg’s (2007) view being that institutional risk managers fit the ‘Hierarchists’ 
group and it can be argued that certainly there are some hierarchic information risk 
managers who will not move away from rules and conduct knee jerk responses. 
However, the reality of managing information risk is accepting that, where information 
is needed to be exploited by a business, there will be an exposure to risk and this risk 
has to be managed and not avoided at all cost.  The notion of risk appetite (and its 
subsidiary, risk tolerance), in relation to information risk is gradually being adopted 
across UK Government as part of any risk management approach.  The UK Technical 
Risk Assessment Document IS1 referred to risk appetite as “logically a function of the 
organisation’s capacity to bear risk, which should not be exceeded” (Great Britain. 
CESG, 2012, p.44).  It continued by describing the close relationship between risk 
appetite and risk tolerance where it suggests that risk tolerance is the more fine grained 
approach to amounts of risk acceptable to particular systems or projects.  
To make such decisions there needs to be an understanding of the threat and either 
locally or collectively such information needs to be available.  (Jones, 2002)   This 
requires the sharing of knowledge and understanding of the fact that incidents have 
occurred and what caused them.  The revised UK Security Policy Framework (Great 
Britain, Cabinet Office, 2014)  highlights its intention is to focus on outcomes that will 
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enable proportionate risk management enabling government to operate in a way that 
maintains effectiveness but is still safe and secure. It is about getting the balance right. 
Ultimately the use of any information should factor in the risk of a compromise to its 
confidentiality, integrity and or availability.   An incident is the manifestation of a risk 
but what is understood by the term risk in the information security sector.  Again, there 
appears to be a lack of common definition.  
2.5.1  What is Information Security Risk? 
 
The 2013 EU Commission Directive on “measures to ensure a high common level of 
network and information security across the Union” provides the definition of risk as 
“any circumstance or event that having a potential adverse effect on security” (EU 
Commission, 2013, p.19).  In the security sector HMG’s risk assessment, standard IS1 
defines risk as “The potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset 
or group of assets and thereby cause harm to the organisation”. (Great Britain, CESG, 
IS1.2009, p.106)    
In summary, some definitions refer to likelihood and others potential. To some extent 
similar words and both therefore need a benchmark to understand; has the event 
happened before and how many times on the assumption that the more occurrences of 
an incident, the more likelihood or potential for that risk to occur again. As there is a 
lack of a common definition of an incident, this thesis proposes a working definition of 
information security risk which will be used to provide clarity to this study.  The 
definition extracted from review of the literature and used in the data collection phase 
is; 
An information risk is an actual, perceived or virtual hazard faced by an 
information asset that, if realised (whether predicted, expected or presumed), 
through chance or probability may adversely affect or impact that information 
asset’s Confidentiality, Integrity and or availability; thereby potentially 
becoming an actual incident or a near miss. 
 
In the above proposed definition virtual is used  through interpretation of Adams (2003, 
p.2) risk model where he refers to virtual risk where there is no agreement of the type of 
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risk as opposed to those perceived directly or through science (in other words a known 
risk). 
2.5.2  The Need for Metrics to Understand Security Incident Risk  
To understand these emerging risks and threats there needs to be usable data to assess 
them in a focussed and practical way. This is needed, particularly where there is 
regulatory control on securing customer data and information such as in the United 
States the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act 1996 (HIPAA) and in the United Kingdom the Financial Conduct 
Authority. Trusted empirical evidence or metrics on security incidents would normally 
be required to enable the formulation and interpretation of any risk assessment.  
Davenport and Harris (2010, p.3) argue that such regulatory oversight leads to the 
demand for better metrics and risk management models. Jones (2002) argues for the 
need to develop metrics to assist measuring the effect of vulnerabilities and later 
compares the way insurance companies use metrics in order to decide levels of premium 
against risks based on historical information. Baker, Wade and Tippett (2007) suggest 
that “metrics to quantify risk factors” are one of two elements required to enable a focus 
on threat the other being risk reduction strategies. 
 
The United States Department for Homeland Security’s (2009) Cyber Security 
Roadmap recognises the need to have metrics.  The European Commission has also 
referred to this requirement suggesting that ENISA and National Authorities conducting 
similar work, such as the UK Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 
should be in possession of the means to perform their role.  This should include powers 
to access  
“comprehensive and reliable data about actual security incidents that have had a 
significant impact on the operation of networks or services.” (EU, 2009, p.15 
section 44).   
The flaw in this being assuming “the power” to access the data relies upon data on 
incidents being available in the first instance. 
 
It is not just in the cyber world that such information is required; following the UK 
HMRC data loss a review of data handling procedures was commissioned.  This report 
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also identified the practical issues surrounding the increased use of technology and risks 
and threats to information.   The UK Data Handling Procedures in Government report 
(2008) suggests that the task of managing information risk for public sector 
organisations is likely to be harder in future due to the ever-changing technology and 
external threat. Particularly as the drive to become ‘digital by default’ in the UK 
permeates through those services delivered to the public.  The term Digital by Default is 
described in the UK 2013 Government Digital Strategy, as: 
“Digital services that are so straight forward and convenient that all those who 
can use them will choose to do so whilst those that can’t will not be excluded” 
(HMG, Cabinet Office, 2013) 
 The UK Govt. in recognising the concerns surrounding incidents included the aspects 
of incidents in its security policies       
“Departments and Agencies must have robust and well tested policies, 
procedures and management arrangements in place to respond to, investigate 
and recover from security incidents or other disruptions to core business.” HMG 
Cabinet Office SPF v11 (Oct 2013, p.17). 
The US Department for Homeland Security (2009) Cyber security roadmap concurs 
with Davenport and Harris’s (2010) view suggesting that such metrics can steer 
investigations into the true cause of security incidents. The roadmap suggests that use of 
information on events that already exists should be gathered. This would produce “a list 
of metrics that might have avoided the incident if they had been known before the 
incident” (2009, p.19). The roadmap's long term objective being to foster the 
development of metrics and data collection schemes that produce actuarial-quality data 
on information security incidents. Although there appears to be a lack of information on 
incidents, and that can affect risk analysis even if more facts were known it is generally 
accepted that there is always an amount of risk that cannot be mitigated.  The insurance 
industry is in place to cover on of the key mitigations, that of risk transference.  The 
next section examines the emerging provisions and challenges in providing such 
transference of risk. 
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2.5.3  Information Security Risk and Insurance 
Earlier in Chapter 1 the assertion is made that information security professionals appear 
to have little empirical evidence on which to factor into information risk assessments. In 
this respect the insurance industry is faced with similar problems when insuring against 
information or cyber security risk. The cyber insurance market, compared with the 
home or car insurance market, is in its relative infancy and began to emerge in the 
1980’s (Bohme and Schwartz, 2010) although this  is different to that suggested by 
Majuca, Yurcik and Kesan (2006) who believe it to be the late 1990’s.   Whatever its 
actual start dates however the need for a strong cyber insurance market is supported by 
Gordon, Loeb and Sohali (2003). 
Traditionally the insurance industry make risk based decisions against known historical 
and empirical data (Jones, 2002). They can quote a premium for a wide range of 
policies (car, home or life) based on factors such as age, location, type of vehicle, 
occupation, number of bedrooms and lifestyle. These decision influencing factors obtain 
information from other nationally or locally collated accepted data sources such as 
accident statistics, crime figures and death rates. Although insurance companies have a 
long historical experience in managing risk (Ashenden and Jones, 2005) the challenge is 
when conducting information security insurance risk assessments with little empirical 
evidence upon which to base any assessment and “hinder competitive pricing” (Bohme 
and Schwartz, 2010, p.2).  In the absence of such information how can insurers assess 
the risk to provide adequate cover against information loss.  This is also the view of 
Majuca, Yurcik and Kesan, (2006, p.13) who observe that “risk-metrics need to be 
developed to sharpen the estimation of risks.”  
Gordon, Loeb and Sohali (2003) identified the problem faced by insurers providing 
cover in the cyber world because of the limited information on security breaches, 
exacerbated by the reluctance of companies who do not reveal details of their security 
breaches.  Against this backdrop of lack of information some insurers have still 
managed to put a value against the risks. Gordon, Loeb and Sohali (2003) note that 
“They have quantified what some claim as unquantifiable risk.” (2003, p.82).   One of 
the risks identified for insurance companies was that of those who felt most at risk may 
be more likely to seek insurance against this, possibly as a cheaper option than spending 
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money on security.   According to Gordon, Loeb and Sohali (2003) to mitigate this 
insurance companies use the analogy of the ill person wanting insurance against the 
well person.  How do insurers assess the differing risk? They achieve this by subjecting 
those who wish to be insured to a health check, where lifestyle and previous medical 
history can assist in determining the level of exposure to a future claim.     
There needs to be an equivalent for companies requiring information risk insurance.   
Gordon, Loeb and Sohali (2003) suggest that companies more likely to suffer an 
information security breach would be disposed to buy insurance as opposed to those 
with a lower chance of such a breach.  This assumption does not appear to be based on 
hard evidence as it could equally be argued that firms assessing themselves to be very 
secure may still determine it is good practice to insure themselves in the same way as 
healthy people still buy health insurance. Gordon, Loeb and Sohali (2003, p.83) 
continue their comparison with other types of behaviours regarding insurance where 
they suggest those who have purchased fire insurance may be less likely to take 
necessary preventative steps as those who do not have fire insurance. The argument may 
be flawed as it is likely that householders who have good locks and an alarm system 
will insure against burglary using these protective measures as discounts off their 
premium and that not having basic security significantly increases the likelihood of 
being burgled (Association of British Insurers, 2017).  
The other side to this could be described in the same way that many people have health 
insurance - because it is considered sensible to do so, likewise for house and life 
insurance.   To some extent Gordon, Loeb and Sohali (2003. p.82) state the obvious in 
that it is “for insurance firms to identify high-risk users and differentiate the premium.”  
Their paper gives the example of one firm of insurers charging a company a higher 
premium just because they were using Microsoft NT software.  “Thus Wurzler [an 
insurer] treats the use of NT software as precondition, much like a life insurance policy 
treats smoking or high blood pressure.” (Gordon, Loeb and Sohali 2003, p.82).   They 
also suggest how insurance companies and the insured can reduce costs or risks through 
a Cyber Risk Management Framework (see figure 2-3) in a straightforward insurance 
risk of one company preventing attack and through insurance reduces the financial risk 
of loss through insurance either to themselves as the first party or subsequent loss to a 
third party. 
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Figure  2-3  Cyber Risk Management Framework.  (Gordon, Loeb and Sohali, 2003, p.84) 
The nature of service provision today could involve other parties, for example where an 
insured company outsources some of its work to a third party or is a customer of 
another company and their IT is connected in some way to support the business. The 
hypothetical example below (figure 2-4) illustrates a scenario that may complicate the 
provision of information security insurance. There are dangers that have not yet been 
perceived by companies in that their assets may not be directly attacked, but some of 
their equipment may be hijacked for the criminal purposes.  
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Figure  2-4  Illustration of the Challenges for Insurance Liability 
 
Instead of intruding into their network, the attacker uses their IT resources to mount an 
attack elsewhere. In this example Company A is fully insured against cyber security 
attacks and breaches. Company A operates company B’s website, who are not insured, 
which offers goods and services. Company C, also not insured, is a customer of 
company B.  An intruder then exploits a vulnerability in Company B’s use of the 
website provided by company A and then, using company B’s connection to its 
customer’s, attacks assets belonging to Company C.  Company C subsequently suffers a 
data breach which results in, for example, adverse media attraction.  As a result, at 
worst, Company C goes out of business, but even if it only suffered a degree of 
financial difficulty the chances are that Company C may seek recourse to litigation 
against Company B who in turn will seek redress from Company A.  
  Company A 
(fully Insured) 
Company B 
(uninsured) 
Company C     
(uninsured) 
                                  
Attacker 
A operates website for B 
B provides web bought 
services to company C 
Attacker uses B’s website to 
gain access to  Company C 
Attacker exploits C 
 39 
 
Even if the attacker is caught, should it transpire that Company A and/or B were found 
to be deficient in their security arrangements litigation could be aimed at both by 
company C.  Company A’s insurance may or may not pay out depending on compliance 
to any terms and conditions in their indemnity policies and it could be the bill for 
litigation and compensation would fall upon both company A and B who could be sued 
for poor security which allowed the offender to easily exploit their vulnerabilities. 
Who is liable?  That is one for the lawyers and outside the scope of this research.   
Company B could say their site was only compromised by company A’s poor security 
and therefore Company A should reimburse company C for the loss of customer data 
and be responsible for the breach.    Do insurers have to consider including conditions 
of insurance that companies have to be diligent regarding the security of any third party 
they do business with?  Would these be pre-requisites to being insured or a factor that 
may affect the premium or whether any pay-out is made subsequent to a breach?  At 
present there is insufficient historical information for insurers to have the same level of 
confidence in assessing risk and premium they currently have in other risks. Gordon, 
Loeb and Sohali (2003) highlight this issue by stating as information security or cyber 
security is relatively new and the normal process on basing price the risk is based on 
actuary tables these do not exist and this is further exacerbated by the fact that firms are 
reluctant to reveal details of security breaches.  
2.6  Risk Assessment - Benefit v Sanction 
The focus of this research section is around the risk assessment and the analysis of 
benefits against sanctions. There are, as would be expected, many methods and styles of 
assessment.   All at some point use the elements of benefits against sanction which 
factor in impact and likelihood.  Impact can often be understood in business terms; how 
long can a company or process survive without access to data before there is a level of 
disruption?  However, without sufficient accurate information on the type and number 
of incidents that do occur, assessing likelihood can be a challenge.  There is a need for 
meaningful assessment in order that organisations can make business decisions (Jones, 
2002).   The current assumption is that the true number of incidents and near misses is 
not known and therefore only a proportion of incident data is available to analyse to 
understand the problem.  If any perceived barriers to reporting are reduced, it should 
logically follow that more incidents would be identified, thereby adding to the overall 
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incident knowledge and subsequently improve the confidence in the outcome of 
analysis, sharing and usage of that incident data. 
The conceptual framework shows the balancing of benefits against any sanction of the 
use of an information asset against the likelihood of anything untoward occurring. It is 
then the benefits against any sanctions that may result that are assessed. This is often 
referred to as a risk assessment.  Risk assessment is described the overall process of risk 
identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. (British Standards Institute, ISO/IEC 
27000, 2014)  It is here that the challenge sits as to properly assess such risks the 
assessment would need to understand the likelihood of an adverse event taking place. In 
the same way as there is a lack of empirical data on incidents Parker (2009) argues that 
there has equally been a lack of any studies into the “validity and accuracy of security 
risk assessments in practice” (2009, p.32). The risk models may be present but their 
usefulness has not been subject to rigour.  The apparent lack of empirical incident data 
would a factor in any criticism of their true effectiveness.  Parker (2009) proposes that 
security risk assessments should in fact come with a health warning that they are likely 
to be “incomplete and subjective” (2009, p.33).  The situation has obviously not 
improved in his perception as previously Parker three years earlier  (2006) in his paper 
‘Making the case for balancing risk based security’ referred to the problem of there not 
being enough valid data to make risk assessment a straightforward and successful 
method.   He argues that although there should be efforts made to improve this 
(although he does not suggest how) he doubts this will be achieved.  
The ever-increasing growth and reliance upon computers, systems and infrastructure, 
together with the increasing criminal activity that exploits this growth of data means 
there is “no hope of ultimate success of risk management and assessment” (Parker, 
2006, p.3).  Dalkey (1969) refers to there being a spectrum of inputs; ranging from 
speculation through to knowledge. In between lies opinion which he believes is the 
flattering name for the collective ‘products of judgement, wisdom, insight and similar 
intellectual processes’. (1969, p.2)   The lower the probability of truth, or as can be 
extrapolated into knowledge of security incidents, results in more speculation as 
opposed to true knowledge.  Using Dalkey’s model (figure 2-5) the suggested lack of 
empirical evidence on security incidents would suggest that risk assessment and 
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judgements on countermeasures may be more based on speculation and opinion rather 
than evidenced knowledge and therefore informed opinion. 
Spectrum of Inputs
SPECULATION              OPINION                KNOWLEDGE
PROBABILITY 
OF TRUTH
Figure  2-5  Based on Dalkey, N (1969, p.3) Spectrum of Inputs 
  
2.6.1  Assessment and Analysis of Risk – Interpretivist or Positivist  
When assessing the potential impact of loss, the calculation requires data to understand 
the potential likelihood of an incident that causes loss.  Perry and Moffat (2004) in their 
paper on information sharing in a military environment identified that to make informed 
decisions certain elements of information need to collated and assessed as part of a 
process.  They proposed an ‘information superiority reference model’ which 
incorporated “Situational awareness, shared situational awareness, collaboration, and 
decision making” (Perry and Moffat, 2004, p.xvii).   It is interesting to note that part of 
the model requires prior knowledge, a concept referred to by Baskerville (1991) who 
describes the notion of risk analysis as professional interpretivistic knowledge.  
Baskerville (1991) outlines his position on the weaknesses of the positivist 
philosophical use of risk analysis against, in his view, the more  important element of an 
interpretive use to which risk analysis can be deployed, particularly where it considers 
the professional and contextual, understanding of an information system and its 
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controls.  He examines the potential for risk analysis not to be considered in the same 
vein as other analysis methods that have empirical statistics available, but places it in an 
interpretative position.  
Baskerville’s (1991) focuses on two aspects of security risk analysis. The first from a 
positivist scientific method, the second as an interpretative scientific method.  He states 
his paper’s purpose is to “debunk much of the criticism of risk analysis as a tool” (1991, 
p.749) particularly recognising that risk analysis is used by information security 
professionals to support them in their role.   He outlines his position on weaknesses of 
the positivist philosophical use of risk analysis as opposed to his view of the more 
important element of interpretive use to which risk analysis can be deployed. 
Particularly where it takes into account the professional and contextual understanding of 
a particular information system and its controls.  He strongly argues that there is a place 
for risk analysis, despite the lack of empirical figures to populate any method of 
calculation, and that the professional experience of those charged with risk analysis 
should be recognised more.  He suggests that improving the volume of evidence related 
to reported incidents could damage the ‘priori knowledge’ element of risk analysis.    
“Improving the positivist scientific accuracy of the statistical representation 
simultaneously reduces the interpretive scientific accuracy.” (1991, p.756)    
However, he also recognises that the lack of empirical evidence makes the findings of 
many risk analysis processes difficult to prove or disprove.  It is this recognition that 
weakens his argument that more information could hinder rather than improve the 
analysis process.  It is possible that any increase in the amount of statistical data to add 
to the risk analysis mix would still not be sufficient in accuracy to place it in the 
positivist area of risk analysis.   It is far more likely to add value and enable more 
confidence in the ‘a priori’ knowledge of the individual to make sound interpretative 
risk judgements by utilising that additional information in the context of the risk 
environment they are analysing.  Baskerville (1991) proposal that a professional 
security practitioner has values and ‘a priori’ knowledge can interfere with empirical 
observations.  In other words the colloquial comment or views from a typical security 
manager such as ‘in my experience and knowledge that cannot be right’ will form a 
significant part of any risk assessment.  When this inference is in play then it could be 
argued the risk analysis is interpretive.    
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Baskerville (1991) suggests that as security events are many and varied in nature, to 
enable an exact recurrence at a later date and therefore making any post incident 
examination will be very difficult.   He continues with the view that such use of 
experience and knowledge makes for difficulty in stating any such study being a real 
science.  Baskerville (1991) argues that risk analysis is also an important 
communication artefact.  “It facilitates the translation of highly structured management 
decision data.”  (1991, p.757) 
It would take some considerable time for complete confidence that all incidents are 
reported and, more importantly, properly categorised to allow sufficient reliance upon 
their accuracy.  Irrespective of the amount of empirical evidence on incidents being 
available Baskerville (1991) asserts his view that a generalist or novice will not possess 
the ‘a priori’ professional knowledge and experience which is necessary to correctly 
interpret the complexity and context of specific organisational settings (1991, p.758).  
This view clearly indicates that Baskerville does not feel security risk assessments can 
be completely conducted in a positivist scientific manner. He maintains that even if all 
incidents are reported, there is still a requirement for experience, knowledge and 
understanding to interpret the findings of any statistical positivist output.  
2.6.2  Other Approaches to Risk Assessment 
Birch and McEvoy (1992) propose a different model.  Their paper outlines an integrated 
approach to information risk analysis for information systems and sets out its own 
methodology - SRA (Structured Risk Analysis).  It is stated this method has been used 
in the finance sector and elsewhere, specifically mentioning the European Space 
Agency (1992, p52).  By removing some of the complexities that are found in safety 
critical applications the authors believe SRA can be adapted for Information security - 
termed SRA-IS. Their paper sets out a process that could be followed for Information 
Systems risk analysis by identifying the workflow of a system.  In their introduction 
Birch and McEvoy (1992) suggest risk analysis must be able to answer the following 
questions: 
“How much is it appropriate to spend on countermeasures?” and  
“Where should spending be directed?” (1992, p.44) 
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The paper argues that, just as a system that is compromised can cost thousands in 
monetary terms, so can over spending on countermeasures in the first place.  It should 
be recognised that at the time of writing this paper, 1992, the amount of compliance 
legislation surrounding data loss/ data breach was less than now. Therefore, the simple 
cost of loss versus cost of prevention now has additional factors to consider – fines by 
regulators or even the courts.  The issue of reputational damage is not considered either 
in this paper.  Again, they focus on countermeasures being the lead concern as opposed 
to risk management.   
“It is important an organisation has the best possible information on risks in 
order to decide whether or not to invest (scarce) resources in countermeasures 
and if so how much.” (1992, p. 44) 
Even in 1992, Birch and McEvoy’s paper recognised that the value of information 
stored on the information systems exceeds that of the value of the technology used to 
store and process it.  They argue that the main purpose of risk analysis and risk 
management is not solely for the determination of appropriate countermeasures 
(Ibid.1992)   This is an interesting point, as it could be argued that the then mandated 
risk assessment methods such as the UK government’s IS1 (Great Britain. CESG, 2012) 
for example, relies on assessments that relate to a pre-defined set of baseline controls.  
According to the asset value, the degree of control that should be applied to counter the 
threat is identified and either applied or reasons stated why the control is not applicable.  
The element of risk assessment only comes into play when, for whatever reason e.g. 
funding or lack of, technology legacy or operational reasons, certain countermeasures 
cannot be put in place.  Therefore, the residual risk tends to be that which is not catered 
for due to the non-implementation of certain, most or all countermeasures identified as 
necessary to counter a specific threat.  
Birch and McEvoy’s (1992) paper argues that the approach of having tick lists of risks 
and countermeasures to those risks does not always cater for all risks. There is always a 
concern that perhaps all risks have not been identified in the context of the use of that 
system.  The risks around protecting the data on the system were no doubt considered 
but the import and export of data, in particular large volumes of it, may well have not 
been on any tick list.   
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2.6.3  An Intuitive Approach to Risk 
To understand if something may happen, past history is a good indicator.  If that history 
is not available or only partly understood that can create difficulty.  The research 
undertaken by Kahneman and Tversky (1977) on ‘intuitive prediction’ could be 
considered relevant here. They state that  
“many prediction problems are essentially unique in the sense that little, if any, 
relevant distributional information is available” (1977, p.2-1).   
Distributional information, in a risk analysis context, being the information on numbers 
and types of reported incidents relevant to the information asset subject to that analysis, 
thereby enabling a more accurate analysis of the risks being assessed.  Kahneman and 
Tversky (1977) identify the other element required for decision making as ‘singular’ 
information which describes the components of a problem that make it stand out from 
the rest.  One aspect of mitigation, that is rarely considered, is to revisit the actual use of 
a system once it has been implemented to ascertain if it is being used in the manner for 
which it was originally designed.  If any changes have taken place, has a review of the 
original risk analysis taken place to consider this change?  
One paper that focuses on the lack of empirical data to enable accurate risk analysis is 
Baker, Rees and Tippett (2007) who call for more data, but do not go into detail about 
how to achieve this. They suggest creating some kind of coding for the risk and threat 
assessment which, in turn, if the threat occurs, it is already coded. However, they 
counter their own suggested benefit of pre-coding by recognising many other factors 
can come into play and, if included the final decision on the type of threat, the true 
incident code may be difficult to understand.  Baker, Rees and Tippett, (2007) note even 
if data was forthcoming the problem of the lack of clear definitions still exists;  
“Current approaches recommend and employ estimates for such critical factors 
as frequency and countermeasure effectiveness because no clear and accepted 
framework exists for what real world measurements are needed to drive risk 
models or how they are to be collected.” (Baker, Rees and Tippett, 2007, p.102) 
This underlines the current predicament of a lack of data and how to share commonly 
occurring, but not similarly coded or classified incidents. Adams (2003) comments on 
risk in general as opposed to information risk.   He argues everyone has “A propensity 
to take risks [which] leads to risk taking behaviour, which leads, by definition, to 
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accidents,” (Adams, 2003, p.6). He suggests responses to risk and risk averseness are in 
some part affected by the knee jerk reaction to events. This reaction can often occur 
before all the facts are known.  Perrow (1984) also describes this approach of 
organisations after an incident, introducing short term reactive actions as opposed to 
taking a longer-term view by stating there is a need for;  
“long term strategies for handling risks rather than short run tactics of posting 
safety notices or levying trivial fines.” (Perrow, 1984, p.63) 
2.7  Information Risk Management 
This section covers the need for risk management and how the apparent lack of 
empirical data from reported incidents can make this difficult.  It builds on the previous 
section to manage risk down to prevent or reduce damage, loss or harm and reduce the 
likelihood of incidents or events occurring. This thesis offers the suggestion that 
significant risk management and investment is currently decided upon despite a lack of 
real evidence.  The result being information security professionals making value 
judgements based on experience, together with some local or sector wide evidence of 
actual known incidents. Information risk management relies upon an understanding of 
the overall contextual security situation (Webb, Ahmad, Maynard and Shanks, 2014). 
One of the indicators of this awareness being knowledge of security incidents that have 
or are likely to occur. It is this reliance upon that awareness, where some key aspects are 
not fully understood (incident data) that this lack of knowledge approach is unlikely to 
be accepted in other risk based industries. Whilst experience and judgement is a 
necessary factor in risk based decision making these should be based on sound 
information. 
The public may not be satisfied or reassured that safety decisions were not, as would be 
expected, based on the results obtained by thorough investigations and assessment of 
incidents, but on a professional’s best endeavours. For example, it is inconceivable that, 
as a result of lack of information sharing and reporting on previous near misses and 
safety incidents, lessons learnt were not being factored into new aircraft designs. Why is 
it that information security incidents are not considered in the same light?    The next 
section will articulate the value in the reporting of incidents and examine a wider 
concern that the perceived lack of incident reporting has on traditional risk assessments. 
 47 
 
As early as 2001 the Information Assurance Advisory Council (IAAC), in conjunction 
with the then National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC), published 
a joint report ‘Sharing is Protecting’ where it was clearly highlighted that;  
“In order to help managers and directors to make informed decisions about the 
risks they face and to demonstrate their exercise of due care and compliance 
with corporate governance obligations, IAAC and NISCC urge organisations to 
share information about Information Assurance incidents and threats.’ (2001, 
p.2) 
It also identifies the growing recognition that information security should be considered 
as a profession in its own right. 
In todays interconnected world it is important that information security is not seen in 
isolation.  Information security risk management should be part of the business and not 
just a technical matter (Ashenden and Jones, 2005).  Elsewhere Blakley, McDermott 
and Geer (2002) suggest that information security is information management and state 
“information needs to be gathered about security incidents experienced by businesses 
worldwide” (2002, p.100). This is another example of a research expressing the need for 
metrics, but not how to achieve it.   The information security sector appears to 
experiencing this lack of information.  It may be just a problem associated with the 
information security sector or, as can be seen by research elsewhere, such as in health 
care, the issue is wider than any one sector.   
As mentioned earlier in this chapter Blakley McDermott and Geer (2002) do offer 
comparisons to the healthcare industry from where it was in the 19
th
 century to where it 
is now.  Certain treatments and medicines worked but more was known about the 
outcomes of an illness and less about the cause and there was no real data collection.  
Blakley McDermott and Geer (2002) suggest there were three important developments 
that helped shape and modernise western medicine;  
“Mandatory professional education and licensure of practitioners 
  Systematic collection and study of public health data 
 Systematic observation studies of safety and effectiveness of treatments.”  
(Blakley, McDermott and Geer 2002, p.101)    
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Blakley, McDermott and Geer (2002) continue by suggesting the information security 
sector consider introducing professionalism and a code of ethics, including the duty to 
report, in other words what the medical profession has in place now.  They also refer to 
the fact that, as yet, no information security equivalent to ‘The Lancet’ exists to which 
security professionals can refer to for recognised published research.   However, as can 
be seen later in the review of healthcare research, for example the Dept. of Health 
(2000), although the three elements cited above may be present in healthcare now, the 
ability to report on adverse patient incidents is far from perfect.   
2.7.1  Professionalism in Information Security.  
As professionalism is referred to by Blakley (2002) as a key element, this next section 
examines professionalism in the information security sector. It took some time for the 
medical profession to get where it is now but already some movement has started in the 
information security sector. Boards and leaders of organisations will normally take 
advice on legal and financial matters from staff or consultants who are members of 
professional bodies to provide an element of assurance and protection that due diligence 
in their decision masking can be evidenced.  As boards understanding of the risks in 
cyber security and associated risks grow, as demonstrated in a  top ten topics for 
directors in 2015 (Nili, 2014) which places Cyber Security at number two, they would 
be expected to seek advice regarding information risk and cyber security.  It would 
therefore be a logical progression for boards to seek professional cyber or information 
security advice. Although electronic communications have been developing for longer 
than a century and professional bodies in fields supporting this such as electronic 
engineering have developed there is not the same range of professional bodies for 
information or cyber security (Jones and O’Neill, 2017, p.4).  
In the UK, professional bodies such as the Institute of Information Security 
Professionals – IISP have been set up and professional certification schemes such as the 
UK HMG CESG Certified Professionals scheme (HMG CESG, 2015; see glossary) for 
competency based certification of Information Assurance professionals are in their 
infancy. These will take time before a tipping point is reached. To assist in reaching this 
point the CCP is now be embedded in the UK Certified Cyber Security Consultancy 
scheme (HMG CESG, 2015; see glossary). This scheme is to encourage properly 
certified and competency based professionals are employed by companies offering 
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security advice and consultancy though a registered scheme.  This is an enabling service 
to provide that level of professional advice to Boards referred to earlier. In the United 
States the Global Information Assurance Certification has been in existence since 1999 
and received accreditation by the American National Standards Institute in 2007. This 
certification is course and exam based, unlike the UK competency based scheme. 
2.7.2  Understanding the User when Managing Risk 
When managing risk, it should be remembered it is not just about the technology and 
processes included in the complexity of information security are also the human factors 
(Ashenden and Lawrence, 2013).  It is equally important to understand how human 
behaviour can equally impact security.  In the UK, the Centre for Protection of National 
Infrastructure - CPNI published a set of guidance known as HoMER (HMG CPNI, 
2015) which assists in managing what it calls ‘employee risk’ (HMG CPNI, 2012).  
Inadvertent behaviour would include human frailties such as gullibility of believing 
someone or something to be genuine but are not through social engineering.   
People can be exploited, as described by Mitnick (2002), who identified that as 
technology to deter attackers improves those same attackers will turn to the staff to 
exploit their human vulnerabilities through social engineering.  A company may deploy 
excellent defences at their network boundaries only for one of their staff to fall victim to 
a well-engineered social engineering attach that instead of an e mail containing a virus 
which would be detected at the company’s outer defence they include a genuine looking 
link to a website or document that contains malware, often known as a phishing attack 
(US-CERT 2008, p.4).  
Dhillon (1995) proposed the view that within organisations the formal and informal 
systems are often not appreciated in the analysis and design of information systems.  In 
other words, users often interpret the formal work requirements in a local way and then 
play out the processes to suit the informal element of their environment.  This is a point 
worth considering that in one part of an organisation a set of behaviours could be 
interpreted as an adverse incident because it rails against a formal approach to using the 
system, whereas in another part of the same organisation, where the culture has taken on 
board the issues of informality in some of the processes and semi formalised these in the 
 50 
 
design, there is not the same concern resulting in incidents or potential incidents not 
being reported. .   
This localised interpretation is also supported by Lipsky (1980) who uses the term of 
‘street level bureaucracy’ to argue that often public sector workers when trying to cope 
with uncertainty or unusual circumstances not catered for in top level policy create local 
procedures that in turn become the accepted policy.   
An example of human interaction with systems is in the use of passwords, where to 
protect unauthorised access a system enforces use of complex, difficult to recall 
passwords, which are frequently changed.  This is backed up by a rigorous policy that 
passwords must not be written down. This was a formal process designed at the 
beginning. This is probably workable for staff that constantly use the system and are 
therefore well practiced at inputting the password on a regular basis ensuring they 
become easier to recall.  It may have been that in limited analysis of the system 
requirements, the needs of frequent users were considered at the expense of those who 
use a system in an ad hoc fashion.  
“Security culture is the totality of patterns of behaviours in an organisation that 
contribute to the protection of information of all kinds.”   Dhillon (1995, p.90).  
In some areas of a business the use of that system is infrequent and therefore the 
opposite experience regarding the use of passwords is evident.  It is then accepted 
locally that as these are impossible to remember, an informal process of recording and 
securing them by locking away is considered good practice.  
This issue regarding human factors and passwords is also referred to in a study 
conducted by Brostoff and Sasse (1999) where they found the majority of users could 
not manage the number of passwords they were allocated.  As a result, users would 
write passwords down or share with others and therefore reduce the effect of the secure 
control the passwords represent.  The example described by Brostoff and Sasse (1999) 
as a situation that many security professionals would find unacceptable. This human 
factor and passwords is also referred to by Ashenden and Lawrence (2013) where the 
rationale for committing a password to memory or writing it down is sometimes down 
to the importance the user considers that password to have.  Just to have a policy to do 
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or not to do something without out an understanding of human factors can lead to 
predicable human behavioural outcomes. 
There is a danger that professionals can be obsessed with risk prevention and not 
consider human behaviours and their attitude to risk.  Wilde (1998) refers to the theory 
of “risk homeostasis” or, as it is also known as, risk compensation.  This was primarily 
referred to and developed in road safety.  Wilde (1998) observes that although the 
research was conducted mainly in road safety the fact that human behaviour and attitude 
to risk can be found in other examples such as smoking, even though the health dangers 
are known or why people live in flood prone areas. The rational being known risk 
versus benefit or perceived benefit.  Wilde asserts that “the mechanisms that are 
involved in risk homeostasis are probably universal” (Wilde 2008, p.91).  Therefore, it 
is likely these same behaviours and attitudes to risk can be found in people’s attitude to 
information risk.    
Wilde (2008) refers to a triggering event in Sweden relating to car driver’s attitudes to 
risk which he states provided clear evidence of risk homeostasis.   When Sweden 
changed from driving on the left to the right-hand side of the road, initially there was a 
marked reduction in the traffic fatality rate. However, the normal fatality rate returned 
after a year and a half.  At the beginning of the changeover drivers’ perceived risk was 
enhanced and therefore “adjusted their behaviour by choosing more prudent behaviour” 
(Wilde 2008, p.90).  Once drivers and the associated media recognised the roads were 
not more dangerous, driver’s attitudes to risk eased,   “consequently, road users opted 
for less cautious behaviour alternatives and the fatal injury rate rose again.” (Wilde 
2008, p.90)   
Whether there is a major disaster, such as the sinking of Herald of Free Enterprise in 
1987, a serious data loss such as experienced by the UK HMRC (2008) or another 
triggering event, it appears that people’s attitude to risk changes and policies and 
processes are introduced to prevent reoccurrence. However subsequent enquiries into 
such disasters highlight that the indicators of a trigger event were missed, ignored or not 
reported properly.  
A classic example of not learning from previous, albeit minor, incidents that led to 
disaster can be found in the enquiry conducted by Lord Justice Sheen (1988) into the 
sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry in 1987 with the loss of 188 lives.   Prior 
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to the disaster there were numerous minor incidents that were noted by members of the 
crew but were either not reported or, if they were, the view of management was not to 
take them seriously or simply dismiss them “…every complaint was an exaggeration”.  
(Sheen: 1987, Para, 19.3) In summary of the cause the whole approach was down to 
management failure “...the body corporate was affected with the disease of sloppiness” 
(Sheen: 1987, Para, 14.1) 
Toft and Reynolds (1999) in the introduction of their book on ‘Learning from disasters 
a management approach’ note that: 
“The underlying philosophy of this book is that socio-technical failures are not 
the result of divine caprice, nor of a set of random chance events which are not 
likely to occur, nor simple technical failures. Rather disasters are incidents 
created by people operating within complex systems.  The evidence suggests 
that where evidence is not learned similar accidents can and do occur.”  (1999, 
p.16)   
Einarsson and Brynjarsson (2008) in their research of survey findings related to 
improving human factors, incident and accident reporting and safety management 
systems in the chemical industry, identified where procedures were put in place they 
often do not take account of the human factor.   
It this lack of a user’s knowledge of the reason behind the process they are undertaking 
can cause decisions made locally to be proved flawed with bad outcomes.  Perrow 
(1984) makes a good point that without a good understanding of a process an operator 
may be limited in their response to an incident. 
“Computerisation has the effect of limiting the options of the operator, however, 
and does not encourage broader comprehension of the system – a key 
requirement for intervening in unexpected interactions.”  (Perrow, 1984, p.122) 
In a survey of Chief Information Security Officers, Ashenden and Sasse (2013) reported 
that it was suggested in the responses that if staff were aware of the issues surrounding 
protecting information they would do the right thing when it came to reporting a 
security incident. 
A situation echoed by Perrow (1984) in his analysis of incidents in the nuclear, 
chemical, aircraft and other types of industries and examines why they occurred, in 
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particular focussing on the relationship between operators and systems.  This view that 
complex systems and lack of relevant practitioner knowledge is also raised by Denyer, 
Tranfield and van Aken (2012).  This situational awareness amongst different workers 
is also reported by Luokkala and Virrantaus (2014, p.194) where they refer to the fact 
knowledge is usually process in teams and that “to successfully perform an independent 
task need to coordinate their actions” and continue “each members actions depend on 
the other members’ actions and communication between the team members”.  It is this 
interdependency that can fail and result in serious incidents where team members do not 
understand how they fit into a process. 
Often operators are blamed but upon examination the sheer complexity of the issue and 
the fact in some industries, e.g. Nuclear power, the knowledge base is relatively new.  
Instrumentation can indicate one possible cause of a problem but these instruments can 
be affected by other issues of complexity that can give a reading that should perhaps 
lead to one course of action but due to other interdependencies this assumption is not 
always the correct one.  In the technology world this contextualisation and situational 
awareness of what systems are reporting and how an operator is to act is also reported  
by Pfleeger and Caputo (2012) supporting the view although in a slightly different 
context  to that reported by Perrow (1984). They refer to the problem of a use or analyst 
failing to “connect the dots” (Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012, p.602). This point is also made 
by Franke and Brynielsson (2014) who argue “situational awareness cannot be treated 
in isolation” (2014, p.20).  They continue by referring to the;  
“combination of information from different arena’s such as a sensor (an 
intrusion detection device) and what they term as ‘an ordinary sensor (a human 
intelligence report)” (2014, p.20). 
2.8  Information Exploitation 
The term exploitation is not described in depth as it is purely relating to the use of 
information which in itself may expose it to risks and therefore incidents surrounding it 
use may occur and is out of scope of this research. Exploitation can mean the 
integration, management and analysis of data (Blasch, 2013, p.131).  The use of the 
term ‘exploitation’ is not in the negative context of misuse of data such as that described 
by Snow and Snow (2007) when referring to the misuse for the purposes of 
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manipulating data to create ‘facts’ out disparate pieces of available information, but in a 
neutral context of utilising the information.  
Once risk assessments and risk management has taken place the information is then 
used. It is that information exploitation that may then expose it to risk. The use of an 
asset may result in its exposure to risk which is covered in the risk assessment section.  
If the risk manifests itself then that is when it is possible an incident is likely to take 
place. 
2.9  Information Security Incidents 
An incident could be said to be the manifestation of a risk but what is understood by the 
term incident in the information security sector is not clearly defined, probably due to 
the fact there is not yet a nationally or internationally recognised incident classification.   
The research highlights the current apparent lack of, or consistency in, any definitions to 
support the understanding of what an incident is. In the health care sector the incidents 
referred to relate to adverse patient incidents as opposed to information security 
incidents. The potential reuse of findings from healthcare research relating to incident 
reporting could be reused in the information security sector.  
A review of information security literature identified research that focussed on 
managing incidents once they had occurred., Henin, S (2008), Sommer (2012) and Wiik 
and Gonzalez, (2005) and for example.  This research related to responding to technical 
incidents either, as in Sommer’s (2012) Guide to Forensic Readiness ‘how to 
forensically handle a security incident’, or   Henin’s (2008) white paper that proposes 
the need to create protocols to share reported incidents of attacks on SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems.   
There appear to be few sources of information that shed light onto the number of 
incidents occurring and subsequently to allow analysis and interpretation that would 
support risk analysis. Unlike other sectors such as health and safety or there is no single 
source of incident data upon which to base risk analysis on.  In the absence of such 
empirical authoritative publications a number of bodies and companies produce surveys 
which attempt to fill part of this incident information gap.  These include the PWC 
Information Security Breaches Survey (2012), Ponemon and Symantec cost of data 
breach 2010 and the Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report (2012).  How accurate 
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are the figures in these surveys.  In fairness they do not claim to be the definitive source 
as they are snapshots of responses from a selection of organisations that have returned 
questionnaires.  However, they do point readers where to focus their mitigation efforts. 
In the Verizon data breach investigation report for 2012 the areas are not specific but 
generalist.  These include generic advice for the smaller organisation (Verizon, 2012, 
p.4) to implement a firewall and if a third party is managing your subsystems make sure 
they do this.  It does not offer guidance as to how to do this or what the purpose of the 
advice is. For example, with regards to firewalls they do not refer to the need for a rule-
set against which the firewall can accept or deny traffic.  Advice to larger organisations 
is equally high level (Verizon, 2012, p.4) and includes; eliminate unnecessary data and 
monitor event logs.  The report then refers to the appendices at the end for advice on 
mitigating common threats, note the emphasis is on the threats not necessarily on what 
has actually manifested itself.  The latest Verizon report (2017) has topical advice under 
the heading “things to consider “at various locations within the report. These tend to be 
more sector focussed but are still high level.  
Critical to managing risk is to understand and have confidence in the level of protection 
against known vulnerabilities and accurate data relating to the types of adverse security 
incidents that have occurred and still occurring.  A good knowledge of trends and 
emerging threats is key to this.  However, without sufficient trusted data, such decisions 
can never be truly fully informed.   Before incidents are reported there needs to be 
active and consistent involvement of the user community, both at the individual user 
level and the wider organisation level.  Ben-Asher and Gonzalez (2015) propose that if 
the user does not understand the situation surrounding them they may not detect 
something is wrong. The degree of knowledge, even with analysts task with monitoring 
events and systems, can impact on the likelihood of an incident being detected (Ben-
Asher and Gonzalez, 2015) As will be seen in this literature review there is also a real 
concern over the ability to identify and classify incidents to provide a true analysis of 
the number of type of incidents actually occurring.   
2.9.1  What is a Security Incident? 
Identifying that a security incident has occurred has to happen before it can be reported. 
It could be argued that not all incidents can be of direct use to an overall Cyber security 
strategy, but not all attacks are totally technical.  Many require elements of social 
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engineering and the targeting of key employees can ensure an easier method of 
breaching the defences of an IT system. Security incidents involving the loss of an ID or 
door entry pass, the misplacing of a relevant technical document or inappropriate 
actions of disgruntled employee, if not reported, can provide the elements of a 
combination of factors that could lead to a successful cyber security attack. 
There is no nationally or internationally recognised incident classification criterion.  
Even the recognised ISO standard for managing security incidents, BS ISO/IEC 27035 
(2011) does not include a definition of an incident.  Within the standard it states;  
“Organisations should ensure that information security incidents are 
documented in a consistent manner, using appropriate standards for 
incident categorisation and classification, and sharing, so that metrics are 
created from aggregated data over a period of time. This provides valuable 
information to aid the strategic decision making process when investing in 
information security controls.” (British Standards Institute 2011, p. 4)  
  
On further examination of this statement phrases such as “‘incidents documented in a 
consistent manner” may be acceptable if only collated and used locally but do not add 
value when any sharing of incident information is required.  Likewise, where the 
standard continues in the same vein regarding categorisation and classification it really 
exposes the standard as a unilateral one.   
This is not to criticise the current focus of the standard but there needs to be more 
consistency and common classification if the wish for wider industry sectors and 
governments to be able to truly understand the information risks they are facing.  This 
“strategic decision making process” referred to in the ISO/IEC 27035 (2011, p4) will 
remain aspirational until there is some consensus, whether voluntary or regulatory, on 
incident categorisation and classification.  
The lack of common definitions is evidenced through an examination of a number of 
CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams).  These CERTS are either run by 
Governments (e.g. GovCertUK, GovCertNL, US-Cert and CERT Australia) or are 
collaborative, not for profit organisations (such as AUSCERT and CERTNL).  All of 
these have differing incident classifications and criteria which tend to focus on technical 
incidents. Whilst it may be relatively easy to generically describe an incident, the real 
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problem appears to be in obtaining a consensus on classification of incident type, 
without this, analysis is problematic. For example; GovCertUK is the Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) for the UK Government. The definition they offer 
of an incident in their Incident Response guidelines (2008) is; “any real or suspected 
event in relation to the security of data or computer systems”.  This can be compared 
with the definition offered by NIST, the US National Institute of Standards and 
Technology in their Guide for Incident Handling (2012)   “An incident is the act of 
violating an explicit or implied security policy”.  This in reality links incidents to local 
policies or definitions. These two national CERTs appear to suggest a different 
approach to defining an incident.  The UK suggests incidents are the product of a data 
or systems breach and the US that incidents are a breach of policy.  The recent issue of 
BS ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016 gives a high level definition of a security incident as  
“one or multiple related and identified information security events (referring to 
their definition of an event – occurrence indicating a possible breach of 
information security or failure of controls) that can harm an organisations assets 
or compromise its operations.”(British Standards Institution, 2016, p.2) 
With such apparent differences the ability to compare and contrast incident data will be 
flawed from the outset. Both definitions are high level and focus on technology 
incidents. In terms of incident classification, the UK CESG site publishes a 
categorisation matrix setting out degrees of seriousness of impact and identifies types of 
incidents as those that are network related and other incidents.  It further describes some 
types of incidents such as targeted attack, website defacement, spam and unauthorised 
access.  The matrix guide states “these categorisations are general”.  NIST, like CESG, 
also provide high level definitions for types of incident such as e mail, web, improper 
usage and attrition.   Interestingly it clearly states “these categories are not intended to 
provide definitive classification for incidents.” (2012, p. 11).     
In their suggestion that cyber security can also be described in terms used by 
information Solms and Niekerk (2013) suggest:  
 
“Cyber security incidents could also be described in terms used to define 
information security Thus, a cyber-security incident would for example also lead 
to a breach in the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information”  
(Solms and Niekerk, 2013, p.99) 
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However, they do not state what the definition of an information security incident is.  
Without definitive incident classification, how can these organisations provide true 
comparisons of incident type and therefore frequency, likelihood and ultimately identify 
trends.  This lack of commonality may also impact on information sharing.  Whilst they 
may be sufficient for individual countries or organisations, and that is debatable, any 
attempt to extrapolate the data to gain a wider risk picture would be a challenge. 
These national organisations are attempting to offer a central facility that should provide 
an overall picture into the national threat levels, but without clear definitions of what an 
incident is, or a standardised categorisation of incident type, such threat analysis and 
assessments can, at best, only be considered generalist.   
 
The International standard ISO 27035 (2011) provides an annex C which suggests 
example incident classifications and even an example incident report form.  The 
standard recognises the need for standardisation but has no authoritative influence at 
present. The standard states;  
“These approaches enable personnel and organizations to document information 
security incidents in a consistent manner, so that the following benefits are 
achieved:” (British Standards Institute, 2011, Annex C, p.50)   
The ISO Standard list of benefits includes the promotion and sharing of information on 
security incidents, making it easier to automate incident reporting, improving efficiency 
and effectiveness of incident handling and facilitating collection and analysis of data 
and finally identifying severity levels and using consistent criteria.  What is clearly 
missing is that element of consistent classification criteria.  
As described earlier in this chapter at 2.5.1 the 2013 EU commission Directive on 
‘measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security across 
the Union’ provides the definition of risk.  It also gives its definition of an incident as 
“any circumstance or event having an actual adverse effect on security” (EU 
Commission, 2013, p.19).   Interestingly their definition of risk is very similar “any 
circumstance or event that having a potential adverse effect on security” (EU 
Commission, 2013, p.19).  This risk definition, and its closeness in words to the incident 
definition, does not spell out the hazard element that any information asset faces.  
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Therefore, for the purposes of this research the author, in the absence of any obviously 
agreed definitions, proposes the following as a working definition of a security incident 
to compliment the definition of information risk in section 2.5.1.   
An information security incident is either, an actual or potential event that has, 
or is likely to, cause harm to the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of 
data, assets, systems or infrastructure whether caused by people, processes or 
technology.  
This suggested incident definition incorporates near misses and the three key elements 
of information security as described in the ISO/IEC 27000 (Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability).  Additionally, it incorporates the need to reflect a wider aspect than 
purely technology based incidents i.e. those involving people and processes as well. 
Perrow (1984) identified a situation where a good knowledge of a process and also 
again 'a priori' knowledge can come into play only if the staff involved are closely 
involved with the process.  He cites the example of the Apollo 13 mission and how the 
issue of a faulty part earlier in the pre-launch testing stage had resulted in a potential 
hazard.  Initially the stance of the space program was based on a greater reliance on 
instrumentation however; the astronauts have something that instrumentation cannot 
cover; situational and contextual awareness and intuition.  The crew of Apollo 13 felt a 
jolt which was not detected and therefore when looking for the problem this was in their 
minds and as a result took the issue more seriously than if it was just left to follow the 
information provided by instruments alone.  Perrow (1984) makes the point the 
appropriateness of the job can often affect an individual’s ability to identify a problem.  
By looking out of the craft’s window they could see gas venting, the combination of 
instrumentation, felt experience and training resulted in;  
“the first thing the crew did, even before discovering the oxygen leak, was to try 
to close the hatch between the CM [Command Module] and the LM [Lunar 
Module] They reacted spontaneously, similar to a submarine crew, closing the 
hatches to limit the amount of flooding.” (NASA, 2009)     
The additional information assisted in understanding what had happened. In information 
security the contextual awareness is similar in that what an alert might be suggesting 
and having an understanding of the true cause. In complex systems, there are often inter 
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dependencies that are not readily known and often become apparent when things go 
wrong. It is in these circumstances that operators or managers, due to their specific 
knowledge and expertise in one part of the overall system, find it difficult to “predict, 
note, or be able to diagnose the interdependency before the incident escalates to an 
accident.”  (Perrow, 1984, p.87) 
In the Rail Standards and Safety Board’s report 2011 ‘Independent review of reporting 
by Network rail and its contractors’ it identified a number of RIDDOR (Reporting of 
Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences) and reports were wrongly classified.  
Many factors were found to account for this including the fact Network rail were using 
more than one database for recording incidents and the lack of cross checking of the 
validity of the original incident classification. A problem that exists in a wider context 
for information security incidents where no common accepted classification exists. This 
is also apparent in vulnerability classification as reported by Schiffman (2011) and even 
in naming conventions for computer viruses despite organisations such as CARO 
(Computer Antivirus Research Organisation) that have tried to introduce one. 
There are a number of differing security standards (ISO2700, PCIDSS and others) that 
arguably are trying to achieve the same result but are often contextual to certain 
industries as suggested by Browne et al (2011).   There appears to be an, as yet, link 
between governments waking up to the real national security threats posed by cyber-
attacks and companies facing increasing regulation and legislation and regulators 
looking to protect individual’s data. There is however some work now taking place to 
try to improve the situation. There is the challenge of upgrading existing standards such 
as the ISO27000 series or creating wholly new ones to face the cyber challenge.  In 
2013 the UK Govt. put out a call for views on cyber security organisational standards 
(2013) in an attempt to understand what would be the best way forward and the 
discussion is still ongoing.  Some of these same companies being regulated and 
monitored are also key components of nations’ critical national infrastructure.   Surely 
there is a real potential to draw these synergies together.  All however still require that 
basic commodity; management information and metrics to monitor levels of threat, 
trends, and potential future threats as well as identifying near misses that could provide 
a rich vein of information to prevent a serious breach.    In fact, the identification of 
incidents and analysing the cause and taking positive action to learn from them and 
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preventing reoccurrence could in turn reduce the number of serious events. 
Unfortunately for many reasons there seems to be a problem with learning from 
mistakes.   
2.10  Incident Reporting  
This section is where the research has identified the greater gaps in knowledge. 
Although there is research on incidents and events that have an adverse outcome, less is 
apparent covering why they are not being fully reported. What are the barriers, why is it 
difficult to report?  The research starts from the premise that not all information security 
incidents are being reported (later tested in the scoping study in chapter 4) and the effect 
this can have on sharing and the challenges faced by organisations and governments to 
achieve this.  It includes research that covers the increasing policy, regulation and 
legislation which requires reporting to take place.  It also includes identified research 
into other factors that may affect reporting including; the seniority or grade of staff, the 
degree of harm caused, informing victims and blame culture.  
2.10.1  Security Incidents –Sharing what is Reported, Situational Awareness and 
the Changing Threats.   
The various national administrations aim to be a position to better defend their critical 
national infrastructures and interests and rely on centralised capabilities to do so.  In the 
United States the White House Executive Order “Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity” (Feb 2013) highlighted the need for improved cyber security evidenced 
by the continual intrusions into critical infrastructures.  The directive continues by 
describing a way to achieve this is through a partnership of those responsible for the 
elements that form the critical infrastructure to “improve cybersecurity information 
sharing and collaboratively develop and implement risk based standards” (2013, p.1).   
Initiatives such as in the US of Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (National 
council of ISACs, 2017; see glossary) which has been in existence since 2003, the UK 
Information Exchanges (CPNI, 2015; see glossary) and new structures such as the UK 
Cyber Information Sharing Partnerships (CPNI, 2013; see glossary) are an attempt to 
widen participation in sharing of threats and associated experience and knowledge. The 
UK CiSP was launched in 2013 as part of the strategy to tackle the growing concerns of 
cybercrime.   The problems possibly lay in the fact that the fundamentals required to 
gather a more complete and rounded situational awareness may not have been grasped. 
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Whilst the top level and high-profile incidents may be shared, the grass roots level of 
incident data appear not to have been.    The challenge is to identify the incidents and 
even when they are will security professional go on to share with others. As identified 
by Messenger (2005) in interviews with security professionals on sharing they referred 
to;  
“various aspects of Knowledge-Based trust, which is about knowing another 
person well enough to predict their behaviour and is likely to develop over time, 
through interacting with the person.” (2005, p.21)   
Sharing relies on the information being available in the first place from individual 
organisations and the way they structure their security governance can influence sharing 
internally (Flores, Atonsen and Ekstedt, 2014). If organisations cannot share internally 
then any external sharing for the common good is a challenge.  
The difficulty lies in the fact that, as yet, no one appears to have the full picture.  Perry 
and Moffat (2004) refer to a model named ‘CROP’ - Common Relevant Operating 
Picture; a view of the battle space shared by all friendly forces.  If the term battle space 
was replaced by ‘cyber’ this model may be useful for governments’ to consider when 
forming their cyber defence capabilities and sharing initiatives as a wider view of the 
threats which in Perry and Moffat’s (2004) approach is termed Cooperative Engagement 
Capability  
“a capability that combines data from all platforms in an operation and allows 
the combined data to produce a better CROP” Perry and Moffat (2004, p. xxxiii)   
Again it is the collation of information to enable informed decisions that is required. 
This research will suggest there is insufficient commonality in the cyber security world 
to use a model such as CROP.  Without a full contextual understanding of the incidents 
that affect and organisation or system decision makers in Government or commerce will 
face the same problems as identified by Perry and Moffat (2004). In their study of the 
challenges faced by military commanders when command and control is more 
centralised, and the challenge of varying information sources and the amount of validity 
in such information they reported: 
 “In most cases decision makers must make decisions without full understanding 
of the values of the critical information elements needed to support the 
decisions”.  (Perry and Moffat, 2004, p.xiv)   
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The increased threat and manifestation of attacks could have a military aspect as well as 
the accepted criminal activity. The concern over cyber criminals and nation state 
involvement in cyber incidents has been increasing (MacAskill and Syal, 2017; UK 
National Crime Agency, 2017) The reference to cyber in UK Government publications 
does not directly mention cyber warfare. Terms such as Cyber defence and Cyber-
attacks, possibly by foreign nation states, are referred to. For example, the threat in the 
Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) identified a key risk as that of “Hostile 
attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cybercrime” (2010, p.27). 
In its 2012 UK Cyber Security Strategy it recognised that Cyber was a Tier 1 National 
Security threat (2011). In the 2015 strategy, the wording has changed referring to;   
“growing numbers of states, with state level resources, are developing advanced 
capabilities which are potentially deployable in conflicts, including against CNI 
and government institutions. including against CNI and government 
institutions.”  
It continues in support of the link between cyber criminals and states by stating  
“and non-state actors, including terrorists and cyber criminals can use easily 
available cyber tools and technology for destructive purposes” (2015, p.20).  
However, other research does use the term warfare.  Cyber warfare has many definitions 
and a review of definitions was conducted by Robinson, Jones and Janicke (2015, p72 
and p.73) who cite a number of them in their paper ‘Cyber Warfare: Issues and 
challenges’. These ranged from Alford (2001) on page 73 
“Any act intended to compel an opponent to fulfil our national will, executed 
against the software controlling processes within an opponent’s system.”  
This relates to pre-planning a disruption of infrastructure to others where the potential 
influence of other actors such as criminals could be involved.  
Carr (2012) on page 73  
“Cyber warfare is the art and science of fighting without fighting; of defeating an 
opponent without spilling their blood)”  
and 
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Cornish, Livingstone, Clement and York (2012) on page 73 who suggest  
“Cyber Warfare can be a conflict between states, but it could also involve non-state 
actors in various ways…”  
The Chatham House Report. ‘On Cyber Warfare’ (Cornish, Livingstone, Clement and 
York, 2010) does refer to notable incidents that have occurred such as ‘Stuxnet’ 
(Norton.com, 2015) and the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008.  
Choo (2011, p.724) poses the question “how can we determine whether an attack is 
criminal or an act of cyber war?” and continues that it may be some governments 
choose to accept that some criminal led cyber-attacks are allowed if targeted against 
nations that fit into their own government interests.  In effect Choo (2011) is agreeing 
with the views of Cornish, Livingstone, Clement and York (2010) and Denning (2014) 
that attribution of the actor can be difficult to determine.  
Incidents such as ‘Stuxnet’ no doubt started in a way that unusual events or behaviours 
in systems could have been noticed by staff but initially not necessarily reported until 
the real impacts became evident. Thus, making it difficult for understanding that either a 
small event was taking place or that many of events were leading to something more 
significant.  
Cornish et al’s (2010) paper does not suggest that many incidents lead to such serious 
events however, the issue of recognising, reporting and collating such events forms part 
of empirical evidence of the numbers and types of security incidents.  There may well 
have been near misses (or reconnaissance in these more major incidents) that went 
unreported.    Now that the stakes are higher, attention on the identification and 
reporting of all security incidents, and not just the technical ones, may become more 
important.   
There are potentially greater challenges to sharing and threats from the more tradition 
owned infrastructures to outsourced ones where the control of security and reporting is 
changing too. The main change being the gradual but increasing use of cloud 
computing.  Whilst it could be argued such cloud use has been around for some time, 
the concern being there will be good, secure providers and others that are less secure 
and it may be the case of ‘caveat emptor’ when the selection of the service provider is 
made.  Companies that are currently subject to breach notification laws may find an 
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increasing complexity if they outsource more of their data storage to such providers.   
Research such as that conducted by Robinson et al (2010) in their study of security, 
privacy and trust in the cloud identified considerable challenges and opportunities in 
this relatively new service provision which included governance and ownership of risk. 
More issues may emerge once significant incidents start to manifest themselves and 
become of media and public interest.    
Some researchers have suggested how to fill the information gap where there is a lack 
of incident data. Bodin, Gordon and Loeb (2008) propose a methodology for measuring 
risk. Using the term ‘PCR - Perceived Composite Risk’.  The problem with it is it uses 
figures which again are not based on empirical evidence. It is perceptive in that respect 
and Bodin Gordon and Loeb (2008), base their model on using the equivalent to the 
Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) measure and they argue that the degree of risk is 
directly related to the size of any financial impact.   The problem with this paper is it 
provides a mathematical and statistical method to equate potential or perceived loss. It 
does not state where the source data for such calculations will come from other than 
using an interpretivist approach.  
“The PCR combines three risk measures through a procedure that determines the 
decision maker’s relative rating of the risk criteria. The weights are decision 
maker dependent” (2008, p.67). 
In other words, potentially using Baskerville’s (1991, p.756) ‘a priori' approach.   
Bodin, Gordon and Loeb’s (2008) risk is based on;  
“The expected severe loss focuses on the breaches that would put the 
survivability of the organisation at risk.  In order to calculate the expected severe 
loss, the decision maker (such as a CISO) first specifies the magnitude of a loss 
that if it were to occur would threaten the organisations survivability.” (Bodin 
Gordon and Loeb, 2008, p.65).  
This places considerable reliance upon a perceived severity of loss. With the current 
apparent lack of empirical data on such losses this is in fact the equivalent of an impact 
assessment of what the consequences, for example reputational and financial would be 
should an incident occur, as opposed to the likelihood of it occurring.  Until more 
visibility of the actual likelihood and impact is mainstream this will always be based on 
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reported high-profile cyber security incidents such as experienced by the UK HMRC in 
2008, TK Maxx in 2007, RSA in 2011, SONY in 2014, Talk Talk (2015) and others. 
2.10.2  Incident Reporting in Healthcare 
This section focusses on literature from the Healthcare sector where it appears more 
research surrounding incidents has been conducted, albeit where they relate to patients.   
However, it is suggested the findings may well be relevant to the information security 
sector. 
The Department of Health Report (2000) introduces the notion of two types of incident.  
Those classed as ‘active’ failures or unsafe acts which are the result of the behaviour or 
actions of front line staff and these are considered to be “short-lived and often 
unpredictable” (2000, p.ix). The other type being ‘latent’ conditions which can exist and 
develop over a period of time without coming to particular notice but, when combined 
with other factors, can result in an incident occurring.  This is similar to the ‘Swiss 
Cheese’ model as proposed by Reason (1990) where safeguards may be by-passed or 
fail due to the coming together of a number of factors which, when combined, lead to a 
break in a safety mechanism. Mahajan (2010) supports this view by giving more detail 
of these ‘active’ or ‘latent’ failures, describing active failures as;  
“omissions, unsafe acts etc. performed by front line staff.   Slips (wrong labels, 
wrong syringe) cognitive failures (memory lapses, ignorance, misreading a 
situation) or violations (deviations from safe practices, procedures or standards)” 
(2010, p.71) 
Mahajan (2010) then describes latent failures as near misses suggesting these are 
elements that make up the conditions that eventually lead to an incident occurring. He 
argues that near misses occur more frequently than the actual incidents that cause harm.  
Barach and Small (2000, p.760) citing research by March, Sproull and Tamuz (1991), 
Battles, Kaplan, Van der Schaff and Shea, (1998) and Petersen et al (1998) suggest that 
near misses can occur between 3 to 300 more times than adverse incidents. There is no 
benefit in just identifying a problem; the real benefit comes from learning from it.  The 
Department of Health Report (2000) in its assessment of the two types of incident 
(active and latent) describes two particular types of response to and learning from an 
incident. These being ‘passive’ where, although the lessons have been identified, they 
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have not subsequently acted upon and ‘active’ whereby any lessons learnt become 
embedded into an organisations processes and culture.  
In many disciplines, there have been major incidents and subsequent enquiries. These 
have included, the Bradford Football Club fire in 1995 (Popplewell, 1985), the sinking 
of Herald of Free Enterprise 1987 (Sheen, 1988) and the Kings Cross Underground fire 
1987 (Fennell, 1988). The subsequent enquiries identified the cause being the 
culmination of a number of smaller events which, if individually had been reported and 
tackled, the disaster would never had occurred.  Many of these minor incidents, 
although different in nature, were often not reported for very similar reasons.  This 
situation was reported by Perrow (1984, p.9) 
“Small failures abound in big systems; accidents are not often caused by 
massive pipe breaks, wings breaking off, or motors running amok.  Patient 
accident reconstruction reveals the banality and triviality behind most 
catastrophes.” 
The next major disaster may not be a fire or a shipping disaster but a failure of one or 
more elements of Critical National Infrastructure facilities resulting in civil unrest and 
or harm.  Will the inevitable subsequent enquiry highlight a lack of incident reporting as 
a cause?  Time will tell.  
 Having examined relevant research from the information security sector this section 
reviews current literature that relates to incident reporting, particularly adverse patient 
incidents, in the healthcare sector.  In the health care sector, adverse patient incidents 
normally result in physical harm as opposed information security incidents that relate to 
loss of data.  There are a number of reports and research papers that focus on the aspect 
of incident reporting.  Whether it be doctors, nurses, physicians or pharmacists tasked 
with examining samples as part of the analytical care of patients, the findings across the 
sector appear similar. The Dept. of Health report entitled “A learning Organisation” 
(2000) was commissioned investigate the issue of ‘adverse events’ in relation to 
patients.   The primary aim being to learn from past experiences and part of that 
learning involved the reporting of such events in the first place, potentially minimising 
the risk of avoidable harm to patients.  The report identified that 
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“NHS reporting and information systems provide us with a patchy and 
incomplete picture of the scale and nature of the problem of serious failures in 
health care”.   (Great Britain, Dept. of Health 2000, p.vii).   
This could easily be read across into the information security incident reporting 
concerns.      
The issue of failing to report incidents is covered in many healthcare research papers 
including Chiang et al, (2010), Lawton and Parker (2002) and Schectman and Plews-
Ogan (2006).   Chiang et al (2010) suggest this failure to report is due to unhelpful 
administrators and other workers, as well as those responsible for the incident, being 
subjected to challenges over their ability and facing the potential for disciplinary action.   
Lawton and Parker (2002) focussed on measuring attitudes of medical staff when 
responding to a number of scenarios.  They observed there is evidence that under 
reporting is a significant problem, particularly for non-confidential reporting systems.  
With regards to the NHS they suggest;  
“The culture of the medical profession, which discourages reporting, and 
increasing fears of litigation are therefore likely to constrain the reporting of 
errors to the NHS” (2002, p.15) 
Further research with regards to perceived lack of reporting in healthcare comes from 
Firth-Cozens (2002) when commenting on the setting up of the National Patient Safety 
Agency to study errors so that lessons can be learned.  Firth-Cozens emphasise “this all 
depends upon errors being reported, and considerable research shows this is far from the 
case today”. (2002, p.7).   An opportunity to test this is provided by Hutchinson et al 
(2007) through analysis of patterns in the reporting of patient safety incidents from 
hospitals in England to the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). These incidents 
were collated through the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) that was 
implemented in 2003. This reporting system was one of the recommendations made by 
the UK Dept. of Health Report;   
“We recommend that a single overall system should be devised for analysing 
and disseminating lessons from adverse health care events and near misses.” 
(2000, p.83) 
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During the period of analysis those hospitals that had reported a higher number of 
incidents also had a lower proportion of incidents in the  
“ ‘slips, trips and falls’ category, suggesting that these hospitals were reporting 
higher numbers of other types of incident”. Hutchinson et al (2007, p.5).   
This could indicate that a number of other hospitals who had recorded proportionality 
higher numbers of ‘trips and falls’ were not necessarily recording other types of adverse 
patient incident. One possible theory is that in those hospitals reporting a lower number 
of trips and falls their patient safety awareness had improved through reporting and 
learning from these types of incident potentially encouraging further reporting.  
Hutchinson et al (2007) argue this by stating  
“staff perceptions of the culture of safety and reporting within their hospital 
influence the actual number of reports being made.” (2007, p.8).   
One of the benefits of a national system that was reported by Hutchinson (2007) is that 
reports increase over time and that higher reporting rates can be correlated to a more 
positive safety culture. This type of central reporting facility at least enables questions 
to be asked of the data and resultant benefits from that analysis could lead to indications 
of incident trends.  The notion of a national reporting system like the NRLS has its 
attractions, however Hutchinson et al (2007), whilst recognising there are benefits, also 
identify drawbacks in such systems.   Particularly those associated with their 
implementation and development.   
In a different study on the aspect of adverse patient incident reporting to the National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) by Olsen et al (2006) they noted that in the 
first full year of the system being in operation more than 500,000 reports were received, 
of which, 79% were reported by acute hospital Trusts. Beneath these figures, Olsen et al 
(2006) discovered that “only 25% of incidents were related to medical care and only 
about 10–15% came from doctors” (2006. p.43) This indicates support for other 
research that shown in section 2.10.3  that doctors are less likely to report than nurses. 
In a separate study of different types of reporting in anaesthesia by departmental, 
hospital wide and national methods Rooksby, Gerry and Smith (2007) examined 
examples of different types of incident reports.  They all have strengths and weaknesses; 
local forms were paper based and gave space for free text under heading such as ‘what 
happened’ and ‘how could this have been prevented’.  The downside was there was 
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limited scope for external issues to be flagged. Hospital wide forms were more limited 
in the ability to write freely and were viewed with suspicion by staff and the local forms 
were not allowed to be completed further causing difficulties. Nationally the challenge 
was to get sufficient participation.  Their summary described the need for a reporting 
system that could to tell a story that could be understood at all levels to obtain the best 
value from the report. 
A study by Tighe et al (2006) into adverse patient incident reporting and its 
effectiveness at one hospital Accident and Emergency department identified a number 
of issues with the reports. These included not all incidents being reported, lack of 
consistency in incident classification and excessive use of ‘other ‘as a classification.   
This points to the concern that when reporting systems are introduced, even the 
incidents that are reported may not contain the levels of accuracy and consistency in 
classification to make analysis into themes and trends reflect true reality.  All the above 
research highlights various problems with reporting.  Are there any other factors to be 
considered.  The next section examines whether there is any correlation to status, grade 
or role that may affect the level of reporting. 
2.10.3  Is the Level of Reporting Affected by Type and Grade of Staff? 
Hutchinson et al (2007) noted that falls tended to be reported in greater numbers by 
nursing staff.  The issue of who reports is found in other research in the health care 
sector that suggests the apparent existence of a difference in attitudes to reporting 
between doctors and nurses.  As identified by Lawton and Parker (2002)  
“Even when the behaviour concerned reflects the deliberate violation of a 
clinical protocol; doctors are less likely than nurses or midwives to report 
colleagues to a superior” (2002, p.17).    
The study undertaken by Lawton and Parker (2002) did have some possible flaws, 
which they accepted, but findings appear to be consistent with that of other research. 
Hutchinson et al (2007, p.5) identified that, “many incidents still go unreported, with 
doctors being less likely than nurses to report” from the research undertaken by 
Kingston, Evans, Smith and Berry (2004).  Schectman and Plews-Ogan (2006) found 
that, upon analysis of the incident reporting system of the University of Virginia VA 
Hospital in the US, out of 1200 incident reports only 3% were reported by physicians.   
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It is of interest to note that this figure was obtained by sampling as the hospital system 
could not differentiate this automatically. This deficiency supports the earlier comments 
by Hutchinson et al (2007) on concerns regarding implementing and developing such 
reporting systems. Incident reporting systems have to be designed appropriately to 
ensure learning is possible.  Having identified this low figure from senior staff, 
Schectman and Plews-Ogan (2006) asked them what would increase reporting. The 
responses showed the most likely method of increasing reporting would be to allow 
electronic reporting followed by a group of three elements, clarifying the reporting 
mechanisms, clarifying what constitutes and incident and to allow anonymous reporting 
(taken from Schectman and Plews-Ogan, 2006, Table 2 p.340).  A difficulty in 
completion of reports was raised by Kingston Evans, Smith and Berry (2004) in their 
study of attitudes of doctors and nurses towards incident reporting.  The responses to 
questions asked of the study’s focus groups provide a good insight into the doctors 
versus nurses’ propensity to report.  From the doctor’s perspective, their responses 
implied that more serious incidents were frequently not reported as incidents but instead 
referred to as ‘known complications’ (2004, p.37).    This suggests the interpretation 
from the professional body of doctors is ‘adverse patient’ incidents are considered as 
not so much as something that went wrong as a result of their actions, but occurred as a 
consequence of a patient’s condition.  Further examples of this came from general 
discussions with doctors that revealed “a preference for doctors of all seniority to keep 
adverse events ‘in-house.” (2004, p.37). In contrast Kingston and Evans (2004) assert 
that from a nurse’s perspective, they were more likely to report incidents citing 
responses such as; “Our organisation tells us that we need to fill out these forms, 
therefore we do.” (2004, p.37) They continue by suggesting an interesting perspective 
of the potential or perceived difference in standing between doctor and nurse, where a 
nurse was more likely to report an incident.  “because of their relative powerlessness, it 
being their only recourse to improve a situation.” (Kingston and Evans, 2004, p.37).   
In another study, Nguyen, Weinberg and Hillborne (2005) describe the experience of a 
web based incident reporting system introduced in five University of California medical 
campuses.  Despite a threefold increase of reports after a new electronic system was 
introduced only 1.7% of safety reports were submitted by physicians.  Nguyen 
Weinberg and Hillborne (2005) suggest there have been numerous calls to tackle 
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apparent reluctance to report through better education and training particularly for the 
next generation of physicians. 
In a paper by Soderberg, Grankvist, Brulin and Wallin (2009) into errors and mistakes 
that took place in Swedish laboratory testing, the findings are consistent with others. 
They conducted a survey of 70 primary health care centres and two hospital clinical 
laboratories studying a specific health area, that of venous blood sampling, and the 
reporting of adverse incidents relating to the errors in such testing.   Soderburg et al 
(2009) identified that even though errors occurred, 69% staff had never filled out an 
incident report.  They observed this despite it being mandatory to report all incidents 
that relate to patient safety as required by the National Board of Health and Welfare in 
Sweden.  Many reasons were given by respondents for not reporting including; “lack of 
time, a complicated reporting procedure, no one else reports incidents and the belief that 
the reporting of an incident would not make any difference.” Soderburg et al (2009, 
p.733) 
In the same area of patient care incident reporting Mahajan (2010) suggests the volume 
of incident reporting in healthcare is less than it should be and certainly lower that in the 
aviation industry or other high-risk industries. He argues that the lack of reports 
prevents learning from the causes of incidents and therefore hinders any future learning 
in the organisation to ensure that type of event is less likely to occur in the future.   He 
also suggests that blame culture can prevent reporting and that the absence of punitive 
measures should improve reporting.  Throckmorton and Etchegaray (2007) also 
included other studies based on reporting and the relationship with the organisational 
culture, whether it is punitive or not.   The concept being, in a less punitive organisation 
the likelihood that reporting would take place increases, as opposed to a punitive 
organisation that would result in a suppressed number of reports.  From the above 
research, there appears to be several potential factors which can affect reporting.  
 Does the degree of harm or loss caused because of an incident have any impact on the 
likelihood it is reported?  The next section reviews the literature that provides an insight 
into this. 
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2.10.4  Is the Degree of Harm Caused a Factor in Reporting? 
A factor that needs to be considered what does the actual or prevention of harm have on 
the reporting of incidents as opposed to data loss does not necessarily have the same 
impact on the person or organisation experiencing a data loss.  Whilst some research 
referred to earlier identified a link between grade or seniority and reporting other 
research focussed on the level of harm and the likelihood to report.  Throckmorton and 
Etchegaray (2007) rather than compare grades of worker and their likelihood focussed 
on one type - Registered Nurses. They based their findings on a widely-distributed 
survey that had a relatively low response rate however, the findings are of note.  The 
degree of harm to a patient was graded and the responses recorded against the likelihood 
to report an incident against the severity of harm caused to the patient. Interestingly 
Throckmorton and Etchegaray (2007, p.408) reported 55% of respondents would report 
an incident with no harm having resulted, whereas 94.7% would report where the harm 
was minimal.  
Throckmorton and Etchegaray (2007, p.408) identified the largest response, 99%, 
would report serious injury and a similar number for death.  This indicates that low or 
no impact adverse incidents do not attract the same high levels of reporting that the 
more serious incidents enjoy. This appears to slightly contradict research by Kessels-
Habraken et al (2010) that where a near miss resulted in no harm to a patient, employees 
may be more likely to report as they would have less fear of repercussions.    The same 
respondents were then asked; would they share the knowledge of the incident with a 
colleague?  The result for sharing the error where there was no harm was far higher at 
67.8% but for the rest of the incidents, where there was a greater degree of harm, the 
respondents appeared slightly less likely to share the error with a colleague.  No reasons 
for this were given.  It could be argued that where an incident is of low severity, the 
need, or perceived need to report the incident is lower than where there is a greater 
degree of harm caused.  It appears that although the inclination to report increases for a 
more serious incident the opposite occurs when it comes to sharing knowledge of the 
error.  
Flaaten and Hevroy, (1999) in their study into the relationship between the seriousness 
of an incident and the subsequent consequence identified that despite the facility for 
anonymous reporting being in place even low level harm incidents were not always 
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reported to a reasonable level.  Schectman and Plews-Ogan (2006) made similar 
findings in their research linking the degree of harm to reporting. In their survey, many 
the respondents indicated that where an event was not considered to be serious it need 
not be reported. In addition, there were some comments that where an individual had 
made a mistake, and had the error pointed out and corrected for the future, a report 
would not be required.  Hagan (2009) similarly observed a tolerance amongst staff to 
new recruits and, if they made a mistake that should have been classed as a security 
incident, rather than reporting it properly they would talk it through with the new 
employee instead.  The danger with this is, firstly no report is made and, secondly any 
lessons that could be learnt from a training need are not centrally collated.  The security 
manager would not be informed as to what additional input would be required for new 
recruit training.    Part of the solution could be ensuring employees understand the 
importance of the processes they undertake in their employment and therefore the need 
to report something when the process is either, not working or an incident within that 
process occurs. 
Many no harm incidents could be arguably thought of as near misses. In other words, if 
no harm is caused there is not a need to report. However, the opportunity to learn from 
these is lost. Similar findings regarding the type of severity of incident and the 
likelihood to report are made by Haines et al (2008) through staff comments derived 
from a widespread survey of 30 ward staff across seven hospitals in Queensland 
Australia.  They identified there was some degree of influence on increased levels of 
reporting if it was felt that litigation may follow.  Equally staff were less likely to report 
if the patient was not injured, where the attitude of the staff to reporting was poor or 
particularly dependant on how busy the staff member was at the time of the fall.   In 
Haines et al (2008) there is also a reference to the problem of incomplete data when 
shared for wider analysis as there are a;       
“complex hierarchy of determinants that can impact upon the recording of 
hospital falls on incident reports that exist within the context of a range of 
environmental/cultural factors that can also impeded incident reporting.”   
Haines et al (2008, p.7) 
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Again, as in Throckmorton and Etchegaray (2007) , the research by Haines et al (2008) 
appears to indicate serious incidents are more likely to be reported but not as readily 
shared where lower harm incidents are concerned   Where it is felt only serious 
incidents are reported other methods could be considered to identify the lower level 
incident rate. The ‘Dept. of Health. An Organisation with a Memory Report’ (2000) 
suggested this very concept of extrapolation in one of its comments where it referred to 
research into the relationships between volumes of incidents and their seriousness, 
citing the Heinrich Ratio (1941)  
“As far back as the 1940s, research in industry demonstrated that for each 
accident causing serious injury, there were a far greater number of accidents 
which resulted in minor injuries or no injury at all – ‘near misses.” (2000, p.53) 
The report referred to Heinrich’s (1941) rationale that for every 1 Major injury there 
were 29 Minor injuries and 300 No-injury accidents.  It should be noted that there are 
counter views on the Heinrich ratio for example Taxis, Gallivan, Barber and Franklin 
(2005) argued that from their research into the Heinrich ration they could not find 
evidence to validate it.   In their research, they did identify;  
“there is an urgent need for a common taxonomy in medication error research 
for defining, classifying, measuring and reporting medication incidents.” (2005, 
p.8)    
Arguing more in favour of Heinrich are Jones, Kirchsteiger and Bjerke (1999) who 
suggest that “that the more near misses (or other deviations) you have the more 
frequently you will have accidents” (1999, p. 62). Others such as Kessels-Habraken et al 
(2010) argue near misses occur more frequently than actual incidents; they also raise the 
concern that without a definition of what a near miss is it is difficult to encourage 
reporting. Kessels-Habraken (2010, p.1306) research offered the definition of a near 
miss that differentiates between incidents that did not reach the patient and those that 
did, but no harm was caused. The point being the absence of true empirical numbers on 
incidents makes it difficult to judge the efficacy of Heinrich’s theory.     Even then, with 
the varying degrees of incident classification discussed earlier in this chapter, this may 
never be possible. 
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2.10.5  Does Informing the Patient or Victim Affect Reporting?  
It is also important to consider the subject of any adverse incident; the patient 
themselves.  In the information security sector, there are a growing number of 
legislative and regulatory requirements for breaches to be notified to victims. These 
requirements also exist in some legislation relating to patient breach notification.   In 
Ontario, Canada there is the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) 
introduced in 2004.   The issue here is this legislation mandates the notification to the 
patient of any personal data loss but does not relate to other types of medical incident or 
adverse patient incident.   Cantor (2002) discusses the notion that patients should be 
informed of incidents that involve them.  After all, they are the victims and could offer 
valuable learning and knowledge as part of any post incident review.  Cantor (2002) 
refers to opposing research views whether the patient should be informed they have 
been the ‘victim’ of an adverse incident.  He identified that Witman, Park and Hardin 
(1996, cited in Cantor, 2002, p.7) in their paper ‘How do patients want physicians to 
handle mistakes?’ suggest that patients want to be informed of even minor events.  
Whereas others Lo B (1995, cited in Cantor, 2002, p.7) argue that patients only need to 
be informed of an adverse incident where actual harm has been caused to that patient.   
If the reporters of incidents, or even those who did not report them, understood the 
needs and intentions of patients once they were informed, this could affect the 
inclination to report in the first place.  Some medical staff may be less likely to report 
an adverse incident if they knew the affected patient was to be automatically informed 
in every case.   
Garret and Reeves (2009) in their survey of Australian pharmacists from one area health 
service investigated interventions made to a patient’s treatment or care, where 
intervention is classed as, “to eliminate or mitigate harm resulting from clinical 
incidents.”  (2009, p.99).  When asked if they always or almost always reported an 
intervention; 35% responded yes where an actual incident had occurred as opposed to 
19% saying yes where there was a near miss.  The survey also identified pharmacists 
believed 65% of incidents are only reported sometimes, rarely or never, with an even 
higher score of 81% sometimes, rarely or never for near misses (2009, p.100). Again, 
the issue of seriousness of incident appears to increase the likelihood of reporting.  81% 
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of errors would be reported if a patient was transferred to intensive care as a result of an 
incident.   
The numerous studies in different healthcare sectors appear to show a link between the 
seriousness of an event and the subsequent likelihood of it being reported, resulting in 
many unreported low harm incidents potentially leading to a more serious incident - the 
‘Swiss Cheese’ model again. The resultant factor being by not reporting any opportunity 
to learn from a near or series of near miss incidents is lost.  This is referred to by Lukic, 
Margaryan and Littlejohn (2010) that incidents tend occur after other, smaller non-
reported events, such as near misses.  Toft and Reynolds (1999) were not researching 
health care or information security but how to learn from the causes of disasters.  The 
sad fact is it is often only after a disaster occurs that the subsequent enquiry identifies a 
number of minor reported or unreported incidents which highlighted the potential for a 
disaster but were not acted upon.  
Peer pressure can be a factor in reporting of near misses. Hagen (2009) identified that 
attitudes to reporting can relate to the action of others.  One of the responses to his 
survey sums that up in the comment; “why should I report near-miss incidents when 
nobody else does”. (2009, p.66) 
Attempts to improve reporting in the health care sector continue.   In 2015 in the UK the 
Care Quality Commission introduced a new statutory ‘Duty of Candour’ Care quality 
Commission (2015, p.8; see glossary) as a result on enquiries into events involving 
patient care at Winterbourne View Hospital, Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.  
The purpose of this new power is “to encourage a culture of openness and to hold 
providers and directors to account.” (2015, p.4). It sets out specific requirement that 
health service providers must follow when things go wrong which includes informing 
the patient.   
In summary, it could easily be argued that the research and findings from the healthcare 
sector point to considerable failings even where there is a requirement to report an 
adverse event.  Whether this is due to peer pressure, the lack of understanding or 
appreciation of the impact, the consequences of that event or even its potential to cause 
harm. The main area of concern is that under reporting is adversely affecting the ability 
to understand the true picture. The initial findings from what research that does exist in 
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the information security sector show potential similarities that indicate such healthcare 
findings could be of use in the information security area should it wish to learn from 
them.   This leads to the question; what if incident reporting was mandated in legislation 
as opposed to as currently in many organisations it is a policy or compliance 
requirement?   The next section examines the impact on reporting where the reporting of 
incidents has been made mandatory through legislation. 
2.10.6  Does Policy Affect Reporting? 
An investigation to ascertain whether security policy in healthcare had any effect on 
reporting (Wiant, 2005) identified the lack of research in security incident reporting and 
was hampered by low response rates.   Wiant (2005) concluded that if reporting is 
included in security policies additional study is required to determine what actions are 
necessary to.  
In the Health and Safety sector it is mandatory to report certain types of incident. 
However, even despite this mandation there can still be under reporting.   The Rail 
Standards and Safety Board (RSSB) were asked to review the number of RIDDOR 
(Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995) lost 
time injuries reported by network rail and its contractors when compared to the number 
of major injuries being reported.   The report ‘the Independent Review of RIDDOR 
Reporting by Network Rail and its contractors (2011)’ also refers to Heinrich (1941) as 
an indicator that not all incidents were being reported when the number of serious 
incidents were extrapolated using the Heinrich ratio.    
It is interesting to note that the report’s authors used the Heinrich Pyramid principal 
which has been used in other official reports such as the Dept. of Health -  a Learning 
Organisation (2000), particularly as other academics (Taxis, Callivan, Barber and 
Franklin 2005) have questioned Heinrich’s model. Whoever is right, it is not so much 
the accuracy of the ratio that is the point in question, but a reasonable assumption in that 
if there are serious incidents there should, by rational thought, be a number of less 
serious ones as well.  And this number would be expected to be greater than the number 
of serious ones.  
The RSSB report (2011) identified barriers to reporting and that there was an 
assumption by senior management that measures put in place to improve safety were the 
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direct cause of lower numbers of incidents being reported. In fact, the review identified 
other behavioural factors came into play.  One of these being the adverse effect of 
league tables for safety, which encouraged the under reporting by managers to improve 
the figures.  
This adverse effect of incentives is also referred to by Wilde (2008) where he suggests 
that such incentives can have undesirable effects manifested by under reporting.   Wilde 
(2008) suggests that “the basic strategy of injury prevention should be to reduce the 
level of risk that people are willing to accept.” (2008, p.90) This view could equally 
apply to information security risk.   If within an organisation individuals were 
encouraged, as part of a culture to accept a lower (or more appropriate) level of risk for 
the activity they are involved in, this should over time bring the level to an accepted 
norm. This is opposed to offering incentives as these can have the wrong effect and 
encourage under reporting.   The RSSB (2011) report highlights that when under 
reporting is tackled and incidents are being reported there is still the issue of incorrect 
classification.  A factor that needs to be taken into account is that Health and Safety has 
direct relationship to the actual or prevention of harm whereas data loss does not 
necessarily have the same impact on the person or organisation experiencing a data loss.    
Sveen, Sarriegi, Rich and Gonzalez (2007) investigated the correlation between the 
reporting of high priority and low priority incidents working on an assumption if the 
focus is made on increasing the reporting of high priority ones and learning from them 
could have an effect on the low priority incidents that may have developed into high 
priority ones if not tackled.  They also suggest that if the focus was one improving all 
incidents then those charged with handling the incident could be swamped by the 
volume of low priority one and not be able to deal with the more serious ones.  Working 
on the assumption that high priority incidents have a potential for greater impact on the 
organisation by focussing on these types it is argued has the greatest benefit.   
Sveen, Sarriegi, Rich and Gonzalez (2007) also considered the incentivising of 
reporting to improve the flow of reports.  Their view was that if such a move to 
encourage took place the increase in lower level easier to notice and report incidents 
could have an adverse impact on the resource allocated to investigate incidents. Sveen, 
Sarriegi, Rich and Gonzalez, (2007) also recognised that the setting of incident 
reduction incentives can, as described in the RIDDOR (2011) report, have negative 
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implications in that actual incidents that should be reported are not in order to meet 
reduction targets. 
The subject of mandating incident reporting or Breach notification as it is also known 
has been commented on by Room, S (2009). High-profile losses such as the HMRC disc 
incident in November 2007 has created what Room (2009, p.285) refers to as a 
“regulatory bear market”.  He describes this as where the main regulators, the 
Information Commissioner and the Financial Services Authority, are very pessimistic 
about the state of data security within regulated organisations.   He poses the question,  
“should data controllers be under a legal obligation to notify security breaches 
or the loss of data to the authorities or to people affected?” (2009, p.377).   
Room (2009) argues that the current cycle of development of security law began in 
2003. He states the significance being the introduction of breach notification legislation 
on California.  He feels that arguably this type of legislation has done more than 
anything else to encourage improvements in data security.  Although this view may be 
correct, even with legislation to ensure incidents are reported there is still the issue of 
the barriers to report and importantly accurately report, classify, collate and analyse that 
incident data. If mandation is in place does it bring any benefits. 
2.10.7  Mandated Breach Reporting.  
What if the reporting of all incidents were to be mandated?  There has been research in 
the area of data breach legislation including Hagen (2009), Cavoukian, (2009), Regan 
(2009) and Romanosky and Acquisti (2009), Romanski, Acquisti and Sharp (2010) and 
Romanski, Hoffman and Acquisti (2012).  
Romanosky and Acquisti (2009) pose an interesting question;  
“Is the legislature trying to fine tune an optimal balance between the costs and 
benefits of data privacy and commercial flows of information, or trying to 
achieve a standard of protection, independently of its economic trade-offs?” 
(Romanosky and Acquisti, 2009, p.1075).   
It appears that an emerging consequence of legislation, originally aimed to provide a 
mechanism to inform victims that their data may have been compromised, is instead 
increasingly resulting in opportunities for that victim to take litigation against the 
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company notifying them of that potential compromise, despite some companies offering 
victims the opportunity to monitor their finances for exploitation of any such breach. 
Hagen (2009) conducted research into a number of organisations in Sweden following 
the introduction of a Security Act in 1998 designed to protect information.  The 
observation was that even though the organisations were complying with the same rules 
there were noticeable differences between organisations in attitudes to security incident 
reporting.   Hagen (2009) identified that even if a report is compiled it may be incorrect 
or incomplete as there were many options available to report an incident open to staff.  
Although Hagen (2009) focuses on the relationship between legislation, policy and 
employee’s attitudes and behaviour, the reporting of incidents is touched upon in his 
paper. He identified that despite legislation mandating the reporting of incidents, it was 
an employee’s attitude and understanding of the need to report, rather than legislation 
that determined whether incidents are reported.   
2.10.8  Does Breach Notification Bring Benefits? 
Schneier (2008) proposes that mandated breach notification is a good thing for three 
reasons. Firstly, it is good practice to inform someone they are or are potentially a 
victim and may have their data exploited to their financial disadvantage. Secondly, the 
notifications may produce statistics for research purposes and thirdly the fact that 
companies suffer adverse publicity as a result of a breach may force them to spend more 
on security to prevent breaches in the first place.  He also suggests, as a consequence, 
companies may therefore be less likely to store as much customer data. 
This may be starting to occur but are the priorities balanced correctly?   In the Ernst and 
Young survey on cloud computing (2011) they identified that data leakage and data loss 
protection technologies were rated second to business continuity plans (BCP) by 
companies who responded to the survey. 36% of respondents stated BCP would attract 
the most funding against 13% for data loss protection. It may appear the value of the 
data for the company could be perceived to be more important than the actual data 
subjects after all without the data, the company cannot function and may go out of 
business.  
Research by Lukic, Margaryan and Littlejohn (2010) suggests that how an organisation 
learns from incidents, in this case health and safety incidents, depends on that 
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organisations attitude and approach to safety.  The objective is not just to share 
information and knowledge about an incident but to “aim for a safety culture where 
learning is a process of continuous knowledge flow.” (2010, p.429). They suggest that 
knowledge and information that is gleaned from one incident may be particularly 
relevant to other incidents that initially do not appear to be of a similar nature.  Lukic, 
Margaryan and Littlejohn (2010) refer to single and double loop learning in relation to 
incidents as do Voss and Wagner (2010). The term ‘double loop learning’ originates 
from Argyris (1997, p.116) who reports on the challenges and lost opportunities of 
learning from staff when things are not working as they should.  He suggests this stems 
from “The inability to uncover errors and other unpleasant truths arises from faulty 
organizational learning” (Argyris, 1977, p.115)   Managers when receiving reports do 
not always act upon them or filter the ‘bad’ news slowly.   Argyris continues regarding 
the challenges for employees to report by saying they are in a ‘double bind’ which is;  
“when employees adhere to a norm that says hide errors they know they are 
violating another norm that says reveal errors.  Whichever norm they choose, 
they risk getting into trouble” (Argyris, 1997, p.116) 
The single loop learning is in effect a sticking plaster approach or knee jerk reaction 
compared to double loop learning where a root cause analysis of the event would take 
place.   Lukic, Margaryan and Littlejohn (2010) refer to double loop learning as 
important due to its ability to “surface latent and systemic causes that might be 
contributing to incidents at a later stage” (2010, p.431).    Voss and Wagner (2010) 
when referring to learning from small disasters suggest understanding the true impact of 
such incidents by proposing two measurements.  One being scale. “How severe is the 
destruction and distress?” The other being scope “How widespread is the disruption 
within the community?” (2010, p.658)   This approach could be considered when 
assessing the impact of any incident or breach that a company has experienced when 
assessing the real impact on its customer base. 
Mandating that breaches are reported will not necessarily improve any learning from 
that incident.  The culture of an organisation can often determine how, and indeed, 
whether an incident is addressed.   Other research namely by CIPPIC (Canadian Internet 
Policy and Public Interest Clinic) 2007 and Romanosky, Telang and Acquisti (2008) 
 83 
 
focus on data breach notification.  CIPPIC argue for data breach notification to be 
introduced nationally and concentrate on the effect of security breaches on victims, 
suggesting there is no incentive for organisations to report incidents and breaches unless 
forced to do so by legislation. In particular, by reporting a security incident, companies 
would have to identify their security failures which could have an adverse impact on 
their reputation.  CIPPIC (2007) identify differing standards and interpretation of the 
various breach notification laws within in the United States; where there are differences 
between States in the reporting criteria.  For example, in some States there are 
exemptions for the requirement to report if the lost data was encrypted or redacted. 
Interestingly there is often no clarification on the degree or standards of encryption 
required to meet this exemption. The degree of this mitigation varies from State to 
State.  The commonly known ‘triggering event’ for notification also varies as do the 
definitions of breach and harm.  There is also an argument that even with definitions 
there will be local interpretations of them (Kessel-Habraken, 2010; Tamuz, Thomas, 
2006).   
If the thresholds for reporting, or indeed being exempt from reporting are not 
standardised, any attempt to understand a country wide picture is limited at best.  The 
reason for mandating is primarily to protect an individual from being a victim of fraud 
or ID theft.  There does not appear to be an intention to understand the true cause of the 
incident or apply any consistent standards. Therefore, any opportunity to learn from the 
incidents may be lost. In fact, CIPPIC (2007) suggest that although breach notification 
can provide organisations with an incentive to improve security, if the sanctions are not 
of a sufficient nature such mandation can have the converse effect by providing some 
organisations with the potential to hide breaches.  
Conversely, Romanosky Telang and Acquisti (2008) suggest that breach legislation 
could offer incentives for companies to report incidents based on the consequences of 
not reporting. Romansky, Telang and Acquisti (2008) also raise concerns regarding 
standardisation of classification of ‘trigger events’.  They do focus on the potential for 
such legislation to influence behaviours, in particular the customer making a demand on 
their service provider to provide for more security of their information. This has the 
potential to make security a customer driven benefit that companies would consider 
offering.  There is also the risk that by continually informing victims they have been 
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subject to a breach may result in the phenomenon known as ‘notification fatigue’, 
Cavoukian (2009).   The next section looks more closely at the impact of breach 
notification on the victims and offenders particularly relating to the resultant litigation 
that may follow. 
2.10.9  The Compensation Culture and Breach Notification 
Victims of data breaches appear to be increasingly seeking compensation often in the 
US through class action (Kim, 2016), which can focus companies’ attention on the 
wider cost implications of any breach.  A study by Romanosky, Hoffman and Acquisti 
(2012) identified that the “odds of a firm being sued in a US Federal Court are 3.5 times 
greater when individuals suffer financial harm.” (2012, p.1) Where the company that 
was responsible for a breach provided free credit monitoring after the breach had 
occurred, it was identified that such companies were six times less likely to be sued.  It 
appears that by putting in place mitigation after an event can in fact reduce the financial 
impact of any litigation made against the company involved and potentially reduce, or 
at least identify, any attempt by criminals to exploit the victim’s data.  Regan (2009) 
and Cavoukian (2009) both refer to the situation that although an organisation may have 
to report a loss or compromise of a customer’s data as a breach, in reality this data is 
invariably not lost in the true sense. That data is still available to the organisation on 
their systems for them to carry on their business. The impact of that breach is arguably 
felt more on the customer who may have had to cancel credit cards, check credit 
references and other counter fraud activity.  Harm has been caused to the customer, not 
the data owner.  The only harm that could be inflicted upon the organisation is through 
any fine, regulatory notice or through reputational damage. 
Romanosky and Acquisti (2009) researched the issue of breach notification further in 
their paper examining consumer data protection laws in the US and their impact and the 
cost implications for organisations. This is in response to the inevitable growth in the 
costs of compensation or regulatory fines being imposed on organisations that suffer a 
data breach, particularly where there is a requirement to notify the victim.  Romanosky 
and Acquisti (2009) propose that some standards such as PCIDSS (Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standards) are becoming the de-facto legal compliance standard 
for organisations that process consumer credit cards. The issue here being not so much 
the common good for protecting critical infrastructures, such as finance, but ensuring 
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the victim of a breach receives some form of compensation.  This element is outside of 
the scope of this research but certainly is of note regarding the consequences of 
organisations not having in place robust and efficient incident reporting systems and 
processes. The reference to standards such as PCIDSS and the different interpretation of 
breach notification exemptions highlights the problem that there may be too many 
standards. 
The question is what affect will this have on encouraging greater reporting of incidents 
in the first place. Whether such legislation reduces instances of identity theft or not is 
hard to distinguish. Romansky and Acquisti (2009) summarise by recognising there is 
limited empirical evidence on the effect of data protection legislation mandating 
incident reporting; a common theme in the literature reviewed. There does appear to be 
an effect on organisation and consumer practices in response to such legislation, 
however this appears only to have a minor effect on identity theft due to a breach. 
2.10.10 Does a Blame Culture Affect Reporting? 
Hood’s (2002) blame avoidance theory describes the extent to which organisations are 
willing or prepared to share are directly related to managers or key professionals fears in 
relation to being blamed for any failures that may occur because of sharing and 
collaboration or where there is a loss of direct organisational control of that data.  In 
other words, once it is shared it is no longer controlled.  The consequences being they 
will either share, or not share, based on whether they feel the risks of personal criticism 
of their decision to be grater or less.   It could be argued that to some extent this is risk 
management but not so much in a controlled manner more as Hood (2002) suggests that 
the result of a serious high-profile incident can lead to ‘defensive risk management’.  
This can result in individuals and organisations trying to avoid blame and shifting it 
elsewhere.   Hood (2002) may offer an explanation to the knee jerk reaction referred to 
earlier where he suggests “protocolizing behaviour for due-diligence defences may 
produce ill-considered and inflexible responses to complex problems.” (2002, p.65). 
This is linked to the earlier views of Hurtzburg (2007).   As argued by Perrow (1984) 
risks will always exist but not to know the true cause can be as damaging as the original 
incident itself.   
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“Risk will never be eliminated from high-risk systems….at the very least, 
however we might stop blaming the wrong people and the wrong factors and 
stop trying to fix the systems in ways that only make them riskier.”  (Perrow, 
1984, p.4) 
A study by Shekelle (2002) suggests the reason physicians do not fully support any 
improvement initiatives is partly due to their view that such programs provide the 
vehicle to apportion blame for anything that might or might not happen to a patient in 
their care.    Shekelle, (2002, p.6) refers to the historical position as the physician being 
seen as the ‘captain of the ship’ as does Cantor (2002).  This captain analogy and the 
issue of autonomy and feeling of responsibility are also discussed by Perrow (1984) 
when studying incidents in the maritime sector.  This analogy probably relates to the 
authority and autonomy a captain enjoys. The crew may not like some of the decisions 
but will not challenge the captain’s authority.   Shekelle (2002) also raises the issue of 
litigation as being of concern to physicians through malpractice.  The main challenge 
being trying to change a culture from one of blame, to that of learning from mistakes.  
Shekelle (2002) proposes this will be difficult and Tondel, Line and Jaatun (2014) 
reported that system administrators were often not sure if they should report an incident 
as by doing so could result in ‘worst case consequences’ (2014, p.48) particularly as 
they were responsible for the system and therefore could be responsible for the incident 
itself.  Waring (2005) suggests that there are ‘significant barriers’ to the successful 
implementation of incident reporting systems referring to the “fear of blame” or “culture 
of blame” that inhibits participation in reporting (Waring 2005, p.1928).  If reporting is 
to be improved, then the concerns that individuals have about apportioning of blame 
need to be tackled.  In Waring’s (2005) study the notion that the inevitability that an 
error will occur and that this is accepted within the medial culture is something that is a 
main factor in the regarding attitudes to reporting.  As errors or incidents are inevitable 
they somehow become accepted as such and subject to ‘normalisation’ and routine. As a 
result doctors may therefore see reporting as a management exercise rather than a 
method to which service could be improved. (Waring 2005, p.1932) 
2.10.11 Incident Reporting in the Aviation Sector where Harm is a Known Factor  
The aviation sector has a number of approaches to the reporting of incidents and near 
misses. The main aspect of aviation that possibly differs from security incidents and 
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possibly even health care is there is an obvious and clear assimilation of harm. If a plane 
has a problem or there is pilot error serious incidents involving mass casualties can 
occur. It is possible that due to the potential scale of the losses and the fact that 
reporting is more likely to occur. Often headline grabbing and so the expectation to 
report from the travelling public is likely to be greater than for individual incidents of 
harm to patients or financial harm caused by an intrusion incident that compromises 
financial or personal data.  Aviation incidents and near miss reports are reported through 
confidential reporting systems such as the US Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) 
and NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting system (ASRS) which provide limited 
immunity from prosecution (Beaubien and Baker (2002, p.3).   In the UK there is the 
Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP). In themselves 
these reporting systems are different and suffer from clarity on taxonomies to which 
Beaubien and Baker (2002) research looks to address.  In a similar way that this 
research has identified the lack of a common definitions in terms such as a security 
incident and the classifications of types of incidents. 
The key issue and possible difference from other incident reporting challenges is that 
the aviation sector’s reporting relate to threats to safety which is understood and 
recognised by the general public and, when things go wrong, are reported widely in the 
media. 
2.11  Lessons Learnt from Other Industries 
One of the main issues identified is that incident reporting is not as good as it should be 
across all sectors perhaps except for the Aviation industry. Even where they have been 
significant research in the healthcare sector there are still issues with under reporting 
despite recommendations that are intended to improve the situation. There does appear 
to be a relationship between the degree of harm and likelihood to report as well as 
differences in grade or stature (doctor versus nurse). Where there have been disasters 
these were often caused by a series of smaller events not being reported or acted upon 
until too late.    
If anything, this makes improving security incident reporting a challenge as despite 
lessons from other industries the improvement is perhaps not as good as it might be.  
The difference in this research is by using the findings and turning them into the critical 
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success factors that could improve reporting, thereby focussing on less buy more 
important elements of the lessons learnt and developing them into terminology more 
readily accepted by information security professional as well as looking at the potential 
for the deployments of such CSFs through an Incident Reporting Maturity Model may 
have a better chance of success.  
2.12  Research Gap and Sumary 
 
It is apparent that the amount of research into the reporting of security incidents is 
limited.   Critical to managing risk is to understand and have confidence in the level of 
protection against known vulnerabilities and accurate data relating to the types of 
adverse security incidents that have occurred and are still occurring.  Knowledge of 
trends and emerging threats is key to this.  However, without sufficient trusted data, 
such decisions can never be truly fully informed.   There is also a real concern over the 
ability to identify and classify incidents to provide a true analysis of the number of type 
of incidents occurring. 
Examination of the literature relevant to incident reporting so far has identified there is 
research into sharing of incidents but are gaps in research in the area of security incident 
reporting. The particular gap being why are security incidents not being reported. This 
creates a concern that what is being shared is not the full picture. The research has also 
identified a lack of standard taxonomies for security incidents and information security 
risk which could result in what is shared is not truly comparable.  
Whereas in the healthcare sector this has been examined and key factors identified such 
as the relationship between harm and reporting and to an extent the level of seniority in 
the staff involved and their likelihood to report. These factors will require further 
research to identify if they are also evident in the information security sector. 
Supporting elements of these apparent factors to reporting will be incorporated in the 
understanding of the Critical Success Factors that could improve information security 
incident reporting which are reported in more detail in Chapter 5. 
This research appears to identify that there is potential relevance in studies relating to 
reporting of incidents conducted in healthcare and elsewhere that could be carried 
across into information security. Whether it be a general propensity in all sectors to 
refrain from reporting, the difference in reporting according to rank or job designation 
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and also the severity of the incident.  By identifying the potential to utilise research 
conducted elsewhere can make up for the specific immaturity of the information 
security sectors depth of research into this area. This reuse may assist in future 
modelling of ways to improve the situation and to assess the impact on current risk 
assessment and analysis methods. If the relevance of the healthcare research is 
supported in the information security sector then the findings of this literature review 
have identified there is the potential to re-use the research conducted in other sectors 
and apply to information security incident reporting. Although the sector subject is 
different incident reporting, other than those incidents identified by electronic logging 
and detection systems, is still in the hands of staff and individuals. The human factors 
that affect the likelihood to report identified in this review are likely to be similar.  
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
3.1  Introduction 
The literature review in the previous chapter highlighted the differing levels of research 
conducted on incident reporting. It suggests that far more research on incidents has been 
conducted in other sectors, such as healthcare and transportation, than had occurred with 
respect to information security incidents. The identified research that was conducted 
into information security appeared to be more focussed on outcomes such as risk 
analysis, incident management and information sharing as opposed identifying reasons 
why there is an apparent lack of security incident reporting.   
Although the healthcare research focussed on patients, and the harm caused by adverse 
patient incidents, there does appear to be the potential for the research conducted into 
that incident reporting to be applied to information security incident reporting.    
This chapter sets out the philosophies considered, the approach, methodology and 
methods to achieve the research goals set out below. 
(1) To test whether the assumption that not all information security incidents are 
being reported is correct. 
(2) To examine whether research on incident reporting conducted in other 
sectors, such as healthcare, can be applied to the information security sector. 
(3) To identify the Critical Success Factors that may be applicable to 
information security incident reporting. 
(4) To propose an information security Incident Reporting Maturity Model that 
could be applied by organisations and may improve the flow of incidents that are 
reported.  
It also provides further information on the types of methods used to gather information, 
such as the scoping study described in chapter 4, the Delphi study described in Chapter 
5 and the Incident Reporting Maturity Model validation study described in chapter 6.  
Though full discussions of those individual methods are described in other specific 
chapters 
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3.2  Research Philosophy - Natural Science or Social Science 
Approaches to research continue to cause arguments between theorists as to which is the 
right approach.  In the past it was the natural sciences that took prominence, particularly 
relating to quantitative research, where the emphasis was on describing events as 
opposed to understanding why things occur (Easterby-Smith et al, 2003) but times have 
changed leading to the opposite research paradigm to natural science, that of social 
sciences.  The social sciences lean more towards how individuals respond, not just to 
the situation being researched, but also to the researcher (Bryson, 2011).  
Onwuegbuzie (2003) observes that over the last century a rigorous debate has continued 
in the United States over the quantitative and interpretative research paradigms. In his 
view this has led to a divide between opposing camps of researchers, resulting to some 
extent a division of opinion and the competitiveness between the two groups as to who 
is right or wrong.   There are researchers who effectively nail their paradigm position to 
the mast and refuse to move. Onwuegbuzie (2003) believes this is a real threat to 
improvement or advancement of research methods and, all the time this mono research 
theory divide continues, suggests;  
“as long as we remain polarized in research how can we expect stakeholders 
who rely on their research findings to take their work seriously.”  
Onwuegbuzie’s (2003, p.2) 
His paper emphasises the need for researchers to appreciate and utilise both quantitative 
and interpretative research methods as equally valid.   As a result Onwuegbuzie uses the 
term ‘pragmatic researchers’ (2003, p.3). This notion is supported by Robson (2011, 
p.18) who suggest a sort of “détente” has developed and that these paradigms are not 
exclusively separate and that many researchers combine both styles. Indeed the scoping 
survey, Delphi study and validation survey in this research incorporated both 
quantitative and qualitative methods.   A brief comparison of the two types is shown in 
Table  3-1. 
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Quantitative Qualitative 
The emphasis of Quantitative research is 
on collecting and analysing  numerical 
data; it concentrates on measuring the 
scale, range, frequency etc. of phenomena. 
 
This type of research, although harder to 
design initially, is usually highly detailed 
and structured and results can be easily 
collated and presented statistically. 
Qualitative research is more subjective in 
nature that Quantitative research and 
involves examining and reflecting on the 
less tangible aspects of a research subject, 
e.g. values, attitudes, perceptions. 
Although this type of research can be 
easier to start, it can be often difficult to 
interpret and present the findings; the 
findings can also be challenged more 
easily.  
 
Table  3-1  Quantitative v Qualitative Research Methods. Extract from University of 
Bradford (2005, p.3) 
 
Collis and Hussey (2009, p. 66) assert that “most students find their paradigm falls 
broadly between one of the two main paradigms” Onwuegbuzie (2003) continues in his 
view that pragmatic use of either side of the research paradigm in his references to 
Sieber (1973) who argues both research methods have advantages and disadvantages 
and that researchers should “utilize the strengths of both techniques in order to 
understand better social phenomena.” (2003, p.8)   Indeed, he continues by referencing 
(Miles & Huberman, 1984, p. 21) that staying pure to one or the other “epistemological 
purity doesn't get research done."    Durkheim (1982) suggests that when trying to 
explain phenomena there is a need to understand the cause as well as the function it 
fulfils.  This has also been referred to as ‘phenomenology’ (Bryman, 2004, p.13) who 
describes this view being attributed to Alfred Schultz (1899-1959) whose works were 
not well known until later translated in the 1960’s. Buckingham and Saunders (2004, 
p.19) use the description by Kolakowski (1972) of the term phenomenalism as  
“the insistence that scientific knowledge has to be grounded in sensory 
experience of phenomena, or things. If we cannot see, tough, smell, taste or hear 
something, either directly or indirectly, then we cannot study it scientifically.”    
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Additionally Buckingham and Saunders (2004) in relation to survey methods, propose 
the phenomenalist approach is that  
“Facts exist prior to, and independently of, research, and can be discovered by 
asking questions and recording answers systematically.” (2004, p.20), 
Where does this research sit on the research continuum from positivism to 
interpretivism?   Due to the apparent lack of identified research this thesis has to look to 
interpretative methods and utilise qualitative data.  However, that has not prevented the 
acquisition of quantitative data as a result of the studies undertaken. On a continuum 
scale this research philosophy could be argued as being pragmatic and located to the 
right of centre of that paradigm.  Therefore this research philosopher sits in that 
‘pragmatic researcher’ position. This is due to that apparent lack of empirical evidence 
and research in the information security sector to understand why the true number and 
types of incidents is not known and the reasons that prevent reporting. Research 
identified elsewhere, healthcare for example, may have the potential to be reused, even 
though it may not have even been used fully within the sector that conducted the 
research in the first place.    
3.2.1  A Perceived Lack of Empirical Data – what Approach to Adopt? 
Positivistic approaches are founded on a belief that the study of human behaviour 
should be conducted in the same way as studies conducted in the natural sciences 
(Collis and Hussey 2003, p.52).   Bryman (2004) explains that positivism is the 
application of methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond.  
Knowledge to test theories is derived from fact or science. Stahl (2005, p.4) describes 
positivism as “subscribing to empiricist epistemology” whereby “true statements about 
reality can be deduced from impartial observation and experience.”  The research 
subject by its very nature is lacking in empirical information. Had the reporting of 
information security incidents been recorded with reasonable diligence over a period of 
time the research would have been more based on a positivist method.  In the same way 
that in the early days of the insurance industry loss or claim information was not 
collated and widely available. Any initial research there would have been based on 
theory as opposed to observation and interpretation of fact, interviews and opinions as 
opposed to formal study.   A positivistic approach will often seek to research a problem 
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or subject and describe a rational reason for it.  This would normally be achieved 
through proving a link between a theory and the variable in the subject being 
researched.     This is the natural science approach with a belief people respond to 
stimulus, or forces, as opposed to the relatively new social science interpretation of 
human behaviours in that they do not necessarily follow a natural order.  The study of 
human motivation and behaviours can be shaped by elements that are not always easy to 
observe.  External or internal cultural or peer pressure issues can often fashion 
behaviour.  The phenomenological style particularly attempts to interpret the behaviours 
of research subjects from their own perspective. In the absence of empirical information 
on security incidents that would allow for a positivist approach to any research an 
interpretivistic approach was selected.   
With a positivist research approach there is an independence where the researcher and 
the subject are different entities and their “interaction needs to be strictly controlled in 
order to avoid contamination or bias.” Jacobson, Gewurtz and Haydon (2007, p.2) 
suggest in an interpretive approach to the research there is social imagination whereby 
the researcher will be “drawing on their own life experiences to describe and theorise 
their subjects of interest.” Jacobson, Gewurtz and Haydon (2007, p.3).  This can lead to 
a risk of bias being introduced and, having recognised this, the researcher must try to 
avoid introducing bias into their interpretation of their observations. The notion of 
researcher bias is covered is section 3.7. 
As there is an apparent lack of data to base the research in a positivist style the 
alternative interpretivist style was adopted. An interpretative approach in information 
risk is not a bad thing and is considered healthy when putting the information into the 
context of its use and the organisation using it.  Baskerville (1991), when referring to 
the making of risk assessments in information security, suggests it would take some 
considerable time to have complete confidence that all incidents are reported and, more 
importantly, properly categorised to allow sufficient reliance upon their accuracy.  
Irrespective of the amount of empirical evidence on incidents being available 
Baskerville (1991) asserts his view that a generalist or novice will not possess the ‘a 
priori’ professional knowledge and experience which is necessary to correctly interpret 
the complexity and context of specific organisational settings (1991, p.758).  This view 
clearly indicates that Baskerville does not feel security risk assessments can be 
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completely conducted in a positivist scientific manner. He maintains that even if all 
incidents are reported, there is still a requirement for experience, knowledge and 
understanding to interpret the findings of any statistical positivist output.  In other 
words; despite there being a large amount of trusted empirical data there is always a 
place for interpretivism of that data, particularly in the context of the environment to 
which it applies. This contextual impact will differ from organisation, sector or location.    
3.3  Research Approach 
3.3.1  Deductive, Inductive or Abductive Research  
The three stages of abductive, deductive and inductive were identified by Charles Pierce 
(1839-1914).  The three stages are described by Ho (1994, p.1) as; 
“at the stage of abduction, the goal is to explore the data, find out a pattern, and 
suggest a plausible hypothesis; deduction is to refine the hypothesis based upon 
other plausible premises; and induction is the empirical substantiation” 
This approach can lead to more than one cycle of the above as, once a particular set of 
data has been analysed and researched, it is then possible to go back to the original 
hypothesis and refine it to start the abductive, deductive and inductive approach again.  
Staat (1993, p.227) describes this reuse as;  
“the testing of the consequences so that new or more precise hypothesis can be 
suggested – obviously resulting in another three phase enquiry.”  
Ho (1997, p.16) describes the notion that not all possibilities can be tested and therefore  
“we abduct only what is more plausible”.  
This research approach starts from an assumption that information security incidents are 
not being reported in sufficient numbers to reflect the real position. This then leads to an 
approach to test the hypothesis to understand if it is in fact true by the use of the surveys 
described in chapters 4, 5 and 6.   It could be interpreted that, as there are few security 
incidents being reported therefore it follows there are only a few incidents occurring.  
This deductive approach could be accepted if there were accurate empirical evidence to 
back up the statement and that it was the view of those in a position to state the 
accuracy of incident reporting metrics.  It is in fact that apparent lack of any real 
information that makes the deduction, although on the face of it accurate, subject to 
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scrutiny. It is this logically correct but not necessarily true position that Williams and 
May (2000) refer to in their deductive statement that “all pigs can fly, Porky is a pig and 
so, Porky can fly” (1996, p.25) 
This research then takes an inductive approach that asks through research what is the 
reason why there are few security incidents.  It may be that is because few incidents 
actually occur or few are reported, but in reality more may be happening.   That would 
be in its simplistic form.  The example given by Williams and May (2000) where they 
propose that a deductive statement is where the conclusion follows the premise.   This 
theory is based not on empirical data but the lack of it.  The deduction to some extent 
being the lack of information supports the reason for the assumption in the first place.  
Deductive approaches can be very linear as (Bryman, 2004, p 9) outlines below 
sequence; 
1. “Theory 
2. Hypothesis 
3. Data collection 
4. Findings 
5. Hypothesis confirmed or rejected 
6. Revision of theory” 
Whereas, with an inductive approach, the theory is often the result or outcome of the 
research. An inductive approach draws conclusions from research findings and 
observations (Collis and Hussey, 2009).  A different approach could be made thereby 
making this research deductive.  There are few incidents because few incidents are 
reported. Either could be argued but each in reality requires further investigation. 
However, as the research develops the use of studies in the form of questionnaires, the 
Delphi study and validation study the research gradually becomes more inductive. The 
assertion that the number of incidents being reported is below the actual level is based 
on assumption and lack of empirical evidence to test the theory. Therefore, at the first 
stages of this research the methodology could be argued as being deductive. The theory 
being a lack of reported incidents due to a number of as yet un-evidenced barriers, but 
this deductive approach can change once the research provides more information and 
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the resultant thesis will identify or infer broader general ideas or theories, an Abductive 
approach.  
Bryman proposed a simple model to demonstrate the inductive, deductive approach. 
(2004, p.10) 
 
Deductive Approach 
 
 
Inductive Approach 
 
 
 
Figure   3-1  Deductive v Inductive Approach Bryman (2004, p.10) 
To further identify where this research sits it sets out to test the theory that not all 
incidents are reported evidence is collated through a survey which contained both 
qualitative and quantitive questions.  The results confirm the theory that incidents are 
not reported but does not identify the reason(s) why, as there are no empirical data sets 
to work from. Therefore the natural science approach cannot support the research. 
Social science in the form of opinions and views of those who work in the field have to 
be sought.  Once sufficient information is received, although there is still a lack of 
empirical data, there is sufficient to firm up the initial theory but with more evidence 
through opinion as to why this should be.  It could be argued this is an inductive 
approach that leads to a deductive one.  This notion of both types being applicable is 
reported by Perry (1998, p.788) and that a researcher would find it unlikely to separate 
the two.   This can continue until sufficient information is available to achieve a 
consensus of opinion on methods to tackle the problem that, if successful, could result 
in sufficient empirical data to be used in a more positivistic manner. 
 
 
Theory 
Observations/Findings 
Theory 
Observations/Findings 
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Abduction 
 
 
Deduction 
 
 
Induction 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3-2  Deductive, Inductive, Abductive Circular Approach. Authors Adaptation of Bryman 
(2004, p.9) 
This leads to the notion that the approach was actually following an abductive then 
deductive followed by inductive approach which can be repeated.   
3.4  Research Methodology 
To support the research goals there needed to be an appropriate methodology that could 
understand the view of the world of the studied group (information security 
professionals) in relation to information security incident reporting. The research is 
based on a pragmatic researcher approach which uses an interpretivistic philosophy. The 
most appropriate methodologies to obtain the data and opinions of security 
professionals were the use of surveys.  This took the shape of a linear mixed methods 
approach where, using questionnaires, each type of survey was different according to 
the specific research aim.   All made use of the collection of mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative data from the studies group.  By taking the Onwuegbuzie (2003) 
“pragmatic researcher”  approach this methodology of a mixture of types of data from 
Theory 
Theory 
Observations/Findings 
Observations/Findings 
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the positivism and interpretative paradigms can give cause to concern that, as Robson 
(2011)  describes being seen as a “pretty minimal theoretical underpinning to multi-
strategy research verging on an ‘anything goes’ philosophy.”(Robson, 2011, p.171). 
This could lead to the research being criticised as lacking in “dubious rationale and 
validity”.  However by having a clear conceptual structure – the conceptual framework 
outlined in Chapters one  and two – these concerns can be allayed and particularly by 
having a “feasible research question as well as other aspects of the design” (Robson, 
2011, p.171). This design framework is set out as;  
 “Purpose(s)  
Conceptual framework 
Research questions 
Methods  
Sampling procedures”  
(Robson, 2011, p.168) 
 
It is strongly believed that the logic and design of this research meets those design 
framework elements to enable the pragmatic researcher approach to be considered valid 
for this research question.  As Bryman (2004, p.463) reflects that “a multi strategy 
approach is becoming far more common”.  He agrees with Robson (2011) that such 
research must be “competently designed and conducted” (Bryman, 2004, p.464)  
By taking the framework set out by Robson (2011) this research does have  
i) Clear purpose – the four goals 
ii)  A conceptual framework  
iii)  A Research question that is based on the goals  
iv) Methods to support this in the three studies  
v) Sampling methods by ensuring the participants are representative of the 
wider group being studies and were eligible for the particular research 
subject. 
The research methodology selected was considered the most appropriate to support the 
research goals outlined in the introduction.  Goals 1 and 2 were tested through the 
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scoping study; goal 2 was also examined as part of the Delphi study as was goal 3. The 
Validation study incorporated some aspects of goal 3 but focussed mainly on goal 4.  
All three surveys would obtain the research material through data gathering.  “You 
cannot be analytical without data” Davenport, Harris and Morison (2010, p.23). In the 
absence of research in this area the ability to test some of the assumptions regarding 
incident reporting was required.  Asking standard questions of a group and then 
analysing the various responses, in particular noting any if there are any differences 
from industry sectors, would provide a good source of data. It would also serve the 
purpose of defining the problem space.  
The general view is that other research methods such as questionnaires or interviews 
should be considered by those undertaking research against the practicalities, logistics 
and the research questions themselves.   “Attention must be given to other data 
collection methods,” (Hasson, Keeney and McKenna, 2000, p.1009).   
One approach that could be considered is that of a case study.  A case study is a 
methodology that is used to “explore a single phenomenon (the Case) in a natural 
setting” (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p.82).   Bryman (2004) refers to case studies 
normally being associated with a location, such as a community or organisation and 
continues that often case studies are associated with qualitative research but often utilise 
both quantitative and qualitative research. This stance is supported by Yin (1981, p.58) 
who continues that their supportive evidence can take many forms “fieldwork, archival 
records, verbal reports observations or any combination of these”.  There are risks that a 
case study can presume that a finding in one community can be replicated in another. 
The disadvantage of a case study is that if based on one community, although having 
some validity, it may not be considered as truly representative of a wider group.  In 
particular one of the sectors may be subject to specific regulatory controls or 
community security policies relating to incident reporting.  This could result in any 
extrapolation of the findings from such singular groups not necessarily reflecting the 
true situation of the wider security community 
A scoping study was considered that would be used to ask the opinions of security 
professionals what their experience of and confidence in the levels of incident reporting. 
At the same time testing a possible re use of research from other sectors that may assist 
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in increasing reporting, if there was indeed a problem.    The challenge was to find an 
appropriate audience to test these assumptions.   
The first methodological approach was to undertake a scoping study used a mix of 
interpretative and some qualitative analysis of the scoping questionnaire text responses. 
Its main aims were to gain an understanding of a number of information security 
professionals as to their perception and experience of incident reporting.  The 
opportunity was also taken to test whether initial findings from research in the 
healthcare sector could be considered as valid, and re-used by those professionals and 
the sector as a whole.   The scoping study is discussed in Chapter 4.  
Subsequent to the analysis of the scoping study results were provided in a series of 
presentations to information security seminars and conferences. The purpose was to 
examine the responses of information security professionals in both the public and 
private sector to identify if any adverse reaction or comment to those results was made.  
It would also identify the level of support for the research, and provide an indication as 
to whether the findings were truly reflective of the reporting of security incidents in that 
sector. 
A number of potential research methods to obtain consensus were considered. These 
were; case studies, focus groups, interviews and questionnaires and the Delphi study.  
This section outlines why a Delphi study, was eventually selected.   
It is often the case that when a report publishes its findings, whether it is the result of a 
disaster or significant event or one commissioned to resolve a problem, the valuable 
content is not always taken up in practice as organisational cultures are resistant to 
change (Perrow, 2007).  The elements identified in the literature review that could 
influence and potentially improve incident reporting may be able to form the basis of a 
series of Critical Success Factors (CSF’s) required to improve security incident 
reporting.  These CSF’s could be considered to be a vehicle to identify what was 
essential for an organisation to focus on should it wish to improve the reporting of 
incidents.    
To gain consensus from a wide community of information security professionals a 
Delphi study was considered an appropriate method. The Delphi method originated 
from research conducted by the RAND group in the 1950’s to identify the impact of 
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technology on warfare. Rand (2017).  A Delphi is a method  of “eliciting and refining 
group judgements” (Dalkey, 1969, p.v) who continues by describing the method as 
having three features; “Anonymous response, obtained by a formal questionnaire; 
iteration and controlled feedback and statistical group response” i.e. the consensus.  
This research used a group of expert opinions to obtain consensus through an iterative 
process (Erffmeyer, Erffmeyer and Lane, 1986).  The study would set out the potential 
CSF’s identified from healthcare and other research and, using a Likert scale, the 
iterative Delphi process would gain consensus to what elements were considered as 
critical to improving incident reporting. A wide range of information security 
professionals were invited to participate ranging from those belonging to the 
information security professional body, the Institute of Information Security 
Professionals – the IISP, Information Asset Owner’s in UK government, members of 
CiSP and other recognised communities of interest.  
Respondents were given the opportunity to add other factors they felt warranted 
inclusion and consideration by the wider Delphi group.   Consideration as to which 
study methods would be the most suitable to achieve a valid and unbiased outcome, 
predominantly through maintaining confidentiality in any responses, was given and of 
course the university’s ethical committee approval was sought. 
A validation study was considered to identify what, if any, of the CSF’s identified 
through this research and the Delphi study had the potential to impact on the 
improvement in reporting. Particularly whether any alignment can be made with the 
proposed incident reporting Maturity Model identified as a possible vehicle for 
organisations to judge their level of maturity against those CSF’s. The validation study  
involved a control group who had not previously been involved in any of the Delphi 
study process but would have met the eligibility criteria to participate in the Delphi if 
they were available at the time. This control group was used to identify if there were 
any opposing views relating to the identified CSF’s. 
3.5  Research Methods 
There are a number of potential methods available for the gathering of research. These 
are outlined in this section. 
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3.5.1  Scoping Study   
The scoping study was designed using a questionnaire to test the assumption that the 
true level of incidents is not known due to a number of issues surrounding the reporting 
of them. It also aimed to study whether research into incident reporting undertaken in 
other disciplines is relevant and has the potential to be reused to good effect in the 
information security sector. To achieve this a representative group needed to be 
identified and, as some of the questions required responses that could identify failings in 
their organisations incident reporting processes, the participants would need assurance 
that their responses were kept strictly confidential. 
In the field of information security there is a common understanding of the need for 
trust.  When asking for sensitive details of a company’s ability to report incidents and 
the fact they may be subject to regulatory controls and the answers will cause 
embarrassment or worse still censure from a regulator if disclosed.  The subject needs to 
be assured of the researcher’s intentions, professionalism and ability to maintain the 
confidentiality assurances made at the outset.   As the author is part of the subject group 
as an information security professional, and therefore aware of this situation, the need to 
assure information obtained from any questionnaires was done so in a confidential 
manner. It was also important to ensure there was no potential to influence the outcome 
of any contributions and reduce the challenge of bias. 
3.5.2  Delphi Study 
The technique known as a Delphi originated from research conducted by the RAND 
group in the 1950’s to identify the impact of technology on warfare  (Rand, 2017).  The 
research used a group of expert opinions to obtain consensus through an iterative 
process (Erffmeyer, Erffmeyer and Lane, 1986).  Since then the method has become 
popular as a research method.  It is described by the originator of the Delphi, Norman 
Dalkey, as “a rapid and relatively efficient way to ‘cream the top of the heads’ of a 
group of knowledgeable people” (Dalkey 1969, p.16).   A Delphi Study was chosen as 
the most appropriate method of obtaining consensus on what were the Critical Success 
Factors to improve security incident reporting.  
The use of a distributed questionnaire was considered which could alleviate the 
discussed concerns. To identify an agreed set of CSF’s a degree of validated consensus 
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would be required. As the CSF’s had not yet been identified the limits to case studies, 
focus groups and interviews in this research would be time consuming and labour 
intensive, particularly if a wide group of security professionals needs to be involved to 
achieve a more relevant and acceptable consensus.  The scope of the subject is narrow 
and will rely upon participants with subject matter expertise. The use of a Delphi in this 
research to assist in identifying CSF’s that ultimately led to a Maturity Model drew on 
the research from De Bruin, Freeze, Kulkani and  Rosemann (2005) who used the 
Delphi to identify Maturity Models and suggest the Delphi could be used as a two-stage 
approach. In this case, it may be used in the first stage to achieve consensus on the 
CSF’s required and, then be used to validate a subsequent Information Security Incident 
Reporting Maturity Model. Becker, Knackstedt and Poppelbub (2009) suggest the use 
of literature analysis to identify the assessment criteria required to formulate material 
for Maturity Models based on the identified success factors.  They continue by 
suggesting the use of explorative research methods citing Delphi methods as suitable to 
achieve this aim.  Therefore the Delphi was considered as the most appropriate method 
for this research.  Chapter 5 sets out the Delphi study and how it was used to identify 
the Critical Success Factors required to improve security incident reporting.   
3.5.3  Validation Study   
The purpose of the Validation study was to give the Delphi participants the outcome on 
the consensus achieved regarding the identification of and final wording of the four 
CSF’s. In addition it was asking whether, having come to that consensus and identified 
the CSF’s could the results of their contribution be placed in an Incident Reporting 
Maturity Model that could be used as a method of improving the reporting of security 
incidents.  This method was intended to add confidence that   “the data collected reflects 
reality and is a true picture of what is being studied”. (McNeill, 1992, p.15) 
There is an accepted risk of misinterpretation by the researcher of a response to a 
question.  The fact that a Delphi was used, which returns the findings to respondents for 
reconsideration to obtain consensus, adds to the validity of the process as any unusual 
interpretation may be further challenged by respondents.  However, as described earlier 
there was not sufficient text to apply coding to conduct a true content analysis.  The 
iterative rounds of the Delphi would to some extent enable participants to question the 
researcher’s analysis of comments. Although they would not have had access to the full 
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set of responses, they were still able to comment on the interpretation of the overall 
wording changes and results by challenging or suggesting amendments as part of the 
iterative Delphi process.  
To add another element of validity a control group would be identified. This control 
group had not previously been involved in the Delphi study.  They did meet the 
eligibility criteria of those in the Delphi study and by involving such a group would also 
provide a level of assurance as to the identified CSF’s as they would also have an 
opportunity to comment on the wording and usefulness of the CSF’s within a Maturity 
Model.  
The Validation study would also incorporate a method that could be used by 
organisations to make practical use of the identified CSF’s.  An Incident Reporting 
Maturity Model would be developed that incorporated the identified CSF’s and place 
them into a Maturity Model to test the potential to judge an organisations level of 
maturity in relation to each of the identified CSF’s.  The original Delphi participants, 
together with the control group, not previously involved in the research but who met the 
eligibility criteria, would also be used to test the IRMM as a potential method of 
adopting the CSF’s as opposed to just publishing a list of them. 
3.5.4  Data Collection 
Having decided to take an interpretivist approach then the data required a method of 
collection.    The Scoping, Delphi and Validation stages would all make use of 
questionnaires.    In particular the Delphi approach uses questionnaires as part of the 
process to “minimise the biasing effects of dominant individuals, irrelevant 
communications and of group pressure towards conformity,” Dalkey, 1969, p.v) 
Semi structured and unstructured interviews, although challenging, are appropriate in 
some circumstances (Collis and Hussey, 2009). For example, where the interviewer 
wishes to understand the respondent’s world or where the interviewee is uncomfortable 
about answering specific questions. The issue that will arise with any form of 
interviewing is the process of interpretation (Buckingham and Saunders, 2004), as the 
real challenge is to ensure the planning of the interviews recognises that the 
interpretation of a question by an interviewee can be different to the understanding of 
the response by the interviewer. 
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The general view is that other research methods such as questionnaires or interviews 
should be considered by those undertaking research against the practicalities, logistics 
and the research questions themselves.   “Attention must be given to other data 
collection methods,” (Hasson, Keeney and McKenna, 2000, p.1009).  The use of 
structured questions using a mixture of questions to provide quantitive and qualitative 
responses was selected as the most appropriate method. 
3.5.5  Data Analysis 
As all three studies had the facility for free text comments an analysis of these needed to 
be undertaken. A recognised approach being content analysis.  Content analysis is 
where qualitative data is converted into numerical data (Collis and Hussey, 2009). This 
type of analysis is firmly embedded where objective and systematic analysis is required.  
Content analysis is often thought of in terms of conceptual analysis.   (Colorado 
University Guide, 2013, p.2). Although a questionnaire, if properly and strictly 
managed, can be considered unbiased. Any subsequent analysis of free text, 
unstructured additional comments should be conducted in such a way that a different 
researcher following the same process should come up with the same or very similar 
findings. To some extent a controlled laboratory experiment not in the positivist 
discipline but that of the interpretivist.   As commented by Bryman (2004)   it has to be 
recognised that although the initial rules and style of questions may be that of the 
researcher and contain an element of bias. However, it is the methodological and 
systematic approach to the interpretation of any research material emanating from those 
questions that should be replicable.  
By using a scoping study, Delphi study and subsequently a validation study allows for 
the resultant qualitative responses to be subject of content analysis.  In the scoping study 
although there were a number of set questions with a selection of response criteria 
against a Likert scale. This scale was originally developed by Rensis Likert in 1932, 
(Robson, 2011, p.303). There was also the provision of additional comments and 
observation which a number of respondents took advantage of.  It is these additional 
free text comments that provide additional information, value and the opportunity for 
further analysis.  
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A key issue in numerical coding of content or words is regarding is whether to code for 
the existence of a term or its frequency.  In the limited scoping study the amount of 
additional comment could yield some interesting insights into the respondent’s 
additional views on a particular subject.  The volume of responses was not an issue as 
the total number of respondents was 38 but even here the time and resource to apply this 
method can be considerable.  Consistency is also vital.  The term’ lack of’ for example 
may have the same meaning as ‘there are no’ it is the subsequent words that accompany 
these short descriptive phrases that may need examination to be really sure the two 
phrases are used in the same context.   The decision on what to code or count “are 
bound to be affected by the nature of the research questions under consideration” 
(Bryman. 2004, p.187) 
Disadvantages of content analysis will always be the element of bias whether 
intentional or not, as they rely on the interpretation of the researcher.  Bryman (2004) 
there is also the potential for the analysis to be considered atheoretical where 
consideration is given more to “what is measured as opposed to what is theoretically 
significant or important” (2004,  p197) 
To some extent the content of the questionnaire in the scoping study could be 
considered as secondary analysis where the findings of other research, in this case the 
where some of the findings in the Department of Health report (2000), notably the list 
of potential barriers to reporting and learning, were re used to ascertain if similarities of 
identified barriers in the healthcare sector were relevant in the information security 
sector. It is the subsequent free text comments made to these barriers and other 
questions that is the subject of the content analysis. 
The intention being to identify any points or relevant comments that could be 
incorporated in the main face to face interviews that take place or in the case of the 
scoping study the planned subsequent Delphi study. Partly the idea of a scoping 
questionnaire is to test the design flow and efficacy of the original concept albeit there 
was considered thought and pre-launch testing of the scoping questionnaire.    The fact 
that the respondents came from a wide range of companies and countries may have a 
cultural impact on some of the responses that also needs to be considered in any 
analysis.  The potential benefit of the approach of using content analysis was twofold.  
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Firstly, to identify additional research material that came as a result of the responses the 
second as a method of further improving, focussing and fine tuning the face to face 
stage of the research. As suggested by Bryman (2004) there is always a risk that such an 
approach could be considered as atheoretical.  However if the method and process are 
sufficiently grounded in logic and accountability then this concern should be alleviated. 
As many of the comments from all the questionnaires contained a mix of suggested re- 
wording, support for the research, general observations on the problem of reporting or 
additional sub sections of a potential CSF the approach of coding was not considered 
appropriate.  Instead where there appeared to be some consensus or argued need for an 
amendment this was made. This amendment was of course then visible to participants 
either as part of round 2 of the Delphi or the validation survey. The researcher’s 
interpretation of such comments can always have the potential to lead to bias which is 
covered in more detail in section 3.7.  To illustrate the types of comments Appendix 9 
shows the suggested additional CSF’s; Appendix 10 shows participants comments from 
round one and round two of the Delphi. and Appendix 16 shows the comments and 
observations from participants of the Validation study. 
3.6  Ethics   
Bryman (2000, p.509) referring to ethical principles describes the approach by Diener 
and Crandall (1978) who have broken the components of ethics into four main areas. 
“Whether there is; 
harm to participants 
lack of informed consent 
an invasion of privacy  
deception involved” 
Harm can mean many things but in general can include physical harm, participant’s 
development, loss of self-esteem and the inducement to perform certain unacceptable 
acts. (Bryman, 2004). In the case of this research the potential harm could be to a 
participant’s self-esteem through a reputational risk should any information provided by 
a respondent to a survey being attributed to them that may have repercussion either 
professionally or relating to their employment.   This element is covered within the 
various survey designs.  This is illustrated by McNeill (1990) in relation to anonymity 
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and confidentiality.  Although he is referring to the question of asking people what 
criminal offences they have committed, his observations are still valid in this area of 
research.  He asserts that to achieve truthful answers there needs to be a guarantee to 
those providing them that their responses would be confidential. He continues this 
includes answers given by a particular individual are not identifiable (McNeill, 1990, 
p.41). In addition there was only one person conducting the analysis of the responses so 
no secondary analysis of questionnaire took place.  Potential participants need to be 
given as much information as possible regarding the survey in order that an informed 
decision on whether or not to participate can take place (Bryman, 2004).  The three 
surveys included the right to withdraw at any point.  The privacy aspect has been 
covered under the confidentiality and anonymity assurances and the aspect of informed 
consent is catered for the instructions included as part of each survey. 
For the research studies in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 the intention was to achieve as honest and 
open response as possible from the selected community invited to take part in the 
Delphi. Buckingham and Saunders (2004) consider that anonymity and confidentiality 
are crucial and, as discussed earlier, that despite complete anonymity within a Delphi 
being harder to achieve, it is still highly important to assure participants their responses 
are kept secure and not shared. In particular by not linking an individual’s identity with 
any findings.  As the invite to participate was sent to several communities of interest it 
is likely that some would know who else is participating. The critical element is to 
ensure any responses are kept confidential.  
In the Delphi there were no questions that were of a sensitive personal nature.   McNeill 
(1990) asserted that to achieve truthful answers there needs to be a guarantee to those 
providing them that their responses would be confidential, emphasising that any 
responses given by an individual are not to be identifiable (McNeill, 1990, p.41). This is 
equally important for the Delphi as it was to the scoping study.  Although the responses 
to this Delphi were more related to views rather than individual personal and 
confidential issues, the respondents, by the very nature of the fact they work in 
information security and the in-built need to be circumspect in relation to their 
employer’s information, McNeill’s approach remains valid. Collis and Hussey (2009) 
advocate that when setting out a questionnaire it should include a reference to the 
confidentiality of information provided. To ensure the research was ethically sound, the 
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proposed methods, controls for anonymity and confidentiality together with the 
questionnaire and supporting documents was submitted to the university’s ethical 
committee and approval granted. (Reference number CURES/662/2015) 
Other benefits of a Delphi study are that it offers considerable anonymity between 
respondents though an iterative process, whilst allowing a form of conferring but 
without the social pressures to conform to the views as expressed by others (Skulmosky, 
Hartman and Krahn, 2007, p.2). The advantage of using a Delphi questionnaire is that 
(Goodman, 1987, cited in Hasson, Keeney and McKenna, 2000, p. 1012) the true ethical 
anonymity is easier to evidence.  Although in a Delphi the participants can present and 
react to ideas unbiased by the identities and pressures of others they do not see their 
individual responses only the outcomes of the consensus forming.  This has been 
referred to as “quazi-anonymity” (McKenna, 2004. Cited in Hasson, Keeney and 
McKenna, 2000, p. 2012).  Having identified potential Communities of Interest that 
represent a range of information security professionals, approval of those responsible 
for such groups was sought and obtained as part of the ethical approach. This was 
achieved by contacting the relevant governing bodies of those groups and seeking 
formal approval to use their members, having outlined the research subject.  It was also 
important to recognise that as the recipients were security professionals they are likely 
to be suspicious of unsolicited requests for information regarding the security of their 
organisation. 
This potential reticence can also be countered where the researcher can demonstrate 
empathy with the participants through recognised professional involvement, skills and 
experience in information/cyber security. This enabled the gaining of acceptance of 
peers that there was knowledge of and a genuine intent to allay those potential concerns. 
To explore the opinions of security professionals on how much credibility they put upon 
the reporting figures within their own organisation it was imperative to instil a high 
degree of confidence in the anonymity of any response.  By demonstrating an 
understanding of the potential reluctance to give honest answers on organisational 
weaknesses and failings in the reporting of incidents enabled honesty of the responses 
as many reported low confidence in the reporting of incidents and associated reporting 
systems.  
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3.7  Researcher Bias   
Where an interpretive approach is undertaken due to the relationship between the 
observed and the observer there is always a risk that the observer can introduce bias into 
their interpretation of the element studied.  Whilst there is recognition that ethics is a 
central aspect of such research Stahl (2005) believes it is of such importance that it 
should not be left to individuals or institutional ethic committees alone. Ethical 
considerations should be considered a “necessary consequence of the choice of certain 
research approaches.” (Stahl, 2005. p.1).  Bryman (2004, p.134) refers to research by 
Sudman and Bradburn (1982) who suggest that “postal questionnaires work better than 
personal interviews when there is a possibility of bias contained within a question”.  
Where Bryman (2004) refers to postal questionnaires in the case of this research where 
they were handed out at the scoping study stage and then later emailed as attachments 
during the Delphi and Validation questionnaire stages this would equally apply. 
There were two elements of potential bias to be considered. Firstly; during the scoping 
study where the author was trying to encourage the conference attendees to complete 
the scoping study questionnaires.  To avoid this the approach was to use the conference 
chairman to introduce the research in a formal way and request participation as it as 
seen of benefit to the security community rather than face to face requests through the 
author. There was an opportunity to engage with the audience at the invitation of the 
conference chairman to provide brief reasons for the research, giving assurances by 
referring to the sections in the survey describing the process to maintain confidentiality 
and anonymity.  The author was careful to ensure this engagement did not create any 
bias for its completion including intonation or emphasis in voice or tone. It was judged 
the attendees would feel sufficiently interested in the subject to want to participate.  
Secondly; the presence of the author at the scoping study and the involvement of the 
author through communities of interest at the Delphi and Validation stages may have 
caused some influence or bias.  As best as possible, by keeping to best academic 
practice in design and keeping one to one engagement to an absolute minimum, the 
distance between author and participant was maintained. The exception to this was 
where it was necessary to clarify an unclear answer and the fact they were know n to 
some of the audience. The researcher, by being part of the community, may be more 
likely to be accepted and trusted. It was believed this would result in obtaining 
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information in a subject area that, to individuals and organisations, is sensitive and 
where other researchers would have experienced difficulty in eliciting the same level of 
detail and data. This issue of keeping responses confidential or anonymous is supported 
by Dalkey (1969) in his description of the three features of a Delphi; 
“i, Anonymous response – where a questionnaire is used to obtain a groups 
opinion.   
ii, Iteration and controlled feedback - is the examination of those responses with 
carefully controlled feedback to enable further iterations from the group. 
iii, Statistical group response - where the opinions of every member of the group 
are defined as an aggregate of those responses, following the final round of 
iterations.” Dalkey (1969, p.v)  
The main aims of these three elements are to minimise any bias from dominant 
participants, irrelevant communication and group or peer pressure.   
Consideration as to which study methods would be the most suitable to achieve a valid 
and unbiased outcome, predominantly through maintaining confidentiality in any 
responses, will be given and of course the university’s ethical committee approval will 
be sought.   As commented by Bryman (2004)   it has to be recognised that although the 
initial rules and style of questions may be that of the researcher and contain an element 
of bias. However, it is the methodological and systematic approach to the interpretation 
of any research material emanating from those questions that should be replicable.  
3.8  Summary 
The intention of this chapter was to identify the philosophical and methodology 
approach to the proposed research question in Chapter one.  It identifies that the 
methods to identify the reasons for an apparent lack of incident being reported were 
abductive using an interpretivist approach supported by series questionnaires each with 
a different emphasis on the research with the aim of identification of the CSF’s. The 
aim was to test the potential to re-use research from another discipline relating to 
difficulties in reporting adverse patient incidents in health care and using the in the 
information security sector.  The re-use of previous research to provide the catalyst for 
further research provided a sound position on which to base the questionnaires, the 
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Delphi and Case Study.  This use of methods to elicit views and opinions from 
information security professionals ensure the research approaches to support and 
interpretivist methodology were maintained.  
The stages to support the methodology are 
Stage 1. To understand if the perceived problem of a lack of reporting of 
information security incidents is supported and whether research on incident 
reporting from other sectors has the potential to be re-used.   
The literature reviewed already provided evidence that it was of concern to a number of 
authors and researchers studying information security, but no specific research on why 
could be identified.  The nearest that could be considered came from the healthcare 
sector where considerably more research into the concerns surrounding the reporting of 
adverse patient incidents had been conducted. 
Stage 2.  Identify the appropriate research methodology. 
This included consideration of the use of qualitative and quantitative research through 
the use of questionnaires, a Delphi study and a validation study to identify the opinions 
of information security professionals. 
Stage 3. A scoping study of a number of information security professionals was 
undertaken to test the initial assumption that there was indeed a problem with 
security incident reporting.  
The scoping study used a mix of interpretative and some qualitative analysis of the 
scoping questionnaire text responses. Its main aims were to identify the understanding 
of a number of information security professionals their perception and experience of 
incident reporting.  The opportunity was also taken to test whether initial findings from 
research in the healthcare sector could be considered as valid to be used by those 
professionals and the sector as a whole.   The scoping study is discussed in Chapter 4 
Stage 4.  Subsequent to the analysis of the scoping study results were provided in a 
series of presentations to information security seminars and conferences.  
The purpose was to examine the responses of information security professionals in both 
the public and private sector to identify if any adverse reaction or comment to those 
results was made.  It would also identify the level of support for the research, and 
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provide an indication as to whether the findings were truly reflective of the reporting of 
security incidents in that sector. 
Stage 5.   Conduct a Delphi study to test the potential for consensus using the 
information gleaned from the identified research and the scoping study.   
It is often the case that when a report publishes its findings, whether it is the result of a 
disaster or significant event or one commissioned to resolve a problem, the valuable 
content is not always taken up in practice as organisational cultures are resistant to 
change (Perrow, 2007).  The elements identified in the literature review that could 
influence and potentially improve incident reporting may be able to form the basis of a 
series of Critical Success Factors (CSF’s) required to improve security incident 
reporting.  These Critical Success Factors could be considered to be a vehicle to identify 
what was essential for an organisation to focus on should it wish to improve the 
reporting of incidents.    
To gain consensus from a wide community of information security professionals a 
Delphi study was considered an appropriate method. The study would set out the 
potential CSF’s identified from healthcare and other research and, using a Likert scale, 
the iterative Delphi process would gain consensus to what elements were considered as 
critical to improving incident reporting. A wide range of information security 
professionals will be invited to participate ranging from those belonging to the main 
professional body, the Institute of Information Security Professionals – the IISP, 
Information Asset Owner’s in government, members of CiSP and other recognised 
communities of interest.  
Respondents will be given the opportunity to add other factors they felt warranted 
inclusion and consideration by the wider Delphi group.   Consideration as to which 
study methods would be the most suitable to achieve a valid and unbiased outcome, 
predominantly through maintaining confidentiality in any responses, will be given and 
of course the university’s ethical committee approval will be sought. 
Stage 6.   Conduct a validation study using the Delphi findings to be incorporated 
within an Incident Reporting Maturity Model  
 The validation study will be in a form of a survey that tests the potential use of an 
Incident Reporting Maturity Model which uses the CSF’s identified in stage 5. This 
 115 
 
stage will also involve a control group who have not previously been involved in any of 
the study processes but do meet the eligibility criteria. This will enable any challenges 
to the identified CSF’s and the notion of an IRMM as a possible delivery vehicle for 
those CSF’s to be adopted within organisations 
Stage 7. Review the outcome of Critical Success Factors and proposed Incident 
Reporting Maturity Model. 
The intention is to analyse the findings of the Validation survey to identify whether the 
IRMM could be applied by organisations to improve their information security incident 
reporting.    It is intended that the IRMM could be offered as a potential tool to assist in 
improving incident volume reporting using a non-proscriptive, iterative, contextual 
approach. 
The next chapter sets out the scoping study referred to in stage 1 that was intended to 
test the assumption that information security incidents were under reported and that 
research from other sectors had the potential for re use by the information security 
sector. 
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Chapter 4 Scoping Study Information Security Incidents.  Seeking the 
Views of Information Security Professionals 
4.1  Introduction and Background 
Chapter 4 describes the scoping study that was designed to test the assumption that the 
true level of incidents is not known due to a number of issues surrounding the reporting 
of them.  It also aimed to study whether research into incident reporting undertaken in 
other disciplines is relevant and has the potential to be reused to good effect in the 
information security sector. It sets out the method of design and distribution of the 
series of questions and the subsequent analysis of the results.  The survey was 
constructed to gather both qualitative and quantitative data. 
It contains the views and opinions from a small group of information security 
professionals who attended recognised information security conferences in June 2011. It 
examines their experience of the reporting of security incidents and the level of 
confidence they had in the actual number reported.  Included in the scoping study were 
a number of identified barriers to learning and, potentially therefore, reporting incidents 
from research in the Healthcare sector.  It starts by outlining why a survey and what 
were the aims then describes the survey design process through which the data was 
collected and analysed to understand whether it is feasible that some of the identified 
reporting barriers and methods to improve reporting could be imported into the 
Information Security arena.   
The issue of incident classification is also a consideration, and this was included in the 
scoping study. Even where incidents are reported there appears not to be a commonly 
accepted or agreed classification. This in itself can lead to problems when comparing 
incidents from either the same or different sectors; in particular this has the potential to 
lead to the false or misleading interpretation of trends.  Where reporting is mandated, 
there is the risk that if the incident is not identified, or the reporting of it and learning 
from it is suppressed through one of the many identified barriers, then the requirement 
to report cannot take place.  The consequences being that any statistics produced are 
likely to be inaccurate.  There are a number of papers and studies on the efforts to share 
incident information between groups and sectors or on risk methods that comment on 
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the lack of accurate data of reported incidents but none tackle the reason why  
(Baskerville, 1991; Baker, Rees and Tippett, 2007).      
The literature review in chapter 2 identified that little research in the reporting of 
information security incidents had taken place. In contrast, in the HealthCare sector, 
there are numerous published papers and reports on ‘adverse patient incidents’ (Hui-
Ying Chiang, Shu-Yuan Lin, et al 2010; Lawton and Parker, 2002; Firth Cozens, 2002) 
and the possible reasons why there was under reporting.   
This chapter will set out why a scoping study was chosen, how the survey was designed 
and developed. It then outlines the selected conferences where it was to be distributed, 
its participants and the response rate.  The chapter then examines the results of the 
survey logically examining each sector of the survey.  It will include a selection of 
relevant comments from respondents and a number of tables setting out the comparison 
of each conference as well the overall picture against each question.  It concludes with 
an analysis of the results before identifying the lessons that were learnt and finally a 
conclusion and identification of the next steps. At the same time that the survey was 
undertaken the organisers at one of conferences invited the researcher to conduct a work 
shop into the reporting of incidents. This workshop did not influence the scoping study 
but does produce some interesting outcomes and the details and outcome are included at 
the end of this chapter. 
4.2  Testing the Assumption 
At this stage of the research it was necessary to identify whether the assumption that 
security incidents were subject to under reporting was correct. The literature review in 
Section 2 tended to support this but there did not appear to be research that had actually 
asked the security professionals who would receive and manage such reports.  There 
was a need to test the assumptions and three security conferences were identified where 
the attendees would be asked to participate in a scoping study. A formal questionnaire 
was developed and, at one of the conferences, a workshop was also conducted on the 
issue of security incident reporting.  If the assumption was proved to appear valid then 
further research could be planned. If not the outcome may have resulted in a different 
research focus.   
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Under reporting of incidents was understood to be a problem in the healthcare sector.  
The report ‘Organisation with a Memory’ (Great Britain, Department of Health, 2000) 
identified a series of barriers to learning from adverse incidents. These were based on 
the reports widespread review of adverse patient incidents and included research 
conducted by Smith and Elliot (1999), Firth Cozens (2000) and Wason (1960). If a 
study of security professionals was to be undertaken relating to under reporting, it made 
sense to incorporated within the scoping study  the views of information security 
professionals on the potential applicability of those identified barriers in the information 
security sector. 
These barriers were; 
 
 “An undue focus on the immediate event rather than on the root cause of 
problems; 
 Latching onto one superficial cause or learning point to the exclusion of more 
fundamental but sometimes less obvious lessons; 
 Rigidity of core beliefs, values and assumptions, which may develop over time – 
learning is restricted if it contradicts these; 
 Lack of corporate responsibility – it may be difficult, for example, to put into 
practice solutions which are sufficiently far-reaching; 
 Ineffective communication and other information difficulties – including failure 
to disseminate information which is already available; 
 An incremental approach to issues of risk – attempting to resolve problems 
through tinkering rather than more fundamental change; 
 Pride in individual and organisational expertise can lead to denial  and to a 
disregard  of external sources of warning – particularly if a bearer of bad news 
lack legitimacy in the eyes of the individuals, teams or organisations in question; 
 A tendency towards scapegoating and finding individuals to blame – rather than 
acknowledging and addressing deep-rooted organisational problems; 
 The difficulties faced by people in “making sense” of complex events is 
compounded by changes among key personnel within organisations and teams 
 Human alliances lead people to “forgive” other team members their mistakes 
and act defensively against ideas outside of the team; 
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 People are often unwilling to learn from negative events, even when it would be 
to their advantage; 
 Contradictory imperatives – for example communication versus confidentiality 
 High stress and low job satisfaction can have adverse effects on quality and can 
also engender a resistance to change; 
 Inability to recognise the financial cost of failure, thus losing a powerful 
incentive for organisations to change.”  (Great Britain, Department of Health, 
2000, p.34)  
For example if a health organisation has, or the staff believe there to be, a ‘blame 
culture’ the likelihood of an individual reporting an incident would be less  than if the 
organisation was focussed on learning from incidents. (Kingston, Evans, Smith, Berry, 
2004: Schectman, Plews-Ogan, 2006). Was this true for information security.  In order 
to try to prevent reoccurrences of incidents it is important to embrace reporting to assist 
in this learning process.    
With regard to the information security sector the scoping study aimed to identify the 
perceived level of reporting together with reasons why people, departments or 
organisations find the reporting of security incidents a challenge.  What are the barriers? 
Are they people specific, organisational or a mixture of both?   
The assumption is therefore, if a significant number of incidents are not reported, the 
data upon which decisions are made could be flawed. Subsequently initiatives to share 
security incident data to gain insight into the wider threats to sectors such as finance, 
pharmaceutical, government etc. would be adversely affected.  Incomplete incident data 
could result in a false sense of security through lack of reported incidents and erroneous 
inputs to risk assessments.  This in turn could place a higher degree of focus on certain 
types of incidents that are reported as being the main threat vectors.    
The scoping study was constructed to gather both qualitative and quantitative data.  The 
aim was to understand their experience of the reporting of security incidents and to 
understand the level of confidence they had in the actual number reported.  Included in 
the survey were a number of identified barriers to learning and, potentially therefore, 
reporting incidents from research in the Healthcare sector.  The identified barriers to 
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learning from incidents may translate into similar reasons why people would not want to 
report information security incidents.  
As there was little research undertaken in the information security area into barriers to 
reporting information security incidents, the research utilised findings from the Health 
Care industry as to the perceived barriers for reporting and learning from incidents (not 
security related, but relating to patients).  It was felt that this would enable an 
examination of information security professionals’ views on the relevance and 
portability of those findings to the information security arena.    
The aim of the scoping study was to test the possibility that reasons for not reporting 
something were not necessarily related to a specific industry, but more to do with 
human behaviour and general reluctance to report something that went wrong.   
Elements of these findings were incorporated into a scoping study of the views of 
information security professionals.  
The researcher was able to facilitate this through attendance at Information Security 
Conferences during 2011. The details are set out later in this chapter together with the 
method of design and distribution of a series of questions and the subsequent analysis of 
the results.  
4.2.1  How does the Scoping Study Link to the Research Goals 
Two of the four goals outlined in chapter one that this scoping study was intended to 
tackle these were;   
(1) To test whether the assumption that not all information security incidents are 
being reported is correct. 
The scoping study was aiming to provide an indication from the security professionals 
attending the conferences whether the assumption had any support.  
(2) To examine whether research on incident reporting conducted in other 
sectors, such as healthcare, can be applied to the information security sector. 
In a similar fashion if the assumption had support that incidents were under reported 
could research elsewhere assist in improving the level of reporting.   
This scoping survey was intended to be used to provide an indication the support for 
both. 
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4.3  Survey Design Process 
There is considerable guidance on survey design. Robson (2011)  provides guidance on 
how to avoid problems with the wording of questions;  whereas Bryman (2004, p.137) 
recognising that response rates to such questionnaires can be low and focusses on areas 
such as the attractiveness of layout, style  and length of questions to improve this. 
Similarly Buckingham and Saunders (2004) provide guidance on layout length and 
types of question.   Collis and Hussey (2009, p.192) suggest the following stages in 
designing a questionnaire.  
“Design the questions and Instructions 
Determine order of presentation 
Write accompanying letter/request letter 
Test questionnaire with a small sample 
Choose method for distribution and return 
Plan strategy for dealing with non-responses 
Conduct rests for validity and reliability” 
 
It is the above framework that the scoping study and, if successful, subsequent surveys 
in this research will follow the same approach.    
4.4  Development of the Survey 
The section sets out how the scoping study questionnaire followed the guide set out by 
Collis and Hussey (2009) but also includes the element of representativeness not listed 
in their guide. 
4.4.1  Design the Questions and Instructions 
The survey mixes two types of questions that would result in quantitive and qualitative 
responses.  This was a conscious decision; if only closed questions were asked, although 
statistics and inference could be achieved, the real insight, views and experience of such 
professionals would not be drawn out. The purpose of open questions enabled the 
respondents to contribute to the research qualitatively and not just respond to the 
question, thereby providing added value from personal and sector experience. The open 
questions offered a specific easy to answer tick box with the facility to expand the 
reason for their choice of answer if they wished.  One section of the questions contained 
the findings from research in the healthcare sector as part of the test of portability of 
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research from one sector to another.  There were no questions that were of a personal or 
sensitive nature.  A Likert scale is used in many of the questions.   The survey contained 
instructions for its completion and return, as well as an overview of the research and 
how the respondent could contribute.  The questions asked can be seen in section 4.6 
4.4.2  Determine Order of Presentation:  
The survey was set in a logical flow and included the opportunity for comment to 
clarify any answers given together with a final section which was free text for any 
comments the subject wished to add.  The fact that it was completed by a worldwide 
audience without any questions regarding its completion does speak for itself, especially 
as the number of human errors in the responses was low.  The majority of those who 
replied included their views in the various sections provided. 
The survey was set out in 5 sections to ease the flow of requested information.  
Section 1:    This section was mainly used to identify certain information about the 
person completing it. This did not include gender or age as it was considered as 
unnecessarily personal necessary to identify the assumptions and the sample size was 
likely to be such that it would not be statistically significant in any case.  This could be 
left as anonymous but primarily the request was to obtain sufficient information to place 
respondents in the public or private sector, business area and gauge the size of 
organisation. 
Section 2:    This section included a mix of question types investigating the methods by 
which incidents are reported that provided qualitative and quantitative answers. There 
was opportunity for the person completing this section to elaborate or clarify their 
answers.   These text boxes were optional to complete but do add an insight into the 
rationale for the choice of answer. 
Section 3:    This section focussed on the respondent’s confidence in the level of 
reporting in their organisation and in general.  This section primarily sought quantitative 
answers with the option to add value to the response through clarification or the 
opportunity to state a point of view. 
Section 4:   This is the main qualitative section as it places fourteen statements taken 
from the Healthcare report considered to be barriers to learning from and reporting 
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incidents and thereby learning from them identified from the  research findings 
‘Department of Health: Organisation with a Memory, (2000)’. It was considered a good 
test of portability of research findings from one specific sector – health - and testing if 
they could be considered valid in another sector - information security.   The 
respondents completing the survey were asked to state their view of each ‘barrier’s’ 
relevance to their industry through a 5 point Likert scale.  A space for comment was 
provided offering insight into any selection made.  
Section 5:   This section did not contain any questions. It was designed to allow the 
person completing the survey to add any additional views or comments should there be 
insufficient space elsewhere 
4.4.3  Write Accompanying Request Letter 
Instead of a letter at all three events, the Chair of the conference introduced the survey 
and the importance of the research subject as well as the benefit of attendees having the 
opportunity to influence research in the subject at hand.  On each occasion the chair 
introduced the author who referred to the questionnaire and the instructions, particularly 
focussing on the aspects of confidentiality and the voluntary nature of the survey. The 
questionnaire itself had a one page introduction.  
4.4.4  Test Survey with a Small Sample 
The draft survey form was tested and refined and then tested on some trusted colleagues 
to ascertain any issues with its design, flow and clarity. This resulted in a reduction in 
the size of the survey form. 
4.4.5  Choose a Method of Distribution and Return 
A printed version of the survey was selected. This was a deliberate choice, although the 
option for advance or subsequent completion of an electronic version was considered, as 
there are a number of versions of office software, and not all are compatible, this could 
prove problematic and detract from the completion of the survey. The NISC conference 
organisers in fact included an electronic version of the questionnaire in their pre-
conference pack which was emailed to attendees and for which gratitude is given to the 
event organisers for doing so.   Therefore the simplest method was to request they be 
completed by hand.  This had the added benefit of ensuring the subject could remain 
anonymous should they wish to.  The other method was to scan and e-mail the 
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completed form back to a University address.   This was chosen over a works address as 
this could possibly put some respondents off, again for fears of being identified, not just 
by the author, but by others monitoring such traffic.     The use of the university address 
is more neutral and a requirement of the Cranfield ethics process.  
The added benefit of being present at the events was to be able to identify and respond 
to any major discrepancies in the design or flow of the survey.   Those completing it at 
the conferences could also hand it in at the event via the organisers, again providing a 
degree of anonymity should they wish.  In the end there were no apparent problems in 
the completion of the survey. 
Services such a ‘survey monkey’ do offer anonymity. However, a more personal, albeit 
confidential, approach was selected.  The future use of an online version has not been 
discounted particularly as there is confidence that those completing the survey did not 
raise any concerns.  
In the end, anonymity did not appear to be of great concern.   As all attendees at the 
NISC and NG conferences had the opportunity to see and hear the author and to some 
extent understand they were not a distant researcher but someone from the same 
community they were, in the majority, more than happy to identify themselves. This 
was less so for the Oil and Gas conference as the author was unable to stay for the 
whole event.   In fact the subject matter was of such interest that many wanted to have 
some form of feedback of the results when known, and were happy for further contact 
with them to be made.  This opportunity was made clear on the first page of the scoping 
questionnaire itself; 
If you do not wish be identified, could you at least indicate the nature and size of 
your organisation to assist in identifying any specific sector trends. If you are 
willing to engage with me for further discussions on your views and opinions I 
would be most grateful.    
 
The resultant proportion of respondents who took advantage of the ability to remain 
anonymous was interesting.   Out of the sixteen survey respondents from NG Europe, 
fourteen provided their details representing 88% of the group content to be identified.  
For those attending NISC, sixteen out of the twenty respondents (80%) were happy to 
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provide full details and one of the two Oil and Gas respondents did.  Overall for the 
three conferences 85% were comfortable in providing details bearing in mind some of 
the sensitivity of the questions, and possible reputational damage should their identities 
and that of who they worked for, this figure is surprisingly high.    Anecdotally it could 
be argued that there is a willingness to contribute further in the research as well as the 
acceptance of the assurances given regarding the protection and confidentiality of any 
responses.   
A method was needed to distribute the survey forms.    Three information security 
conferences being held in June 2011 were identified.  One in Scotland, one in London 
and one in Lisbon, Portugal.  The researcher was presenting at all three conferences and 
this provided an ideal platform to distribute the survey forms to the attendees.  An 
approach was made to the organisers of all three events, seeking approval to utilise the 
opportunity to introduce the research subject and distribute the survey forms.  All three 
were very supportive and included the survey within the delegate packs.  
There was an opportunity to engage with the audience to provide brief reasons for the 
research, giving assurances by referring to the sections in the survey describing the 
process to maintain confidentiality and anonymity.  The researcher was careful to 
ensure this engagement did not create any bias for its completion. It was judged the 
attendees would feel sufficiently interested in the subject to want to participate.  
The survey content and design for all three events was the same, except that it indicated 
what event had been attended by those who completed the survey.   There were two 
reasons for this; firstly, it made it more specific to that event and, secondly, it provided 
the possibility to identify if there were any significant differences in responses, 
depending on the conference that may require further investigation.  It was anticipated 
that the type of attendees expected at each event, although in the main working in 
information security, were going to be diverse in the level of seniority, industry sector 
and location they operate. 
To ensure anonymity there were a number of options available to return the completed 
survey.  It could be completed then scanned and emailed or returned by post.  The other 
method was simply to hand it in personally to an event organiser or the researcher.  
Anyone who wished to remain anonymous could choose the method in which they had 
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most confidence.   The majority of those completing the survey handed it in during the 
event.  A smaller number chose either to complete it and post back or to scan it and e-
mail it back.   
4.4.6  Plan a Strategy for Dealing with Non-Responses 
Determining what a good response rate is can be a challenge.  It was accepted that paper 
based surveys often returned greater responses than online ones (Nulty, 2008) although, 
as more confidence grows in on line surveys, this could change. “As a general rule a 
response rate of 30% or greater for a postal or externally sent questionnaire is generally 
regarded as reasonable. A goal of 50% or more responses should be attempted in any 
questionnaire that involved face to face interviews.” (Neville, 2005, p.33).   
In this survey this was a challenge as no written reminder could be sent as the survey 
was distributed to attendees by the organisers.  The author did not distribute them 
personally, so could not send reminders. This is interesting, as to some extent it goes 
against most academic advice to ensure anonymity.  If you target those who did not 
reply, this implies you know the identity of those who did.  This was not achievable due 
to the anonymity of the survey.  The request to complete the survey was reinforced at 
several opportunities during the conferences.  The Chair at all of the events introduced 
the survey and at varying points during the event reminded attendees to complete the 
questionnaire if they wished. This was often made at the same time as the request for 
delegates to complete the normal conference feedback forms as the events progressed. 
However, at the end of two of the conferences the Chairman made the request to anyone 
who had not completed the survey to do so when they returned home. 
4.4.7  Conduct Tests for Validity, Reliability and Representativeness 
Collis and Hussey’s (2009) guide refers to validity and reliability but not 
representativeness.  Easterby-Smith Thorpe and Lowe (2003) refer to reliability, validity 
and generalization. McNeill (1992) introduces his concept of three key areas regarding 
research; reliability, validity and 'representativeness'.   
Validity 
This relates to being confident the data collective reflects reality and is a true picture of 
what is being studied. (McNeill, 1992, p.15)  The rationale for asking the completion to 
be anonymous was to elicit answers that were as near to reality as possible.  Asking 
 127 
 
someone if they are doing something they know they should be, and getting them to say 
they do not, requires considerable assurance regarding confidentiality. There is an 
accepted risk of misinterpretation of a question.  By going through trial runs with 
different people before deploying the survey should have reduced the likelihood of this 
occurring to a low level. 
The fact that it was distributed at three completely different events demonstrates its 
potential portability across organisation seniority and countries. 
Reliability 
By ensuring the process and method of collecting evidence is reliable any future use of 
this method should result in similar findings. (McNeill, 1992, p.14).  
The survey was designed so that it could be completed anonymously by attendees at the 
three information security conferences.  If they were to be asked to complete it again 
anonymously, it would be safe to assume they would complete it in a similar fashion. 
The only exception being where any changes had occurred at their place of work 
regarding reporting processes.  For example, if they had subsequently implemented a 
method of incident classification or introduced incident recording software their 
answers would be different.  In general the facts should be the same, but some of the 
perceptions of the person filling the survey may have changed slightly.  It very much 
depends on the time difference between the first time the survey was sent out and if it 
were to be re- issued. 
Representativeness of the Participants 
McNeill (1992, p.15) suggests it is important to ensure the group that are being studied 
are a true reflection of others in that group. As it is often too difficult to send 
questionnaires to the entire eligible group it is important the selected group are typical 
of others.   Bryman (2004) comments that the researcher would wish to be able to report 
that the sample is representative of a wider group to enable the findings to be 
generalized beyond those who participated.  Buckingham and Saunders (2004, p.70) 
also refer to the importance of the “people you interview need to be representative of 
the wider population from which they have been sampled.” 
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By surveying information security professionals at a number of information security 
conferences the audience had already complied with the above.  They were information 
security professionals from a wide mix of public and private sector organisations both 
UK and worldwide or suppliers to the same. In the main, at the NISC event software, 
hardware and consultancy suppliers were present as well as security professionals.  
These suppliers, although aware of the survey did not complete the survey unless they 
were also represented at the event, not just as a vendor, but where their own information 
security representative was present. As a result, when assessing the number of responses 
against those who could have responded some attendees (who were present as 
conference staff, organisers, product vendors etc.) were discounted, as were multiple 
attendees from the same organisation.  In the latter case the assumption was made that 
one respondent from each organisation present would complete the survey. The fact that 
the majority provided their details in section 1 of the scoping questionnaire provided the 
opportunity to clarify this aspect.  Upon analysis of the results 80% of those completing 
the survey gave their full details and there were no repeat organisations in those 
responses.  The degree of completion would then be according to the organisational 
structure.  A large organisation normally has a dedicated information security manager 
and team with a wider range of incidents and experience in their overall management 
with which to base their answers.  Whereas in a smaller organisation a single person 
may well handle more of the overall process themselves.  
Although this was a scoping study should the same survey be reissued to the similar 
respondents in the same environment it is safe to assume the responses would be the 
same except where any changes had taken place at their organisation which meant that a 
previous answer was no longer valid. For example, a change in the method of reporting 
incidents or an introduction of incident classification. 
There is a need to ensure those responding to a questionnaire are reflective of the sector 
of the population as a whole. This is not easy as Robson (2011, p.276) suggests  
“carrying our real world studies can mean that the requirements for 
representative sampling are very difficult, if not impossible to fulfil.”  
By selecting information security conferences and using the attendees as survey 
participants gave a degree of confidence the sample was representative of a wider 
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group. It is recognised though that, as this was a scoping study, it may be those who 
responded may not have been a complete representation of those who manage incidents 
but the initial goal was to test an assumption. The surveys conducted in Chapter 5 and 6 
had a greater emphasis on repetitiveness with an eligibility criteria as well as using 
recognised Communities of Interest. The next section outlines the three selected 
conferences and the survey participants. 
4.5  Survey Participants  
The Incident Reporting survey was distributed at three information security events in 
June 2011. This section sets out the three selected conferences. It provides a brief 
overview of the conference, its attendees and survey response rates. 
The plan was to attend a predominantly public sector (NISC) and private sector (NG) 
events to enable some comparison but the actual sector representation would not be 
known until the event itself and then ratio of those who actually responded could 
influence this further. These ratios worked well by offering any likely differences in 
opinion between a mainly public sector group and that which was in the private sector.  
The other factor worth noting was the mix of seniority and nationality.  NISC attendees 
who completed the survey could mainly be described as Information Security Officers 
(ISOs) who in the main are middle manager whereas those who attended the NG event 
were more senior being in the main Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) who 
held more senior positions. 
4.5.1  The National Information Security Conference (NISC) held in St Andrews 
Scotland on the 8
th
 to the 10
th
 of June 2011.        
This is primarily a public sector conference attended by Information Security Officers 
(ISO’s) and supported by a vendor exhibition. NISC is an annual event held in St 
Andrews, Scotland and has been running over a number of years.  It has good 
relationships with Her Majesties Government (HMG) and agencies across the UK 
which gave a degree of credibility to this conference above other less well known ones.   
Unlike many similar events, which are more London centric, is held in Scotland to try 
and ensure greater participation by the Scottish information security community who 
may be less able to attend the more predominance of London based event.   Having said 
that, the attendance from the rest of the UK was significant.    
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The attendees range from vendors, who demonstrate their Information security products, 
to central and local Government employees together with system integrators.  Therefore 
not all attendees would be in a position to answer the survey.  
The NISC organisers were more than happy to support the research and allowed the 
survey to be sent out in the pre event material as well as a printed copy being available 
in the delegates’ packs upon arrival.  This resulted in six surveys out of the overall total 
of responses of 20 being completed in advance of the event and sent either by e mail or 
by post in accordance with the instructions in the survey form. The added benefit of 
early completion gave the reassurance that no one identified any flaws in the flow or 
content of the survey.  Had they done so, despite the testing, it would have enabled the 
researcher to consider making any changes prior to the main event. 
Due to NISC’s Scottish connection, the Scottish Information Assurance Forum (SIAF) 
also holds a session at the event and the majority of those who attend this continue to 
participate throughout the NISC event. The Chair of SIAF asked for a brief overview of 
the research to be presented to the attendees as he and others in SIAF thought it of 
value.  This was given during a brief ten minute period to, in effect, repeat what was on 
the front of the surveys and answer any questions that attendees might have. It is 
possible that this briefing may have encouraged participation in the scoping study but 
the questionnaire did not have facility to see if this was the case. 
Response rates for NISC (National Information Security Conference) St Andrews,   
Out of a potential number of delegates who would be eligible to complete it of 70, a 
total of 20 completed survey forms.  This represented a return rate of 29% with the 
Public Sector being the largest group at 75% of the respondents.  Note; a considerable 
number of attendees were vendors who would not be in a position to answer the survey.  
These were removed from the total number of prospective respondents.  
4.5.2  The NG Security Summit Europe held in Lisbon, Portugal between the 14
th
 
and 16
th
 of June 2011.  
This is primarily a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) event attended by large 
international private sector companies with no vendor exhibition.  The NG Security 
Summit was run on a smaller scale than NISC but with a higher level of senior 
attendees. This was the first information security event the organisers had run.  They 
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had significant experience in IT conferences and the main difference from NISC was 
the approach to vendors.  Whereas NISC had a vendor village the NG event there were 
no vendor stands.  The conference was more intense and highly focussed. This 
difference is possibly one of the reasons why, although overall attendee numbers at 
NISC were higher than at the NG conference, the actual number of information security 
professionals present was a smaller proportion than the NG Conference. 
Response rates for NG Security Summit 
At the end of the NG conference a total of 16 completed survey forms were received out 
of 44 who would be eligible to complete it.  This represented a return rate of 36%.  With 
94% coming from the private sector.   
At the NG event there were no vendor stands.  The conference was more intense and 
highly focussed.   As a result the proportion of attendees eligible to answer the survey 
was higher than NISC.   Another factor of a higher return rate may have been the 
researcher was asked by the organisers to run a workshop on the research topic and so 
as an element of trust and confidence in the researcher may have encouraged 
completion.  The workshop is outlined in section 4. 
4.5.3  The Cyber Security for Oil and Gas held in London on the 22
nd
 June 2011.   
This conference was held in the Grosvenor Hotel in London.   It was mainly attended by 
technical security and counter fraud staff from the Oil and Gas industry.  The researcher 
was presenting on a related subject but again approached the organisers to see if they 
were willing for attendees to consider completing the survey.  At this conference the 
researcher was only present for their morning presentation session up until lunchtime.  
Response rate for Cyber Security Oil and Gas   
Unlike the NISC and NG conferences the author was unable to stay for the whole event 
and not present to engage with the audience and therefore missed the opportunity for 
gaining their trust and to raise the profile of the subject matter.  This together with the 
fact that the attendees were not CISO’s or ISO’s but more technical in nature, adversely 
affected the number completed surveys.  Only two responses were received from this 
event. These have been included in the overall scoring of survey responses but, due to 
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the low number, not included in comparisons in the same way as for the NISC and NG 
events. 
4.5.4  Summary of Conference Participants 
There was considerable interest in the research at both NISC and the NG conferences 
and by being in attendance to answer questions, the authors assurances about anonymity 
and confidentiality appeared to be accepted by attendees.  Attendees were keen to find 
out when the research results would become available possibly indicating the interest in 
the research and its relevance to their role. 
The researcher, by being part of the community, was accepted and trusted. It was 
believed this would result in obtaining information in a subject area that, to individuals 
and organisations, is sensitive and where other researchers would have experienced 
difficulty in eliciting the same level of detail and data.  
The next section describes the results and outcomes of the survey. It highlights any 
differences in responses by conference group and includes examples of specific 
comments made by the respondent’s answers 
4.6  Survey Results  
The results of the completed surveys make use of the ability to compare figures from 
the two main conferences as well as including the completed surveys from the Oil and 
Gas conference. Without the advance identification of the different events in the survey 
preamble valuable research pointers and comparisons would not have been possible.  
For example, the ratio of public to private sector in attendees at NISC was 75% public 
sector and 25% private whereas the ratio at NG Europe was reversed with 6% public 
sector and 94% private sector.  To some extent when comparing the NISC against the 
NG results it is possible to infer any possible differences between the opinions of public 
versus private sector Information Security professionals.  The next section provides a 
breakdown of results by section. The full table of results is reproduced at Appendix 3 
4.6.1  Survey Section 1 - Details of Respondents 
Based on the responses to the question that asked where their organisation was based 
(UK, Europe or elsewhere including if multi located) the group from NISC indicated 
they were primarily UK based.  For NISC, 90% indicated the UK was either their sole 
base or they were also based there, as opposed to 25% who stated they had a European 
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base.  For NG the ratio was 44% had a base in the UK whereas some as well as a UK 
base indicated a larger number of bases, 75%, were in Europe and elsewhere.  
Q. If your organisation is multi-based do you feel your answers given may be 
different according to the country where the incident occurred? 
The rationale for this question is whether there were any cultural or legislative reasons 
that may be a factor. For NISC 25% felt that answers may be different according to the 
country where the incident occurred, however, no one made any additional comment. 
With regards to the NG group 69% felt there may be a difference and as a result there 
were more comments.   These included; 
A company that was globally present in over 100 countries.   
“Differing laws, regulation and cultures affect what is in place where”. 
A company based in Europe.   
“Culture is different. Awareness level is higher in the UK than what it is in other 
European countries where we have operations.”  
 A company based outside Europe  
“XX is a multi-based company.  We can definitely see a different reporting from 
different sites. E.g. Less from India, China. More from US and YY”. [sanitised 
home country] 
A worldwide company.  
“Need to take into account the culture.” 
Another worldwide company.   
“Have a globally consistent policy and processes that govern these activities. Although 
recognise that data breach disclosures in some jurisdictions will require localised 
custom responses. Especially true in the U.S.” 
The above responses tend to indicate that there could be differences dependent upon 
where the incident was reported, which in turn may have an effect on reporting rates. 
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4.6.2  Survey Section 2 – Incident Reporting Requirements and Methods of 
Reporting. 
Q. Are you subject to any regulatory reporting for incidents (e.g. FSA, HMG, 
contractual?) If yes - please describe 
For NISC the ‘yes’ response was 70% and NG  a lower score of 50% which was 
interesting due to the fact that a number of attendees at NG were from organisations that 
would be accountable to regulatory bodies.  However, the NISC figures included 
Government policy and Information Commissioner requirements to report incidents as a 
number of the comments identified. Other examples given by the NISC attendees of 
bodies to which they had to report incidents to included Health Departments, FSA, 
GovCERT and PCIDSS.  In the main these reflect the Public Sector orientated group 
that attended.  Even though there is no specific data breach notification legislation in 
place in the UK, it is clear from some of the comments that there are a number of 
avenues to report and an expectation in some sectors that they will be.   
NISC comments included; 
“ICO/FSA” 
“We report to the [country] Govt Health Department and have health specific 
regulations” 
“HMG and Contractual” 
“GOVCERT reporting as prescribed by [network] Code of Connection” 
Examples of NG comments included; Legal requirements such as Sarbanes Oxley 
(SOX).  There were also examples of NG organisations that had multiple locations 
having to report to different standards.  Examples of the responses being  
“Reporting incidents impacting availability of systems to regulators, with 
slightly different rules/requirements depending on the country.”  
 “Local legal requirements, Central Bank of [Home country], EU legislation.”   
One company referred to the need to report breaches to customers;  
“Data breaches related to clients must be reported.” The comments here again 
reflect the majority of NG attendees being from the private sector. 
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Q. Do you have a formal policy and procedure for reporting?   
In both groups, due to the respondents being subject to various forms of regulations, it 
was not surprising there was a high response that there are policies and procedures in 
place.  For NISC it was 95% and NG 88%.  This still leaves a small number in both 
groups who have no formal policy for incident reporting. 
Q. What methods are used to report incidents (tick all that apply) 
Table  4-1  What Methods are used to Report Incidents 
This showed a selection of reporting methods and respondents could tick all that applied 
to them.  A wide variety of methods were listed and only a few additional ones were 
added by the respondents; one being 'forensic team'.  The most used methods by the 
NISC group were to their line manager and by e mail (both 80%).  For the NG group e 
mail was the highest (88%) followed by a specific team (75%).  Although there were no 
comments to indicate why there was a difference, the fact the NG group had a wider 
distribution of locations, many worldwide, and the reporting methods in place may be 
different. 
Q. How would you rate your current reporting system? 
Bearing in mind the above scores for what methods are used to report incidents, the 
figures returned (see table 4-4) show for NISC attendees a split of 40% for both fit for 
purpose and adequate. With a fifth (20%) stating it was not fit for purpose.   For the NG 
group the results were not so favourable with the majority (44%) stating the system was 
adequate and only a quarter (25%) stating it was fit for purpose.  The remaining 31% 
feeling their reporting mechanisms were unfit. 
 
 Verbal E Mail Form Website/ 
intranet 
Line 
manager 
Specific 
person 
team 
Anonymously Other 
NISC 75% 80% 50% 35% 80% 70% 35% 10% 
NG 56% 88% 44% 56% 56% 75% 56% 13% 
Total 
(inc. Oil 
& Gas) 
68% 79% 45% 42% 66% 71% 45% 13% 
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Table  4-2  Rating of Current Reporting Systems 
Q. If you were in charge of the incident reporting system, what changes, if any, 
would you make? 
From the NISC Delegates 65% made comments including allowing for anonymous 
reporting, improve incident classification and subsequent analysis. Others thought there 
could be improvements in the reporting mechanism suggesting solutions such as 
intranet based reporting and improvements to user training.  One response highlighted 
the need to improve the reporting of incidents by suppliers and delivery partners.  There 
were a number of other comments including the need for incident reporting 
categorisation and the method of reporting i.e. forms. 
Examples of comments made include 
NISC; 
“Add clarity to classification of incidents,” 
“Allow for anonymous reporting” 
“Improve reporting by suppliers and delivery partners” 
“Expand policy, training and awareness, intranet form, better definitions of an 
incident, lessons learnt. Investigative and audit resources.” 
“Better user training” 
“More user education”  
For the NG attendees 75% made comments.    Examples are shown below 
“Formalise the process to ensure reporting, Train/educate users to report” 
“Need a better system and more awareness to end users” 
“Raise awareness” 
 Fit for Purpose Adequate Not fit for Purpose 
NISC 40% 40% 20% 
NG 25% 44% 31% 
Total (incl. Oil & Gas) 32% 45% 24% 
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These were broadly similar to NISC including emphasis on better education and 
training for users as well as the need for incident classification.  Some of the comments 
made here reflect the development of the Critical Success Factors through the Delphi 
study in chapter 5. 
Q. Who investigates reported incidents? 
For both NISC and NG the answer ‘specific person/team’ was the highest with 85% and 
81% respectively.  For the two Oil and Gas respondents it was 100%. Therefore it may 
be the case this is a standard practice across all sectors. 
Q. Do you use any software tool to manage the reports/provide management 
information? 
In both groups the majority make use of a software tool to assist - NISC 55%, NG 63% 
(note no software packages were mentioned) 
 
Q. Do you use any 'incident definitions' in separating incident types? 
For NISC, 50% use definitions and at NG 75%. What is clear is, even with those that 
use definitions, they are specific to the organisation therefore making comparisons 
extremely difficult.  This highlights one of the potential problems of numerous 
Government and industry sector aims for sharing incident data to provide a greater 
overview of the frequency of types of incidents.  Without common incident data 
definitions, merely sharing numbers of incidents, differently classified has the potential 
to complicate the overall picture. On examining the responses to this question the 
answers given are high level and do not contain any specific incident definitions.  Two 
respondents said they had a more detailed list and one sent it in.    
This lack of incident definition adversely affects those looking to integrate incidents 
reported into a bigger picture.  The results indicate organisations either classify 
incidents or they do not.  Those that do tend, from the comments provided, either to 
look at factors such as impact or place them in vary general criteria.  It was one of the 
reasons to include a suggested incident definition for the Delphi and Validation study’s 
to try and gauge responses against a common definition. 
Examples of comments from those who do try to classify the incident by type are; 
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Some NISC attendees referred to asset type e.g.  
“Physical, IT and Personnel.” 
 Others to incident type e.g. 
“Theft, virus, unauthorised access."  
Some referred to the value of the data;  
“Personal data, non-personal data, protectively marked data.”  
Others related the incident to business impact for example;    
“Incidents that need to be reported to the FSA (potential or actual customer 
impacting incidents) are rated as 1. Near miss; 2 Impact from a single dept.; 3. 
Operating division impact; 4. Whole company impact.” 
NG attendees’ comments included; Theft and fraud, social engineering and misuse of 
systems.    Others tried to classify incidents according to impact for example  
“Minor, significant, major.’” 
“By severity of business impact and confidentiality of information.” 
Q. Are other people/teams/ groups involved in the investigation of incidents or 
their resolution?  (E.g. training, HR)  
One reason for this question was to understand if incidents are just reported or actually 
investigated as to do this requires additional resource or capacity.  True learning from 
incidents cannot occur if there is no analysis of cause. Equally if there is a lack of data 
this hinders any analysis  
“Good data is a pre-requisite to qualitative risk analysis and the lack of good 
data may be the main reason qualitative analysis of information security risk is 
not normally performed (Blakley, McDermott and Geer (202, p.99) 
 [It is interesting to note here that in the overwhelming number of incidents other staff 
from outside information security units are involved in their investigation. For NISC it 
was 90% of the responses and for the NG 100%. The additional resources that typically 
become involved are those from Human Resources (HR).  This tends to suggest more 
emphasis on disciplinary action than root cause analysis 
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4.6.3  Survey Section 3 – Confidence in the Level of Reporting in your 
Organisation and your Opinion of Incident Reporting Levels in General.   
 
Q. With regards to your incident reporting system, how confident are you 
regarding the number of incidents reported? 
To some extent this question is key to the research as it gives the respondents the 
opportunity to comment honestly through the arrangements to ensure anonymity 
(although most chose to waive this) on whether the number of incidents reported 
represents the real picture.  The breakdown of figures for confidence in the numbers of 
incidents reported is described and shown at tables 4-3 and 4-4.  
As stated earlier the concern is that not all incidents are reported and therefore security 
and risk decisions are being based on flawed information 
 With regards to your incident reporting system, how 
confident are you regarding the number of incidents 
reported 
Event attendees All incidents Majority of 
incidents 
Some 
incidents 
Few incidents 
NISC 15% 20% 40% 25% 
NG 0% 47% 47% 6% 
Total (inc. Oil & Gas) 8% 30% 46% 16% 
Table  4-3  Degree of Confidence in the Number of Information Security Incidents Reported 
 
At NISC a low number scored all information security incidents were reported, where 
slightly more felt the majority were. The largest score being only some incidents are 
reported.  Compare this with the findings at NG Europe where there was an equal split 
amongst those who either felt the majority or only some incidents were reported with a 
lower figure than NISC where they felt few incidents were reported. No one at NG 
believed all incidents were reported 
 
 
. 
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 With regards to your incident reporting system, how 
confident are you regarding the number of incidents 
reported – aggregation of scoring 
Event attendees Combination of All or the 
Majority are reported 
Combination of Some or Few 
are reported 
NISC 35% 65% 
NG 47% 53% 
Total (inc. Oil & Gas) 38% 62% 
Table  4-4  Combination of Confidence in Number of Incidents Reported 
Probably most organisations would ideally like to think that all or the majority of 
incidents would be reported.  As can be seen for NISC attendees only 35% felt this was 
the case. The far larger proportion of 65% felt only some or few incidents were 
reported.  For NG 53% of respondents felt only ‘some’ or ‘few incidents’ were reported.  
This clearly highlights a significant lack of incidents being reported in both groups. 
When taking all the responses together the figures show a significantly smaller 
proportion of respondents (38%) have confidence ’all’ or the ‘majority’ of incidents are 
reported as opposed to those (68%) who felt only ‘some’ or a ‘few’ are.  
It is clear from this the view of the respondents was that many incidents are not 
reported.  This supports the first goal ‘to test whether the assumption that not all 
information security incidents are being reported is correct’. 
The results in table 4-1 and 4-2 clearly show concerns re the number of incidents being 
reported. 
Whichever way the results are looked at it seems there are likely to be barriers as all 
incidents are not reported.  So despite having various methods available for staff to 
report incidents ranging from e mails, to forms or direct to line managers there is a lack 
of confidence that the true number of incidents are being reported.         
Q. In your experience or opinion are some groups of workers more likely to report 
than others? 
This question asked who was more likely to report and, who are least likely with an 
option of ‘don’t know’.  The results may indicate where the effort and resources to 
improve reporting can be focussed upon.  Amongst the responses there were some 
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interesting variations.  Table 4-5 below shows the responses when asked who is more 
likely to report an incident. Respondents could answer ‘more likely’, ‘less likely’ or ‘do 
not know’ for each staff type category. The do not know % is the remaining score but 
not shown in the table. Therefore, the percentage figures are showing selected 
preferences as opposed to distinct either/or answers.  
Table  4-5  Type of Staff Likely to Report Security Incidents 
In the NISC, mainly public sector, group the result was a fairly even view spread across 
the board with the staff ‘more likely’ to report an incident being junior managers at 
40%. The staff least likely to report being general staff at 42%.  With the NG mainly 
private sector group the figures were more varied with middle managers standing out 
significantly being highlighted as ‘more likely’ to report at 87% and general staff 66% 
being ‘least likely’.  The overall scores, including the Oil and Gas, for the staff group 
‘more likely’ to report, show Middle Managers at 58%, with general staff being ‘least 
likely’ at 55%.    
The survey did not go into great detail regarding this element and it is possible that the 
perception middle managers are more likely to report may be affected by the method 
used internally by organisations for reporting incidents.  It may also reflect the 
demographic of the respondent.   It could possibly indicate the case that incidents are 
reported to more senior staff who then initiate the reporting process.  Therefore, once 
aware, due to their position they had a greater degree of accountability and 
responsibility to report.   
 
 
 
General 
Staff 
Junior 
Managers 
Middle 
Managers 
Senior 
Management 
Directors 
 More 
likely 
Least 
likely 
More 
likely 
Least 
likely 
More 
likely 
Least 
likely 
More 
likely 
Least 
likely 
More 
likely 
Least 
likely 
NISC 30% 42% 40% 32% 35% 32% 35% 26% 20% 32% 
NG 33% 66% 60% 40% 87% 13% 40% 53% 47% 40% 
Total 
(inc. 
Oil & 
Gas) 
30% 55% 46% 33% 58% 38% 35% 38% 32% 46% 
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Q. Are security incidents reported to Board Level? 
This question was inserted to gauge the involvement in the incident reporting process of 
Boards. The regularity was not clarified by a time scale of monthly, quarterly etc.  One 
respondent from NG did not answer this question so the percentage scores allowed for 
this. Table 6 below outlines the results. For NISC respondents the highest score stated 
the Board were notified ‘regularly’ on incidents and although for the NG group this was 
a lower score of 27% whereas the highest score for NG was 47% for ‘only if serious’ 
when taken together including Oil and Gas the score of ‘regularly’ was still the highest 
at 41%.   
 Only if 
Serious 
Regularly Occasionally Rarely Never 
NISC 25% 55% 10% 5% 5% 
NG 47% 27% 0% 27% 0% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
35% 41% 5% 16% 3% 
Table  4-6  Incidents Reported to the Board 
Boards appear to be kept regularly informed regarding security incidents. This might 
reflect the impact some incidents can have from a reputational or regulatory perspective.  
Q. Is Management information on incidents created?              
The majority in both groups answered yes to this NISC 75% and NG 69% with overall 
being 68%.  The question was not asked how is this management information used.  
Should analysis of this information take place, bearing in mind the lower confidence in 
reporting, the management information will be somewhat is flawed in as much that not 
all of the incidents are reported.   The following question asked if under reporting was a 
consideration in management information. 
Q. Does this take into account under reporting?                      
The answers show  25% of NISC respondents stating ‘yes’ with the majority saying 
‘no’ and one no response.  For NG there were four who did not answer but the data 
shows a slight majority of those responding stated their figures cater for this. 
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Q. If subject to a serious/targeted malware or external attack do you warn/inform 
anyone outside of your organisation?   (E.g. CPNI, WARP, CERT, GOVCERTUK 
etc.)  
This question gave a refreshingly high number of positives in that there is a 
considerable amount of external reporting, albeit some is mandatory and others best 
practice or at least an expectation to do so.  For NISC 90% stated they would report and 
81% for the NG attendees with 82% overall. 
Comments from NISC; 
“Security agencies, WARPs, GovCERT, CPNI, CINRAS, Dept. of Homeland 
Security, FBI, Data Commissioner, colleagues in similar organisations, FSA,  
their Telecoms provider,” 
Comments from NG on what agencies these incidents were reported to included; 
“ANSSI [French agency], partners and key customers, CPNI, police, central 
bank, clearing house, regulatory body, various agencies  and regulatory bodies 
depending on country affected, CERT, local authorities, country specific forum 
for banks, industry wide information sharing network.” 
The interesting point here is there is not one focal point for reporting.  In some instances 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) will be notified, but not by all 
respondents. Therefore providing overall statistics or insight of the real information 
security incident picture is a challenge.  It is highly probable that any report that collates 
‘security incidents’ will be missing considerable numbers of unreported incidents. This 
leads to an assumption that what is reported can, at best, only really be considered a 
snapshot.   Particularly where it is clear the classification of such incidents is highly 
diverse. 
The question continued - If no, are there any particular reasons why not? 
There were no comments from NISC but comments from NG included;  
“Not mandated”   “company reputation”, “organisation is reluctant to do so” 
“image”.   
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 It could be as the NG attendees were mainly private sector company image does have 
an influence on whether to report to another body. 
Q. If certain types of incident were mandated to be reported to a central body (e.g. 
the ICO) what type of incidents do you think these should be? 
For NISC the responses included;  
“Malware, Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) and other targeted attacks.”  
“Personal information “  
“Where Criminal offences are involved”  
However, a note of caution was expressed with one respondent stating  
“ICO, yes, but very reticent to do so because of reputational damage.”  
For NG the responses had similar themes but also included the notion of providing the 
central body with;  
“A general executive report on a regular basis.” 
“Incidents that could impact on the economy.”  
Comments from Oil and Gas included; 
“Major attacks or incidents.” 
“Thefts – devices, data, DNS, suspected hacking into network.” 
There is a real mixture of comments here.  Where most respondents recognise some 
types of incident should be mandated to report, there is a wide view on what these 
should be.  This ranges from all information security incidents to the serious ones.  The 
majority focussed on personal data loss.  The wide range probably reflects on the lack of 
any type of universally accepted incident classification currently in existence. Again 
with the wide range of regulatory bodies’ organisations have to report to depending on 
the sector they operate adding a central mandatory body with differing definitions  
would no doubt cause problems in classification. 
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Q. Do you feel mandated reporting would increase the number of incidents 
reported locally? 
 Mandation would 
increase reporting 
Mandation would not 
increase reporting 
Not sure 
NISC 37% 37% 26% 
NG 40% 33% 27% 
Total (inc. Oil & 
Gas) 
39% 33% 28% 
Table  4-7  Would Mandated Reporting Increase Reporting 
The results here are fairly even with NISC respondents showing an equal spread of 
‘yes’ and ‘no’ of 37% with the remainder unsure. For NG it was ‘yes’ 40%, ‘no’ 33% 
with the remaining 27% unsure.  Overall, with the Oil and Gas results included the 
proportion who said it would increase reporting was ‘yes’ 39% with 33% saying ‘no’.   
The comments made regarding the mandated reporting and safeguards help to 
demonstrate why there is no clear winner here.  For this issue to progress a great deal of 
work would need to be done with regards to classification and safeguards, together with 
issues surrounding the multiple number of bodies who already require reporting. 
An attendee from NG made the additional comment; “I do not feel it can be done.” 
Q. If mandated reporting was introduced, what safeguards would you like to see in 
place? 
Many NISC respondents commented on the need for a ‘no blame culture’ and protection 
for the reporting organisation. Other comments included: 
“Mechanism for reducing blame if voluntarily reporting genuine mistakes. E.g. loss of 
laptop etc.” 
“Ability to hold off full report until investigation is complete. Any release of info on 
breach would need to be sanitised and as anonymous as possible.” 
 “I would like to see incidents anonymised for press releases, I would also like to see 
less penalty imposed on those who report than those who do not report but are 
discovered to have not reported an incident – rewarding honesty.” 
 ‘Cultural change issues.’  (Possibly referring to response of reporting and how 
perceived by press, public and staff), 
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NG comments included; 
“Anonymity’ and ‘protection of reputational risk” was recorded several times as was,  
“protecting the informer’ and the data provided.” 
“A level of certainty of retained public anonymity.” 
“Protection against data leakage.” 
Oil and Gas comments;  
“Non-disclosure and protection of data.” 
“Tight audience – not public.” 
The issues generally highlighted here are that should mandatory reporting of certain 
incidents be introduced, there would be concerns over who had access to the 
information, how it was disseminated and also the element of blame associated.  There 
was reference to rewarding those who report and punishing those who do not.    
Q. Do you read/make use of the various incident report surveys? (Verizon, 
Symantec, PWC etc.) 
The responses were to a straight forward yes or no. The answers to this question are 
incorporated into table 4-8 together with the answers to the question below.  
Q. Do you feel the security incident data they collect/made available to them 
represents; The Full Picture; Reasonable Picture; or Partial Picture 
There are a few annual or bi annual incident and breaches surveys that are published – 
mainly by private sector organisations which try to collate and analyse security 
incidents, trends and costs.  These include the PWC incident and breaches survey, 
Verizon’s incident surveys and those produced by Symantec. The point of the question 
was to see what proportion of those who responded read such reports and to ascertain 
their views on whether they contained the whole picture bearing in mind earlier survey 
findings highlighted in this paper.  
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Table  4-8  Representation of Picture of Security Incidents by Incident Surveys 
For NISC attendees 75 % read such surveys however none thought they reflected the 
full picture.  The majority, 45%, felt they provided a reasonable one.  For NG 94% read 
them but again no one thought such surveys capture everything but a higher proportion, 
81%,  thought the picture provided was a reasonable reflection of reality.    
4.6.4  Survey Section 4 – Barriers to Learning from and Reporting Information 
Security Incidents. 
This section of the survey was created to ascertain the views of the attendees at NISC, 
NG and Oil and Gas on a list of fourteen suggested barriers to learning from and 
therefore potentially reporting incidents from research in the Healthcare sector referred 
to in section 4.2. The barriers are reproduced in this section in the order they were set 
out in the survey. These barriers do not relate to learning from information security 
incidents but ‘adverse patient incidents’.  The value of such a comparison is to identify 
if the same human traits apply to both types of incident. 
The respondents were asked to indicate to what degree they could apply as barriers to 
reporting and learning from information security incidents.  Each statement included an 
option to select from a 5 point Likert scale of ‘Strongly Agree’, ‘Agree’, ‘Neither 
agree/disagree’, ‘disagree and ‘strongly disagree’.  The tables highlighting the responses 
also include the overall agreement scores by combining ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ 
together. Likewise the same approach is taken for generally disagreeing with the 
statement by combining ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’.  The middle option of 
neither agreeing nor disagreeing is not included in the combination scores.    
 
 Percentage 
who read 
incident report 
surveys 
What picture do they represent regarding the 
reporting incidents? 
Full Picture  Reasonable 
picture 
Partial 
Picture 
NISC 75% 0% 45% 35% 
NG 94% 0% 81% 19% 
Total (inc. Oil 
& Gas)  
79% 0% 58% 26% 
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Barrier 1. An undue focus on the immediate event rather than on the root causes 
of problems; 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
20% 
 
45% 20% 15% 0% 
65%  15% 
NG 
Combination 
25% 
 
38% 19% 6% 13% 
63%  19% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
24% 40% 21% 11% 5% 
64%  16% 
Table  4-9  Barrier to Reporting - Undue Focus on Immediate Event 
Both NISC and NG attendees selected ‘agree’ with 45% and 38% respectively. Overall, 
including Oil and Gas ‘agree’ was the most popular with 40%.  ‘Strongly agree’ was the 
next highest.  It is interesting that when looking at ‘agree’ versus ‘disagree’ and 
discarding ‘neither agree/disagree’, 64% of respondents ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that 
this is a real problem.  These scores could indicate a support for a concern that if more 
focus is on the incident rather than the cause learning from any mistakes may be less 
likely to happen.   
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as;  
“We do however have a culture of conducting RCA’s [Root Cause Analysis]  
post incident though not all incidents are captured. “ 
“I believe one factor is fear that they have done something wrong or fear of 
getting someone else in trouble, combined with an ignorance of something to 
report” 
“It seems in these times of resource constraint many people look for expedient 
answers and focus on what’s ‘front of mind’ rather than cause elimination i.e.  
TREAT the SYMPTOM.” 
NISC respondents who disagreed made comments such as: 
“RCA always undertaken and possible improvements identified.” 
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NG respondents who agreed made comments such as:  
“Just pushing paper will not solve/prevent history being repeated, difficult to 
stop headless chickens leading to knee jerk reaction –   I have no answer it is an 
observation.” 
“Root cause analyses can help, - however if you manage to SLA [Service Level 
Agreement]why require a RCA in all cases.” 
NG respondents who disagreed made comments such as; 
“Believe that the service restoration/incident management is the necessary first 
step- once restored then appropriate route cause problem management should 
occur.” 
 
Barrier 2. Latching onto one superficial cause or learning point to the exclusion of 
more   fundamental but sometimes less obvious lessons 
Table  4-10  Barrier to reporting.  Latching onto one Superficial Cause 
For this question the responses were not so clear cut. Of the NISC respondents 30% 
agreed, 30% disagreed with 25% neither agreeing nor disagreeing.  The NG respondents 
were clearer in their views with 31% agreeing against 13% disagreeing but a larger 
proportion 44% chose to neither agree or disagree.   
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as; 
“Especially true if it would take resources to address the route of the problem.” 
NISC respondents who disagreed made comments such as: 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
agree  nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
10% 30% 25% 30% 5% 
40%  35% 
NG 
Combination 
13% 31% 44% 13% 0% 
44%  13% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
11% 32% 32% 24% 3% 
43%  27% 
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“for these incidents where an RCA is conducted, tools such as ‘5-why’ are used 
to avoid this” 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as:   
“Corporate need for closure at any cost preferably without the need for any 
cost.”   
NG respondents who disagreed made comments such as;  
“Sometimes the above appears to be correct. However this is more driven by 
communication needs rather than waiting hours before communicating 
anything,”  
“Understand concern but down to style/approach of problem management. 
Necessary to look at in addition to root causes: 1, Trigger 2, aggravating factors 
3, avoidance failures.” 
Other comments included those from NISC respondents stating neither agree nor 
disagree; 
“Needs a holistic approach.” 
“Root cause analysis.” 
Barrier 3. Rigidity of core beliefs, values and assumptions, which may develop over 
time – learning is resisted if it contradicts these; 
 Strongly Agree Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 10% 50% 25% 15% 0% 
60%  15% 
NG 19% 56% 13% 13% 0% 
75%  13% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
13% 50% 21% 16% 0% 
63%  16% 
Table  4-11  Barrier to Reporting - Rigidity of Core Beliefs 
Clearer preferences emerge here with 50% of NISC respondents stating they agree and 
56% of NG likewise. Only 15% and 13% respectively stating they disagree.  When 
comparing agreeing to disagreeing NISC respondents totalled 60% with NG 75% 
agreeing.  
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as;   
 151 
 
“This can be a danger but I would hope most people will try to understand any 
developing issue so avoid further problems in the future, degree of risk 
acceptance.” 
“This is true of all science though.” 
“Culture of senior management.” 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as:   
 
“That is human nature – change is resisted, culture people and human nature 
condition a person to expect to follow rules.” 
NG respondents who disagreed made comments such as; 
“Depends upon organisational attitude – horses for courses I guess.” 
 
Barrier 4.  Lack of corporate responsibility – it may be difficult, for example, to 
put into practice solutions which are sufficiently far-reaching; 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
25% 55% 0% 20% 0% 
80%  20% 
NG 
Combination 
19% 38% 25% 13% 6% 
57%  19% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
21% 47% 13% 16% 3% 
68%  19% 
Table  4-12  Barrier to Reporting - Lack of Corporate Responsibility 
For this question there is again a clear leaning to agree with the statement.  55% of 
NISC respondents agree as does 38% of NG. Taking all who agree to some extent the 
scores are 80% for NISC and 57%.  Interestingly the views of the NISC, who are 
mainly public sector (75%), felt very strongly about this.  No one had a neither agree or 
disagree view.   For NG the scores were slightly less in agreement mainly due to 25% 
not having a view either way. 
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as; 
“All incident reporting should be encouraged by the head of an organisation, 
who should be setting an example.”   
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“Education of security with regard to ICT is particularly poor.” 
NISC respondents who disagreed made comments such as: 
“Cost is a factor, existing regulations in the financial service industry and for 
any company that uses personal or payment data goes a long way to deal with 
service impacting events. Virus type incidents are another problem but a single 
piece of malware on the wrong server or workstation may be a problem.  It 
would be difficult to report down to this level.” 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as: 
“Not sure if it would make a huge difference.”  
NG respondents who disagreed made comments such as;  
“Not an issue in a highly regulated company.” 
Barrier 5.  Ineffective communication and other information difficulties – 
including failure to disseminate information which is already available; 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
26% 47% 16% 5% 5% 
73%  10% 
NG 
Combination 
31% 50% 19% 0% 0% 
81%  0% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
27% 49% 19% 3% 3% 
76%  6% 
Table  4-13  Barrier to reporting - Ineffective Communication 
Again this question has resulted in a clear majority agreeing with the statement. 47% 
stating they agree for NISC and 50% of NG.   The respondents who disagree were low 
in number.  For NISC 10% disagreed to some extent but for NG no one disagreed with 
the statement in any form.  Overall NISC respondents who agreed were 73% and for 
NG 81%. 
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as; 
“Although there is some good communication, large organisation = SILO = 
generally poor communications, communication is a tricky one.”  
A valid comment from one respondent was  
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“You need to maintain confidentiality so the criminals don’t know how 
successful they were but you also need to let staff know about malware and 
security threats.” 
NISC respondents who disagreed made comments such as:  
“We have disseminated much information, however this gets forgotten or 
ignored, and all staff get security awareness training.” 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as:  
“The eternal problem – info leads to people not reading anything and thus 
missing important messages.” 
“Not many tech staff have the ability to communicate the issue in business 
language.” 
An Oil and Gas attendee who stated they agree commented 
“Awareness is key” 
Barrier 6. An incremental approach to issues of risk – attempting to resolve 
problems through tinkering rather than tackling more fundamental change; 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
22% 33% 17% 28% 0% 
55%  28% 
NG 
Combination 
13% 50% 31% 6% 0% 
63%  6% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
17% 42% 22% 19% 0% 
59%  19% 
Table  4-14  Barrier to Reporting - An Incremental Approach to Risk   
Here there is an interesting difference of opinion between NISC and NG.  NISC 
respondents although tending to agree also had a reasonable number of 28% disagreeing 
whereas NG only 6% disagreed and although 31% neither agreed nor disagreed 50% 
stated they agreed.  Overall 55% of NISC agreed to some extent and 63% of NG agreed.    
There were no comments from NISC respondents who indicated they agreed. 
NISC respondents who disagreed made comments such as:  
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“I hope this isn’t the case. With our incident management process we try to 
discover the root cause when we can and then feed back to a project 
improvement but it isn’t easy to ensure you have all the facts at the outset.” 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as: 
“Refer back – Get it fixed and move on mentality – no trend analysis means that 
trends are missed.” 
“Human nature drives this as well as economic and ‘fear of failure’ concerns. 
There is risk in grasping the nettle.” 
An Oil and Gas response from the respondent who agreed was;  
The respondent who disagreed stated  
“Not sure this poses a major barrier to reporting. “ 
Barrier 7. Pride in individual and organisational expertise can lead to denial and 
to a disregard of external sources of warning – particularly if a bearer of bad news 
lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the individuals, teams or organisations in question; 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
22% 26% 11% 42% 0% 
48%  42% 
NG 
Combination 
6% 69% 6% 19% 0% 
75%  19% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
14% 46% 11% 30% 0% 
 
60% 
  
30% 
Table  4-15 Barrier to Reporting -Pride in Individual and Organisational Expertise Leading to 
Denial 
 
The NISC attendees were fairly split between 26% stating they ‘agree’ and 22% 
‘strongly agreeing’ totalling 48%. Whereas 42% stated they ‘disagree’.  Here the NG 
attendees gave a large 69% response to generally agreeing with only 19% stating they 
disagree. This is quite a discrepancy between the two groups.   The NG group clearly 
agreeing whereas the NISC group split.  This may be a public sector v private sector 
issue in relation to the way that security is viewed. 
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as;  
“Yes professional arrogance and protectionism”   
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“But not sure if it is ‘pride’ or ‘assumption of trust.” 
NISC respondents who disagreed made comments such as: 
“Our organisation is more likely to believe external expertise than internal” (A 
local Authority respondent) 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as:  
“Of course. There is always someone who will tell you that they told you so. 
Risk based decisions are not always 100%” 
Oil and Gas attendees stated  
“Perhaps too much acceptance that an incident or warning is a cost of doing 
business” 
Barrier 8. A tendency towards scapegoating and finding individuals to blame, 
rather than acknowledging and addressing deep-rooted organisational problems; 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
22% 11% 26% 42% 0% 
33%  42% 
NG 
Combination 
25% 19% 31% 13% 13% 
44%  26% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
22% 14% 27% 30% 8% 
 
36% 
  
38% 
Table  4-16  Barrier to Reporting - A Tendency to Scapegoat 
An interesting mix of responses. No NISC respondents stated they strongly disagreed 
but 42% disagreed. NG attendees had low scores for disagreement - 13% for both 
strongly disagree and disagree.   Almost a quarter of both groups had responses of 
strongly agreeing 
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as;  
“A belief that scapegoating and blame will occur is a major factor.” 
NISC respondents who disagreed made comments such as:  
“Blame culture is strongly discouraged although it persists in some locations 
and teams.” 
“We allow staff to make anonymous reports if they wish, so I hope we do not 
look for a scapegoat.2 
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NG respondents who agreed made comments such as: 
“I wish this was not true but it is.”  
“Comes with the territory in the CISO role. The higher you go the thinner the 
branch.” 
NISC respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed stated  
“I’m sure this is true in some places but not prevalent in ours”.  
“Perhaps in some departmental areas but not endemic of whole organisation.” 
An Oil and Gas attendee who disagreed stated; ‘I think we are past this.’ 
 
Barrier 9. The difficulties faced by people in ‘making sense’ of complex events are 
compounded by changes among key personnel within organisations and teams; 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
11% 42% 16% 32% 0% 
53%  32% 
NG 
Combination 
13% 44% 25% 19% 0% 
57%  19% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
11% 41% 22% 27% 0% 
 
52% 
  
27% 
Table  4-17  Barrier to Reporting - Difficulty in Making Sense of Complex Events 
A slight leaning towards accepting the statement. NISC and NG had 42% and 44% 
respectively of respondents selecting they agree with the statement.   When the strongly 
agree selection is added this resulted in 53% and 57% respectively. 
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as;   
“Especially in policing at the moment.’ 
“This can be a real problem. Key staff tend to be relied on and it is easy to 
assume that staff will stay for ever.” 
NISC respondents who disagreed made comments such as:  
“Locally turnover of key staff is insignificant” 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as:  
“Knowledge management is done but it is not effective due to the sheer volume 
of information.” 
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“Relationships matter and they take time to build – especially with regard to 
trust.” 
 
Barrier 10. Human alliances lead people to ‘forgive’ other team members their 
mistakes and act defensively against ideas from outside the team; 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
16% 47% 21% 16% 0% 
63%  16% 
NG 
Combination 
31% 31% 13% 19% 6% 
62%  25% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
22% 38% 16% 22% 3% 
60%  25% 
Table  4-18  Barrier to Reporting – Human Alliances Tending to Forgive Within the Team 
Again both groups tended to agree with this statement.  47% of NISC attendees agree 
with 16% strongly agreeing. 31% of NG agreed and also the same amount strongly 
agreed.  Both respondents from Oil and Gas disagreed. 
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as;  
“In some cases. In a council social care teams are more likely to be forgiving.’ 
Almost inevitable.”  
Other NISC comments included;  
“I hope this doesn’t happen as we try to have an open approach but there is 
always the danger that this can be the case.” 
“May lead to incidents not being reported in the correct manner/at all.” 
 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as:  
“That’s what good teams do!” 
Other NG comments included;  
“Depends on the incident. People and culture can be managed.” 
NG respondents who disagreed made comments such as;  
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“Alliances are very often temporarily made. When an organisation adopts such 
attitude it starts an on-going process that means alliance needs to be break and 
/on extend in fact develops the openness.”    
An Oil and Gas respondent who disagreed stated.  
“This does not impact reporting – but we are past the blame culture”  
 
Barrier 11. People are often unwilling to learn from negative events, even when it 
would be to their advantage; 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
16% 26% 11% 42% 5% 
42%  47% 
NG  
Combination 
25% 31% 19% 25% 0% 
56%  25% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
19% 22% 14% 38% 3% 
 
41% 
  
41% 
Table  4-19  Barrier to Reporting – People Unwilling to Learn 
A large proportion of NISC attendees disagreed – 42%,  Where for NG  the largest 
score went to agreeing at 31%  but overall agreement versus disagreement was a  
percentage split for and against of  41%.  
 
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as;  
”This is a danger we try to deal with.” 
NISC respondents who disagreed made comments such as:  
“Can often learn more.”  
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as:  
“Influencing and motivational activities can help. However these are many 
‘alphas’ who all want control and influence.”  
“Human nature again.” 
Oil and Gas comments, both of who disagreed, included;    
“Lessons learnt are key.” 
“Not a problem for our industry1  quite the opposite.” 
                                                 
1
 Energy Sector 
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Barrier 12.  Contradictory imperatives – for example communication versus 
confidentiality; 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
16% 68% 0% 16% 0% 
84%  16% 
NG 
Combination 
19% 50% 19% 6% 6% 
69%  12% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
16% 57% 11% 14% 3% 
 
73% 
  
17% 
Table  4-20  Barrier to Reporting – Contradictory Imperatives 
There was strong support for this statement with 68% of NISC selecting agree and 50% 
of NG doing likewise.  Overall 84% and 69% agreed to some extent with the statement. 
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as; 
“Team v Corporate responsibilities.”  
“With any attack on the infrastructure such as a hack, or DoS/DDoS it is 
important not to let the criminal know how close they came to succeeding.”  
“People still do not believe that everything is confidential, and that if they do 
report something that they will not be identified as the person reporting.”  
 
NISC respondents who disagreed made comments such as:  
“Our data is confidential, it would not be shared any more than necessary but 
the lesson can be.” 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as: 
“It depends on the individual and how confident they are.” 
“Convenience versus security, TCO v ROI2, You can program a system to do 
what it is told irrespective of external influences – not so with people.” 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 TCO - Total Cost of Ownership versus ROI – Return On Investment 
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Barrier 13. High stress and low job-satisfaction can have adverse effects on quality 
and can also engender a resistance to change; 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
32% 47% 11% 11% 0% 
79%  11% 
NG 
Combination 
44% 38% 13% 6% 0% 
82%  6% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
Combination 
35% 46% 11% 8% 0% 
 
81% 
  
8% 
Table  4-21  Barrier to Reporting – High Stress and Low Job Satisfaction 
Both groups score highly in favour of this statement. For NISC 47% agree and 32% 
strongly agree. For NG an even greater leaning to strongly agree amongst the group 
with 38% agreeing and 44% strongly agreeing. Both respondents from Oil and Gas 
were in agreement.   
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as;   
“Policy is in a state of flux, with major job insecurity and workload.” 
“The human factor. Often working 8 hours or more will be more productive 
than working 7 but working 12 will usually be less productive. It can be hard to 
get the best out of people, at which point they may feel valuable but try to get 
that bit more and the stress builds fast.” 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as:  
“High stress leads to need hide stuff – look at Nick Leeson!” 
Barrier 14. Inability to recognise the financial costs of failure, thus losing a 
powerful incentive for organisations to change;   
 
  
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
NISC 
Combination 
26% 47% 5% 21% 0% 
73%  21% 
NG 
Combination 
31% 44% 13% 13% 0% 
75%  13% 
Total (inc. 
Oil & Gas) 
27% 49% 8% 16% 0% 
 
76% 
  
16% 
Table  4-22  Barrier to Reporting – Inability to Recognise Financial Costs of Failure 
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As with Question 13 another high proportion agreeing with the statement.  With NISC 
respondents recoding 47% agree and 26% strongly agree. For NG a similar picture with 
44% stating agree and 31% strongly agree.  Both Oil and Gas respondents agreed.   
NISC respondents who indicated they agreed made comments such as;   
“We always try to cost any incident and that may be an actual cost and a 
potential cost, so we know how close we came to having a more serious 
incident.”  
“Also reputational cost of failure is not understood /regarded.” 
NG respondents who agreed made comments such as:  
“Difficult to quantify cost, especially where reputational cost is evident.” 
“We don’t have the ability to define this very well yet.” 
An Oil and Gas comment was;  
“It is always hard to quantify value of the ‘never happened’.” 
4.7  Summary of Section 4 - Survey Responses 
 
When comparing the responses of the main survey groups of NG and NISC attendees 
there was not a complete consensus of general agreement or disagreement across all of 
the barriers. In general the NG Europe attendees tended to agree with most but the 
differentials in levels of agreement for some questions were small.   
Of the 14 barriers there were two where a difference of opinion appeared between the 
NG and NISC attendees.  In these barriers (shown in table 4-16 and 4-19) the majority 
of NISC attendees tended to disagree as opposed to the NG attendees agreeing.   
The barrier in table 4-16 ‘A tendency towards scapegoating and finding individuals to 
blame, rather than acknowledging and addressing deep-rooted organisational 
problems’ showed for NISC an overall agreement of 33%  against overall disagreement 
of 42% where NG attendees scored in agreement 44% against disagreement of 26%.  
For the barrier in table 4-19 ‘People are often unwilling to learn from negative events, 
even when it would be to their advantage’  NISC attendees scored overall in  agreement 
42%  against overall disagreement 47%, where NG attendees scored in agreement 56% 
against disagreement of 25%.    
 162 
 
There was the risk that seeking views and degrees of comment on barriers from one 
sector, Healthcare, to another, Information Security, may not have worked.  It may have 
been they were considered to be irrelevant. However, the response was good and many 
added comments to qualify their individual selections.   
Acceptance of the Barriers - Which ones were supported most by the Information 
Security professionals? 
Having requested the views of professional this section examines the levels of overall 
agreement or disagreement associated to each barrier.   Of the fourteen barriers listed 
for comment the majority, eleven, had over 50% support from respondents as strongly 
agreeing or agreeing they apply to information security incidents. Only one barrier, 
number 8, had more not in agreement. However, the difference being only 2% with 27% 
neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Barrier 11 is split equally with those agreeing against 
those who do not.   
To try and provide an indication of clear preference, any total of the scores of ‘agree’ or 
‘strongly agree’ of 60% or more would arguably show support for the statement. When 
applied; nine of the barriers meet this suggested criteria. Were this indicator of clear 
preference raised to 70%, four barriers would still meet this with one close behind at 
68%. 
 
Table 4-23 below lists the barriers and shows the barrier number with an asterisk 
identifying those barriers whose combined ‘agree’ or’ strongly agree’ score is over 
60%.  Neither agree/disagree figures are discounted for this purpose. The figures 
represent the total responses from NISC, NG and Oil and Gas. 
Note; barrier 6 is very close to the criteria with 59% agreeing and only 19% disagreeing. 
Due to the low number of respondents disagreeing, it could be argued that this too was 
generally accepted.  Particularly as some of those barriers that met the 60% criteria had 
higher disagreement percentages.  Namely barrier 7 (30%) and barrier 10 (25%) 
respectively. 
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Barriers with a score of over 60% General agreement are shown with an asterisk * 
No Barrier  General 
Agreement 
General 
Disagreement 
1* An undue focus on the immediate event rather than 
on the root causes of problems 
64% 16% 
2 Latching onto one superficial cause or learning 
point to the exclusion of more fundamental but 
sometimes less obvious lessons 
43% 27% 
3* Rigidity of core beliefs, values and assumptions, 
which may develop over time – learning is resisted 
if it contradicts these 
63% 16% 
4* Lack of corporate responsibility – it may be 
difficult, for example, to put into practice solutions 
which are sufficiently far-reaching 
68% 19% 
5* Ineffective communication and other information 
difficulties – including failure to disseminate 
information which is already available 
76% 6% 
6 An incremental approach to issues of risk – 
attempting to resolve problems through tinkering 
rather than tackling more fundamental change 
59% 19% 
7* Pride in individual and organisational expertise can 
lead to denial and to a disregard of external sources 
of warning – particularly if a bearer of bad news 
lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the individuals, 
teams or organisations in question 
60% 30% 
8 A tendency towards scapegoating and finding 
individuals to blame, rather than acknowledging 
and addressing deep-rooted organisational problems 
36% 38% 
9 The difficulties faced by people in ‘making sense’ 
of complex events are compounded by changes 
among key personnel within organisations and 
teams 
52% 27% 
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10
* 
Human alliances lead people to ‘forgive’ other team 
members their mistakes and act defensively against 
ideas from outside the team 
60% 25% 
11 People are often unwilling to learn from negative 
events, even when it would be to their advantage 
41% 41% 
12
* 
Contradictory imperatives – for example 
communication versus confidentiality 
73% 17% 
13
* 
High stress and low job-satisfaction can have 
adverse effects on quality and can also engender a 
resistance to change 
81% 8% 
14
* 
Inability to recognise the financial costs of failure, 
thus losing a powerful incentive for organisations to 
change 
76% 16% 
Table  4-23  Summary of Barriers 
In Table 4-23 where there was a score indicating general agreement with the barrier of 
60% or over this barrier is indicated by an asterisk.  There were nine of the identified 
barriers to reporting and learning in the healthcare report that due to this score could be 
considered as applicable in the security reporting arena. These positive scores indicate 
that research in the health care sector relating to incident reporting can be considered as 
applicable in the information security sector, albeit for security incident reporting. It 
was this apparent portability of research from one sector to another sector that was 
further tested in the Delphi in Chapter 5. 
It is worth noting that none of the surveys contained any comments in Section 5. This 
section did not contain any questions. It was designed to allow the person completing 
the survey to add any additional views or comments should there be insufficient space 
elsewhere.   
A number of those who did respond and who gave their details, despite the offer of 
anonymity, showed genuine interest in being informed of the research findings. This 
was generally when handing in responses to the organisers and this feedback was passed 
back or in email responses with the questionnaire attached. 
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4.8  Reflection on the Survey Process 
Due to using surveys in the next two stages of the research it was important to reflect 
early on the lessons learnt so as to avoid issues later on in the research. This section 
aims to identify the improvements that were needed to improve data quality. There were 
some problems with the methods used to complete the survey.  As the respondents had 
identified themselves they were contacted to seek clarification, which they were more 
than happy to oblige.  Where some answers were missing or unclear, reference to this is 
made in the spreadsheet used to collate all the responses and in the ‘Table of Results’ 
(See Appendix 3). Missing pages and ambiguous answers has been taken into account 
in any analysis. 
Where there are comments from those who completed the answer they have been 
reproduced in italics and replicated the exact text. With some responses this does not 
make for good grammar or sense.  It could be that this is as a result of the language of 
the person completing or just that the person completing was doing so in a hurry. 
4.8.1  Lessons Learnt - What Worked Well? 
The construct of the survey achieved its aim in eliciting honest and open views through 
the efforts made to ensure anonymity.  Having said that, for whatever reason, the 
majority of respondents were more than happy to provide their full contact details.  It 
could be assumed that this is due either to their belief in the research aims and the 
willingness to take part in further discussions with the author or that although provided 
with the opportunity to be completely anonymous they trusted the researcher in the 
promise to keep the identities confidential.  The personal approach certainly assisted in 
obtaining a good response.   
Bearing in mind this was not just a UK audience but a worldwide one, it was surprising 
that not one question was received seeking clarification in how to complete it.  There 
were some errors in completion but these were the type of errors that could be made in 
completing any form. For example, missing out a section or adding information when it 
was not requested.  As a result there were only a few where a note had to be made in the 
compilation of figures where a question had been missed.  Interestingly there were no 
particular or repetitive mistakes.  Therefore the error rate was small and the location of 
any mistake was random.  However, it was noted that, despite the checking and 
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validation, a small comments box at the end of question 2.3 had been omitted.  The final 
selection box related to 'Other' (please describe below) but the comments box was 
missing.   This was annoying, however it did not affect the results as those who placed a 
tick against ‘Other’ were only inserting a word or two to describe a function not 
covered in the choices.  It is considered that this omission did not adversely affect the 
scoring or opportunity to comment by the responder.   
It was surprising how many participants completed their contact details in full, as all 
good practice regarding formulating surveys point to the best results being from those 
who are anonymous.  Despite this offering, an extremely high number provided their 
details and were honest in their answers (as far as one can tell). 
The decision to identify the event that the person completing the survey attended by 
including reference to it, specifically in those distributed at the event, assisted in 
identifying any differences in responses that may have materialised specific to that 
event.  Again, surprisingly the two main events were diametrically opposed regarding 
their type of seniority of attendees and the public/private sector mix. 
It was particularly pleasing to see the number of non UK participants.  This provided a 
wider insight into the views of security professionals who were not subject to the type 
of media and public attention in the UK at the time surrounding data loss incidents 
(HMRC, MOD).   
The initial concern with regard to formatting issues was born out by some who tried to 
complete the word document electronically and found difficulty due to software 
compatibility issues.   There is confidence now that the survey has been successfully 
deployed it is now worth the effort of creating it as an online document.   
As inevitably there is a risk the survey could emerge onto the internet any use of home 
or work addresses could have caused potential spamming or identity issues.  The choice 
to use the University e-mail address for contact purposes ensured that, although this risk 
still existed, the university address did offer some protection. In the event this concern 
has not manifested itself. 
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4.8.2  Lessons Learnt - What did not Work Well? 
Surprisingly little went wrong apart from the problem with different versions of 
Microsoft Office resulting in the formatting of boxes being an issue.  The length of the 
preamble was cut down following early reviews and a number of comments were 
received on how well the questions ran.  Some comments were made regarding the 
wording of the barriers in Section 4 however, the wording choice was deliberate as they 
were taken directly from the previous research in the healthcare industry. The aim was 
to compare and identify if any of those barriers were relevant for Information Security.  
If the wording used was different this could have had the effect of nullifying any 
comparison. 
Some interpretation of the handwriting did prove slightly challenging and this is where 
a typed response would have proved better. However for primary evidence of 
completion a personally handwritten response is far better. Also for those seeking 
anonymity (as it turned out most declined this) using a machine would have left a record 
should there be any comeback later. 
Had the researcher been able to remain at the Oil and Gas cyber security event during 
the evening and following day more forms would have been returned.  It should also be 
noted the event was not attended by the same type of security professional that went to 
NISC and NG.  It was more aimed towards technical security and fraud rather than the 
CISO/ISO audience.  In addition the maturity of the industry in regards to Infosec 
seemed less than others.    This may only be an indication from the presentations 
viewed.   For example one company had only just employed their first Information 
Security Officer. 
4.9  NG Security Summit Workshop on Incident Reporting  
In parallel an opportunity was provided by the NG Security Summit to delve further 
into some of the issues covered in the survey.  Whilst it does not form the core part of 
the data collection it provided an opportunity to add some insights into CISO’s thinking 
on the topic and as such is reported here for completeness. In particular, the aspect of 
the Department of Health (2000, p.45) research into “effective incident reporting 
systems”.  
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The workshop was held as part of the NG Security Summit held between the 14
th
 and 
16
th
 June 2011  in Lisbon, Portugal. There were approximately 35 people in the room 
who were either CISO’s or had a similar role. The organisers ran a number of 
workshops and panel sessions and invited the researcher to run a 40 minute workshop 
on security incident reporting.  This workshop could be considered as a form of focus 
group. A focus group is where the researcher acts as a facilitator to lead the discussion 
of a group to obtain an understanding of what individuals within the group, and the 
group as a whole, think about a particular subject (Buckingham and Saunders 2004; 
Yin, 2014). Although there was a slide set that was used to generate discussion, its 
primary intention was to get a high level view on the researches perception of a lack of 
security incident reporting.  This was the first test of that assumption amongst a group 
gathered to discuss the issue as opposed to individually completing a questionnaire 
anonymously.   As recognised by Bryman (2004) transcribing focus groups can be 
difficult and, at the outset, this was an opportunity for the researcher to make use of the 
offer of a slot at the conference as part of a series of practical workshops to discuss 
pertinent information security topics. This was an opportunity to gauge opinion on 
another element of the health care research.   
This research workshop was held at the second of a series of three security 
professionals’ conferences that the scoping study was distributed, but the only one that 
had a workshop. This workshop was the first of the scheduled events so at that stage, 
apart from the previous evening dinner, the attendees had not met as a group before 
which could have stifled debate.  However, the subject matter appeared to be of interest 
to them as there was a full house of attendees.  
There were approximately 35 in the room.  The attendees were informed of the purpose 
of the research and that they were under no obligation to participate and they could 
withdraw at any time.   They were shown some of the researcher’s organisational ‘in 
house’ security incident training video clips to set the scene before introducing the 
subject through a set of power point slides.  The workshop was entitled.  ‘Information 
Security Incidents – Are they reported?’ 
The second slide asked the question ‘if not – why not’ and followed up with ‘What are 
the barriers?’ 
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At NG Europe, during the workshop, the organisers also provided a member of staff to 
note any comments that came from any subsequent discussion on a flip chart.   The 
workshop became quite lively and although many attendees felt that incidents were 
under reported   there were differences of opinion on the reasons why.  Interestingly a 
number of the reasons were closely linked to those identified in the Healthcare sector 
and as the comments started to come out it became easier to relate some of them to a 
slide entitled ‘effective incident reporting systems’.  The comments were captured on a 
flip chart. These are shown as Appendix 1.  The below is a short summary of the 
comments made by workshop attendees. 
One attendee asked whether any research had taken into account gender.   To date this 
had not specifically featured in identified research.   
Questions were raised whether the litigatious nature of a country would affect reporting.  
It was felt by attendees’ that a greater influencing factor was the type of legislation and 
compliance regulations an organisation faced.  Some organisations, which were based 
or operating from the US, were subject to breach notification legislation as well. 
Some participants felt that one difficulty was that of employees not understanding the 
impact or consequences of a data loss and therefore not reacting to a situation as they 
did not recognise its seriousness. 
There were comments that not all reporting mechanisms are effective and some work 
better when they reflect the organisations structure or culture. The theme of ‘blame’ and 
‘repercussions’ to those who report were voiced.  One comment made was the ‘Threat’ 
or the perception of sanctions to the person reporting must be removed somehow.  This 
led to some participants referring to other strategies that some companies had adopted – 
anonymous reporting for example. One company suggested that it incident reporting 
had increased following the introduction of anonymous reporting.   Another attendee 
commented that if staff report and there is no feedback they do not see the point.  Others 
suggested that low levels of reporting are due to complex reporting mechanisms which 
meant employees could not see the benefit of reporting, particularly if their contribution 
or diligence was nor recognised.  Some commented that more use should be made of 
technology (e.g. DLP- Data Loss Prevention) to improve reporting.  Others felt that to 
just solely rely on technology was flawed in its own right. 
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Following the discussion the researcher then introduced the slides in their presentation 
(see figure 4-1 below) that reproduced findings from the Department of Health: An 
Organisation with a Memory (2000, p.45) report suggesting how incident reporting 
systems can be improved. These were compiled from the report’s researchers 
experience in the safety industry and that of research in the aviation industry.   
Effective Incident Reporting systems 
           • Separate collection and analysis from disciplinary or regulatory bodies 
               • Collate information on near misses 
               • Feedback to those who report 
               • Make it easy to report in the first place 
               • Standardise reporting in your organisation 
               • Individuals should be thanked for reporting incidents, rather than 
                    automatically blamed for what has gone wrong 
               • Make reporting mandatory 
               • Standardise the impact and risk of reported incidents. 
               • Consider the potential for confidential or sanitised reporting 
 
Figure  4-1  Slide 9 from the NG Europe Workshop Presentation.    An Extract from Department of 
Health: An Organisation with a Memory (2000, p.45) 
 
Many of the earlier comments from workshop discussion were easily linked to some of 
the recommended bullets the presentation slide contained. For example; reporting 
mechanisms, anonymous reporting, removing blame and not receiving feedback. 
Although the slide list was taken from the Department of Health Report, the report itself 
had not specifically identified the link between the perceived barriers to learning and 
reporting and the need for effective reporting systems.  The workshop attendees, having 
been exposed to the barriers then during a discussion on those barriers, and prior to the 
slide identifying the effective reporting systems identified in the report, began to 
identify methods of overcoming them that were similar to the effective reporting 
systems also contained in the report.  This unrehearsed linkage appeared to demonstrate 
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that the Department of Health report’s findings had the capability of being further 
exploited in other sectors.  
4.10  Substantive Contribution to Research in this Area 
There are three areas where it can be demonstrated this research has provided a 
substantive contribution to the body of knowledge in the subject of Information Security 
Incidents. Firstly, the scoping study shows amongst the participants there is a lack of 
confidence that all or most information security incidents are reported.  A range of 
views from information security professionals from both the public and private sector 
has validated the researcher’s assumption that the true number of information security 
incidents is not known due to under reporting.  This is despite 58% being subject to 
regulatory reporting. With only 38% believing all or the majority of incidents are 
reported as opposed to 62% only believing that some or few are reported. 
Secondly the study has demonstrated that findings from research in a different sector, 
Healthcare, into a similar problem of incident reporting and learning from incidents has 
the potential to be used in the information security sector.    As the barriers are human 
or organisational (or a mixture of both) it could be concluded that any strategies or 
methods developed to overcome these barriers in one sector could have the potential 
bring a degree of acceptance and success in that of another. To some extent the 
workshop held in Lisbon demonstrated this where the discussion over ways to improve 
incident reporting led to very similar comments to those contained in a summary slide 
of findings from the Healthcare sector. 
Thirdly the methods used to elicit sensitive information from potentially reticent 
participants proved successful and could be imitated by others conducting similar 
sensitive research. 
4.11  Conclusion 
This scoping study has shown that following recognised methods for the construct of 
surveys can bring about valid and honest responses and where the responder feels 
confident in the handling of their information and comments.  This in turn has provided 
a strong view that incident reporting in itself can be complex as can the reasons why 
they are, or are not, reported.  The mix of quantitative and qualitative answers has 
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provided interesting responses and views that a simple quantitative survey would be 
unlikely to elicit. 
It is also apparent that barriers to reporting do exist, as the consensus is that not all 
incidents that occur are reported.  Therefore, the current trust placed in the outcome of 
risk assessments needs to be carefully considered as an element of any risk assessment 
is based on likelihood of the occurrence of a threat or vulnerability.    
The findings of this survey furthers the knowledge regarding the reporting of 
information security incidents by clearly identifying, though validation from a wide 
range of information security professionals, that not all incidents are reported.  By 
saying not all, this in fact relates to a considerable number that do not come to official 
notice.  Thus potentially putting into jeopardy assumptions made by a range of risk 
assessment calculations, where security incidents form part of that analysis.    
Most organisations have considerable avenues open for staff to report incidents 
including forms, e mail, by phone, to line managers etc. but despite this only 32% have 
confidence these systems are fit for purpose.    
There appear to be issues regarding incident definitions.  From the responses, those who 
did describe how they classified incidents did so mainly from internal definitions.   
There is at present no national or internationally accepted definition of a security 
incident.  The recently introduced BS ISO/IEC 27035 Information Security Incident 
Management standard (2011) may lead to this.  This is an area that will need further 
research. This lack of incident definition adversely affects those looking to integrate 
incidents reported into a bigger picture.  The results indicate organisations either 
classify incidents or they do not.  Those that do tend, from the comments provided, 
either to look at factors such as impact or place them in various general criteria. 
The barriers to reporting and learning identified in the healthcare research drew a mixed 
response of agreement. This is described in more detail in the report but there are some 
aspects where certain barriers appear to be well recognised and agreed as relevant in the 
domain of information security.   
The issue of the introduction of legislation or regulation wider than the current measures 
to mandate the reporting of certain types of incidents drew a mixed response with 39% 
feeling this would result in an increase in reporting. It is interesting that, even if the 
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mandatory reporting of information security incidents was introduced, the view was 
there would not be a significant increase in reporting. 
Referring back to the goals that this scoping study was intended to tackle these were  
(1)To test whether the assumption that not all information security incidents are 
being reported is correct. 
This was achieved as there was a clear margin of respondents that believed there was 
under reporting. 
(2) To examine whether research on incident reporting conducted in other 
sectors, such as healthcare, can be applied to the information security sector. 
This too was achieved as there were nine of the barriers to learning from incidents 
scoring over 60% agreement that they were relevant in information security. The 
workshop also indicated that other research from the Department of Health report 
(2000) into “effective incident reporting systems” appeared to have a linkage between 
those reporting systems and the barriers and could equally be applicable in the 
information security sector.   
This scoping study leads to the need for further consideration into how the issue of 
incident reporting can be improved. The issue of a lack of a common incident definition 
will also need to be resolved particularly to ensure future studies can at least ensure 
when respondents answer questions relating to incidents there can reference a specific 
definition.    Chapter 5 investigates the Critical Success Factors to improve security 
incident reporting. 
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Chapter 5 Obtaining the Consensus of Information Security 
Professionals through a Delphi Study 
5.1  Introduction 
Chapter 4 set out the findings from the scoping study and how it achieved two of the 
research goals. These being confirming the assumption that information security 
incidents were under reported and that there is a potential to re-use research on barriers 
to learning from incident reporting from other sectors. This chapter sets out the 
methodology and reasons for the selection of a Delphi study to which invited 
information security professionals to contribute to, and arrive at, a consensus as to what 
constitutes the Critical Success Factors to improve the reporting of security incidents. 
This would provide further assurance with regards to goal 2 and address goal 3. 
It sets out what a Critical Success Factor is and how the Delphi study was used to 
identify those CSF’s required to improve security incident reporting. The chapter also 
includes the construction process and distribution of the Delphi survey form, the rounds, 
together with the outcome and findings.  This Delphi study was developed from the 
research obtained from the literature review (Chapter 2) and the scoping study (Chapter 
4).  The Delphi outcome; a consensus as to the Critical Success Factors required to 
improve security incident reporting, would then need to be communicated. The use of a 
Maturity Model was identified for this purpose and this is referred to in this chapter, but 
dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6. 
It can be the case that when an enquiry or report publishes its findings, whether it is the 
result of a disaster, significant event or one commissioned to resolve a problem, the 
valuable content is not always taken up as organisational cultures are resistant to and or 
difficult to change (Perrow, 2007; Schein, 1992).  This research investigates the 
potential to make use of recommendations from such reports and academic research in 
other disciplines for the potential reuse and benefit of the information security sector.  
The common elements relating to the reporting of incidents, particularly the perceived 
barriers to such reporting, identified from research elsewhere could influence and 
potentially improve security incident reporting. The scoping study in Chapter 4 
identified that these elements had the potential to be reused. A method of extracting the 
benefit from the findings and putting them to practical application was required.   
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As this research already suggested there is a perceived problem with the reporting of 
security incidents in general. Simply publishing a list of what elements could improve 
the situation neither has the contextual application of those findings in the information 
security sector, nor any validity on what could actually work.  Refining the elements to 
identify which ones could make a real difference would need further research. Chapter 3 
set out the methodology that identified the use of Critical Success Factors as a 
recognised method (Caralli, 2004) for identifying the important elements for success. It 
was considered such an approach would take security incident reporting forward, this 
chapter expands on that.  
5.2  What is a Critical Success Factor?   
There are a number of definitions of Critical Success Factors. Bullen and Rockart 
(1981, p.7) define them as; “the limited numbers of areas in which satisfactory results 
will ensure successful competitive performance for the individual, department or 
organisation. CSF’s are the few key areas where “things must go right for the business 
to flourish and for the manager’s goals to be attained”.  Elsewhere the software 
Engineering Institute describe them as;  
“The handful of key areas where an organisation must perform well on a 
consistent basis to achieve its mission.  CSF’s can be derived through a 
document review and analysis of the goals and objectives of key management 
personnel, as well as interviews with those individuals about their specific 
domain and the barriers they encounter in achieving their goals and objectives”.  
(Gates, 2010, p.xi)  
Bullen and Rockart (1981) continue in describing what Critical success Factors are not.    
They should not be used as a standard set of measures.  They are areas of major 
importance for a particular group at a particular time. Whilst CSF’s are in use in 
industry, retail for example, they have not been commonly used in government although 
there are reports on their use in healthcare (Eni, 1984; Gates, 2010).   The use of Critical 
Success Factors in this research is to attempt to set out what is really important to set in 
train or achieve to bring about an improvement in the process for identifying and 
reporting of information security incidents thereby enabling better informed judgment 
for risk management and increasing the amount of data that can be effectively shared, 
 176 
 
analysed and acted upon within organisations and further outside to relevant sectors and 
even nationally and internationally.   CSF’s provide the tool to prioritise issues already 
identified as a priority. Their use can enable appropriate levels of focus on what must be 
done particularly where concentrated attention from management is required (Eni, 
1989) 
CSF’s to be successful must not be large in number otherwise the focus is lost. Freund 
(1988) identified from research common problems associated with identifying and 
implementing CSF’s 
Symptom Probable  Cause(s) 
Too Many CSF’s Defined at too low a level 
 Confusing CSF’s with performance indicators 
Incorrect CSF’s  Unrealistic view of marketplace 
 Solving “political” problems 
 Strategies defined before CSF’s are identified become 
self-fulfilling prophecies 
Weak Performance Indicators  Improper linkage to CSF 
 Boss sees data, but subordinate doesn’t 
Management Frustration  Insufficient front-end training for participants 
 Insufficient time allowed 
 Planning process overly complex 
Table  5-1  What Can Go Wrong.  Freund (1988, p.23)   
Similar issues are reported by Poon and Wagner (2000) where a number of 
organisations who had set CSF’s were studied. They suggest that CSF’s are “the 
conditions that need to be met to assure success of the system” (Poon and Wagner, 
2001, p.395).  Either they were a success or a complete failure.   Their research led to 
some valuable key elements required for any CSF’s to be successful. These were 
referred to as “Meta success factors” (Poon and Wagner, 2001, p.393); 
“Championship” - someone has to lead the effort and 
“Availability of resources” - without this the process will struggle and finally 
“link to organisations objectives” – an organisation will struggle to make any 
progress on CSF’s that are not really deemed critical for that business.   
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If these were not in place the CSF’s were likely to fail whereas when the above are in 
place the CSF’s are successful in achieving the overall aims set across a number of 
organisations.  Mendoza et al (2007) utilised CSF’s across a number of disciplines; 
processes, human factors and technology. It is clear that CSF’s can be utilised in 
differing scenarios and with different approaches. The key is to gather information from 
the right sources; hence the proposed Delphi to identify the CSF’s is asking a group of 
information security professions from differing communities of interest. 
Leidecker and Bruno (1984) state that the identification of Critical Success Factors is an 
important element in developing an organisation strategy.  Rockart and Bullmer (1984) 
suggest a two stage approach to identify the CSF’s through an interview based 
discussion of the goals followed by identification and development of the CSF 
measures. Whereas Caralli (2004) suggests a five stage approach, which commences 
with the scope then data collection followed by analysis before the CSF’s are devised, 
then finally they are analysed.  Indeed Caralli has reported on the use of CSF’s in an 
Enterprise security environment in which he describes the use of CSF’s as a simple and 
powerful concept.  Boynton and Smud (1984) propose that although recognised as being 
applicable in developing and organisations strategic plans CSF’s can also be equally 
applicable to be used to identify critical issues associated with implementing a plan. 
They also state CSF’s can be flexible and do not require a rigorous format and therefore 
offer advantages in their applicability to different uses.  They do however identify a risk 
that flexibility can also lead to ‘an overly casual approach to their application.’ 
(Boynton and Smud, 1984, p.26)  Whilst the use of CSF’s in this research is not 
focussing on one organisation but a generic issue the intended outcome is the same. The 
description by Freund below and the intended outcome for this research use of CSF’s 
are similar, he describes Critical Success Factors as:  
“Important to achieving overall corporate goals and objectives,  
Measurable and controllable by the organisation to which they apply,  
Relatively few in number – not everything can be critical,  
Expressed as things that must be done not the end point of the process,  
Applicable to all companies in the industry with similar objectives and strategies 
and are hierarchical in nature.”   Freund (1988, p.20) 
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In this research the overall goals and objectives are to provide a method by which 
organisations can improve their incident reporting.  The factors are measurable through 
the use of the Maturity Model and the outcome of increased reporting which feeds into 
risk management locally and further afield.   The number of CSF’s is determined by use 
of a Delphi survey of information security professionals, using a Likert scale to identify 
the CSF’s importance. The aim being to identify from the Delphi respondents whether 
the suggested elements are achievable as outcomes and they are applicable to the 
information security sector.  The use of security professionals to identify the CSF’s is 
endorsed by Boynton and Smud  (1984) who state that the factors should be elicited 
from  those who represent a cross section of the major functional areas.  As Gates 
(2010) points out although CSF’s cannot guarantee an outcome they are a useful 
technique for managing commitments.  It is this development of CSF’s that is appealing 
in the research.   
The aim is not to impose CSF’s and a Maturity Model on organisations, but suggest 
through research and professional opinion what could be used to achieve improvement.  
It may be that the timing of any introduction of the outcome of this research may mean 
it is not adopted but on the other hand for some organisations that see the need (and 
with increasing concern regarding Cyber security and data breach legislation) this is in 
fact a very good time to implement the findings of this research.  
To ascertain the validity of the proposed Critical Success Factors and whether they 
could be incorporated into a Maturity Model the use of a Delphi study was considered. 
The next section explores the rationale for the Delphi. 
The use of a case study was initially considered but due to the results of the Delphi 
study set out in Chapter 5 it was instead decided to use the police service security 
professionals who had not been part of the original Delphi, either as they were new in 
post or as a result of other organisational changes to act as a control group to in the 
validation study (Chapter 6) as an assurance to the Delphi study outcomes. 
The reason for considering the UK police service was in earlier research into the police 
service and incident reporting Humphrey (2004); it was identified there were concerns 
regarding the level of confidence in the number of incidents being reported.    Since that 
research the police service appears to have has improved its incident reporting 
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capability and the central collation of incidents has enabled an improving interpretation 
of the figures.  
5.2.1  Critical Success Factors in Security Incident Reporting 
The use of Critical Success Factors in this research aims to identify what is really 
important to potentially improve the identification and reporting of information security 
incidents. An increase in empirical security incident data should enable better informed 
analysis and judgments for risk management decisions and tackle those the under-
reporting concerns of Gordon, Loeb and Sohali, (2003), Hagen (2009) and Parker 
(2010).  Should the reporting of security incidents increase this in turn should improve 
the volume of empirical incident reporting data for analysis and assessment. See figure 
5-2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5-1 Authors Suggested Current Restricted Flow of Reported Incidents and the Potential    
Improvement using the CSF’s and the proposed IRMM 
This increase in available incident data can be shared, analysed and acted upon 
internally within organisations with increased confidence as it is likely to better reflect 
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 Where necessary this data can be utilised further afield in relevant sectors locally, 
nationally and internationally as demonstrated by the below figure.   
 
 
Figure  5-2  Authors Design of the Potential Relationship Between Local, Regional/Sector and 
National use of Improved Security Incident  Reporting Data.  
Through the identification of the potential Critical Success Factors (CSF’s) required to 
improve security incident reporting, organisations could use these to focus on what 
activity was essential to improve the reporting of those security incidents.   An 
appropriate research method to refine what elements of security incident reporting could 
be classed as CSF’s with the aim to seek consensus from a wide community of 
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information security professionals.  Based on the report Dept of Health Report (2000) a 
number of identified perceived barriers to incident reporting were initially tested in the 
scoping study (Chapter 4).  The outcome of that study gave a degree of confidence as to 
what were the more relevant to information security. However, it should be pointed out 
that the intention of the scoping study was to identify if the perceived problems relating 
to the reporting of security incidents did exist and whether other research into incident 
reporting could have the potential for reuse.  As that study it was not intended at the 
time to test what methods could improve security incident reporting, and could be 
considered as CSF’s,  a more in depth study was needed to achieve this.   
5.2.2  How were the Critical Success Factors Developed 
The potential CSF’s to improve security incident reporting to be included in the Delphi 
were developed from the literature review in Chapter 2.  The main sources for these 
being The Dept. of Health: An Organisation with a Memory (2000, p.45) list of 
“characteristics of effective reporting systems” and from Barach and Small (2000) both 
of which had researched adverse incident reporting across health, safety and aviation. 
The remaining elements were based on feedback and suggestions from participants who 
took part in the scoping study and workshop in Chapter 4, and at information security 
conferences held in 2011 and 2012 where the initial findings of the research and scoping 
study was socialised through a number of presentations to security professionals to seek 
views and challenges on the assumptions regarding security incident reporting. The 
scoping study confirmed, through the survey of security professionals, the assumption 
security incidents were under reported and that there was potential to re-use research 
from the healthcare sector as shown from the results of the applicability of the barriers 
to learning. It followed that as this research on barriers to learning could be re used and, 
now that the scoping study had confirmed the assumption that incidents were being 
under reported, that same healthcare research that identified “effective incident 
reporting systems” could be reused to identify the Critical Success Factors.    
The intention was to use the first rounds of the Delphi to identify which of the thirteen 
elements to improve incident reporting could be considered as CSF’s.  These elements 
would at least provide a stimulus for responses.   
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The thirteen elements used were: 
1. Separation of collection, and analysis from any discipline or regulatory process 
2. Collection of reports of ‘near misses’ as well as actual incidents 
3. Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible feedback to the reporting community 
4. Ease of making a report 
5. Standardised reporting systems within organisations  
6. A working assumption that individuals should be thanked for reporting incidents 
rather than being automatically blamed for what has gone wrong 
7. Mandatory reporting 
8. Standardised risk assessment (to determine the impact of the incident)  
9. A common understanding of what factors are important in determining risk 
10. A mechanism or process for confidential reporting 
11. A recognition by senior management that incidents will happen 
12. Incidents reporting systems that are designed appropriately to ensure learning is 
possible 
13. Incident analysis that considers root cause analysis and wider systems/processes and 
not just the initial impact assessment 
 
The first ten were taken from Dept. for Health an Organisation with a Memory (2000, 
p.45) which listed “characteristics of effective reporting systems” as derived from the 
research into the reporting of adverse incidents. The remaining three elements were 
derived from the feedback and comments from the participants of the Scoping study and 
other presentations. 
5.3  What Method is Most Appropriate for Identifying the Critical Success Factors 
This section examines the potential methods that could be used to identify the Critical 
Success Factors as well as the reasons for discarding some of those options. 
5.3.1  The Case Study 
One approach that could be considered is that of a case study.  A case study is a 
methodology that is used to “explore a single phenomenon (the Case) in a natural 
setting”. (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p.82).   Bryman (2004) refers to case studies 
normally being associated with a location, such as a community or organisation and 
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continues that often case studies are associated with qualitative research but often utilise 
both quantitative and qualitative research. This stance is supported by Yin (1981, p.58) 
who continues that their supportive evidence can take many forms “fieldwork, archival 
records, verbal reports observations or any combination of these”.  There are risks that a 
case study can presume a finding in one community can be replicated in another 
(Bryman, 2004) however, the possible use of multiple case studies could alleviate this. 
The aim of this research was, if possible, to obtain consensus across a wide 
representation of the information security community, not just from one or a number of 
groups. The disadvantage of a case study is that if based on one community, although 
having some validity, it may not be considered as truly representative of a wider group.  
In particular, one of the sectors may be subject to specific regulatory controls or 
community security policies relating to incident reporting.  This could result in any 
extrapolation of the findings from such singular groups not necessarily reflecting the 
true situation of the wider security community.  However, any findings from a singular 
group may provide useful indicators of potential success factors that could be applied 
across the wider information security sector. This, in itself, would require a further 
study to validate such indicators. To achieve a consensus would require a greater 
number of case studies and as the intended participants were information security 
professionals a large number of organisations and companies would need to be involved 
to obtain a reasonable number of responses as many may only employ person who met 
the eligibility criteria. A case study approach was therefore discounted.   
5.3.2  Focus Groups 
A focus group is where the researcher acts as a facilitator to lead the discussion of a 
group to obtain an understanding of what individuals within the group, and the group as 
a whole, think about a particular subject (Buckingham and Saunders 2004; Yin, 2014). 
The use of focus groups is a recognised research approach however; there are also 
concerns that, within a focus group, social pressures can take effect, such as undue 
influence by some participants through their domination of responses which may affect 
the views of others (Collis and Hussey, 2009). There is also a view from Rowe, Wright 
and Bolger ((1991) that with some groups may due to the groups motives instigate 
premature closure of the group discussion in order to simply reaching agreement or 
where agreeing to the firsts solution rather than offending anyone.  (1991, p. 236).  In a 
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similar vein, obtaining the views of all participants can be a challenge. Some members 
of a focus group may be uncomfortable in presenting their views in an open forum 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2003) and, as recognised by Bryman (2004), 
transcribing focus groups can be difficult but not impossible.   
Focus groups can be a useful way of finding out what the main issues and concerns of 
any group are. The outcome of a focus group or case study can help in questionnaire 
design or to develop a future interview strategy (University of Bradford, 2005, p.23). It 
could be argued that the scoping study in Chapter 4 had already made use of the 
conference attendees as a focus group, particularly the presentation session at the NG 
Lisbon conference, where participants discussed the initial findings of the academic 
research.  As the intention was to obtain consensus from a wide representation of the 
information security sector the use of a focus group was discounted. 
If the use of a case study or focus group is discounted, then a different process of 
gaining consensus from a wider community would be required.  Whatever the selected 
method some type of interview process to ensure consistency in the questions asked 
would be needed. 
5.3.3  Interviews and Questionnaires 
There are several types of interviews that can form a study (Bryman, 2004 and 
Buckingham and Saunders, 2004) and the main types are set out below; 
i. Structured 
These involve using a questionnaire based on previously identified and set questions 
which are provided to all participants (Buckingham and Saunders, 2004).  They can be 
read out or printed.   The key element is to avoid any bias or leading of responses 
including intonation or emphasis in voice or tone. Being structured does not constrain 
the researcher from noting further comments outside of the interview boundaries.  
However, there are other types of interview that could be considered. 
ii. Semi-Structured 
These interviews have some structure and standard questions but the researcher may not 
include all or may add others depending on how the interview is progressing. With such 
interviews the interviewee “has a great deal of leeway in how to reply” (Bryman, 2004, 
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p.321). This leads to a potential difficulty when comparing results or views against a 
single topic. 
iii. Unstructured 
This is where the interview is more likely to be unstructured or where a printed 
questionnaire asking broad and wide ranging questions that may not elicit a specific 
response to the area of research in question. The researcher could be using a set of 
topics as an aide memoir or even just one question and the respondent can answer freely 
(Bryman, 2004, p.320). These types of interviews can often be spontaneous in both 
question and response.  These can be time consuming and difficult to record the answers 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009). However, this can often engage the respondent in a 
conversational style that may be appropriate for the type of study particularly where 
there is no fixed agenda (Buckingham and Saunders, 2004, p.131) 
Semi structured and unstructured interviews, although challenging, are appropriate in 
some circumstances (Collis and Hussey, 2009). For example, where the interviewer 
wishes to understand the respondent’s world or where the interviewee is uncomfortable 
about answering specific questions. The issue that will arise with any form of 
interviewing is the process of interpretation (Buckingham and Saunders, 2004), as the 
real challenge is to ensure the planning of the interviews recognises that the 
interpretation of a question by an interviewee can be different to the understanding of 
the response by the interviewer. 
The general view is that other research methods such as questionnaires or interviews 
should be considered by those undertaking research against the practicalities, logistics 
and the research questions themselves.   “Attention must be given to other data 
collection methods,” (Hasson, Keeney and McKenna, 2000, p.1009).   
The use of a distributed questionnaire was considered which could alleviate the 
discussed concerns. To identify an agreed set of CSF’s a degree of validated consensus 
would be required. As the CSF’s had not yet been identified the limits to case studies, 
focus groups and interviews in this research would be time consuming and labour 
intensive, particularly if a wide group of security professionals needs to be involved to 
achieve a more relevant and acceptable consensus.  The scope of the subject is narrow 
and will rely upon participants with subject matter expertise. The use of a Delphi in this 
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research to assist in identifying CSF’s that has ultimately lead to a Maturity Model drew 
on the research from De Bruin, Freeze, Kulkani and  Rosemann (2005) who used the 
Delphi to identify Maturity Models and suggest the Delphi could be used as a two-stage 
approach. In this case, it may be used in the first stage to achieve consensus on the 
CSF’s required and, then be used to validate a subsequent Information Security Incident 
Reporting Maturity Model. Becker, Knackstedt and Poppelbub (2009) suggest the use 
of literature analysis to identify the assessment criteria required to formulate material 
for Maturity Models based on the identified success factors.  They continue by 
suggesting the use of explorative research methods citing Delphi methods as suitable to 
achieve this aim.  Therefore, an alternative research method, the Delphi was considered 
as the most appropriate method for this research.   
5.4  The Delphi Study 
The technique known as a Delphi originated from research conducted by the RAND 
group in the 1950’s to identify the impact of technology on warfare. Rand (2017).  The 
research used a group of expert opinions to obtain consensus through an iterative 
process (Erffmeyer, Erffmeyer and Lane, 1986).  Since then the method has become 
popular as a research method.  It is described by the originator of the Delphi, Norman 
Dalkey, as “a rapid and relatively efficient way to ‘cream the top of the heads’ of a 
group of knowledgeable people” (Dalkey 1969, p.16).   Participants in a Delphi do not 
assemble, nor do they know the identity of others participating in the study.  The Delphi  
“allows all group members equal participation and influence even when 
geographically separate” (Moga, Guo, Schopflocher and Harstall, 2012, p.5).  
Dalkey (1969, p.v) states there are three features of a Delphi;  
 i, Anonymous response – where a questionnaire is used to obtain a groups opinion.   
ii, Iteration and controlled feedback - is the examination of those responses with 
carefully controlled feedback to enable further iterations from the group. 
iii, Statistical group response - where the opinions of every member of the group are 
defined as an aggregate of those responses, following the final round of iterations.  
The main aims of these three elements are to minimise any bias from dominant 
participants, irrelevant communication and group or peer pressure.   
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The Delphi process works by circulating a question or issue to a selected group who in 
turn respond.  Their views are collated and then returned, including any views of the 
collective group allowing each respondent to review their opinion and return the 
response again. This process continues until either, there is a consensus, or a point of 
diminishing return is reached.       
“The Delphi is only appropriate to investigate certain research problems; so 
careful consideration must be given to the nature of the problem before selecting 
this approach.”  (Hasson, Keeney and McKenna 2000, p.1009).  
This Delphi was not specifically looking for “generation” of ideas but “evaluation” and 
“extension” (Day and Bobeva, 2005, p.106) of those already put forward following 
earlier research identified in the literature review.  In this research, the aim is to gather 
the views of professionals from a wide range of security related disciplines with a focus 
on a perceived real-world problem – security incident reporting.  The intention is to 
improve the understanding of that particular sector which has been termed by Robson 
(2011, p.365), as ‘research integration’ and that the Delphi method has been used for 
this purpose.   
If poorly undertaken a Delphi can be considered an alternative method of data 
collection, as opposed to consensus forming. However, it can be much more than this 
due to the iterative process and can provide a real understanding of the research subject 
(Day and Bobeva, 2005). A Delphi can also be used as a method of obtaining qualitative 
results. One attractive element of using a Delphi is, apart from asking for respondents to 
provide quantitative responses for analysis, to include a facility for comments by the 
respondent. This free text qualitative response from a questionnaire can be utilised to 
add contextual analysis.  As identified by Hasson, Keeney and McKenna (2000) 
respondents may use this facility to qualify their selection or justify the inclusion of a 
new process which may result in additional quantitative responses to analyse in the 
subsequent iterations. In the case of this research the view of Hasson, Keeney and 
McKenna (2000) was considered as an important opportunity to provide the Delphi 
participants with a capability to suggest alternative, and not formally identified through 
other research, CSF’s that could be put forward. It also offers the capability to refine the 
wording of those potential CSF’s already identified. 
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Other benefits of a Delphi study include that it offers considerable anonymity between 
respondents though an iterative process, whilst allowing a form of conferring but 
without the social pressures to conform to the views as expressed by others (Skulmosky, 
Hartman and Krahn, 2007, p.2). The advantage of using a Delphi questionnaire is that 
(Goodman, 1987, cited in Hasson, Keeney and McKenna, 2000, p. 1012) the true ethical 
anonymity is easier to evidence.  Although in a Delphi the participants can present and 
react to ideas unbiased by the identities and pressures of others, they do not see other 
participants individual responses  - only the outcomes of the consensus forming.  This 
has been referred to as “quazi-anonymity” (McKenna, 2004. Cited in Hasson, Keeney 
and McKenna, 2000, p. 2012).   
The Delphi can seem to be a simple concept but, as Linstone and Turoff (1975) observe 
this can result in it being used without carefully considering the potential problems and 
many have failed in their aims. Linstone and Turoff (1975) offer a number of reasons 
for the failure of a Delphi and these include; 
 “ the person managing the Delphi imposing their views and over 
specifying its structure; assuming it is the ‘surrogate’ for all other 
communications;  
 poor techniques of summarising and presenting the responses; ignoring 
or not  disagreements resulting in some participants dropping out   
 underestimating the demands that a Delphi and appreciating the time 
respondents put into the process.” Linstone and Turoff (1975, p.6)  
There are detractors of the Delphi as a research method, particularly with reference to 
the selection of experts. One such is Sackman (1974) in their Delphi Critique which in 
turn was evaluated by Rowe, Wright and Bolger (1991) where they considered many of 
Sackman's criticisms were based on Delphi’s that had not been executed well .     
Rowe, Wright and Bolger suggest four necessary characteristics a Delphi should 
demonstrate in order to be considered valid (Rowe, Wright and Bolger (1991, p. 237) 
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1. “Anonymity. Allowing group members to make their responses privately and avoid 
undue social pressure 
2.  Iteration.  Presenting the questionnaire over a number of rounds allowing 
participants to change their opinions 
3. Controlled Feedback.  Informing group members of the opinions of other group 
members. Often provided by a summary of the group response 
4. Statistical group response. Where the group’s judgement is normally expressed as a 
median and the spread of opinions may be used as an indication of the consensus.” 
Although the researcher may identify the respondent, each respondent in turn will not 
know the details of others. They may assume fellow professionals may be taking part 
but any such individual’s details are not confirmed. The feedback is controlled through 
a questionnaire and the iterative stages allow for responses to develop. Finally, it offers 
a statistical and analytical measure of the Delphi responses received at each iteration.  
The iterative stages also allow the respondent to review and revise their own response, 
considering the information from the summarised response of the previous iteration.  
The below figure illustrates Rowe, Wrights and Bolger’s (1991, p.243) view that the 
Delphi is a two stage process where the first stage seeks to reduce any individual bias 
and the second stage equally weighs responses and averages them.   
 
Figure  5-3  Delphi as a Two-Stage Process (Rowe, Wright and Bolger (1991, p.243) 
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5.4.1  How Many Rounds are Required to Achieve Consensus? 
The number of Delphi rounds required can be a challenge in that there needs to be 
sufficient opportunity for consensus before fatigue and lack of time or interest on behalf 
of the respondents is reached.  Determining the design and number of iterations likely to 
be required used research from other Delphi studies such as Skulmoski, Hartman and 
Krahn (2007) who set out a model for a three round Delphi process and as does Day and 
Bobeva (2005).   The number of rounds can also affect the response rate.  An important 
part of the planning is to recognise when to cease the Delphi, either due to a growing 
obvious consensus and or a diminishing number of returns potentially indicating ‘survey 
fatigue’ as highlighted by Hasson, Keeney and McKenna (2000) and Day and Bobeva 
(2000).  
Skulmoski, Hartman and Krahn (2007) reported in their Delphi comparison study that 
the number of rounds did not exceed three, indeed with some only taking one round. 
Rowe, Wright and Bolger (1991) report that most commonly although the number of 
rounds is variable they seldom go past two iterations (1991, p.237). In separate research 
Erffmeyer R, Erffmeyer E and Lane (1986) also sought the optimum number of rounds 
to a point where stability in the consensus could be reached.  Their research used a 
group of students to reach consensus for a hypothetical problem; the NASA Moon 
Survival Problem.   Individuals were asked to rank 15 items of equipment in terms of 
their importance for the survival of the crew of a crashed spaceship.  In this study, it 
found that the group reached stability after the 4
th
 round.    The criticism that could be 
laid at this study was the participants were not experts and therefore it is likely to take 
longer to achieve consensus. The number of items (15) had to be ranked and without 
specific survival skills and there was likely to be a greater difference in the early rounds 
than if a panel of survival experts were used.   
The amount of time required to the post Delphi round analysis to keep up the 
momentum is also a deciding factor.   To some extent there is an element of being a 
‘hostage to fortune’ as, despite diligent planning, there may be a very low, or 
conversely, an exceptionally high response.  It is recognised that dropout rates in Delphi 
panels can be quite high and some studies have resulted in findings based on Delphi 
panels in very small numbers (Moga, Guo, Schopflocher and Harstall, 2012). This was 
also identified by Skulmoski, Hartman and Krahn (2007) where sample size can be 
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affected by the number of ‘experts’ available, accepting they may be few in number, but 
still be representative to achieve an accepted consensus.  However, Skulmoski, Hartman 
and Krahn (2007) urge caution in small sample size Delphi’s. Therefore, any Delphi 
questionnaire return dates or commitment to further rounds must factor these variables 
in, otherwise potentially good Delphi candidates could lose interest waiting for the 
second or subsequent rounds.   
Skulmoski, Hartman and Krahn (2007) identified in their sample of several Delphi 
studies the sample sizes (panellists) varied considerably from as low as 3 to 171.   Day 
and Bobeva (2005) refer to the largest sample size being one in Japan which involved 
several thousand people but most study’s (citing Gordon, 1994) involving between 15 
and 35 people. These lower sample sizes need to be considered when considering 
whether a response rate is valid.  Determining what a good response rate is can be a 
challenge.  It was accepted that paper based surveys often returned greater responses 
than online ones (Nulty, 2008) although as more confidence grows in on line surveys 
this could change.  
“As a general rule a response rate of 30% or greater for a postal or externally 
sent questionnaire is generally regarded as reasonable. A goal of 50% or more 
responses should be attempted in any questionnaire that involved face to face 
interviews.” (Neville, 2005, p.33).   
One potential limiting factor surrounding a Delphi is in achieving a good response rate 
recognising the Delphi requires continuing ‘audience participation’ potentially from a 
narrower field of experts than a more general questionnaire.  As with any study or 
questionnaire the response rate can be poor. Asking respondents to persevere, not once 
but potentially several times, to achieve consensus can result in a dropout rate and 
ultimately limit the number of rounds that are likely to achieve any meaningful 
response.  Erffmeyer, Erffmeyer and Lane (1986, p.7) suggest that whilst the Delphi has 
limitations these can be overcome if the Delphi is implemented “according to the 
guidelines of those who devised it” referring to (Dalkey, 2009) who as one of the 
RAND employees involved in the first use of the technique, produced a paper on how 
the technique could be improved following earlier use.   
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Having identified the Delphi as a method for finalising the CSF’s and to assist in the 
forming of the Maturity Model the next section examines who should be invited to 
participate. 
5.4.2  Identifying the Respondents  
The respondents to a Delphi should have good knowledge of the subject matter in hand 
otherwise criticism that the validity of the Delphi would be levelled at the outcome. In 
their critique of the Delphi process, Rowe, Wright and Bolger (1991, p.240) refer to the 
differing views of academics on the selection of expert’s to take part. As this can be 
time-consuming some Delphi’s suffered from poor execution or sloppy execution  
Therefore, it was important that any participants in this survey could be evidenced as 
being expert in the subject examined.   
There is currently no singularly recognised information security profession or 
community of interest (CoI) in the UK.   However, there are a number of established 
information security CoI’s in the UK whose members could be harnessed to achieve a 
degree of consensus based on their knowledge and broad sector experiences.   These 
include the Institute of Information Security Professionals and the Information 
Assurance Advisory Council – IAAC. There are other communities of shared I.T. 
infrastructures, such as the Police National Network (PNN) which is primarily a 
criminal justice network supporting police and criminal justice organisations and the 
UK HMG Government Secure Intranet (GSI) where the codes of connection (the rules 
to comply with for using that infrastructure) stipulate the reporting of security incidents 
is required. Having identified potential CoI’s, approval of those responsible for such 
groups was sought and obtained as part of the ethical approach. This was achieved by 
contacting the relevant governing bodies of those groups and seeking formal approval to 
use their members, having outlined the research subject.  It was also important to 
recognise that as the recipients were security professionals they are likely to be 
suspicious of unsolicited requests for information regarding the security of their 
organisation.  Such professionals are also often bound by the needs to protect their 
organisation and therefore may be reticent to provide full and complete answers. 
Kotulic and Clark (2004. p.603) identified this difficulty when trying to obtain 
responses to security questionnaires sent to organisations and their experience was a 
very low response rate of 0.61%.  Others such as Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt (2014, 
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p.100) obtained a higher response in their survey managing a 15.2% response. This was 
put this down to the sensitive domain of security and the unwillingness to give out 
information and possibly survey fatigue. 
It was therefore important to ensure the respondents were informed of the fact that any 
professional or security body they belonged to also supported the Delphi.  
5.4.3  Eligibility to Participate 
Simply identifying security professionals would not enable the focus on security 
incident reporting. The Delphi was designed for use by experts making meaningful 
judgements or forecasts Rowe, Wright and Bolger (1991, p.241).  Amongst those 
professionals the target audience for participants were those who have been directly or 
indirectly involved with security incident reporting.  A respondent eligibility criteria 
was drawn up to make clear in any correspondence to potential Delphi participants this 
was not a general information security survey, but one focussed on a specific subject - 
security incident reporting.   To demonstrate the responses were from those who had 
relevant experience or expertise the invitation to respond needed to make it clear what 
type of experience and expertise was being sought. Otherwise the validity of the 
response and the ‘expertise’ or ‘experience’ of the subject matter could be diluted to a 
general interest response. This too was important to counter any challenge regarding the 
relevance of the expertise of the participants. The below criteria were included in the 
invitation to participate letter (Appendix 4)   
  Eligibility criteria for completion of the questionnaire.  
Through your experience in information security many of you will meet the 
requirements.  I am particularly looking for those of you who at some point have 
been involved or provided advice and guidance on one or more of the following;   
i) the reporting of, investigation or management of security incidents,   
ii) risk analysis, risk assessment and/or risk management, 
iii) any policy, regulatory or legal role that covered incident reporting 
However, even if you do not meet the above but feel you have a valuable 
contribution to make your involvement in this research will definitely be most 
welcome.  
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There was a risk this may severely reduce the volume of responses, but it was important 
to encourage those involved in the subject matter to contribute, as opposed to those who 
were a member of the CoI but their experience and expertise lay elsewhere. There was 
still the ability to allow others who may not have met the exact criteria but felt in their 
role or experience they had a valuable contribution to make. 
Having identified the potential participants and the eligibility criteria it is important, as 
with any questionnaire based research, that the Delphi can stand up to any challenge 
that it lacked methodological rigour. Sackman, (1975, cited by Hasson, Keeney and 
McKenna 2010, p.1009) suggest the planning and construction must be carefully 
thought through to avoid this risk.  The next section describes the Delphi construction 
process. 
5.5  The Delphi Study Approach 
Having identified a number of relevant groups to distribute the study to an appropriate 
design of a Delphi questionnaire and accompanying instructions were set out. The 
provision of clear instructions is key to ensuring respondents understand what is 
required of them (Buckingham and Saunders, 2004).  The research survey processes of 
best practice outlined in Chapter 4 for the Scoping study appeared to be successful, thus 
the same approach was planned for the Delphi, subject to the lessons learnt outlined in 
section 4.8. 
This Delphi will focus on CoI’s in the information security domain to provide 
participants to the survey who meet the eligibility criteria and to provide a degree of 
confidence in any potential respondent that the research and survey is supported by their 
particular CoI. As the invite to participate was sent to several communities of interest it 
is likely that some would know who else is participating. The critical element is to 
ensure any responses are kept confidential.  
This aspect was catered for in the distribution of the Delphi material either by sending a 
common message by blind copying (bcc) respondents and where appropriate sending 
individually addressed messages.   Once participants had responded, subsequent rounds 
were sent direct to individuals. Any general reminder messages were sent as ‘bcc’.  
Should any respondent not wish it to be known to their employer they are participating, 
their responses could be returned by them by post as opposed to e-mail, or by a third-
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party proxy using a different e-mail address. The challenge being if the respondent, 
having completed round one of the Delphi, wished to remain completely anonymous, 
there is no way of knowing who to send the ‘round two’ iteration to without sending it 
to everyone, irrespective whether they responded in the first place.   The option, as 
described in the instructions, to post the response would at least cater for any concerns 
of a respondent relating to the use of a company email system. In the end some 
respondents did return round 1 by post but all gave their full details enabling round 2 to 
be sent direct to them by email.   
5.6  Delphi Questionnaire Construction and Design 
There are three critical stages to consider in a Delphi study (Day and Bobeva, 2005) the 
design, implementation and evaluation.  Associated with these are;  
i, the Delphi approach 
ii, the constitution of the Delphi panel members, and, 
iii, managing responses.   
In conjunction with the above stages the method by which the use of the Delphi to 
encourage participation is equally important.  The below sections describe the approach 
to constructing the Delphi.  Getting this right is imperative as a poorly designed and 
constructed survey can put respondents off (Robson, 2011).  The intention is for those 
surveyed to understand what is being asked of them, they need to be willing to do so 
and provide their response to enable valid interpretation.  
There is considerable guidance on survey design.  Linstone and Turoff (1975, p.65) 
believe that the person managing the Delphi will be more productive if they see their 
role as “producing results, not on surveying what is already there”. They also offer tips 
on design that range from Creating Panels, Stimulating Response, Orchestrating 
interaction, interpretation and summation of responses and finally communication of the 
results.   
As in Chapter 4 the design stages suggested by Collis and Hussey (2009, p.192) were 
followed and again including the stage missing of representativeness.  
“Design the questions and Instructions 
Determine order of presentation 
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Write accompanying letter/request letter 
Test questionnaire with a small sample 
Choose method for distribution and return 
Plan strategy for dealing with non-responses 
Conduct rests for validity and reliability” 
5.6.1  Design the Questions and Instructions 
The list of potential CSF’s contained a number of closed yes/no questions ranging from 
is it relevant to information security incidents, to selections ranking the importance of 
an element to improve incident reporting using a Likert scale. Each potential CSF 
question section also had the facility to provide an open response thereby enabling both 
quantitative and qualitative responses.  The facility for free text comments against each 
of the identified elements allowed for a qualitative response from participants in a 
broader fashion (Collis and Hussey, 2009) and not just respond to the question, thereby 
providing added value from their personal and sector experience. In the main, those that 
are closed are of the tick box style and therefore quick to answer and easier to codify the 
response. The survey contained instructions for its completion and return, as well as an 
overview of the research and how the respondent could contribute. 
This approach was successful in that in round one of the Delphi study 57% of those who 
responded provided additional comments and in round two 56% did. Even with the 
subsequent validation survey, reported in Chapter 6, over 80% of respondents provided 
comments, which was significantly above expectations. 
5.6.2  Determine the Order of Presentation:  
The Delphi study questionnaire was set out in two sections to ease the flow of requested 
information.  
Section One - Identification of respondent and relevant business sector 
This section was mainly used to identify information about the person completing the 
survey and outlined the arrangements for completion. It also provided an explanation 
relating to the Delphi process, the potential number of Delphi rounds and the various 
options for returning the responses. Emphasis was also made that respondents could 
‘withdraw from the survey at any time and after the completion of the survey’ and 
importantly reiterating  
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‘all responses will be treated with strict confidentiality and the final analysis 
and any reporting will not identify individuals or companies’   
The questions enabled, if required, sufficient information to place respondents in the 
public or private sector, business area and gauge the size of organisation as well as what 
community of interest they belonged to, recognising that many could belong to more 
than one of those communities.  The instructions for Section 2 also included Freund’s 
(1988, p.20) description of a Critical Success Factor to ensure consistency in 
interpretation.   
Section Two -The potential Critical Success Factors –  
Thirteen elements that could be considered as potential Critical Success Factors were 
identified from the literature review and scoping study research. These are listed below.    
1. Separation of collection, and analysis from any discipline or regulatory process 
2. Collection of reports of ‘near misses’ as well as actual incidents 
3. Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible feedback to the reporting community 
4. Ease of making a report 
5. Standardised reporting systems within organisations  
6. A working assumption that individuals should be thanked for reporting incidents 
rather than being automatically blamed for what has gone wrong 
7. Mandatory reporting 
8. Standardised risk assessment (to determine the impact of the incident)  
9. A common understanding of what factors are important in determining risk 
10. A mechanism or process for confidential reporting 
11. A recognition by senior management that incidents will happen 
12. Incident reporting systems that are designed appropriately to ensure learning is 
possible 
13. Incident analysis that considers root causes and wider systems/processes and not 
just the initial impact assessment 
As these elements were formed outside of the Delphi group, rather than just accept these 
are the only potential Critical Success Factors, the identification of any other potential 
elements considered by participants as relevant to the information security sector, was 
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needed.  The Delphi round one questionnaire provided a facility for the respondents to 
suggest any other elements they believe should be considered.  
You can add any factor that you think has not been considered and feel worthy 
of inclusion. It may be included in the next round for your fellow professionals 
to consider.’ 
These may be incorporated in subsequent iterations if sufficient support for a new 
element was evidenced from those taking part.    
In the Delphi first round respondents were asked to provide answers against each of the 
elements shown above.  (Table 5-2) below shows the questions section of the survey.   
 
Table  5-2  Extract Example of the Delphi Round 1 Questionnaire 
The purpose of the first question ‘Is it [the element] relevant to information security 
incidents’ is key because if a significant number of respondents answered no, it 
immediately rules the element out from being considered a Critical Success Factor.  
The second question ‘Is this a possible Critical Success Factor’ is an obvious one that 
requires the respondent to make an initial decision as to their views on this point.  
Having been provided with Freund’s (1988) description of a CSF, the aim was to start 
focussing the respondent’s opinion on this point. 
Element 
Description 
(each of the 
thirteen elements 
were described 
individually here.)  
E.g.  Ease of making 
a report 
 
Is it relevant to 
information 
security incidents  
Select as 
appropriate or 
Circle the Yes or 
No 
Is this a possible 
Critical Success 
Factor 
Select as 
appropriate or 
Circle the Yes or 
No 
Rank the importance of 
the element to improve 
incident reporting by 
selecting  or circling as 
appropriate one of the 
below numbers as 
applicable to the key 
below; 
1. Highly important 
2. Important 
3. Neither 
Important/unimportant 
4. Unimportant 
5. Highly unimportant 
Comments (if 
any) 
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The third and final question was intended to assist in the ranking of those elements 
identified as possible CSF’s then drill down into the respondent’s views as to how 
important the element is to incident reporting.    The intention being to separate out 
those elements not considered as relevant.  This allowed for focus on those identified as 
possible CSF’s and analyse their Likert ranking. 
At the end of each potential CSF set of questions was a space for free text comments.  
These text boxes were optional to complete but do provide an insight into the rationale 
for the choice of answer.  The additional benefit being these comments allowed for an 
analysis of the original wording of the elements based on the observations of 
respondents as part of the process to achieving consensus. This analysis led to a 
rewording of the main element descriptions and the addition of further descriptors to 
these elements.   This supported the view by Hasson, Keeney and McKenna (2000, 
p.1000) that the outcome from the initial survey may produce qualitative information 
that can be turned into a quantitative form for the second round. To allow for comments 
may only draw a limited response as with regards to self-completed questionnaires 
“most people do not like writing” Buckingham and Saunders (2004, p.71).  Allowing 
for comments also mitigates against the criticism of Delphi’s that the validity can be 
weakened by not allowing participants to discuss the issues raised as suggested by 
Hasson, Keeney and McKenna (2000, p.1013).  They continue that a Delphi consensus 
does not necessarily mean the right answer has been found, but the results may be 
useful in identifying issues for further debate.    
5.6.3  Write Accompanying Letter/Request Letter 
The introductory letter and support from any sponsor to encourage participation is 
equally important to get right. It must not show any bias towards any of the elements 
and needs to be clear on who is eligible to take part. The explanatory invitation to 
participate letter headed  ‘Information Security Incidents Reporting Delphi Study 
December 2015’(Appendix 4) was sent out to the various CoI’s which set out the 
purpose, eligibility criteria and the way confidentiality was being approached. It also 
included further options for those wishing a higher degree of anonymity, returning by 
post for example.  
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The letter contains an explanation of the nature of the Delphi and its purpose. Complete 
anonymity can be difficult in a Delphi as the identity of the respondent should be known 
by the researcher to ensure they receive subsequent stage iterations to enable further 
responses.    
The intention of the letter was to accompany the actual questionnaire, setting out a brief 
background and experience of the researcher, the subject, and the rational for the 
research. The letter explained why they had been sent the questionnaire and that the 
research was supported by their relevant CoI to provide assurance to the potential 
participant that the researcher was genuine and had relevancy to their profession. This 
was felt important as many questionnaires are often sent out in an unsolicited manner 
and by gaining approval of the relevant CoI body it may encourage the respondents to 
participate if they met the criteria.   As many security professionals do not just belong to 
one community of interest and therefore could receive the questionnaire via more than 
one of them, there was a real risk this could be both annoying and be considered as a 
type of ‘spam’. This was anticipated as the letter included in the second paragraph an 
advanced apology.   
‘It may be you have also received this through other CoI’s that you belong to and, 
if this is the case, may I apologise if it appears that you are being spammed.  One 
response would be really appreciated’.  
This was indeed the case and to some extent helped to further publicise the support of a 
number of CoI’s and potentially further encourage completion.   The letter also 
explained the eligibility criteria and questionnaire format. It also pointed out that the 
respondent could add any unlisted elements they felt should be considered.   
An expectation of the demands of the time of the potential respondents was included. 
Testing had indicated it would take approximately 15 minutes to complete. These 
timings were based on experience of the volunteers whilst it was being tested.  Finally, 
explaining the Delphi process and the intention to seek consensus and again time 
management that normally such studies do not go further than three rounds. It was felt 
important that as the respondents may wonder how much time their participation would 
involve and that the subsequent rounds were likely to take less time to complete. 
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A definition of a security incident to be used for the purposes of this research was 
included. This definition was included as one of the outcomes of the scoping study in 
Chapter 4 clearly demonstrated that no commonly agreed definition of a security 
incident was used by the respondents to that study. To avoid any misunderstanding of 
what was meant by a security incident a definition to be used for this survey was 
included. 
This definition was developed in the absence of a universally accepted security incident 
definition and its development is described in more detail in Chapter 2. 
An information security incident is either, an actual or potential event that has, 
or is likely to, cause harm to the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of 
data, assets, systems or infrastructure whether caused by people, processes or 
technology. 
Recognising that not all professionals belong to a CoI there was always the potential for 
some respondents to forward on the introductory letter and questionnaire to those they 
felt may also be eligible. The introductory letter included this point by stating after the 
eligibility criteria    
'If you know of someone else who is equally eligible, but may not have received 
this, please forward them a copy of this letter and questionnaire.'  
This in fact appeared to take place as some other CoI’s and individuals did respond as a 
direct result of the request being sent out.   These included members of the Europol 
Security Committee who then passed the Delphi out to relevant EU government 
organisations.  In the UK the questionnaire was subsequently re distributed by the UK 
National Technical authority, the UK MOD the Government DSO forum and other 
groups who upon seeing it forwarded to others in the Information Security Profession. It 
should be noted that this snowball approach means that it is not possible to calculate the 
response rate to the survey. 
5.6.4  Test the Questionnaire with a Small Sample  
It is considered good practice to test a survey prior to its distribution (Bryman, 2004; 
Buckingham and Saunders, 2004). The draft survey form was reviewed, refined and 
then tested to ascertain any issues with its design, flow and clarity. Hasson, Keeney and 
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McKenna (2000) and Collis, Hussey (2009) consider it is best practice that a small 
scoping should be conducted to test for these possible issues.      
These drafts, as well as the instructions and introductory letter, were initially tested on a 
small group of volunteers who met the eligibility criteria. Attention was paid to the 
language, logical flow and any potential misunderstanding of words or phrasing that 
could affect the response. Draft versions were also sent to university colleagues for 
comments. Having made amendments identified from the initial testing, a different 
group of users tested the questionnaire as if they were completing it for real.  They were 
requested to test the documents from work, home and other machines.  The main 
intention was not only to test the content but also to test Microsoft word and pdf version 
compatibility. As it was likely a number of different operating systems and software 
versions would be used, combined with individual and corporate sets ups and defaults 
for common office products, this variety of set ups could cause issues if not identified at 
an early stage. For example, some corporate email defences may strip out macro 
commands and the survey did incorporate the opportunity to use drop down lists.  This 
aspect was catered for in the design that if drop downs did not work the question and 
selections for answers were still visible in the text.  This testing did identify a couple of 
minor errors in the drop downs. However, a decision to still include drop downs was 
based on comments from testers relating to the ease of completion offered using drop-
down selections. Testing also identified issues such as wordiness of the letter and 
questions.  This resulted in a reduction in the size of the survey form, greater clarity in 
the instructions and identified ambiguities reworded. Following a final set of testing 
using a mixture of other eligible volunteers, including some from academia, the final 
questionnaire was ready. 
The formulation of the questionnaire and letter took considerable time in wording and 
testing.  The fact that it was completed by a worldwide audience, without any questions 
regarding its completion does demonstrate the importance of testing. The number of 
human errors in the completion of responses was low. These errors included missing out 
some answers. These errors were factored into the analysis of responses for each section 
to ensure the appropriate statistical validity was obtained.    
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5.6.5  Choose Method for Distribution and Return 
It is important to identify a method for distribution, decide upon a time to respond, any 
cut-off date for non-responses including managing the expectations of participants when 
the next round(s) will be distributed.  The survey was emailed to the CoI’s that had 
agreed their support.  A form of words to base their research support message to the 
membership was included as it was felt it would assist the process and ensure key 
consistent messaging was maintained. Some organisations simply mailed out to their 
membership, others posted it as a link to their website to download.   The survey was 
designed to be completed either as a word document, a pdf form or printed and 
completed by hand and then scanned and e-mailed back or even posted if required.  
5.6.6  Plan Strategy for Dealing with Non-Responses 
At the outset, it was decided to personally respond to every completed response by 
thanking the sender, although this was not made clear in the introductory letter. This 
later proved beneficial where anyone who had responded and returned a completed 
survey, but not received an acknowledgement would know their answers had not been 
received. This made a subsequent chase up group ‘bcc’ message easier by stating that 
had a respondent replied but their response blocked at any of the mail gateways then 
they would not have received a thank you message. If they had not received a thank you 
please contact the researcher.  
 
5.6.7  Conduct Tests for Validity and Reliability and Representativeness 
As outlined in the scoping study in Chapter 4 where McNeill (1992) introduces his 
concept of three key areas regarding research; reliability, validity and 
'representativeness'.  This was considered as part of the Delphi process as well. 
Reliability.  By ensuring the process and method of collecting evidence is reliable any 
future use of this method should result in similar findings. (McNeill, 1992, p.14).  
The only difference regarding future surveys obtaining similar findings is if the context 
in which the survey was re-issued had changed. For example, any changes that had 
occurred at their place of work regarding reporting processes because of regulatory 
change.  In general the facts should be the same, but some of the perceptions of the 
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person filling the survey may have changed slightly.  It very much depends on the time 
difference between when the first survey was sent out and if it were to be re- issued. 
Validity:  This relates to being confident the data collective reflects reality and is a true 
picture of what is being studied. (McNeill, 1992, p.15)  
There is an accepted risk of misinterpretation of a question.  Undertaking trial runs with 
different people before deploying the survey reduced the likelihood of this occurring to 
a low level. The fact that a Delphi was used, which returns the findings to respondents 
for reconsideration to obtain consensus, adds to the validity of the process as any 
unusual interpretation may be further challenged by respondents.  The fact that the 
Delphi was supported by the various CoI’s and that the responses were from numerous 
sectors and country from the public sector, private sector and some academia, as well as 
being iterative and obtained consensus demonstrates it can be considered to reflect 
reality.  This also assists in evidencing the sample representativeness of the Delphi 
respondents which is discussed further below. 
Representativeness: Using the views already set out for representativeness in Chapter 
4 and reiterating that McNeill (1992, p.15) suggests it is important to ensure the sample 
population that are being studied are a true reflection of others in that group and 
Buckingham and Saunders (2004, p.70) also refer to the importance of the “people you 
interview need to be representative of the wider population from which they have been 
sampled. 
The range of participants that made up the Delphi respondents gives confidence that the 
selected group or the subject matter is typical of others.  Surveying information security 
professionals from a number of recognised CoI’s adds weight to the sample 
representativeness. Whilst recognising as stated earlier, no singular representative group 
as yet exists, by using bodies such as the Institute of Information Security Professionals 
to assist in identifying the participants and that other CoI’s provided their support 
coupled with an eligibility criteria to ensure those who were completing the Delphi had 
knowledge and experience of incident reporting and the use to which such information 
could be put when assessing information security risk were involved. The participants 
were from a wide mix of public and private sector organisations and academia from the 
UK and worldwide.   
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5.7  Summary of Approach to the Delphi Study  
The Delphi process was designed to follow identified best practice.  It was conducted 
through a number of stages which are summarised below. 
- A review of literature on Delphi study’s to understand both the potential 
benefits and concerns of this study method and to design out where possible 
any potential challenges to the process. 
- Making use of the general approach and lessons learnt from previously 
conducted questionnaires where the need to ensure respondents were content 
with the confidentiality arrangements. 
- Testing of the initial Delphi construction through;   
o Use of academics and volunteers for ambiguities and errors 
o Dry runs to test the survey for any further errors 
o Inclusion in the testing the identification of potential issues due to 
multiple methods of submission. In particular, the potential adverse 
effects of differing versions of Microsoft and adobe software as well 
as printing on potential participant’s systems. Also factored in were 
the possible security controls at corporate mail gateways that may 
affect any macros used for drop-down menus in the questionnaires. 
o The viability and instructions for alternative methods of return such 
as printing hand completion and scanning and returning of responses.  
- Ensuring clear, unambiguous, concise communication separate to the 
questionnaire 
- Canvassing the level of support and interest for the subject matter and 
Delphi approach from appropriate relevant professional bodies and 
Communities of Interest. 
- Obtaining formal approval from these groups to use their membership as a 
form of distribution. 
- Identifying points of contact to distribute the questionnaire 
- Thank each respondent individually so they know their questionnaire has 
been received. 
- Keep interest high through updates to professional bodies. 
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- Send appropriate messages to all respondents giving update on progress 
without appearing to apply pressure to respond. 
The introductory letter, Email text sent to CoI’s, and final version of the round one 
survey are shown as appendices 4, 5 and 6 respectively. 
5.8  The Delphi Questionnaire - Results of Round One.     
The Delphi round 1 was launched at the beginning of December 2015 and was 
distributed through a number of recognised CoI’s during December 2015 and January 
2016.  Responses were then received during the months following.  This section 
provides the results and analysis of the Delphi questionnaire responses. The first 
consideration is whether the return rate is sufficient to be valid and that the level of 
representation from respondents reflects the wider information security community. 
Section 1 of the questionnaire asked respondents for details that assisted in the 
demographics for example to identify the sector they worked in (public, private or 
Academia) and the size of their organisation.   
 Overall the range of representation was encouraging. A total of 115 responses were 
received from the UK, Europe and further afield including Australia, India, America 
and South Korea.  Against the findings of Skulmoski, Hartman and Krahn (2007) 
referred to earlier in the chapter where they reviewed Delphi’s that had numbers of 
respondents ranging from 3 to 171, this was a favourable response. The types of 
organisations represented by the respondents included law enforcement, central 
government, local government, finance, energy, retail, health, telecommunications, 
military, managed service providers, pharmaceutical, service industry, food, academia 
and others.  
5.8.1  Breakdown of Responses to Round One of the Delphi 
 
 
 
Table  5-3  Overall Response by Sector 
The distribution of public and private sector was 59% public sector 37% private sector 
with a smaller amount, 4% from academia.   This lower level of academic response was 
Public Sector Private Sector Academia 
59% 37% 4% 
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expected as less academics are likely to be involved in the management of security 
incidents but clearly some, based on the eligibility criteria, felt they had valuable 
contributions to make . 
5.8.2  Breakdown of Response by Size of Organisation  
Number of employees 0-500 501-
1000 
1001-
5000 
5001-
10000 
10000+ Self employed 
All groups 15% 6% 25% 14% 37% 3% 
Table  5-4  Response by Size of Organisation 
Each employee size group is represented in the returns. 15% of the responses came from 
security professionals employed by organisations employing less than 500 staff, 25% 
from those employing between 1000 and 5000 and interestingly a larger percentage of 
respondents, 37%, who worked in major companies or organisations of over 10,000 
employees.   This range of size of organisations is a good indication of the validity of 
the response.    Self-employed professionals represented 4% of the total received.   
Table  5-5  Response by size of organisation by sector 
The breakdown of size of organisations between the largest two groups, the public and 
private sector shows the public sector had no representation from the smallest size and 
only 1% from the next size up. Their responses were more representative of the medium 
to large employee groups with 45% from 1001-5000 21% from 5001-1000 and 35% in 
the 10000 plus range. In contrast the private sector were more representative of the 
smallest and largest employee groups with the largest representation, just over half, 
from the biggest employee base (10,000+), and just over a third from the smallest 
employee group (0-500).  The size of organisation groupings were set out originally to 
give an overview of the responses by size of company.  If regrouped as small, 0 to 1000, 
medium 1001 to 10000 and large being over 10000 this shows the response from the 
Number of employees 0-
500 
501-
1000 
1001-
5000 
5001-
10000 
10000+ Self employed 
Public Sector 0% 1% 43% 21% 35% 1% 
Private Sector 35% 0% 5% 5% 54% 1% 
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public sector mainly representing medium and large organisations and the private sector 
representing as small and large organisations. This could  possibly reflecting a tendency 
for public  sector organisations are not normally found to be small in number and 
private sector organisations do have many small companies. With such a wide range of 
responses from different sectors and countries this was not possible to confirm with 
official statistics on organisational size.  
A considerable number who responded did indicate which the community of interest 
body they had been made aware of the survey by.  Although in some cases the 
respondent indicated more than one body, which vindicated earlier planning to 
apologise for potential spamming and the belief that some professionals belong to more 
than one security body. The biggest response group was the Institute of Information 
Security Professionals (IISP) which accounted for just fewer than 50% of the responses.   
This also provided a degree of validity relating to the professionalism of respondents as 
these members must demonstrate information security competencies in the information 
security sector to be eligible to be members. 
5.8.3  Section Two of Round One of the Delphi  
This section was aimed at the views of professional on the 13 elements identified from 
previous research.  Respondents were asked to answer against a list of processes 
considered to be effective for the overall reporting process of reporting incidents.  
Against each process they could state ‘yes’ or ‘no’  if they believed it is relevant to 
information security incident reporting. Then the same again whether they believe the 
process could be considered a Critical Success Factor (CSF).   They were informed a 
process can be very important but not necessarily a Critical Success Factor.  The Delphi 
questionnaire set out that CSF’s have been described as:  
“Important to achieving overall corporate goals and objectives,  
Measurable and controllable by the organisation to which they apply,  
Relatively few in number – not everything can be critical,  
Expressed as things that must be done not the end point of the process,  
Applicable to all companies in the industry with similar objectives and strategies 
and hierarchical in nature.”  (Freund, Y, 1988, p.20) 
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Although different groups had slightly differing scores, overall the consensus on what 
was a Critical Success Factor was very similar.  It may be that differing bodies will 
consider some types of element more relevant than others in their sector.   For the 
purposes of the next round of the Delphi the overall consensus was used. Therefore, 
there is a degree of confidence that the overall response is representative of a wide 
information security community.    
  Is it relevant 
to security 
incidents?             
Is this a 
possible CSF?   
Yes No Yes No 
1. Separation of collection, and analysis from any 
discipline or regulatory process 
87% 13% 58% 42% 
2.Collection of reports of ‘near misses’ as well as 
actual incidents 
97% 3% 61% 39% 
3.Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible feedback 
to the reporting community 
96% 4% 73% 33% 
4. Ease of making a report 98% 2% 71% 29% 
5. Standardised reporting systems within 
organisations 
94% 6% 58% 42% 
6.  Working assumption that individuals should be 
thanked for reporting incidents rather than being 
automatically blamed for what has gone wrong 
95% 5% 58% 42% 
7. Mandatory reporting 88% 12% 64% 36% 
8. Standardised risk assessment (to determine the 
impact of the incident)   
90% 10% 63% 37% 
9. A common understanding of what factors are 
important in determining risk 
89% 11% 60% 40% 
10. A mechanism or process for confidential 
reporting 
89% 11% 61% 39% 
11. A recognition by senior management that  
incidents will happen 
90% 10% 67% 33% 
12. Incident reporting systems that are designed 
appropriately to ensure learning is possible 
93% 7% 61% 39% 
13. Incident analysis that  considers root causes 
and wider systems/processes and not just the initial 
impact assessment 
99% 1% 82% 18% 
Table  5-6  Response to Questionnaire by Element Relevance and is it a CSF? 
 210 
 
The above responses are the results of the questions to each of the listed elements.   
Is the element relevant to information security incidents?  
The responses clearly show the respondents feel that the elements identified in research 
elsewhere are relevant to the information security sector.  This reinforces the findings 
from the scoping study that research elsewhere into incident reporting has the potential 
to be reused in the information security sector.  The lowest score agreeing the element is 
relevant being 87% and the highest 99%. 
The next question is important. Is the element a possible Critical Success Factor?   
Here the responses were more discerning with the lowest score as a possible CSF being 
58% for three of the elements and the highest element scoring 82%.    
These scores produced quantitative data that required further breakdown to enable a 
judgement to be made in the consensus forming process.  The questionnaire then asked 
respondents to rank the importance of the elements to improve incident reporting based 
on a five point ‘Likert’ Scale ranging from 1 Highly important to 5 Highly unimportant. 
The facility for respondents to add comments after each answered element was also 
provided.  
These figures show that many of the elements are considered important and that to 
identify which ones may be potential critical success factors would require examining a 
combination of the two quantitative yes/no questions and the Likert responses together 
with analysis of the comments that were provided.    
On initial examination of the question to ‘rank the importance of the element to improve 
security incident reporting’ elements 11 and 13 had over 50% scores at the highest 
ranking. Others, although popular also had higher mid-range to negative scores. For 
example element 10 scored relatively well , 7 and 8 had relatively high scores but the 
mid-range and negative scores showed that consensus might not be as easy to achieve. 
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1. Separation of collection, and analysis 
from any discipline or regulatory 
process 
27%  46%  15% 11% 1% 
2.Collection of reports of ‘near misses’ 
as well as actual incidents 
32% 54%  11% 3% 0% 
3.Rapid, useful, accessible and 
intelligible feedback to the reporting 
community 
40% 46%   11% 3% 0% 
4. Ease of making a report 46%  43%  11% 0% 0% 
5. Standardised reporting systems 
within organisations 
32% 47%   14% 6% 1% 
6. A working assumption that 
individuals should be thanked for 
reporting incidents rather than being 
automatically blamed for what has gone 
wrong. 
35% 47%  17% 1% 0% 
7. Mandatory reporting 45%  32%  14% 9% 0% 
8. Standardised risk assessment (to 
determine the impact of the incident)   
43%  35%  16% 6% 0% 
9. A common understanding of what 
factors are important in determining 
risk 
25% 50%  15% 7% 2% 
10. A mechanism or process for 
confidential reporting 
35% 41%  19% 4% 1% 
11. A recognition by senior management 
that  incidents will happen 
51%  33%  
 
7% 7% 2% 
12. Incident reporting systems that are 
designed appropriately to ensure 
learning is possible 
29% 52%  15% 3% 1% 
13. Incident analysis that  considers root 
causes and wider systems/processes and 
not just the initial impact assessment 
58%   36%  1% 0% 0% 
Table  5-7  Importance of Element in Reporting Incidents using a Likert Scale 
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A number of the comments were received suggested some combination or changes to 
the initial wording of the potential CSF’s to make them more relevant to security. This 
could make it easier to better judge their potential as a CSF going into round two.  
Others comments suggested changes to a potential CSF’s wording that incorporated 
parts of the less popular elements. 
5.9  How the Potential CSF’s were Selected for Round Two 
Having collated scores relating to the elements relevance, it potential for becoming a 
possible Critical Success Factor and its importance in improving security incident 
reporting, the next stage was to identify which of the elements could go forward to the 
Delphi round two as potential CSF’s. As stated earlier, Fruend’s, (1988, p.20) view is 
CSF’s they should be “relatively few in number – not everything can be critical,”  
Firstly, by identifying if any of the original 13 elements were not considered as relevant 
to security. In the first round of the Delphi all scored highly enough to be considered as 
relevant. The highest scoring element was number 13 ‘Incident analysis that considers 
root causes and wider systems/processes and not just the initial impact assessment’ with 
99% and the lowest element 1 ‘separation of collection and analysis from any 
disciplinary or regulatory process, with a score of 87%.  
Then by examining the Yes/No question is the element a possible CSF. As stated earlier 
three of the elements (4, 12 and 13) scored well in the ‘highly important’ Likert scale.  
The next choice ‘Important’ Likert scale scores were taken into consideration.  Some 
scored highly overall when the ‘Highly important’ and ‘important scores were taken 
together.   
As can be seen in Table 5-7 a number of the elements consistently score the highest 
although their position varies slightly, therefore the differences in each column would 
need to have some other review to ensure the most popular were consistent.  
As the aim was to focus on the CSF’s and improve security incident reporting this 
resulted in some weightings being applied to the importance of the element to improve 
security incident reporting. . The yes no CSF score was used as it stood. However the 
next question which asked for a Likert scale scoring was had weightings applied to the 
Highly Important and Important scores as Highly Importance was considered a higher 
value than important but simply taking each score from the Likert range did not 
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differentiate this importance. This process was validated within the academic 
supervision of this research.   
As it was judged using a Likert scale, the highest importance received a weighting of 2   
then the importance answer a lower weighting of 1.5.  A combination of scores of the 
potential of the element being a CSF and the importance to improve security incident 
reporting showed 7 elements scoring over 200% once the weighting had been applied. 
The top 4 elements were then selected as the potential CSF’s and three elements that 
scored less than the top four but were clear of the remaining elements were included as 
possible CSF’s.  
Element 
number 
Critical 
Success 
Factor 
Yes 
Highly 
Important 
Highly 
Important 
score 
weighted 
x2 
Important Important 
score 
weighted 
x1.5 
Total of CSF 
Yes score and 
weighted 
Highly 
Important and 
Important 
scores 
1 58 27 54 46 69 181 
2 61 32 64 54 81 206 
3 73 40 80 46 69 222 
4 71 46 92 43 64.5 227.5 
5 58 32 64 47 70.5 192.5 
6 58 35 70 47 70.5 198.5 
7 64 45 90 32 48 202 
8 63 43 86 35 52.5 201.5 
9 60 25 50 50 75 185 
10 61 35 70 41 61.5 192.5 
11 67 51 102 33 49.5 218.5 
12 61 29 58 52 78 197 
13 82 58 116 36 54 252 
       
        Highest Scoring elements considered as potential CSF's 
   Middle scoring elements that may be Possible CSFs 
 
       
 
Note: All figures are percentages 
   
       
Table  5-8  Summary Chart of how most popular elements that could be CSF’s were identified 
Examination of the comments provided suggestions as to the wording of each of the 
higher scoring elements in preparation for round 2.  For example, ‘near misses’ was a 
popular answer in some responses but others felt they should not be separated out from 
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normal incidents.  Therefore reference to near misses was included in the amended 
description of element 4 ‘ease of making a report’ to reflect the relative popularity of 
near misses into an already high scoring element.  The near miss element which was 
scored as a possible element was also amended to reflect the comments made.   
Some examples of comments from respondents to the ‘near miss’ element were 
“The more data the easier it is to identify a pattern” 
“If anything this should be considered as more important that actual incidents. 
This is the opportunity to take action to avoid future incidents and real damage” 
It is vital to collect this information as it could help prevent any potential future 
major incident occurring” 
There were some comments that were not as supportive  
“important but not a CSF as not vital. How do you capture this information and 
can you justify the effort” 
“Near misses are difficult to determine. They go unnoticed by the outside. It 
needs tremendous trust to report them, as there will be consequences” 
For the element ‘ease of making a report’ when finally issued in round 2 the wording 
had changed from 
Ease of making a report  
to 
2a. Amended wording:  
Ease of making a report, recognising if incident reporting is difficult individuals 
will be less likely to submit them. This may particularly affect the reporting of 
near misses. The reporting process should: 
 Include a sufficiently clear level of education and awareness to all staff in how 
the reporting process works.   
 Describes what an incident is. 
 Describes how to report it and what escalation needs to take place. 
 Sets out levels of expected feedback.  
 Be clearly set out as part of any governance process. 
This re wording had taken into account comments from round one participants to 
improve on the bland initial element to a more focussed one 
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 “the system must be user friendly” 
“if it’s not easy to make a report then will discourage from making future 
reports”  
“This is extremely important, if it isn’t easy for users to report incidents and 
events then they will probably not be bothered to do so” 
 “the most important factor is knowing who to communicate with and how” 
 “It is important to make reporting straightforward and simple” 
The inclusion of the education and governance wording came from some of the 
suggestions for other CSF’s.  
“Education and awareness re incident reporting” 
“clarity of reporting systems (who do I tell) 
“Reporting lines” 
“Staff Awareness re reporting” 
“Establishment of governance” 
The next section explains the manner in which some aspects of the suggested additional 
CSF’s were incorporated.   
5.10  Other Suggested CSF’s 
To ensure the respondents did have an opportunity to put forward a different view on 
the elements identified through research elsewhere, they could make suggestions for 
other potential elements to be considered. The response to this was encouraging.  Of the 
67 public sector respondents 34 (51%) made a total of 45 suggestions, of the 43 private 
sector 10 (23%) made a total of 18 suggestions.  The space for these suggestions was set 
out in such a way those respondents could also score them against the same criteria as 
the 13 listed ones.  This enabled a similar ability to identify those that may be 
considered as Critical Success Factors.  These were collated and compared with those 
that already existed as well as looking to identify if any suggested element had 
sufficient support that it could be included in round 2 of the Delphi.  The list of these 
suggestions is shown at Appendix 9. 
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It became apparent that the majority that were suggested were very similar to those 
already set out and this, as well as other comments made by respondents, was one of the 
reasons for adding additional descriptions to the initial wording of the most popular 
elements before sending them out in round 2.  The additional elements suggested were 
in effect sub descriptions that gave more clarity to the original elements meaning.  Of 
the suggestions ‘education’ and ‘governance’ regularly featured in some form or 
another.   As a result  no new elements were introduced but the original wording of the 
most supported elements was amended to take into account of the comments made.   
Again using the example of developing the element relating to ‘Ease of making a 
report’;   the Delphi round 2 included the original CSF wording, then showed an 
amended wording to take into account some of the comments and the suggestions for 
possible other elements.   Education was weaved into this element as a result. An 
example is set out below; 
Original wording (Element 4) 
Ease of making a report  
Amended wording:  
Ease of making a report, recognising if incident reporting is difficult individuals will be 
less likely to submit them. This may particularly affect the reporting of near misses. The 
reporting process should: 
 Include a sufficiently clear level of education and awareness to all staff in how 
the reporting process works.   
 Describes what an incident is. 
 Describes how to report it and what escalation needs to take place. 
 Sets out levels of expected feedback.  
 Be clearly set out as part of any governance process. 
The above amendment included elements of the suggestions including ‘education’ and 
‘governance’.  
The next section describes the process of the 2
nd
 Round of the Delphi and how the four 
most popular elements plus the three that were supported as possible CSF’s were 
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amended to reflect the suggestions and comments into more rounded elements for the 
2
nd
 round participants to consider.   
In fact all of the elements included in round 2 included the original wording together 
with a suggested re wording based on the comments received in round one. 
5.11  Delphi Round Two 
Having identified the top 4 scoring elements and the next three possible CSF’s the task 
was to engage the participants in round 2 of the Delphi.  The methodology of the survey 
design and testing for round 2 followed the approach for round 1. As there were 
identifiable respondents this time the round 2 survey was directed at only those who had 
responded to round one on a more personal basis.  The main difference being the survey 
questions design. 
As there was now a potential 115 respondents in the Delphi panel it and their responses 
to round 1 had been numbered, it was easier to send and track the responses to round 2.    
 
The Round 2 Delphi was divided into three sections 
Section 1 was primarily instructions to the participants and they were informed they 
could withdraw at any time. 
Section 2 explained the emerging consensus around the top 4 elements.  It continued by 
stating 
“The CSF descriptions have been added to, based on the responses and 
comments provided in round one. This section asks your views on whether you 
feel the additional description affects the element as a Critical Success Factor. 
There are again five choices available for you to indicate your preference. This 
time the options ask your opinion whether the amended wording of the element 
either; significantly improves its value as a CSF, improves its value as a CSF, 
neither improves or reduces its value as a CSF, reduces its value as a CSF and 
finally significantly reduces its value as a CSF.  In addition, please indicate 
whether this amended element remains a CSF - Yes or No? There is also space 
for any comments you may wish to make.” 
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Section Three informed the participants about those elements that did not score the 
highest but could be considered as CSF’s as a result of the amendment to the wording 
based on comments made in round one. 
Section 3 set out the three elements that due to their positioning in the scoring 
could still be considered as a CSF.  This section contains those elements that 
scored well, but not as well as the above four elements, but were scored higher 
than the rest. As in Section 2, the descriptions have been added to, based on the 
responses and comments provided in round one. This section asks your views on 
whether or not you feel the additional description affects the element and 
improves it to such an extent that it can be considered eligible to be included as 
a Critical Success Factor amongst the four already identified in Section 2. There 
are three of them (again not in any order of preference).   
Element 2.  Collection of reports of near misses as well as actual incidents 
Element 7. Mandatory Reporting 
Element 8.  Standardised risk assessment (to determine the impact of the 
incident)  
Again, there are five choices available for you to indicate your preference. The 
options are that the amended wording either; significantly improves the element 
such that it should now be included as a Critical Success Factor with the four 
CSF elements above, improves the element such that it should now be included 
as a Critical Success Factor with the four CSF elements above, neither improves 
or diminishes the element such that it should remain where it is, it diminishes  
the element such that it should not be included as a Critical Success Factor with 
the four CSF elements above and finally it significantly diminishes the element 
such that it should not be included as a Critical Success Factor with the four 
CSF elements above.   There is also space for any comments you may wish to 
make. 
The 2
nd
 Round Delphi was made up of a 5 point Likert and a yes no question that was 
slightly different in wording for the top 4 elements to the next three ‘possibles’ to reflect 
the opportunity for participants now that the elements wording had been amended to 
reflect the various comments made. 
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In essence the top 4 Likert scale was asking  
How do you feel the amendments impact on the value of the element as a Critical 
Success Factor? 
1. Significantly improves the value of the element as a Critical Success Factor 
2. Improves the value of the element as a Critical Success Factor 
3. Neither improves or reduces the value of the element as a Critical Success Factor  
4. Reduces the value of the element as a Critical Success Factor 
5. Significantly reduces the value of the element as a Critical Success Factor 
Finally they were asked to confirm or not whether they felt as a result of the changes did 
the element remain a CSF.  
In view of the above, does this element remain a Critical Success Factor?    YES or    
NO     
With regards to the three possible elements the question was different where it was 
asking for the participant to reconsider the positioning of them as a potential CSF. The 
instructions being 
The below elements scored well, but not as well as the above four elements but were 
scored higher than the rest.  Further descriptions of the element have been added as a 
result of comments made by respondents in Round One.   The original element number 
is shown in brackets.   Please place your view against each of the three elements that the 
emerging consensus scored well, but not as well as the above four elements in Section 2 
by  selecting or circling, as appropriate, one of the five numbered choices.  
Do you feel the amendments impact on the value of the element and its potential to join 
the four Critical Success Factors in Section 2 
1. Significantly improves the element such that it should now be included as a Critical 
Success Factor. 
2. Improves the element such that it should now be included as a Critical Success 
Factor.  
3. Neither improves or diminishes the element and that it should remain where it is.  
4. Diminishes the element such that it should not be included as a Critical Success 
Factor. 
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5. Significantly diminishes the element such that it should not be included as a Critical 
Success Factor.  
Again there was a 5 level Likert selection. See table 5-8 for the full wording and results. 
To reduce the burden on respondents and lessen the completion time, instead of 
requesting their details again, each was allocated a reference number used collating their 
round 1 response.  The round 2 Delphi questionnaires were then numbered accordingly 
so each respondent received their allocated numbered questionnaire.  To overcome the 
potential issues which were in part experienced in round 1 each respondent was sent 
two emails, one with a word version of the round 2 and the other with a pdf version.   
The Delphi round 2 was sent out by email at the end of April 2016.   It was sent to the 
original 115. Initially found some respondents had left the organisation they belonged to 
for round one. This was identified by out of office messages that were returned; none 
had forwarding addresses. This reduced possible number of respondents to round 2 to 
111.   
A Subsequent e mail was sent out thanking those who had responded stating that those 
who had would have received confirmation and if others had sent a response but not 
received a response to make contact as it was possible their response had been blocked.  
This achieved an additional burst of activity and likely acted as a prompt to those who 
had not done so to now complete it.   
Some responses were unclear and due to the reference number approach the respondents 
were able to be contacted by email for clarification.  The reason appeared mainly due to 
some boxes responses being stripped out as they were macros. 
After assessing the results there appeared to be a consensus on the elements considered 
to be Critical Success Factors. The results indicated no significant changes or 
disagreements in respondent’s views. There were still some suggestions re minor re 
wording of the descriptions of the CSF’s.  There was some support for promoting one or 
possibly 2 elements as CSFs but this needed to be balanced against. Whilst an element 
may be important it does not necessarily make it a CSF (Freund, 1988).  In the end 82 
respondents completed round 2 giving a 74% return.  The below table sets out the 
summary of responses to the elements identified as Critical success Factors from round 
one.   
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Do you feel the 
amendments 
impact on the 
value of the 
element as a 
Critical Success 
Factor? 
1. Original 
wording 
(Element 3) 
Rapid, 
useful, 
accessible 
and 
intelligible 
feedback to 
the reporting 
community 
2.  Original 
wording 
(Element 4) 
Ease of 
making a 
report  
3.  Original 
wording 
(Element 11)  
A recognition 
by senior 
management 
that incidents 
will happen.  
4.  Original 
wording 
(Element 13)  
Incident 
analysis that 
considers root 
causes and 
wider systems/ 
processes, not 
just the initial 
impact 
assessment. 
1. Significantly 
improves the 
value of the 
element as a 
CSF 
27 33 52 30 
2. Improves the 
value of the 
element as a 
CSF 
61 45 37 44 
3. Neither 
improves or 
reduces the 
value of the 
element as a 
CSF 
6 13 10 20 
4. Reduces the 
value of the 
element as a 
CSF 
5 9 1 6 
5. Significantly 
reduces the 
value of the 
element as a 
CSF 
0 0 0 0 
In view of the 
above, does this 
element remain a 
CSF?  
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
100 0 98 2 95 5 95 0 
Table  5-9  Do Amendments to Wording Improve the Highest Scoring CSF? 
 222 
 
Looking at the results for each element in turn. 
Element 3 Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible feedback to the reporting 
community 
 
The results appear to indicate that the amended wording has improved the view of the 
respondents with 88% stating it either significantly improves or improves the value of 
the element as a CSF. When asked is it still a CSF there 100% support for it.  This 
indicated the amendments had made a difference and there was solid support that it 
remained a CSF. 
Element 4 Ease of making a report  
This too appears to show the amended wording has improved the view of respondents. 
78% thought the wording significantly or improved the wording and there was a 95% 
score that it is still a CSF.  Although there was some dissention regarding it remaining a 
CSF the overall score of 95% showed convincing support 
Element 11 A recognition by senior management that incidents will happen.  
Again the results appear to show the amended wording has improved the view of 
respondents. 89% thought the wording significantly or improved the wording and there 
was a 95% score that it is still a CSF.  This element had the highest score for an 
improvement of the CSF wording and like element 4 had a 95% support for it to remain 
a CSF. 
Element 13 Incident analysis that considers root causes and wider systems/ processes, 
not just the initial impact assessment. 
Likewise to the other results shows an indication of an improvement in the 
wording.77% thought the wording significantly or improved the wording and there was 
a 95% score that it is still a CSF.  In a similar vein to element 4 and 11 an improvement 
in wording. 
Overall none of the elements had a score that the wording significantly reduced its value 
as a CSF.  The highest score of a reduction in the value was 9% for element 4.  
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In summary it appears that the amendments to the original wording were well received 
and that the top four elements are still considered to be CSF’s.  This clearly indicates a 
consensus from the Delphi participants.  
5.12  Section 3 Possible Critical Success Factors.  
The next section focusses on those elements that did not score highly enough in round 
one to be considered as a Critical Success Factor but still had scored sufficient to be 
included in round 2 as a possible CSF following amendments to the wording.  The 
rewording that had taken place following the comments made in round one may have 
been sufficient to change the respondent’s views.    Therefore in round 2 the participants 
were also asked to consider three possible elements that could be elevated as Critical 
Success Factors and if support for one or more of the top three diminished significantly 
could replace one or more of them.  
These were;  
Element 2. Collection of reports of near misses as well as actual incidents 
Element 7. Mandatory Reporting 
Element 8. Standardised risk assessment (to determine the impact of the 
incident)  
Many of the comments that were received were supportive of the element and the 
revised wording but opinion whether it they should now be considered as CSF was 
divided. 
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The below table provides the results for the three possible CSF’s 
Do you feel the 
amendments impact on 
the value of the element 
and its potential to join 
the four CSFs in 
Section 2? 
Original wording 
(Element 2)  
 
Collection of 
reports of near 
misses as well as 
actual incidents 
Original 
wording 
(Element 7) 
Mandatory 
Reporting 
Original wording 
(Element 8) 
 
Standardised risk 
assessment (to 
determine the impact 
of the incident) 
1. Significantly 
improves the element 
such that it should now 
be included as a CSF. 
 
16 
 
29 
 
16 
2. Improves the 
element such that it 
should now be included 
as a CSF. 
 
46 
 
44 
 
28 
3. Neither improves or 
diminishes the element 
and that it should 
remain where it is.  
 
35 
 
20 
 
50 
4. Diminishes the 
element such that it 
should not be included 
as a CSF. 
 
2 
 
7 
 
5 
5. Significantly 
diminishes the element 
such that it should not 
be included as a CSF.  
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
Table  5-10  Do Amendment’s Improve the Possible CSF Elements? 
Element 2. Collection of reports of near misses as well as actual incidents 
The scores for this element showed a 16% support that the wording had significantly 
improved that it should now be considered as a CSF. However, 35% of the scoring was 
that it neither improved or diminished the element and should stay where it is and not be 
a CSF. A useful element but not a CSF. There was little concern that the wording had 
diminished the element 
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Element 7. Mandatory Reporting 
This potential CSF had a higher level of scoring in support of it being considered as a 
CSF.  29% feeling it significantly improved the element. There were supportive 
comments but the areas of concern related to what is mandated to be reported and 
whether internally or externally. Some linked the wording to ease of making a report 
rather than making reporting mandatory.  
Comments such as  
“mandatory reporting can give a negative perception – how can it be enforced’  
“[Referring to ease of making a report] ‘it appears duplicative to raise the issue 
again here’. ‘I struggle whether this is a CSF. An organisation should have a 
culture of reporting’.     
On balance although there was greater support for it to be considered there was 
sufficient concern from respondents that it was not considered as strong enough to 
become a CSF.   
Element 8. Standardised risk assessment (to determine the impact of the incident)  
This element had the highest score (50%) that it should remain where it is.  Although 
like other possible elements there was support for it to be considered. 
5.13  Review of Additional Comments Provided in the Delphi 2 Response.  
There were many positive comments regarding an improvement of their description but 
also some criticism. As the respondents came from a wide range of sectors and sizes of 
organisations and some were overseas respondents, it may be difficult to achieve 100% 
agreement as to the  to exact wording but the Delphi 2 outcome gives a high degree of 
confidence in the wording that was sent out.   
The approach taken was to only amend further where there is common agreement.  In 
essence recognising, although it appears that the Delphi 2 had reached acceptable 
consensus, there was still room for further minor tidying up of the wording in 
preparation for the Incident Reporting Maturity Model validation study. 
5.14  Summary  
In summary the four identified CSF’s were still considered to be so by clear high 
scoring.  Of the possible CSF’s, Mandated reporting, scored the best. However, in view 
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of the comments and the fact that clarity as to what should be mandated to report and it 
is difficult to measure if incidents were reported of not,  meant it was not considered as 
a CSF.  To be included in a Maturity Model it would also be harder to judge as an 
organisation would either have mandated reporting or not and the maturity would be on 
the confident that incident were being reported against that mandating. In addition 
organisations may be subject to external regulatory or policy reporting requirements. 
With the soon to be introduced General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 
2016/679) which relates to personal data incidents as opposed to other types of incidents 
this could make the ‘mandation of reporting’ if it were a CSF more complex.   
The findings show a group of four CSF’s that could run in a natural sequence. Starting 
from a recognition that incidents will occur to then having a process that makes it easy 
to report incidents, then provide feedback to reporters (to encourage future reporting ) 
and finally making use of the reports to understand the root causes to prevent or reduce 
reoccurrence.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5-4  The Four CSF’s in a Cyclical Process 
Chapter 6 sets out the Validation study to test the original findings of the Delphi and 
introduce an Incident Reporting Maturity Model.  
A recognition by senior management 
that incidents will happen and that 
they must play a full and active part in 
the incident management process. 
Ease of making a report, 
recognising if reporting incidents 
is difficult individuals will be less 
likely to submit them. This may 
particularly affect the reporting 
of near misses. 
Rapid, useful, accessible and 
intelligible feedback to the 
reporting community. 
Incident analysis that considers 
root causes and wider systems/ 
processes, not just the initial 
impact assessment. 
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Chapter 6 Validation of the Delphi Study Findings. The Creation and 
Testing of an Information Security Incident Reporting Maturity Model 
6.1  Introduction 
Chapter 5 set out the four main Critical Success Factors identified through a Delphi 
study that have the potential to improve information security incident reporting.  Once 
the CSF’s had been identified, the next stage was to conduct a validation study which 
aimed to;  
i) Provide an opportunity to that the final CSF selection findings from the 
Delphi study did not cause any concern from the Delphi participants.  This 
may identify any significant differences of interpretation which could call 
into question the researchers interpretation. 
ii) Test the potential of an Incident Reporting Maturity Model (IRMM) as a tool 
in which to place the four CSF’s and to see if it can be used to evaluate an 
organisations maturity level against those CSF’s.  
iii) To further test the IRMM and CSFs a control group, who had not previously 
participated in the formation of the CSF’s but met the eligibility criteria, was 
identified.  
The purpose of the use of a control group as well as the original Delphi participants was 
to enable a comparison of their scoring against that of the Delphi participants to identify 
if there are any significant differences between the two. This has two benefits. Firstly to 
test whether the identified CSF’s wording is understandable as the control group had not 
previously been exposed to their development. Secondly, to identify any significant 
differences of opinion that would warrant further investigation or research. 
This Chapter aims to validate the findings from the Delphi and proposes a method to 
communicate them to the information security community using an Incident Reporting 
Maturity Model. This is in support research goals three and four which, for 
convenience, are reproduced below. 
 (3) To identify the Critical Success Factors that may be applicable to 
information security incident reporting. 
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(4) To propose an information security Incident Reporting Maturity Model that 
could be applied by organisations and may improve the flow of incidents that are 
reported.  
Research goal 3 was primarily dealt with in Chapter 5 but the validation study would 
also provide assurances particularly with the involvement of the control group.  The 
main goal that the validation study is seeking to address is no 4.  
Having identified the four CSF’s through the Delphi study there needed to be a method 
to make practical use of the research in a real world environment rather than simply 
providing a list of them.  To assist in the uptake of the use of these CSF’s a method that 
would enable businesses and organisations to evaluate where they were positioned in 
relation to these CSF’s was considered a more practical and beneficial approach. The 
four identified Critical Success Factors could be placed within an Incident Reporting 
Maturity Model (IRMM).  This could be used as a tool that could potentially assist in 
the identification of the level of maturity an organisation has in relation to these CSF’s 
and whether or not there is an appetite to take them further.  However, although the 
Delphi study had been conducted and a consensus reached, it would be diligent to 
conduct a form of validation against the final wording of the CSF’s and to test the 
Delphi findings with a selection of security professionals who, although eligible to take 
part in the Delphi study, did not. The validation study therefore gave the opportunity of 
the original Delphi participants for any further comments on the CSF wording as well as 
testing whether the CSF’s could be placed in a IRMM to enable organisation to judge 
their level of maturity against those factors.  In addition it introduced a control group 
who were not exposed to the previous stages of research to judge how well the CSF’s 
and the IRMM would be accepted by those not being involved in their development.   
6.2  Validation 
With any research there is always a concern that, despite rigour in design and approach, 
doubts could exist regarding the accuracy of the data analysis and interpretations of the 
findings. There is a risk the researcher may have been “‘fooled’ as to be mistaken about 
them” (Robson, 2011, p.85).  There is considerable debate amongst researchers over 
what constitutes validity. Scheurich (1997) in his criticism of interpretations of what is 
meant by validity argues that when differing research views describe varying types of 
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validity they often are dealing with the same problem. As previously discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5 the issues of Validity, Reliability and Representativeness are important 
to demonstrate the rigour of the research and assurances the findings are based on 
reality.   This research is based on a pragmatic approach recognising that both positivist 
and interpretative methods and approaches have been adopted. The mix of types of 
quantitative and qualitative questions in the surveys is a good example. The table 
offered by Easterby-Smith Thorpe and Lowe (2003) who instead of the terms validity, 
reliability and representativeness refer to the term generalizability. This generalization 
test is partly undertaken by the validation study. The author has added comments in 
italics to reflect how this study addresses the challenges asked in the table.  For example 
under generalization the research did not intend to validate the research findings in the 
healthcare sector and elsewhere regarding incident reporting but to test whether they 
could be reused. 
 Positivist Relativist Constructionist 
Validity Do the measures 
correspond closely to 
reality?(as far as possible 
based on following best 
practice and use of 
security professionals) 
Have sufficient number of 
perspectives been 
included? (in terms of the 
range of professionals 
taking part in the studies 
it is believed so) 
Does the study 
clearly gain access to 
the experiences of 
those in the research 
setting?  (Yes, based 
on the professionals 
responding) 
Reliability Will the measures yield the 
same results on other 
occasions (There will be 
variables as organisations 
and views may change 
over time. The control 
group and validation 
study helped to assure 
reliability) 
Will similar observations 
be reached by other 
observers  (Yes, but there 
is the risk regarding 
interpretation of 
comments However, those 
interpretations of the CSF 
wording changes were 
included in subsequent  
Delphi rounds and 
validation so some of this 
concern can be dismissed) 
Is there transparency 
in how sense was 
made from the raw 
data (The Delphi 
process gives an 
opportunity to 
challenge the 
authors 
interpretations if 
there was concern. 
The raw data is in 
the appendices) 
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Generalizability 
(others such as 
McNeill (1992); 
Buckingham and 
Saunders(2004) 
refer to 
representativeness) 
To what extent does the 
study confirm or contradict 
existing findings in the 
same field (There does not 
appear to have been any 
similar research in the 
information security 
sector but confirmation  
research in other 
disciplines can be reused 
What is the probability that 
patterns observed in the 
sample will be repeated in 
the general population  (if 
referring to the security 
community this is likely 
based on the similarity of 
findings between the 
Delphi participants and 
Control group but if 
referring to the public it 
would not be applicable ) 
Do the concepts and 
constructs derived 
from this study have 
any relevance to 
other settings?  (Yes, 
as shown reuse into 
information security. 
The findings have 
the potential to be  
re-used  back into 
the original research 
findings from 
healthcare) 
Table  6-1  Perspectives on Validity, Reliability and Generalizability (with Author’s added context 
in italics) Easterby-Smith Thorpe and Lowe (2003, P.53)  
Others such as Yin (2014, p.45) refer to four tests of the quality of research designs 
‘Construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability’.  Yin (2014) refers 
to construct validity as an issue where researchers make subjective judgements whereby 
their pre-conceived views can influence the data gathering and, in the case of a survey, 
its construction.  Internal validity does not apply always to studies but the element 
where Yin (2014) suggests it does is where inferences from the collective data are 
made.  External validity relates to how far the results can be considered a true 
representation of a wider group which links into the views of Easterby-Smith Thorpe 
and Lowe (2003) in table 6-1 above. Finally Yin (2014) refers to reliability, if another 
researcher followed the same path would the same results be obtained.  Buckingham 
and Saunders (2004, p.296) also refer to a number of types of validity; face validity, 
content validity, construct validity and external validity. Despite considerable rigour in 
the approach to the Delphi study; the ability to question or challenge the findings 
arguing the construct was biased or that the external validity was not met still exists.  
To demonstrate reliability in that should the Delphi be rerun and analysed by a different 
researcher the quantitative answers of the Delphi study rounds should result with the 
same percentage scores against the relevant elements to increase reporting (assuming 
respondents answer the same as they did before).  Internal validity or inference is harder 
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to validate. The quantitative answers provide clear views but a combination of 
qualitative free text comments provided by the respondents, when used to clarify their 
answer or place a different view or suggestion, could result in some variation of their 
interpretation by a different researcher.  Validation is important to ensure the findings of 
research can be considered as sound or accurately reflect the phenomena under study 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009, p.64). Scheurich (1997, p.81) describes validation as 
separating research than can be considered acceptable from that which is not. Yin 
(2014) advocates that following recognised research procedures is important in 
preventing threats to validity.  The use of the Delphi process in its self is a partial guard 
against the risk of researcher inference as the participants may well voice views on a 
researcher’s interpretation during the iterative stages. The use of a validation survey will 
try to alleviate these concerns, particularly by making use of a control group where the 
group’s answers can be compared with those who have already been involved in the 
Delphi study.  
To add to the validation a control group, made up of professionals who were considered 
as meeting the original criteria to be part of the Delphi study, but have not as yet been 
involved, were also sent the IRMM.  This was intended to achieve the three aims set out 
in 6.1. 
The outcome of the IRMM and comparison of findings should provide the assurances 
that the original interpretation of the researcher met the challenge of Easterby-Smith 
Thorpe and Lowe (2003, P.53) as set out in their table (Table 6-1).  
6.3  What is a Maturity Model? 
A Maturity Model is a method used to judge or gauge an organisations level of maturity 
against particular criteria. In this research that being the reporting of incidents. The level 
of maturity is set against a scale. Maturity “combines notions of evolution with levels of 
process formality.” (Fraser, Moultrie and Gregory, 2002, p.248). They continue by 
suggesting that to avoid complexity “they propose a definition of maturity that 
encompasses effectiveness and repeatability” (2002, p.248) 
6.4  Why a Maturity Model? 
Can a Maturity Model make a valid contribution to the incident reporting problem. 
Referring to the conceptual framework, the perceived gap was the need for more 
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information on reported incidents. Having identified the CSF’s that have the potential to 
increase the reporting of security incidents how would an organisation judge its current 
position, identify the gaps and move towards improvement.   
It has been suggested that “companies demonstrate behaviors (sic) that reflect their 
maturity levels” Dinsmore (1998, p.24 cited by Jugdev and Thomas 2002, p.6).   Jugdev 
and Thomas (2002, p.6) also argue that Maturity Models do have their critics in that 
they can be inflexible, are typically geared towards identifying, but not solving, 
problems and do not consider the rapid pace of change.  A Maturity Model will contain 
a scaled of a number of levels of maturity. The typical 5 levels of maturity do not offer 
sufficient granularity, they can be impractical and focus on process rather than the 
resources required.  Having surfaced these concerns Jugdev and Thomas (2002) do 
recognise the benefits of Maturity Models that raise awareness of issues.   It is this 
raising of awareness that could be a prime benefit and the understanding of what could 
improve reporting and where an organisation is placed relative to the identified factors 
against the Maturity Model levels is an attractive proposition.  
To assist organisations in understanding how far they are progressing towards 
attainment of a goal, the notion of measuring an organisations maturity have become 
more popular.  This popularity has spawned many different models; in 2005 a study by 
De Bruin (2005) identified over a hundred different models. Not only are they large in 
number but also in style. Fraser, Moultrie and Gregory (2002) provided a table setting 
out a sample range eighteen Maturity Models and their differing numbers of levels and 
approach.   Although large in number and of differing approaches they also have 
degrees of commonality with varying levels of granularity.  For example, they all 
describe a number of maturity levels, descriptors (although they can differ or vary in 
name) and descriptions of activities against each level.  One potential reason for the 
large number is the problem definition and approach can vary according to the industry 
or sector and Becker, Knackstedt and PoppelBub (2009) suggest the continuing 
development of Maturity Models can often result in model owners reviewing their own 
to compare its suitability and potentially providing incentives to consider change.  
Due to the large variation of model types, no one model appeared to be used more than 
another. Jugdev and Thomas (2002, p.6) suggest that the Maturity Model field is 
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relatively young and that no model has achieved worldwide acceptance. In this research 
the proposed use and area being researched was compared against a synopsis of designs 
laid out by Becker, Knackstedt and Poppelbub (2009, p.217). Their structure for a 
business process Maturity Model includes the iterative procedure, evaluation and 
methodological approach used in this research. Becker, Knackstedt and PoppelBub 
(2009) also make the valid point that consideration should be given to whether there is 
in fact a need for a Maturity Model in the first place.   
In the UK, to measure or benchmark government departments and agencies standing 
relating to information security, an Information Assurance Maturity Model was first 
introduced in 2008 and formed part of the UK Information Assurance Maturity Model 
and Assessment Framework (Great Britain, CESG, 2015) as one measure to monitor the 
recommendations following the 2008 UK Government Data Handling Review (Great 
Britain, Cabinet Office, 2008).   The purpose being to support the drive to embed 
information risk management processes within organisations. This was aimed at 
providing greater levels of assurance when departments and agencies wished to share 
information with the knowledge there are comparable and, to some extent, consistent 
approaches being adopted.  This Information Assurance Maturity Model was introduced 
to enable individual government organisations to assess at what stage of maturity they 
sit and this was subject to external audit.  Thereby providing a process that would 
potentially allow for benchmarking across like-minded groups, as well as provide a 
minimum level of maturity to aspire to.  Over time this can be raised as the lowest 
common denominator of maturity is reached by all and then the bar can be raised, if it is 
deemed important to do so. The use of Maturity Models for information security and 
cyber security are not new, other work such as research by the US Department for 
Homeland Security in its Electricity Subsector Cyber Security Capability Maturity 
Model (ES-C2M2) (2014, p.15) which has a different number of levels -  0 to 3, where 
0 means that even the initial practices at 1 have not been achieved. 
The IRMM could have the potential to not only be used to assess the internal maturity 
of an organisation regarding incident reporting but also for the IRMM to support 
information sharing.  It could be used to assess the maturity of third party organisations.  
Having confidence that, if something went wrong within the organisation that data was 
being shared with, it would be reported could provide additional assurance. This 
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potential additional use of a Maturity Model supports the view of Becker, Knackstedt 
and PoppelBub (2009) that there is a need for a Maturity Model in the first place. To 
examine its potential use to be extended to external third party verification of incident 
reporting maturity the following question was included in the Validation survey 
questionnaire. 
Q. “If other organisations used the same model would this assist when determining the 
ability of that organisation to handle incidents? (for example, if exchanging data with 
them or contracting them as a third-party supplier)”  
The responses that it was valuable or extremely valuable from the viewpoint of the 
original Delphi respondents was 80% and even higher at 92% from the control group.    
Whilst Maturity Models may not suit all organisations, they are a recognised approach 
to consider as they can identify any gaps between where an organisation is against 
where it would like to be. However, many models do not make it clear how to achieve 
the closing of the gap (Mettler and Rohner, 2009).   None the less the main purpose of a 
Maturity Model is to identify a gap that can be closed after following improvement 
actions (Fraser, Moultrie and Gregory, 2002,). However they continue by stating it is 
recognised, that the “‘knowing -doing- gap’ can be very difficult to close.” (Fraser, 
Moultrie and Gregory, 2002, p.248)   This is despite organisations knowing what needs 
to be achieved. 
6.5  Levels of Maturity 
Within most Maturity Models there is a common approach to depict maturity against 
stages of levels. There are variations on the titles but in the main they are broadly 
similar. Five levels of maturity are common, although they can range from three to six 
(Mettler and Rohner, 2009) with the highest level being a notional ideal. Other Maturity 
Models such as that posed by De Bruin and, Rosemann (2005) use a five-level scale, as 
shown in the table below.  
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Low Maturity                                                                               High Maturity 
Un-coordinated, isolated 
projects     
Low BPM skill  
Key Personnel                      
Reactive 
Manual (Meaningful) 
Internally Focused   
Low Resourcing     
Naive                                                                       
Static          
 Co-ordinated Business 
Process Mapping Activities 
High BPM Expertise 
Organisational Wide 
Coverage 
Proactive  
Automation 
Extended Organisation 
Efficient Resourcing 
Comprehensive 
Understanding                                                
Innovative 
Table  6-2  Levels of Maturity Taken from De Bruin and Rosemann (2005, p.4)                                                                                  
6.6  Is a Maturity Model Suitable for all? 
Suitability relating to the desired outcome should be considered. Several Maturity 
Models have a linear approach - a progression through from a low standpoint to final 
maturity (Shackleton, Fisher and Dawson, 2004).  However, this may stifle 
improvement or at least not recognise it fully.  It may well be the organisation going 
through the maturity process has more maturity in some areas as opposed to others and 
improvement is not simply linear or iterative but more in line with the standpoint of 
Shackleton, Fisher and Dawson (2004) that other approaches other than linear should be 
considered.  They refer to research by Quirk (2000) who identifies spaces for 
improvement rather than a simple linear approach. Such an approach of a non-iterative 
model could fit the IRMM incident reporting maturity levels.  One organisation may 
have a good security culture but a poorly implemented reporting system. It is the 
reporting system that holds them back whereas another organisation may have a good 
reporting system, but a poor security and safety culture.   If the levels of maturity placed 
such items as culture or reporting systems on a linear path this may be misleading in 
 2. Defined                                                                                 
Innovative 
                                                                                  
Innovative 
                                                                                  
Innovative 
 
 4. Managed                                                                               
Innovative 
                                                                                  
Innovative 
                                                                                  
Innovative 
 
5. Optimised 
                                                                                                                                                            
1 .Initial State                                                                                
Innovative 
                                                                                  
Innovative 
                                                                                  
Innovative 
 
3. Repeatable                                                                                 
Innovati e 
                                                                                  
Innovati e 
                                                                                  
Innovative 
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demonstrating where the improvements in both the Critical Success Factors for the 
organisation and the ultimate measurement of maturity lay.     
6.7  Maturity Models - A Good or Bad Approach? 
There is always a danger that once a system is introduced the maintenance and checking 
of its validity and continuing use can be forgotten and the model is then left to exist on 
its own.  It is inevitable that any process introduced will need re-evaluation against the 
original requirements. With this in mind Becker, Knackstedt and PoppelBub (2009) 
suggest that Maturity Models need to be regularly evaluated.    
The term Maturity implies that a function or process is understood and commonplace in 
its application in the workplace. The key goal is to ensure that once this is achieved it is 
sustainable and the actual need for the model has declined or disappeared.  (Fraser, 
Moultrie and Gregory, 2002, p. 248). Refer to this as sustainability In other words, the 
activities required to achieve the highest levels of maturity are now institutionalised.   
Some of the criticisms aimed at Maturity Models are well documented. As already 
referred to the view of Jugdev and Thomas (2002) that Maturity Models do not solve 
the real issues and they do not consider the pace of change and they focus on process 
not people. Skulmoski (2001) suggests that as the area of Maturity Models is relatively 
young there is a lack of empirical evidence on what models competencies support 
success.    Despite this, it is claimed by Jugdev and Thomas (2002) that Maturity 
Models have contributed to identifying the competencies required to bring about 
success in the area of focus applied.   Fraser, Moultrie and Gregory (2002, p.244) 
describe the potential comparison between a maturity level descriptions and the use of 
“‘Likert’ scales questionnaires with anchor phrases,” to which to place a decision 
against. The notion being there is the high and low end of a maturity level and the same 
with a Likert scale which are viewed as very good to the low end as very poor. The 
respondent to such Likert scale questionnaires is simply to place their score against the 
one they feel appropriate without further guidance whereas with Maturity Models there 
is more of an evaluation of the positioning against the level   There is also a risk that 
maturity level grids or matrices, which describe the level activity as often trading the 
resolution in brief terms as opposed to a deeper description of what is required. Fraser, 
Moultrie and Gregory  (2002, p.244) who suggest it is a challenge to ensure the maturity 
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grid is fit for purpose and that compromise is often required to ensure the aim of the 
Maturity Model is realised in the “interests of producing a useful and usable tool”  
Fraser, Moultrie and Gregory (2002) propose there could be a pairing of Maturity 
Models.  In what they describe as management maturity and process maturity grids.   
For this research that could translate into an incident reporting matrix that dealt with 
improving the reporting of incidents and a process grid that then handled the levels of 
maturity for making use of them.  
The initial management stage diagram proposed by Fraser, Moultrie and Gregory (2002, 
p.244) has been reproduced below. The italicised text reflects suggested replacement 
words that relate to incident reporting to show how it could be relevant in this research. 
The first matrix is the management maturity element. 
 
Stage V Certainty We know why we do not have a problem with quality (incident reporting) 
Stage IV Wisdom Defect prevention (incident reporting) is a routine part of our operation 
Stage III Enlightenment Through management commitment and quality improvement (improvement 
in incident reporting) we are identifying and resolving our problems 
Stage II Awakening  Is it absolutely necessary to always have problems with quality (incident 
reporting) 
Stage I Uncertainty We don’t know why we have problems with quality (incident reporting) 
Table  6-3  Maturity Model Matrix Adapted from Fraser, Moultrie and Gregory (2002, p.244) 
The proposed IRMM is primarily based at the management maturity element, as this 
needs to be tested as part of the validity study.  At this stage of the research the IRMM 
is based on a reasonable assumption of the 5 levels of maturity, rather than being more 
prescriptive as to the process to bring about change.  This could be a candidate for 
further research should an organisation decide to adopt the IRMM.  
One of the challenges to Maturity Models is they only differentiate between maturity 
and immaturity, albeit at various levels and the term immature, although not explicitly 
used in such models can have a detrimental effect. Andersen and Henriksen (2006) 
propose that there should be more emphasis on activities that are focussed on the 
‘customer’.  In the case of security incident reporting there could be a number of 
‘customers’; the organisation itself; various teams; like-minded organisations or parts of 
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wider groups affected by the data produced. If this approach were to be taken, as 
opposed to the traditional linear or iterative Maturity Model, would it make any 
difference for this research. 
The conceptual framework from Chapter 1 answers this to some extent by including the 
outcomes of improved reporting which would be to the benefit of all the customers 
involved.  Never the less to achieve outcomes it is easy to argue some basic activity and 
level of maturity will be required.  As there is ‘no one size fits all’ Maturity Model then 
the test of the model to be used should be to examine if there are opportunities for its 
improvement. 
 
This research has considered the some of those ‘customers’ (the Information Security 
Professionals) by asking them in the first place, as part of the Delphi study, to identify 
what are the Critical Success Factors required to improve security incident reporting.  
The challenge is to turn the consensus for the CSF’s into a meaningful and useable 
Maturity Model. The fact that the CSF’s have been identified through a research study 
should add to the value in including them in the Maturity Model. Fraser, Moultrie and 
Gregory (2002) argue that it is this challenge of identifying success factors makes it 
difficult to ensure the Maturity Model approach. Some models are experienced based 
(Fraser, Moultrie and Gregory 2002, p.248) whereas the proposed Maturity Model in 
this research is based on research that has identified the success factors. 
 
The model this research intends to develop is one where not all elements of a particular 
stage of maturity need to be completed before activity at the next level can commence. 
Stages often indirectly lead to the belief that one stage higher is better than the lower 
stage, however often activity in each of the iterative stages can and will occur.   
Anderson and Henriksen (2006, p.239) argue that 
“the triggers for moving to one stage rather than to another stage are more 
rewarding to focus on rather than observing whether government is at stage I or 
IV”,  
where they refer to digitalisation of e government and in their four-stage model moving 
from publishing intention stage I to delivery phase IV. 
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The question of whether a Maturity Model is the right approach was considered in this 
research and in the IRMM survey there were specific questions to test whether 
respondents had used them before, had any views on their use as well as how relevant 
they could be to this research.   If none of the respondents had either used or disliked 
Maturity Models it could have influenced the outcomes of their responses or they 
probably would not have opted to complete the survey at all. The survey respondents 
possibly do not represent that view.  It transpired that the research identified that most 
respondents had used Maturity Models previously (70% of the Delphi respondents and a 
lower number 62%, but still majority, of the control group). There were equivalent 
responses regarding the usefulness of Maturity Models as tools to assess a particular 
situation (88% against 69%).  Therefore it could be considered that the respondents 
answers were not going to be unduly affected by their lack of or poor experience in the 
of Maturity Models. 
6.8  The Incident Reporting Maturity Model – IRMM 
The IRMM construct was based on the methodology and outcome of the two rounds of 
the Delphi study outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 and the design stages suggested by Collis 
and Hussey (2009, p.192) were followed and again including the missing stage of 
representativeness.  
 “Design the questions and Instructions 
 Determine order of presentation 
 Write accompanying letter/request letter 
 Test questionnaire with a small sample 
 Choose method for distribution and return 
 Plan strategy for dealing with non-responses 
 Conduct rests for validity and reliability” 
The intention in this validation stage is to provide a vehicle for the four identified 
Critical Success Factors to be part of an Incident Reporting Maturity Model that 
organisation could potentially use to bring about and improvement in the number of 
incidents being reported. 
6.8.1  Design the Questions and Instructions  
The four CSF’s identified as a result of the Delphi were placed in a proposed IRMM. 
The intention being to understand the participants views on its potential use as a tool 
that organisations can use to adopt the four CSF’s.   
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6.8.2  Determine the Order of Presentation  
The IRMM contained instructions, the four identified CSF’s set in a proposed Maturity 
Model format. See Appendix 14 which is the Delphi group version and Appendix 15 
which is the Control group version. This took up the first five pages and the following 
pages contained the questionnaire which again like the other surveys contained a mix of 
quantitive and qualitative questions.  
The survey included the wording of the four identified Critical Success Factors which 
had been further refined based on the comments from participants from round 2 of the 
Delphi study.  The validation survey would also seek to identify if any further suggested 
wording changes came from either the original Delphi participants and importantly from 
any of the control group who would not have seen this wording before.   
The purpose of the validation was not only to present the final version of the CSF 
wording but also request the Delphi participant’s views on whether the use of an IRMM 
would be of benefit to their organisation.  The questions also sought to understand the 
use of Maturity Models within their organisations as it was possible that any responses 
may be influenced by previous experiences and usage of such models. 
The intention was to use a 5 point Likert scale against each of the 4 CSFs. The first 
asking  
“Based on the Critical Success Factor and the level description how easy was it for you 
to interpret the maturity position of your/another organisation?  
The intention being that by looking at the description of the CSF would its description 
make it easy to understand or deduce what is meant by the CSF in relation to their 
organisation? This was aimed more at the wording of the CSF to see if then the level of 
maturity against it can be judged. 
The second question 
Based on the Critical Success Factor and the level description how easy would it be to 
use to judge your or another organisations position in the Maturity Model? 
The second question is asking if the wording enabled respondents to interpret the CSF 
and how easy is it to rank or evaluate their organisations position.  The difference 
between the two questions being the understanding of the wording of the CSF and, 
having understood it, how easy an exercise to judge the organisations position.   
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This was followed by general questions on Maturity Models to gauge the participants 
experience of them and possible any bias towards or against them from that experience. 
The reason for this was if the respondent did not feel Maturity Models were of use this 
may have had a negative impact on the IRMM survey response.  
Q. Do you use Maturity Models in your organisation or one for which you have 
reviewed or assessed. The choices were yes or no 
Q. Do you personally feel Maturity Models are useful tools to assist an 
organisation understand where they sit regarding to a particular situation. The 
choices were yes no or no strong view  
Q. Some Maturity Models set out a larger number of elements to measure 
against. Is just listing the critical elements a better approach.   The choices were 
yes no or no strong view  
The final contained specific questions on the IRMM. 
Q. Overall would you consider this Maturity Model to be of value to your 
organisation to assess how security incident reporting is handled and managed 
against the identified Critical Success Factors. The choice was a Likert scale of 5 
Q. If other organisations used the same model would this assist when 
determining the ability of that organisation to handle incidents? (For example if 
exchanging data with them or contracting them as a third party supplier)  The 
choice was a Likert scale of 5 
Q. Once refined would you consider using this Maturity Model in your 
organisation or one you would be assessing. The choice was Yes Possibly or No  
Q. Would just knowing what the Critical Success Factors are and using an 
internal method of ensuring a gradual move to ensure they were embedded be a 
better approach for your organisation  The choice was Yes Possibly or No 
There was a final section which allowed for any other comments.  They may wish to 
make. All of the questions allowed for free text comments 
 
The IRMM was sent out to all those who had responded to round two of the Delphi (82 
in total). In addition, a control group was used to add a test of the validity of the CSF 
the external validity of the interpretation of the Delphi findings and to ascertain how 
well the IRMM would be understood by those who had not been involved in its iterative 
construction through the Delphi process.  Of all the responses, only one respondent 
 242 
 
sought clarification on the question and, when explained, had no difficulty in then 
providing their answers.   
6.8.3  Write Accompanying Letter/Request Letter 
The IRMM had two versions one for original Delphi group and the other the control 
group. The Chair of the National Policing service Information Board and Commissioner 
of the City of London Police (who had already supported the Delphi) was approached 
again. He agreed to support a request for those who were newly in post as security 
professional in the UK Police Service who, if eligible under the agreed criteria, may 
wish to become part of a control group. He wrote an introductory letter (appendix 11) 
which accompanied the email that was sent to potential control group participants.  
The Delphi group received an email which (appendix 13) which was in effect the 
introductory letter.  The email contained the rational for the IRMM and in particular 
explained that it contained the four CSF’s that incorporated the amended descriptions 
taken from their comments.  It asked they view the IRMM to see whether it was 
understandable, usable and considered to be of value to their organisation regarding the 
deployment of those CSF’s.  
6.8.4  Test Questionnaire with a Small Sample 
As in previous studies the IRMM underwent testing to ensure the flow, instructions and 
questions did not cause any confusion or ambiguity. Again testing of the differing 
formats of word and pdf and whether the questionnaire would be blocked by IT security 
took place 
6.8.5  Choose the Method of Distribution and Return 
As in the Delphi study the IRMM was emailed to those who had participated in the 
Delphi and to the potential members of the Control Group. The emails were different as 
the control group email had the accompanying letter from the commissioner of the City 
of London police as well as the IRMM. The method of return was also the same and 
instructions on how to do this were included.   
6.8.6  Plan Strategy for Dealing with Non Responses 
Again, as in Chapter 5, it was decided to personally respond to every completed 
response by thanking the sender. This again later proved beneficial where anyone who 
had responded and returned a completed survey, but not received an acknowledgement 
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would know their answers had not been received. After the initial deadline date had 
passed a chase up email was sent to those who had not appeared to have responded.  
This resulted in further responses from those who had not yet responded received a 
thank you message.  
6.8.7  Conduct Tests for Validity and Reliability and Representativeness 
This followed the same rationale as for Chapter 5 
Validity.  
This study was based on the findings of the Delphi study and in itself was a test of the 
validity of findings that approach.  By selecting the original Delphi participants ensured 
a degree of consistency as they had already been involved in the previous Delphi study 
and were aware of the research.  The addition of a control group was intended as a test 
of that validity by introducing participants who met the eligibility criteria but had not 
been involved. Should any noticeable discrepancies in the results of the two groups be 
realised this could challenge the reliability and validity of this and the Delphi study.  
Reliability 
Using the same methods and controls outlined in chapter 5 for the Delphi should this 
IRMM be reissued later then the results should be similar apart from any changes in 
policy or perceptions and experiences of the participants since their last involvement. 
Representativeness 
One of the two groups participating was those who had already taken part in the Delphi 
study and the representativeness of this group has already been set out in chapter 5.  The 
control group was a new introduction and the next section describes the approach to 
make sure the representativeness challenge could be countered. 
6.9  Identifying a Control Group - Representativeness  
A control group is a method that assists in understanding the phenomenon we are 
interested in better when we compare it with something else which is similar (Bryman, 
2004, p.41).   For this research a Control Group was considered as part of a validation 
exercise to understand whether a security professional, not involved in the Delphi 
process, would; 
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a. understand what was asked of them, 
b. understand the  potential use of the IRMM in relation to the wording and meaning of 
the CSF’s to improve reporting as sufficient to as they would not have seen the CSF’s 
before.  
c. provide an opportunity to compare their responses with those professionals who had 
been involved in the Delphi to see if any differences of opinion occur. 
The possible challenge with the control group being that it was not a wide 
representation of the overall Delphi group. The practicalities of finding a control group 
outside of the security professionals who had already taken part in the Delphi survey 
were significant. The approach taken was to identify a group of security professionals 
from within one of the sectors that provided a response to the Delphi. In fact, the first 
round of the Delphi 26% of the respondents came from Law Enforcement so a control 
group from that sector would at least represent a significant proportion of those who 
responded in the earlier rounds.  In the end, there were 13 control group respondents 2 
of which were outside of law enforcement.   
Identifying potential control group respondents was not easy. As has been described 
earlier considerable length to invite security professionals to take part in the Delphi 
rounds one and two had taken place over a period of approximately 14 months. To 
identify through professional bodies another yet unused number who met the criteria 
and were willing to participate may have proved difficult.  In the end it was identified 
that one particular group of respondents that came from the law enforcement sector had 
experienced considerable churn in their security staff and that may provide a small 
number of volunteers to take part who were relatively new to that sector and may have 
worked in other security sectors. 
If the IRMM is to be considered as a useful tool it needs to be of practical use, not just 
that it works with those who had been directly involved in its iterative construction.  To 
use a previously unsighted group to take part in the IRMM at the same time using the 
same format may identify weaknesses in approach or indicate that the consensus 
achieved for the CSF may not be able to continue through into the IRMM.  
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6.10  Summary of findings from the IRMM Validation Study 
 
There were 59 respondents from the Delphi group (response rate out of 101 = 58%) of 
which 50 made comments (84%).  There were a possible 101 responses due to attrition 
from previous Delphi rounds (left organisation, dropped out etc.). This is a minimum 
response rate as the IRMM questionnaires were sent to all Delphi participants including 
those who did complete round 1 but did not participate in round 2 and may also have 
left their organisations but no indication of this (e.g.in the bounced e mail.)  Of the 59 
respondents 58 had completed round 2. Only one respondent who did not complete 
round 2 but did complete round 1 responded.  
For the Control group there were 13 responses of which 11 made comments. The 
potential response rate for the Control group was difficult to assess. The UK police 
service security contacts held by the National Policing Information Risk Management 
Team recognised that there had been some reduction in security staff and due to this and 
other changes 35 UK police forces were contacted. Most with personal email addresses.   
Some bounce backs indicating a leaver were received but this does not mean all the 
addresses related to an employee still in post.   The response of 11 completed forms 
from law enforcement represents a minimum return of 31%. Two other control group 
forms were received who were not in the targeted law enforcement group. One as a 
result of it being forwarded by a respondent to the Delphi study to a person in their 
organisation who was new and would be responsible for such monitoring and 
measurement.  The other was from an organisation that had responded to round 1 of the 
Delphi but due to staff changes had not responded to round 2 or the initial IRMM.  This 
respondent worked for that organisation and became aware of the Delphi and IRMM 
and volunteered to respond. It was decided to use them as a Control group response as 
they had not personally responded to the initial Delphi.  
6.11  The Validation Survey Results 
The below table sets out as comparison of the findings from the validations survey and 
compares the results from the Delphi participants against the Control Group. 
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Question 
 
Delphi Respondents Control Group 
CSF 1 A recognition by 
senior management that 
incidents will happen and 
that they must play a full 
and active part in the 
incident management 
process 
(A 5 point Likert Scale was 
used) 
Easy or very easy to 
understand/interpret an 
organisations position 
91% Easy or very easy to 
understand /interpret an 
organisations position 
84% 
Easy or very easy to use 
to judge an organisations 
position against the 
maturity levels 
76% Easy or very easy to 
use to judge an 
organisations position 
against the maturity 
levels 
69% 
CSF 2 Ease of making a 
report, recognising if 
reporting incidents is 
difficult individuals will be 
less likely to submit them. 
(A 5 point Likert Scale was 
used) 
 
Easy or very easy to 
understand/interpret an 
organisations position 
90% Easy or very easy to 
understand/interpret an 
organisations position 
77% 
Easy or very easy to use 
to judge an organisations 
position against the 
maturity levels 
79% Easy or very easy to 
use to judge an 
organisations position 
against the maturity 
levels 
69% 
CSF 3 Rapid, useful, 
accessible and intelligible 
feedback to the reporting 
community (A 5 point 
Likert Scale was used) 
 
Easy or very easy to 
understand/interpret an 
organisations position 
83% Easy or very easy to 
understand/interpret an 
organisations position 
85% 
Easy or very easy to use 
to judge an organisations 
position against the 
maturity levels 
75% Easy or very easy to 
use to judge an 
organisations position 
against the maturity 
levels 
85% 
CSF 4 Incident analysis that 
considers root causes and 
wider systems/processes, not 
just the initial impact 
assessment. (A 5 point 
Likert Scale was used) 
 
Easy or very easy to 
understand/interpret an 
organisations position 
87% Easy or very easy to 
understand/interpret an 
organisations position 
84% 
Easy or very easy to use 
to judge an organisations 
position against the 
maturity levels 
73% Easy or very easy to 
use to judge an 
organisations position 
against the maturity 
levels 
62% 
Do you use Maturity Models 
in your organisation or one 
for which you have 
reviewed or assessed (Yes or 
No) 
Yes 70% Yes 62% 
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Question Delphi Respondents Control Group 
Do you personally feel 
Maturity Models are useful 
tools to assist an 
organisation understand 
where they sit regarding to 
a particular situation. 
(Yes/No /No Strong View) 
Yes 88% 
No 2 % 
No Strong view 10% 
Yes 69% 
No 8% 
No Strong view 23% 
Some Maturity Models set 
out a larger number of 
elements to measure against. 
Is just listing the critical 
elements a better approach.  
(Yes/No /No Strong View) 
Yes 52% 
No 12% 
No Strong view 36% 
Yes 69% 
No 0%  
No Strong view  31% 
Overall would you consider 
this Maturity Model to be of 
value to your organisation 
to assess how security 
incident reporting is 
handled and managed 
against the identified 
Critical Success Factors 
Said it was valuable or 
extremely valuable 
88% Said it was valuable 
or extremely valuable 
85% 
If other organisations used 
the same model would this 
assist when determining the 
ability of that organisation 
to handle incidents? (for 
example if exchanging data 
with them or contracting 
them as a third party 
supplier) 
Said it was valuable or 
extremely valuable 
80% Said it was valuable 
or extremely valuable 
92% 
Once refined would you 
consider using this Maturity 
Model in your organisation 
or one you would be 
assessing 
(Yes/Possibly/No) 
Yes 59% 
Possibly 40% 
No 2% 
Yes 62% 
Possibly 38% 
No 0% 
Would just knowing what 
the Critical Success Factors 
are and using an internal 
method of ensuring a 
gradual move to ensure they 
were embedded be a better 
approach for your 
organisation  
(Yes/Possibly/No) 
Yes 34% 
Possibly 49% 
No 17% 
 
Yes 46% 
Possibly 31% 
No 23% 
Table  6-4  Validation Survey Results 
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In general, with regards to the four identified Critical Success Factors the answers 
relating to whether the CSF is considered very or easy to interpret the scores were high.  
Although still high there appeared to be less confidence in using the Maturity Model to 
judge the position of their organisation.  This was understandable as the tool had not 
actual been used to assess the organisation merely as to its potential to do so.  It is likely 
that this confidence may result from actually using the tool but even so the scores across 
all four CSF’s showed the lowest to be from the control group for CSF number four at 
62%.   This is still an encouraging score. 
Except for CSF number 3, the Delphi group scored higher but only by a small amount.  
What was particularly encouraging were the responses to the questions relating to the 
use of the IRMM as a tool to deploy the CSF's. 
With regards to the use of Maturity Models The Control group appeared to use Maturity 
Models less. This may be of no significance or could reflect on the majority of the 
control group being from the one public sector group and possibly less likely to use a 
Maturity Model. A similar difference regarding the view on the usefulness of Maturity 
Models. If the control group had used Maturity Models less they are less likely to have 
been able to comment on their usefulness.  
With regards to the IRMM being of value to their organisation the scores were 
encouragingly high where 88% of the Delphi group considered it to be either valuable 
or extremely valuable and even amongst the control group this score was 85%. 
The specific question that asked whether the IRMM could be used to assess third party 
organisations with whom their share information was also high. Particularly with the 
control group. Interestingly the respondents gave even higher scores for other 
organisations using it so they could be judged than they were to use it to judge 
themselves.  Having said that, once refined, most would use the IRMM.   
When asked if just having a list of the CSF’s as opposed to using the IRMM would be 
better for their organisation this gave the lowest of positive scores across the whole 
questionnaire which again indicates  a favourable stance for the IRMM and even if not 
used the CSF’s could be used as a standalone entity. 
The overall results were encouraging on two main counts. Firstly there were only minor 
differences between the Delphi group and control group findings.  Broadly speaking the 
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control group was not at odds with the Delphi group results.   There was support for the 
Delphi even to deploy it. This indicates the potential for the IRMM to be further 
researched as to the outcome of its use and any potential increase in reporting that 
results which is one of the recommendations for future research. 
Although when the validation Maturity Model was sent out there was no request to use 
it to judge the respondents organisation a couple did. There were also favourable 
comments from some of the respondents that they would actually use or consider using 
the IRMM once further refined and finalised to conduct an assessment against their 
current reporting. A selection of some of the comments relating to the potential use of 
the IRMM are summarised below. 
Yes: I’ve used this table to match against an internal scoring mechanism we 
used last year to compare ourselves at different points along our road to 
implementing an internal/[redacted]-partnered SOC 
I have already started to apply some of the knowledge that I have learned 
through the review of this model 
These two comments appear to indicate the IRMM has started to be used in one form or 
another.  The below comments relate to its usability. 
I like the straightforward nature of this MM, in which it describes the key 
elements of incident management that can be easily understood by non-technical 
management and can be evaluated in real-world terms.  It is concise which can 
give a quick look overview that would be applicable to most sizes of 
organisation. 
It clearly and simply defines what success factors are relevant and why and how 
they are to be scored. 
The following are examples of its future use either now or once refined. 
Please let me know if this hard work of yours gains acceptance. I would be 
happy to use it to bench mark our 'as is' maturity and then use it further to 
improve the standards in an attempt to achieve 'optimised' in all CSFs 
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Where I would find this model and the 4 CSFs particularly helpful would be in 
highlighting to the SIRO where I see vulnerabilities in our current incident 
reporting mechanisms 
I would definitely consider using a version of this MM as part of any wider 
evaluation as I like the concise nature, simplicity of use and the focus on the key 
requirements of the capability.   
When can I start using it? 
There were of course others who would not consider using it. In the specific question 
relating to once refined would you consider using it there were eighteen responses one 
said no, six said yes and the rest, ten, said possibly. One response was unclear. The no 
response was below  
Not my role to do this sort of thing ……   
6.12  Summary 
The validation survey had three main aims; 
To check that the final CSF selection findings;  
To test the potential of an Incident Reporting Maturity Model (IRMM) as a tool; 
and 
To further test the IRMM and CSFs using a control group.  
In relation to the first aim;   
CSF 1.  There were two comments from one respondent from the Delphi group stating 
the first two of the bullet points did not read well. There were no other adverse 
comments from the Delphi or control group for this CSF so no amendment was 
considered.  
CSF 2. There were no comments from any of the respondents. 
CSF 3.  There was one observation about the investigative process, not the wording of 
the CSF. One comment about informing the community from the same respondent who 
made the comments regarding CSF 1. This was not a wording challenge. There was 
another comment that they were not sure about one of the bullet statements being quite 
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correct and referred to anonymity needed in some cases. As a result no change 
considered.  
CSF 4. There was one comment from a Delphi participant suggesting the removal of the 
word ‘just’ from the third bullet point. This could be amended but no other comments 
were made, so again no change to the wording of this bullet point was made. 
Therefore, overall no CSF wording was challenged to an extent there would be cause 
for concern for either the wording or author’s interpretation of comments through the 
Delphi rounds. Three of the comments made came from the same respondent. The low 
number and nature of the comments made was viewed as a majority endorsement of the 
CSFs wording  
With regards to the second aim 88% of respondents from the Delphi and 82% from the 
control group felt the IRMM would be valuable for their organisation to use and when 
asked if they would use it for their organisation a good majority of the Delphi said yes 
with 40% saying possibly. This was similar to the control group.   This gives a strong 
sense that the CSF’s combined with the IRMM have a real potential to be used to 
improve security incident reporting.  These figures also answer the aim as the control 
group scores were broadly similar to that of the Delphi group. In summary, the four 
identified CSF’s were still considered to be so by clear high scoring.   
The four CSF’s could be viewed as sequential. Starting from a recognition that incidents 
will occur to then having a process that makes it easy to report incidents, then provide 
feedback to reporters (to encourage future reporting ) and finally making use of the 
reports to understand the root causes to prevent or reduce reoccurrence.    
Should an organisation wish to use the ISO/IEC 27035 standard the CSF’s and IRMM 
appears to have the potential to assist in this.  When the four CSF’s are placed in an 
order of approach and then compared with the ISO/IEC 27035 stages there does appear 
to be a synergy.  
Using the four identified Critical Success Factors they could be placed in a circular 
fashion as previously described in Chapter 5. 
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Figure  6-1  The Four CSF’s in a Cyclical Process 
 
This cyclical process can be compared to the British Standard ISO/IEC 27035 approach 
to managing incidents as described by Tondel, Line and Jaatun (2014, p.44) in their 
figure below.   
A recognition by senior 
management that incidents will 
happen and that they must play a 
full and active part in the incident 
management process. 
Ease of making a report, 
recognising if reporting 
incidents is difficult individuals 
will be less likely to submit 
them. This may particularly 
affect the reporting of near 
misses. 
Rapid, useful, accessible and 
intelligible feedback to the 
reporting community. 
Incident analysis that considers 
root causes and wider systems/ 
processes, not just the initial 
impact assessment. 
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Figure  6-2  Adaption of The Incident Management Process. Tondel, Line and Jaatun (2014, p.44)  
A comparison of the 5 ISO/IEC 27035 stages against the 4 CSF’s identified in the 
Delphi outlines where the CSF’s compliment the standard’s stages and should assist in 
adopting the standard in practice. For example stage 1, to ‘plan and prepare’ for incident 
management, those plans will be tested this may not be taken as seriously unless there is 
‘an acceptance that incidents will occur’ (CSF 1) and Stage 2 ‘Detect and report’ 
requires staff to know how to what and how to report so CSF 2 ‘ease of reporting’ will 
provide valuable assistance.  Assess and decide relies on the incident being reported in 
the first place so this stage has a reliance on CSF 1 and 2. Stage 4 ‘Responses’ does 
have an element of communication and may include updating the person who reported.  
This stage should include CSF 3 ‘feedback to the reporter’. Finally stage 5 ‘learn’ is 
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complimented by ‘CSF 4 ‘root cause analysis’. The below table sets out the comparison 
and relationship between the incident management stages and the CSF’s. 
 
Table  6-5  Authors Comparison of the CSF’s Against the ISO/IEC 27035 Incident Management 
Process Stages set out by Tondel, Line and Jaatun in Figure 6-2  
ISO/IEC 27035 
stages 
CSF’s applicable to the 
stages 
Comment 
1.Plan and 
prepare 
1.  A recognition by senior 
management that incidents 
will happen and that they 
must play a full and active 
part in the incident 
management process 
To plan there needs to be an 
acceptance that something will 
happen 
2.Detect and 
Report 
2.  Ease of making a report, 
recognising if reporting 
incidents is difficult 
individuals will be less 
likely to submit them. This 
may particularly affect the 
reporting of near misses. 
If it is not detected or reporting is 
difficult then under-reporting will 
occur. The CSF ‘Ease of reporting’ 
should help to alleviate this 
3.Assess and 
Decide 
 Not part of the CSF process 
 3.  Rapid, useful, accessible 
and intelligible feedback to 
the reporting community 
 
An important part of the process not 
shown in the ISI/IEC stages 
4.Responses  Actions on reporting can only occur 
if the incident is reported. One 
response could be notification to the 
reporter of what has happened to the 
report 
5. Learn 4.  Incident analysis that 
considers root causes and 
wider systems/ processes, 
not just the initial impact 
assessment 
A synergy of approach – both deal 
with learning from the incident 
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Figure  6-3  Authors Suggested Current Restricted Flow of Reported Incidents and the Potential 
Improvement using the IRMM. 
Figure 6-3 demonstrates the potential impact that barriers to reporting currently have 
and the result should an organisation adopt the proposed CSF’s and IRMM. This in turn 
may release the flow of security incident data to enable more informed decisions on risk 
management.  If this is achieved at a local organisation level the following figure 6-4 
outlines how this could have the potential to improve the information flow to enable the 
sharing of information security incident knowledge. This in turn could potentially 
support the risk management process locally, regionally (or by commercial sector) and 
then at national level; with a further potential to become international.  Initiatives in the 
UK such as CiSP (CERT UK, 2015) aim to improve the sharing of cyber security 
incident information at a national level. However, this research will explore the view 
that due to under-reporting initiatives national incident sharing initiatives, such as CiSP 
can be viewed as an aspirational approach. To be more effective at the national level the 
reporting of incidents at the lower level has to be improved.   
 
Improved 
Incident 
Knowledge  
Current 
Incident 
Knowledge 
Incident 
Reporting 
Current Barriers 
Reduced Barriers 
assisted by use of CSF’s 
in a maturity model 
Current analysis 
data pool 
Improved analysis 
data pool 
 
 
Use of 
incident 
information 
Current levels of reporting 
Improved levels of reporting  
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Figure  6-4  Authors Design of the Potential Relationship Between Local, Regional/Sector and 
National use of Improved Security Incident Reporting Data.  
 
In this research the goal is to improve security incident reporting that will ultimately 
enable better and more informed information sharing within organisations.  The 
Validation study and use of a control group has added assurances that the original 
findings as to what are the Critical Success Factors required to improve security 
incident reporting. By considering their results against the outcomes from the original 
Delphi groups finding does give credibility to the outcome. The next chapter sets out 
how this research could be applied to organisations.  
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Chapter 7 Summary and Conclusions 
7.1  Summary 
 
This research set out with an assumption, based on the author’s previous findings 
through an MSc, that a proportion of information security incidents were not being 
reported. However to what degree there was under reporting was not known.  The 
intention was to ascertain what research existed that may help to understand more about 
the issues surrounding security incident reporting. It became clear that, although there 
was research relating to sharing and the problems as a result of incidents occurring, 
there was little research that specifically focussed on security incident reporting.  
The healthcare sector had many examples of research focussing on the reporting of 
incidents relating to patients.  ‘Adverse patient incidents’, as this was referred to, gave 
an insight into what barriers there may be to reporting incidents in general, irrespective 
of what was to be reported. Having identified there appeared to be a gap in research into 
security incident reporting the author needed to test the assumption that there was 
indeed a problem with underreporting of information security incidents. 
 
The conducting of a scoping study was intended to do just that. Recognising that to get 
an honest picture relating to the reporting of security incidents from those charged with 
protecting organisations information assets would need careful consideration. There 
would be real concerns that would surround confidentiality and trust when requesting 
detailed and honest views on a particular professional’s employer’s incident reporting 
failings and concerns.   This in turn may result in poor returns to any attempts to obtain 
such information through research surveys. Other researchers had experienced this 
problem including Kotulic and Clark (2004) and Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt (2014).  
By carefully considering the approach to take to elicit such sensitive information it was 
possible to encourage security professionals to give real insight into the problems 
associated with incident reporting. The scoping study, discussed in chapter 4, in 2011 
was intended for anonymous responses to ensure participation and honesty.  There was 
a good response to the questionnaire and surprisingly many respondents showed a 
willingness to provide their details, despite the offering of anonymity.  It became 
apparent that there were real issues and the security profession wanted to assist in the 
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research.  This openness and trust continued in the subsequent Delphi and Validation 
studies. 
 
Following the research and scoping study two distinct aims to try to reduce the problem 
of underreporting emerged.  One was to identify the Critical Success Factors required to 
improve information security incident reporting, the other to identify a vehicle upon 
which those CSF’s could be utilised to benefit any organisation. The one proposed was 
an Incident Reporting Maturity Model (IRMM).   This would be achieved through the 
use of further surveys.  
 
7.2  Results of Data Collection 
By focussing on the appropriate groups and confidentiality of responses the three 
surveys provided a rich vein of information and the number of additional comments 
identified a willingness to assist in the research. The summary of each is set out below. 
7.2.1  Scoping Study 
The primary intention was to test the assumption there was a real concern that there was 
under reporting of security incidents.  If this had not been evidenced in this study then 
the research may well have either ceased, or focused on other identified areas of 
concern that did emerge from the scoping study, such as incident classification.  The 
scoping study also provides the assurance that the potential for reuse of research 
conducted elsewhere in the information security sector was worth pursuing.   
7.2.2  Delphi Study 
The Delphi method was selected as it was judged to be the most appropriate research 
method to take the findings from the literature and scoping study further and to seek 
consensus as to the identification of the Critical Success Factors required to improve the 
reporting of incidents. By using recognised security Communities of Interest and 
obtaining their permission and support for their members to be approached to 
participate was a key factor in gaining recognition that may persuade those security 
professionals, who met the eligibility criteria, to take part.  
The result was a consensus after 2 rounds with valuable contributions in not only 
identifying the elements that could be CSF’s, but also in the formulation of a better 
description of them that incorporated some of the supported aspects of the potential 
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CSF’s that did not make it to the final list of four. This culminated in four CSF’s which 
sat neatly into a cyclical process as shown in Figure 5-5 in Chapter 5 and reproduced 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  7-1  The Four CSF’s in a Cyclical Process   
 
7.2.3  Validation study   
The study had two aims, one to validate the outcome of the analysis of the Delphi study 
and the iterative changes to the wording of the Critical success Factors and secondly, to 
seek the views of participants on the proposal to use a Maturity Model.   This was 
achieved through the use of the original Delphi participants and a control group, who 
met the eligibility criteria for involvement, but were not at the time either in post or 
available to participate in the Delphi.  Both groups completed the validation study and 
the comparison between the two showed considerable consensuses of opinion which 
A recognition by senior 
management that incidents will 
happen and that they must play a 
full and active part in the incident 
management process. 
Ease of making a report, 
recognising if reporting 
incidents is difficult individuals 
will be less likely to submit 
them. This may particularly 
affect the reporting of near 
misses. 
Rapid, useful, accessible and 
intelligible feedback to the 
reporting community. 
Incident analysis that considers 
root causes and wider systems/ 
processes, not just the initial 
impact assessment. 
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gave a high level of confidence in the analysis of the original group’s contribution. It 
was reassuring that the control group, who had not been involved at all, scored very 
similarly to those who had.  A number of the comments that were provided also 
indicated a real potential for the IRMM to be used in the real world. This is a 
recommendation later for areas of future research.    
7.3  Answers to the Research Questions 
The research questions (in italics) and the thesis outcomes to support the goals and 
provide a valuable contribution to the furtherance of research in information security 
incident reporting are: 
(1) Is the perception that not all information security incidents are reported a 
correct one? 
This is a key element to the research and, if confirmed, what follows is to identify the 
possible reasons for this under reporting. 
The Scoping study supports this assumption. The participants clearly indicate that there 
is under reporting of information security incidents.  Only 38% of respondents believed 
the majority or all incidents were reported. 
(2) Are the reasons for low reporting similar to those identified in other 
research such as the healthcare and safety industries? 
This will identify research already conducted elsewhere and examine whether any 
findings can be applicable to information security. The results can then be tested by 
conducting surveys through questionnaires on representatives of the information 
security profession. This in turn will enable the information security profession to make 
use of such findings to improve reporting in their sector. 
The Scoping study, Delphi and Validation studies again support these 
(3) Is it possible to identify the Critical Success Factors required to improve 
information security incident reporting? 
The identification of Critical Success Factors using information security professionals 
should enable a greater degree of focus on what is important and more likely to achieve 
results thereby improving the identification of methods to deploy to enable better 
reporting. 
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The Delphi study and Validation Study demonstrated that this is entirely possible with 
four CSF’s being identified and the wording appropriately amended to ensure the CSF’s 
reflected the views of the Delphi participants. In addition the four CSF’s have been 
shown they can be used to compliment the ISO27035 incident management process and 
potentially assist in putting the standard into practice.  
(4) Can a security incident reporting Maturity Model be developed that would 
enable an iterative approach to its deployment whilst taking account of any 
methods already in place? 
This will give information security professional a greater degree of knowledge in what 
activities and reporting mechanisms to deploy that may improve the level of reporting.  
The validation study using original Delphi participants and a control group who had not 
been involved in the Delphi has shown strong support for the potential for an Incident 
Reporting Maturity Model  
Overall, the research has been able to demonstrate it has answered those questions.  The 
relationship between incident reporting metrics and risk assessments on a superficial 
level appears to be easy to comprehend but the research did not go on to test this in 
detail.  
7.4  Research Contribution 
There are two areas where it can be demonstrated this research has provided a 
substantive contribution to the body of knowledge in the subject of the reporting of 
Information Security Incidents.   
7.4.1  Theoretical 
The scoping study shows amongst the participants there is a lack of confidence that all 
or most information security incidents are reported.  A range of views from information 
security professionals from both the public and private sector has validated the 
researcher’s assumption that the true number of information security incidents is not 
known due to under reporting.  This is despite 58% being subject to regulatory reporting 
and only 38% believing all or the majority of incidents are reported as opposed to 62% 
only believing that some or few are reported. 
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The study has demonstrated that findings from research into a similar under- reporting 
problem in the Health Care sector can be used and tested against the views of 
Information Security Professionals.    As the barriers are human or organisational (or a 
mixture of both) it could be concluded that any strategies developed to overcome these 
barriers in one sector could bring a degree of acceptance and success in that of another. 
To some extent the workshop held in Lisbon, outlined in section 4.9 demonstrated this, 
where the discussion over ways to improve incident reporting led to very similar 
comments to those contained in a summary of findings from the Health care sector. 
7.4.2  Practical 
The contribution this thesis makes to the furtherance of knowledge regarding the 
reporting of information security incidents is to demonstrate, through validation from a 
wide range of information security professionals, that there is a strong view that a 
significant proportion of security incidents are not reported and that there appear to be 
similar barriers to reporting incidents as those found in research in the healthcare sector 
studying the reporting of ‘adverse patient incidents’.   
The assumption is therefore, if a significant number of incidents are not reported, the 
data upon which decisions are made could be flawed.     Subsequently initiatives to 
share security incident data to gain insight into the wider threats to sectors such as 
finance, pharmaceutical, government etc. would be adversely affected.  Incomplete 
incident data could result in a false sense of security through lack of reported incidents 
and erroneous inputs to risk assessments.  This in turn could place a higher degree of 
focus on certain types of incidents that are reported as being the main threat vectors.   
Although not a key part of the research an information security risk and security 
incident definition was proposed.   The incident definition was created to ensure 
consistency in understanding of the term for the purposes of the Delphi and Validation 
studies 
In addition the research methodology in obtaining sensitive information form security 
professionals has proved successful and could be replicated by others to overcome 
previously experiences of researchers in only achieving low level of response.  
Focussing on the anonymity (even though most waived this) and by engaging with the 
security communities of interest appears to have been successful. 
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7.5  Future Application of the Research 
Since beginning this research for managing and reporting incidents has become 
paramount with the introduction in May 2018 of the EU GDPR legislation and their 
associated fines; As such this research is timely, relevant and necessary to enable 
organisations to be able to meet the reporting requirement should an incident occur. 
Under this legislation organisations must notify their relevant jurisdictions information 
Commissioner within 72 hours of a breach where it is likely to result in the risk and 
rights of individuals.   Whilst this thesis has focussed on the reporting of security 
incidents in their widest sense, those relating to personal data which the GDPR is 
concerned with, represents some of those types of incidents. Therefore if the CSF’s are 
applied they should equally improve the likelihood of the reporting of GDPR related 
incidents and potentially reduce the level of financial sanction levelled to organisations 
for either, not reporting, or indeed if such reported incidents are acted upon early may 
not result in a more serious breach that requires notification.   The financial penalties for 
breaches under the new legislation can be punitive and when balanced against the 
potential costs of improving incident reporting may well represent a beneficial use time 
and resource. The use of the Maturity Model may well assist organisations to 
benchmark if the identified CSF’s are in place in order to potential improve that 
reporting.  Table 5-10 on page highlights how the CSF’s can be used to support a 
security incident management process.  The IRMM can be used by organisations to 
judge their current levels of maturity against the CSF’s and identify areas for potential 
improvement.  It terminology can always be tailored to suit the relevant business sector 
whilst the CSF’s appear to be internationally and multi business sector acceptable. 
 
7.6  Potential Papers 
As a result of this thesis a number of potential papers based on the three studies have 
been identified which could benefit academia, business and security professionals.  
1. The Scoping Study outlining how research from other sectors was demonstrated as 
having the potential for reuse in a different sector as well as the methods and approach 
used to obtain sensitive responses from security professionals 
2. Delphi study being used to obtain consensus for CSF’s and again obtaining honest 
views from security professionals 
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3. The Validation study as a method of confirming the consensus and proposing a 
potential Incident Reporting Maturity Model together with the involvement of a control 
group to compare the Delphi and IRMM views of this not previously involved group 
with the Delphi participants.  
7.7.  Reflections on the Data Collection Approach 
7.7.1  Surveys: What Worked Well? 
The construct of the surveys achieved its aim in eliciting honest and open views through 
the efforts made to ensure anonymity.  Having said that, for whatever reason, the 
majority of respondents were more than happy to provide their full contact details.  It 
could be assumed that this is due either to their belief in the research aims and the 
willingness to take part in further discussions with the author or, that although provided 
with the opportunity to be completely anonymous, they trusted the researcher in the 
promise to keep the identities confidential.  The personal approach certainly assisted in 
obtaining a good response.   
The fact the author is also a security professional and that previous research experience 
in eliciting sensitive information regarding critical infrastructure protection within 
policing potentially may have ensured a reasonable level of confidence amongst 
participants for them to want to be involved and provide honest responses.  Coupled 
with the assurances of anonymity if chosen, the results were better than expected.   
Bearing in mind this was not just a UK audience but a worldwide one, it was surprising 
that only one participant asked for clarification on a question out of all the three studies, 
not one question was received seeking clarification in how to complete them.  As a 
result, there were only a few where a note had to be made in the compilation of figures 
where a question had been missed.  Interestingly there were no particular or repetitive 
mistakes.  Therefore the error rate was small and the location of any mistake was 
random.   
7.7.2  Surveys: What did not Work Well? 
Surprisingly little went wrong apart from the problem with different versions of 
Microsoft Office and Adobe Acrobat resulting in the challenges with formatting of 
response boxes.  The other issue was that of some organisations defences stripping out 
macros that were embedded in the questionnaires in the form of drop down menus.  
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This was identified in testing, particularly with Microsoft word and there was a risk 
some organisations defences may block one or other of the questionnaires. This was 
countered in the Delphi and validation survey by sending the word and pdf forms out 
separately.   
In the paper based scoping study some interpretation of the handwriting did prove 
slightly challenging and this is where a typed response would have proved better. 
However, for primary evidence of completion a personally handwritten response is far 
better. Also for those seeking anonymity (as it turned out most declined this) using a 
machine would have left a record should there be any comeback later.   Subsequent 
Delphi studies were mostly completed by typing and all the validation study responses 
were typed.  The other issue is that of storage.  Paper returns have a risk associated in 
that they are the sole record and to be on the safe side scanning or copying them to 
ensure a backup is available is now required.   An electronic version is easier to 
replicate and provide resilience. 
The one disappointing element of the scoping study was the low response from the Oil 
and Gas conference.  Had the author been able to remain at the event during the evening 
and following day more forms may have been returned. In addition, the event was not 
attended by the same type of security professional that went to the NISC and NG 
conferences.  The Oil and Gas event, even though billed as a security event, was more 
aimed towards technical security and fraud rather than a CISO/ISO audience.  It 
appeared the maturity of the Oil and Gas industry in regards to Infosec seemed less than 
others.    This may only be an indication from the presentations and conversations held 
during the event.    
7.8  Areas for Suggested Further Research 
It is suggested that an area for further research is a case study on of the use of the 
IRMM in one or a number of organisations to understand whether or not the IRMM did 
indeed result in an improvement in the number of incidents being reported. Using the 
IRMM with a small number of organisations to benchmark where they currently sit and 
then, over time, analyse following the application of the CSF’s whether it made any 
improvement in the level of reporting. 
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It was identified during the scoping study, and through the literature review, that there is 
a problem with a lack of standard taxonomies for security incidents and information 
security risk.  This makes comparisons of incident type challenging and the information 
sharing initiatives currently in place can suffer through this lack of clarity.   It is 
recommended that this would be an area for research that could bring about further 
improvements in the overall incident management process. 
If the issue of incident reporting were to improve, are there appropriate resources to 
handle them?  If the pool of empirical data improves then this would benefit risk 
assessment however if the number of incidents that would be referred to CERTs 
increased the logistics of handling such an increase may be a challenge.  In their paper, 
Limits to Effectiveness in Computer Security Incident Response Teams Wiik, Gonzalez 
and Kossakowski (2005) identify that, if there is an increase in reporting of incidents 
then there is the likelihood of lack of resources amongst CERTS to cope. 
In their abstract Wiik, Gonzalez and Kossakowski (2005) state;   
“The main task of a CSIRT is to mitigate the effects of computer security 
incidents. A frequently identified problem is that CSIRTs are over-worked, 
under-staffed and under-funded”  
Based on a case study they continue; 
“identified that short-term pressure from a growing incident work load prevents 
attempts for developing more response capability long-term, leading the CSIRT 
into a capability trap. Fundamental solutions will typically involve a worse-
before-better trade-off for management.”  (Wiik, Gonzalez and Kossakowski, 
2005, p.1) 
If this is the case, then an increase in incident reporting can leave to an overloading of 
already struggling CERTS and it may be that it will take some considerable time before 
any benefits derived from an increase in incident reporting will bring tangible empirical 
evidence based assumptions of risk trends. This should not be a reason for deterring any 
improvement in incident reporting.  There is also a risk that if reporting increased there 
could be scope for misinterpretation and concern that the situation is getting worse, 
when in fact it is informing those responsible for managing risk and allocating resources 
where the true problems and challenges exist.   
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7.9  Conclusion and Recommendations  
Through the use of a scoping study, a Delphi study and subsequent validation study the 
research identified four Critical Success Factors believed necessary to improve the 
reporting of security incidents and subsequently offer a security incident reporting 
Maturity Model that can be deployed by organisations to achieve this improvement in 
reporting.  It outlined the apparent lack of consistency of information risk and incident 
definitions and classification and the subsequent challenges this places upon 
professionals tasked with implementing the growing number of information sharing 
initiatives.  
The Scoping, Delphi and Validation studies have shown that by following recognised 
methods for the construct of surveys and can bring about valid and honest responses 
amongst a group of respondents who by the nature of the area being researched can be 
reticent in providing that information. This research has provided a strong view that 
incident reporting in itself can be complex as can the reasons why they are, or are not, 
reported.  The various studies mix of quantitative and qualitative answers provided 
valuable and insightful responses and views that a simple quantitative survey would be 
unlikely to elicit. 
It is also apparent that barriers to incident reporting do exist, as is the consensus is that 
not all incidents that occur are reported; this in fact relates to a considerable number that 
do not come to official notice.  Thus potentially putting into jeopardy assumptions made 
by a range of risk assessment calculations, where security incidents form part of that 
analysis.   Therefore, the current trust placed in the outcome of risk assessments needs 
to be carefully considered as an element of any risk assessment is based on likelihood of 
the occurrence of a threat or vulnerability.    
It is evident from the literature review in Chapter 2 that the amount of research into the 
reporting of security incidents is limited.   Critical to managing risk is to understand and 
have confidence in the level of protection against known vulnerabilities and accurate 
data relating to the types of adverse security incidents that have occurred and are still 
occurring.  Knowledge of trends and emerging threats is key to this.  However, without 
sufficient trusted data, such decisions can never be truly fully informed.   There is also a 
real concern over the ability to identify and classify incidents to provide a true analysis 
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of the number of type of incidents actually occurring. There is an identified a lack of 
standard taxonomies for security incidents and information security risk. This was not 
followed up in depth by this Thesis but as stated earlier is an area for recommended 
further research. 
This research aimed to add value to academic knowledge by investigating the subject of 
security incident reporting which appears not have been  studied in depth. It examined 
the potential re-use of research on the subject conducted elsewhere such as in healthcare 
studies into patient safety and the adverse incidents that can lead to harm as well as 
aviation and other safety industries.  These research findings could be of relevance to 
the information security field.  A potential method to improve incident reporting was 
proposed using the identified CSF’s and placing them into an Incident Reporting 
Maturity Model which has the potential to be applied by organisations in an iterative, 
non-proscriptive and contextual manner. 
The outcome may potentially result in improved security incident reporting which 
creates an increase in the knowledge of incident occurrence together with the true cause. 
This in turn may deliver a more informed analysis for future risk management through 
the availability of more empirical data than is currently available relating to such 
incidents. By potentially increasing the pool of incident reporting data this could enable 
improved analysis and lead to better informed risk based decisions and the ability of 
organisations and nations to share information in their quest to improve overall cyber 
security.  
The research aimed to highlight that current national strategic approaches to information 
sharing rely on a belief that incidents are reported when in fact a considerable number 
are not. The inability to analyse what is not reported could result in flawed or less that 
optimal judgment on the causes and numbers of incidents and may well result in 
inaccurate assessments.  It is recognised that the introduction of a proposed Maturity 
Model will not in itself make a significant and immediate impact. However, it may 
provide a catalyst for removing, or at least reducing, the effect of any identified barriers 
to reporting. Over time, should more incidents be reported, this may produce greater 
confidence in the true level of actual incidents occurring. This in turn may possibly 
enable better informed decisions on resource and financial expenditure to counter or 
reduce the likelihood of those incidents occurring. 
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GLOSSARY 
Term Description of Term 
Bring Your 
Own Device 
(BYOD) 
Employees are more and more likely to want to organize their personal lives 
using a smart telephone. They bring this expectation to the workplace and 
want to use their telephones to organize their work life too. Available at: 
https://search.proquest.com/docreview/1196914876?pq-origsite=gscholar 
(Accessed: 27/8/17) 
CARO Computer Antivirus Research Organisation 
http://www.caro.org/naming/scheme.html (Accessed: 5/7/15)  
Candour Any patient harmed by the provision of a healthcare service is informed of 
the fact and an appropriate remedy offered, regardless of whether a 
complaint has been made or a question asked about it.  Page 8 Regulation 
20: Duty of Candour – Information for providers Care Quality Commission 
March 2015  http://www.cqc.org.uk/content/regulation-20-duty-candour   
Accessed: 15/7/15
 
CESG 
Certified 
Consultancy 
Scheme 
CESG's approach to assessing the services provided by consultancies and 
confirming that they meet CESG's standards. This approach replaces the 
CESG Listed Advice Scheme (CLAS), which focussed on individual 
consultants. Certified Consultancy builds on the strength of 
CLAS but certifies the competence of suppliers to deliver a wider and more 
complex range of cyber security consultancy services to both the public and 
private sectors. 
https://www.cesg.gov.uk/servicecatalogue/service_assurance/consultancy/P
ages/consultancy.aspx  (Accessed: 11/7/15) 
CESG 
Certified 
Professionals 
CCP 
The CESG Certified Professional (CCP) scheme has been developed to 
address the growing need for specialists within the cyber security profession 
and is building a community of recognised professionals in both the UK 
public and private sectors. CCP has been acknowledged as HMG’s standard 
for cyber security professionals  
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/awarenesstraining/certified-
professionals/Pages/index.aspx  (Accessed: 11/7/15) 
Cyber security 
Information 
Sharing 
Partnership 
(CiSP) 
The Cyber-security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP), part of CERT-
UK, is a joint industry government initiative to share cyber threat and 
vulnerability information in order to increase overall situational awareness 
of the cyber threat and therefore reduce the impact on UK business. CiSP 
allows members from across sectors and organisations to exchange cyber 
threat information in real time, on a secure and dynamic environment, 
whilst operating within a framework that protects the confidentiality of 
shared information. https://www.cert.gov.uk/cisp/   (Accessed: 2/5/15) 
Cloud The cloud definition is described in NIST Special Publication 800-146 Sept 
2011. Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential 
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characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models. 
Available at: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-
145.pdf   (Accessed:  8/3/15.) 
Cyberspace The computers, networks, programs and data which make up the 
information infrastructure  Pollitt, M, (1998) Cyber Terrorism Fact or 
Fancy? Computer Fraud and Security 1998 Vol 2 p 8-10   
https://doi.org/10.10.1016/S1361-3723(00)87009-8 
Available at: 
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361372300870098           
(Accessed: 27/8/17) 
Digital by 
Default 
Digital by Default. Government digital Strategy: December 2013 ‘By digital 
by default, we mean digital services that are so straightforward and 
convenient that all those who can use them will choose to do so whilst those 
who can’t are not excluded.’   
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-digital-
strategy/government-digital-strategy. (Accessed:5/7/15) 
Employee 
Risk 
Employee risk is defined as counterproductive behaviour, whether 
inadvertent, negligent or malicious, that can cause harm to an organisation. 
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2012/2012021-homer.pdf 
(Accessed: 11/7/15) 
 
Financial 
Conduct 
Authority 
FCA Financial Conduct Authority. Its oversight includes data security 
“Customer data protection is a serious issue. ‘You [referring to those subject 
to its oversight] are responsible for securing your customer data and 
protecting it from fraudsters’. https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-
crime/data-security   (Accessed: 30/7/17)  
HIPAA The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 
Public Law 104-191, was enacted on August 21, 1996. Sections 261 
through 264 of HIPAA require the Secretary of HHS to publicize standards 
for the electronic exchange, privacy and security of health information. 
Collectively these are known as the Administrative 
Simplification provisions. 
The US Department of Health and Human Services  (HHS)      
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-
regulations/index.html  (Accessed: 30/7/17) 
HoMER Holistic management of Employee Risk – HoMER guidance to help manage 
the risk of employees’ behaviour damaging business.  
Http://www.cpni.gov.uk/advice/Personnel-security1/homer/    (Accessed: 
7/7/15) 
Information 
Exchanges. 
Sharing of information about the risks facing networks is beneficial to both 
government and industry. CPNI facilitates 'information exchanges' which 
allow one company to learn from the experiences, mistakes and successes of 
another, without fear of exposing company sensitivities. - See more at: 
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/Who-we-work-with/Information-
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exchanges/#sthash.thSdjpSC.dpuf  (Accessed: 11/7/15) 
Information 
Sharing and 
Analysis 
Centres - 
ISACs 
ISACs are trusted entities established by Critical Infrastructure Key 
Resource (CI/KR) owners and operators to provide comprehensive sector 
analysis, which is shared within the sector, with other sectors, and with 
government. https://www.nationalisacs.org/about-isacs  Accessed: 5/8/17) 
NG NG Next Generation.  Organisers of the NG Security Summit conference in 
Portugal 
Phishing Phishing. Phishing emails are crafted to look as if they’ve been sent from a 
legitimate organization. These emails attempt to fool you into visiting a 
bogus web site to either download malware (viruses and other software 
intended to compromise your computer) or reveal sensitive personal 
information. The perpetrators of phishing scams carefully craft the bogus 
web site to look like the real thing.  https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/emailscams_0905.pdf   (Accessed: 
15/7/15) 
RIDDOR 
Reporting of 
Injuries, 
Diseases and 
Dangerous 
Occurrences 
Regulations 
Is the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulations 2013. These Regulations require employers, the self-employed 
and those in control of premises to report specified workplace incidents. 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/healthservices/riddor.htm  (Accessed: 11/7/15) 
Risk Appetite The amount of risk exposure, or potential adverse impact from an event, that 
the enterprise is willing to accept or retain. This risk appetite provides a 
threshold beyond which the enterprise will apply risk treatments and 
controls to reduce the risk exposure level to within the appetite of the 
enterprise.  Drew, M (2007) BT Technology Journal  January 2007, Volume 
25, Issue 1, pp 19-29  10.1007/s10550-007-0004-x 
Risk 
Assessment.  
Risk assessment. A systematic process of evaluating the potential risks that 
may be involved in a projected activity or undertaking. 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/risk-assessment  
(Accessed: 5/7/15)    
Risk 
Tolerance 
The amount of uncertainty an organization is prepared to accept in total or 
more narrowly within a certain business unit, a particular risk category or 
for a specific initiative.  
https://www.rims.org/resources/ERM/Documents/RIMS_Exploring_Risk_
Appetite_Risk_Tolerance_0412.pdf   Accessed: 15/7/15 
Root Cause 
Analysis 
A structured evaluation method that identifies the root causes for an 
undesired outcome and the actions adequate to prevent recurrence. Root 
cause analysis should continue until organizational factors have been 
identified, or until data are exhausted.  
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/rca/rootcauseppt.pdf  p.31 Accessed: 
2/5/15   Now moved to https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/default-source/safety-
messages/safetymessage-2005-08-01hurricanekatrina-vits.pdf  Accessed 
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2/8/17     Author  O’Conner B  p.5   
Sarbanes 
Oxley Act 
2002 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 The legislation came into force in 2002 and 
introduced major changes to the regulation of financial practice and 
corporate governance. Named after Senator Paul Sarbanes and 
Representative Michael Oxley, who were its main architects, it also set a 
number of deadlines for compliance.  http://www.soxlaw.com/   (Accessed: 
30/7/17)
 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. The flow of gas and oil through 
pipes, the processing and distribution of water, the management of the 
electricity grid, the operation of chemical plants, and the signalling network 
for railways. These all use various forms of process control and 'supervisory 
control and data acquisition' - known as SCADA technology.  
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/scada/  (Accessed: 5/7/15) 
Security 
Policy 
Framework 
Security Policy Framework  (SPF) The security policy framework describes 
the standards, best-practice guidelines and approaches that are required to 
protect UK government assets (people, information and infrastructure). 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework  
(Accessed: 11/7/15) 
Smart City One that has digital technology embedded across all city functions.  
http://smartcitiescouncil.com/smart-cities-information-center/definitions-
and-overviews  Accessed: 2/5/15 
Smart Phone A wireless phone with computing capabilities. Power, D (2013)  Mobile 
decision support and business intelligence: an overview. Journal of Decision 
Systems vol. 22 No 1, p4-9 
www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/12460125.2012.760267?needAccess
=true  (Accessed:27/8/17)  
Social 
engineering. 
Social engineering is a strategy for obtaining information people wouldn’t 
normally divulge, or prompting an action people normally wouldn’t 
perform, by preying on their natural curiosity and/or willingness to trust.  
https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/emailscams_0905.pdf  (2008, p.4)  
(Accessed: 15/7/15) 
Stuxnet A computer worm that targets industrial control systems that are used to 
monitor and control large scale industrial facilities like power plants, dams, 
waste processing systems and similar operations. It allows attackers to take 
control of systems without the operators knowing.  
http://uk.norton.com/stuxnet  (Accessed: 12/7/15) 
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Photograph of NG Security Summit Lisbon 2011 Workshop Flipchart 
 
     
 
1 
PhD Security Incident Reporting Survey 
I am currently studying for a PhD at Cranfield University - Defence Academy UK. The aim 
of this research is to identify the reasons why people, departments or organisations find the 
reporting of security incidents a challenge.  What are the barriers? Are they people specific, 
organisational or a mixture of both? 
Many professionals and researchers believe the actual number of incidents that occur against 
those reported is significantly different.  This perceived discrepancy could have a significant 
adverse effect on decisions made where to direct resources to protect information assets.  
As respected professionals attending NG Security Summit Europe your personal and 
professional experiences and views will be of particular value. You may well have your own 
thoughts as to how these actual or perceived barriers can be dismantled. 
The attached questionnaire can be completed either anonymously or, if you wish, identify 
yourself and participate more fully in the research.  If you do not wish be identified, could 
you at least indicate the nature and size of your organisation to assist in identifying any 
specific sector trends. If you are willing to engage with me for further discussions on your 
views and opinions I would be most grateful.   
I am attending NG Security Summit Europe and available to answer any questions, or, if you 
are willing, conduct face to face interviews.   I can assure you that any information provided 
in the questionnaire and/or subsequent discussions will be handled and stored securely.   
I have tried to keep the questionnaire simple with most responses being tick box, whilst 
providing space for comments.  It is intended for completion by hand as trying to cater for 
different versions of office products is not always easy.  I am sure there are many valuable 
viewpoints out there so please do not be inhibited in any response. 
The survey is in 5 small sections. 
1. About you/your organisation.
2. Incident reporting requirements and methods of reporting.
3. Confidence in the level of security incident reporting in your organisation and your
opinion of incident reporting levels in general.
4. Barriers to reporting.
5. Your chance to add any additional views or further comments on any specific
question.
I appreciate your work time is precious and often longer than there are hours in the day. Any 
contribution is gratefully received and I thank you in anticipation of your co-operation in this 
research. I will provide a summary of the findings of the results (sanitised of course) through 
the organiser of NG Security Summit Europe and individually to those who ask for it.   
Details on how to return completed questionnaires are at the end. 
Regards, 
Mike Humphrey MSc. M.Inst.ISP  May 2011 
 +44(0)7767 392434 
m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk
APPENDIX 2
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SECTION 1 
About you (if you wish to identify yourself) or some detail regarding the industry (Govt/ 
Private Sector/Academia etc.) you work in to assist in identifying any possible differences in 
these groups.  *Note. If self- employed, some questions are not easily answered or 
applicable. Therefore please indicate in the box below you are self- employed and also 
which sector your answers are based on from previous experience or consultancy. 
  Name 
  Role 
  Organisation 
  
  Tel/ Mobile 
  E mail 
Irrespective of any wish to remain anonymous, to assist in analysis of the information can 
you please complete the following which will assist in identifying the sector or size of your 
organisation and whether this has any effects on the responses?  
Staff size of your organisation; 
0-500          501-1000         1001-5000          5001-10000          10000 +          *Self employed  
Which Sector do you work in?  
Public Sector  (If one of the boxes below does not describe your sector please tick 
other and add a description) 
Central Govt             Local Govt          Health            Law Enforcement 
Other (please specify) 
             
Private Sector   (If one of the boxes below does not describe your sector please tick 
other and add a description) 
Finance             Retail  Transport    Manufacturing 
Service industry   Communications            Energy    Consulting 
Other (please specify)              
 
Academia       
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1.1 Where is your organisation based? Tick all that apply 
 
UK              Europe                  Elsewhere              (please specify below)       
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2  If your organisation is multi-based do you feel your answers given may be different 
according to the country where the incident occurred? 
 
Yes         No            Add any additional explanation below  
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SECTION 2 
 
Incident reporting requirements and methods of reporting: For example are you subject to any 
regulatory reporting? How do staff report security incidents?  Incident definitions: Do you 
work to any if so what ones do you work to?  
 
2.1. Are you subject to any regulatory reporting for incidents (e.g. Government, Financial, 
contractual? Etc.)  
 
Yes  No   
If yes -  please describe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2  Do you have a formal policy and procedure for reporting? 
Yes  No   
 
2.3 What methods are used to report incidents?  Please tick all that apply 
 
Verbal 
E mail 
Specific form 
Website/intranet 
To line manager 
Specific team/person 
Anonymously 
Other (Please describe below) 
2.4 How would you rate your current reporting system? 
 
 
Fit for purpose                 Adequate               Not fit for purpose 
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2.5.  If you were in charge of the incident reporting system, what changes, if any, would you 
make? 
 
 
 
 
2.6. Who investigates reported incidents? 
Line manager 
Specific person/team  
Other (specify) 
 
 
2.7. Do you use any software tool to manage the reports/provide management information? 
Yes            No               If yes please provide details below 
 
 
 
2.8. Do you use any 'incident definitions' in separating incident types? 
 
 
Yes            No              If yes can you briefly list them or attach to this survey? 
 
 
 
 
2.9. Are other people/teams/ groups involved in the investigation of incidents or their 
resolution?  
(E.g. training, HR)  
Yes            No 
If yes please specify 
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SECTION 3 
 
Confidence in the level of security incident reporting in your organisation and your opinion 
of incident reporting levels in general.  Do you feel all /most/some etc. are reported?  Who is 
more likely to report? What do you do with the reports? 
 
3.1. With regards to your incident reporting system, how confident are you regarding the 
number of incidents reported? 
 
a. All or most incidents are reported 
b.  The majority are 
c.  Some are 
d.  Few are 
3.2. In your experience or opinion are some groups of workers more likely to report than 
others? 
 
General staff  More Likely     Less likely  Do not know 
Junior managers More Likely     Less likely  Do not know 
Middle managers More Likely    Less likely   Do not know 
Senior management More Likely     Less likely  Do not know  
Director level  More Likely     Less likely   Do not know   
 
3.3. Are security incidents reported to Board Level? 
Only if serious 
Regularly  
Occasionally  
Rarely 
Never 
 
3.4. Is Management information on incidents created?             Yes               No 
3.5. Does this take into account under reporting?                     Yes               No 
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3.6. If subject to a serious/targeted malware or external attack do you warn/inform anyone 
outside of your organisation?   (E.g. a Government, CERT etc.)  
Yes          No                If yes who?  Please indicate below 
 
 
 
If no, are there any particular reasons why not? 
 
 
 
3.7. If certain types of incident were mandated to be reported to a central body (e.g. 
Information Commissioners) what type of incidents do you think these should be? 
 
 
 
3.8. Do you feel mandated reporting would increase the number of incidents reported locally? 
Yes                   No                          Not sure  
3.9. If mandated reporting was introduced, what safeguards would you like to see in place? 
 
 
 
3.10. Do you read/make use of the various incident report surveys? (Verizon, Symantec, 
PWC etc.) 
Yes                   No                           
3.11. Do you feel the security incident data they collect/made available to them represents; 
The full picture         a reasonable picture         a partial picture 
 
Note: This is not a criticism of the surveys - they can only report what is made available.    
  
   
  
  
8 
 
SECTION 4 
 
From research carried out in other sectors it is apparent that there may be barriers to reporting 
and therefore learning from incidents. 
Below is a list of some of those identified barriers.  Can you indicate to what degree they 
could apply as barriers to reporting and learning from information security incidents? 
 
4.1. An undue focus on the immediate event rather than on the root causes of problems; 
 
 Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
         Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Latching onto one superficial cause or learning point to the exclusion of more   
fundamental but sometimes less obvious lessons; 
 
   Strongly Agree          Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
      Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
4.3. Rigidity of core beliefs, values and assumptions, which may develop over time – 
learning is resisted if it contradicts these; 
 
    Strongly Agree           Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree  
       Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
4.4.  Lack of corporate responsibility – it may be difficult, for example, to put into 
practice solutions which are sufficiently far-reaching; 
 
Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
 
     Comment? (If any) 
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4.5. Ineffective communication and other information difficulties – 
including failure to disseminate information which is already available; 
 
Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
     Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
4.6.  An incremental approach to issues of risk – attempting to resolve problems through 
tinkering rather than tackling more fundamental change; 
 
Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
    Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
4.7. Pride in individual and organisational expertise can lead to denial and to a disregard 
of external sources of warning – particularly if a bearer of bad news lacks legitimacy in 
the eyes of the individuals, teams or organisations in question; 
 
Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
     Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
4.8.  A tendency towards scapegoating and finding individuals to blame, rather than 
acknowledging and addressing deep-rooted organisational problems; 
 
Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
   Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
4.9. The difficulties faced by people in “making sense” of complex events is compounded 
by changes among key personnel within organisations  and teams; 
 
Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
    Comment? (If any) 
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4.10. Human alliances lead people to “forgive” other team members their mistakes and 
act defensively against ideas from outside the team; 
 
Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
        
    Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
4.11.  People are often unwilling to learn from negative events, even when it would be to 
their advantage; 
 
 Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
 
   Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
4.12. Contradictory imperatives – for example communication versus confidentiality; 
 
Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
 
Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
4.13. High stress and low job-satisfaction can have adverse effects on quality and can also 
engender a resistance to change; 
 
Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree        
Comment? (If any) 
 
 
 
4.14.  Inability to recognise the financial costs of failure, thus losing a powerful incentive      
for organisations to change;   
 
Strongly Agree            Agree           Neither Agree/              Disagree           Strongly Disagree           
                                                                       Disagree           
  Comment? (If any) 
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End of Questionnaire (unless you wish to add any comments etc. in Section 5) 
 
Thank you again for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.   Your responses can be 
returned in one of the following ways. 
1. By post  
Mike Humphrey (Infosec), Security Dept.  PO Box 8000 London SE11 5EN England. 
2. Electronically 
If you wish to scan it and e mail it to me (thereby potentially identifying yourself or your 
organisation) but still require me to remove any reference/ indication to you or your 
organisation I will keep the questionnaire and delete the e mail.   
E mail   m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk   
3. You can hand it in at the NG Security Summit conference to one of the Organisers 
Confidentiality and Security of responses 
Where anonymity is requested it will be honoured.  If you wish to contribute, but not be 
identified, I will ensure that is the case.  I appreciate that to be honest in a response and 
identify an organisation those comments relate to may cause concern or a reluctance to fully 
answer a question.  That is why I have provided sectors and staff sizing in a way that would 
make any obvious department or company identification difficult. 
I work for an organisation that handles information to the highest level of security 
classification and therefor electronic and paper storage of any responses will be protected 
within that environment.  I have the support of that organisation in my research and therefore 
permission to store any responses.  One of the reasons I chose the Defence Academy for this 
research was for their recognised ability and capability to handle any sensitive information. 
Regards 
 
Mike Humphrey MSc. M.Inst.ISP                                                                  May 2011 
+44(0)7767392434  
m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk 
  
12 
 
SECTION 5 
Your chance to add any additional views or further comments on any specific question. For 
example you may disagree with my assumptions with reference to under reporting, you may 
have views on the barriers listed.   This is your opportunity to state your views on the issues, 
again in the knowledge the responses will be un-attributable. 
 
If you wanted to add more to any of your answers please indicate the section and paragraph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table of Results 
The below table provide a comparison of the primary findings between the two events 
Subject NISC NG Other conferences Total 
Attendees eligible to complete the 
questionnaire 
70 
(*a) 
44 
Number completed 20 29% 16 36% 2 38 
SECTION 1 
Identified themselves 16 80% 14 88% 1 31 82% 
Public Sector 15 75% 1 6% 0 16 42% 
Private Sector 5 25% 15 94% 2 22 58% 
Subject to regulatory reporting 14 70% 8 50% 0 22 58% 
SECTION 2 
Have a formal policy and 
procedure for reporting 
19 95% 14 88% 1 34 89% 
Methods to report 
Verbal 15 75% 9 56% 2 26 68% 
E mail 16 80% 14 88% 2 32 79% 
Specific form 10 50% 7 44% 0 17 45% 
Website/intranet 7 35% 9 56% 0 16 42% 
To line manager 16 80% 9 56% 0 25 66% 
Specific team 14 70% 12 75% 1 27 71% 
Anonymously 7 35% 9 56% 1 17 45% 
Other 2 10% 2 13% 1 5 13% 
How they rate their current 
reporting system 
Fit for purpose 8 40% 4 25% 0 12 32% 
Adequate 8 40% 7 44% 2 17 45% 
Not fit for purpose 4 20% 5 31% 0 9 24% 
Who investigates 
Line Manager 4 20% 2 13% 0 6 16% 
Specific Person/Team 17 85% 13 81% 2 32 84% 
Other 4 20% 5 31% 0 9 24% 
Use a software tool 11 55% 10 63% 0 21 55% 
Use incident definitions 10 50% 12 75% 0 22 58% 
Others involved in 
investigation/resolution 
18 90% 16 100% 1 35 92% 
SECTION 3 
Confident in number of incidents 
reported (*b) 
All 3 15% 0 0% 0 3 8% 
Majority 4 20% 7 47% 0 11 30% 
Some 8 40% 7 47% 2 17 46% 
Few 5 25% 1 6% 0 6 16% 
Group of workers most likely to 
report  (*b) 
General staff 6 30% 5 33% 0 11 30% 
Junior managers 8 40% 9 60% 0 17 46% 
Middle managers 7 35% 13 87% 1 21 58% 
Senior management 7 35% 6 40% 0 13 35% 
Directors 4 20% 7 47% 1 12 32% 
Incidents reported to Board level 
APPENDIX 3
(*b) 
Only if serious 5 25% 7 47% 1  13 35% 
Regularly 11 55% 4 27% 0  15 41% 
Occasionally 2 10% 0 0% 0  2 5% 
Rarely 1 5% 4 27% 1  6 16% 
Never 1 5% 0 0% 0  1 3% 
Management information on 
incidents created 
15 75% 11 69% 0  26 68% 
If a serious targeted  malware or 
external attack do you 
warn/inform outside your 
organisation 
18 90% 13 81% 0  31 82% 
Would mandating incident 
reporting increase those reported 
locally (*c) 
        
Yes 7 37% 6 40% 1  14 39% 
No 7 37% 5 33% 0  12 33% 
Not sure 5 26% 4 27% 1  10 28% 
Do you read/use incident report 
surveys 
15 75% 15 94% 0  30 79% 
Do they represent the….         
Full picture 0 0% 0 0% 0  0 0% 
Reasonable picture 9 45% 13 81% 0  22 58% 
Partial picture 7 35% 3 19% 0  10 26% 
SECTION 4 Barriers to 
reporting    *(d) 
        
1. Undue focus on immediate 
event….. 
        
Strongly agree 4 20% 4 25% 1  9 24% 
Agree 9 45% 6 38% 0  15 40% 
Neither agree/disagree 4 20% 3 19% 1  8 21% 
Disagree 3 15% 1 6% 0  4 11% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 2 13% 0  2 5% 
2. Latching onto superficial 
cause…. 
        
Strongly agree 2 10% 2 13% 0  4 11% 
Agree 6 30% 5 31% 1  12 32% 
Neither agree/disagree 5 25% 7 44% 0  12 32% 
Disagree 6 30% 2 13% 1  9 24% 
Strongly disagree 1 5% 0 0% 0  1 3% 
3. Rigidity of core beliefs…..         
Strongly agree 2 10% 3 19% 0  5 13% 
Agree 10 50% 9 56% 0  19 50% 
Neither agree/disagree 5 25% 2 13% 1  8 21% 
Disagree 3 15% 2 13% 1  6 16% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0  0 0% 
4. Lack of Corporate 
Responsibility…… 
        
Strongly agree 5 25% 3 19% 0  8 21% 
Agree 11 55% 6 38% 1  18 47% 
Neither agree/disagree 0 0% 4 25% 1  5 13% 
Disagree 4 20% 2 13% 0  6 16% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 1 6% 0  1 3% 
5. Ineffective communication 
and other…….  
        
Strongly agree 5 26% 5 31% 0  10 27% 
Agree 9 47% 8 50% 1  18 49% 
Neither agree/disagree 3 16% 3 19% 1  7 19% 
Disagree 1 5% 0 0% 0  1 3% 
Strongly disagree 1 5% 0 0% 0  1 3% 
6. Incremental approach to 
issues of risk……. 
        
Strongly agree 4 22% 2 13% 0  6 17% 
Agree 6 33% 8 50% 1  15 42% 
Neither agree/disagree 3 17% 5 31% 0  8 22% 
Disagree 5 28% 1 6% 1  7 19% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0  0 0% 
7. Pride in individual and 
organisational 
expertise……. 
        
Strongly agree 4 22% 1 6% 0  5 14% 
Agree 5 26% 11 69% 1  17 46% 
Neither agree/disagree 2 11% 1 6% 1  4 11% 
Disagree 8 42% 3 19% 0  11 30% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0  0 0% 
8.  A tendency towards 
scapegoating 
        
Strongly agree 4 22% 4 25% 0  8 22% 
Agree 2 11% 3 19% 0  5 14% 
Neither agree/disagree 5 26% 5 31% 0  10 27% 
Disagree 8 42% 2 13% 1  11 30% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 2 13% 1  3 8% 
9.  Difficulties making sense of 
complex events……. 
        
Strongly agree 2 11% 2 13% 0  4 11% 
Agree 8 42% 7 44% 0  15 41% 
Neither agree/disagree 3 16% 4 25% 1  8 22% 
Disagree 6 32% 3 19% 1  10 27% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0  0 0% 
10.  Human alliances lead to 
forgiveness…… 
        
Strongly agree 3 16% 5 31% 0  8 22% 
Agree 9 47% 5 31% 0  14 38% 
Neither agree/disagree 4 21% 2 13% 0  6 16% 
Disagree 3 16% 3 19% 2  8 22% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 1 6% 0  1 3% 
11.  Unwillingness to learn….         
Strongly agree 3 16% 4 25% 0  7 19% 
Agree 5 26% 5 31% 0  8 22% 
Neither agree/disagree 2 11% 3 19% 0  5 14% 
Disagree 8 42% 4 25% 2  14 38% 
Strongly disagree 1 5% 0 0% 
 
0  1 3% 
 
 
        
         
12.  Contradictory 
Imperatives………… 
        
Strongly agree 3 16% 3 19% 0  6 16% 
Agree 13 68% 8 50% 0  21 57% 
Neither agree/disagree 0 0% 3 19% 1  4 11% 
Disagree 3 16% 1 6% 1  5 14% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 1 6% 0  1 3% 
13. High stress and low job 
satisfaction……….. 
        
Strongly agree 6 32% 7 44% 0  13 35% 
Agree 9 47% 6 38% 2  17 46% 
Neither agree/disagree 2 11% 2 13% 0  4 11% 
Disagree 2 11% 1 6% 0  3 8% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0  0 0% 
14.  Inability to recognise 
financial cost of failure….. 
        
Strongly agree 5 26% 5 31% 0  10 27% 
Agree 9 47% 7 44% 2  18 49% 
Neither agree/disagree 1 5% 2 13% 0  3 8% 
Disagree 4 21% 2 13% 0  6 16% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0  0 0% 
         
         
 
*a:  It is difficult to assess accurately as the attendee list although it excluded exhibitors did 
include some suppliers who attended as delegates who would not be in a position to answer 
the questionnaire.  The estimate of 70 is based on removing duplicate attendees and those 
who appeared to be suppliers. 
*b: One respondent for the  NG conference did not provide any response in these sections 
therefore the % scores were based on the resultant lower number of responses of 15 as 
opposed to 16 for the remainder of questions.  This is also reflected in the overall scores for 
that section being out of 37 instead of 38.  
*c: One respondent for NISC and one for NG conference did not provide any response in 
these sections therefore the % scores were based on the resultant lower number of responses 
of 19 as opposed to 20 and 15 as opposed to 16 for the remainder of questions.  This is also 
reflected in the overall scores for that section being out of 36 instead of 38.  
*d: one respondent did not return section 4 complete and answers for Question 4.5 onwards 
were missing hence the % for these scores will be out of 19 respondents instead of 20 except 
for Q6 where another responder did not answer this question so this question for NISC the % 
is out of 18 respondents and not 20. 
 
Information Security Incident Reporting Delphi Study  - December 2015 
An opportunity to contribute to research into the reporting of information security incidents 
1 
Dear Colleague, 
I am a part time PhD student at Cranfield University at the Defence Academy of the UK, 
Shrivenham.   My PhD research looks at the issue of security incident reporting.  My day job 
is that of the Head of Information Assurance and Operational Security at the National Crime 
Agency. I am a Fellow of the Institute of Information Security Professionals (IISP) and an 
elected member of the Information Assurance Advisory Councils’ (IAAC) management 
committee.   
I have come to a stage in my research where I need to seek the views from information 
security professionals on what could be considered the Critical Success Factors required to 
support the security incident reporting process. This request for assistance in contributing to 
academic research has reached you through your membership of a recognised Information 
Security Community of Interest.   It may be you have also received this through other CoI’s 
that you belong to and, if this is the case, may I apologise if it appears that you are being 
spammed.  One response would be really appreciated. 
The enclosed questionnaire contains a list of elements identified through my research that are 
considered to be effective in the reporting of security incidents and it is your views on the 
relevance of these elements that I am seeking.  There is also the facility within the 
questionnaire to add any factor(s) that you think has not been considered and you feel worthy 
of inclusion.  It may be included in the next round for your fellow professionals to consider. 
Completion of the questionnaire should take no more than 15 minutes.  Once returned I will 
analyse all the responses and send the collective view back to you so you can then further 
score/comment on any emerging consensus from fellow professionals.  Normally such 
exercises take the form of no more than three rounds, the final one being as near to consensus 
as possible.  In the second, and possible, third rounds the completion time is a lot shorter as 
you are being asked whether you agree or disagree with the emerging consensus (assuming 
that there will be consensus, it may be there is not ) and will have already understood the 
content and aims. 
For the purpose of this study, as there is no universally accepted definition, I am using one I 
have crafted for my thesis:   
An information security incident is either, an actual or potential event that has, or is 
likely to, cause harm to the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of data, 
assets, systems or infrastructure whether caused by people, processes or technology. 
Eligibility criteria for completion of the questionnaire. 
Through your experience in information security many of you will meet the requirements.  I 
am particularly looking for those of you who at some point have been involved or provided 
advice and guidance on one or more of the following;  
APPENDIX 4
i)   the reporting of, investigation or management of security incidents,                                                   
ii)  risk analysis, risk assessment and/or risk management,                                                                                
iii) any policy, regulatory or legal role that covered incident reporting. 
However, even if you do not meet the above but feel you have a valuable contribution to 
make your involvement in this research will definitely be most welcome. If you know of 
someone else who is equally eligible, but may not have received this, please forward them a 
copy of this letter and questionnaire. 
The attached questionnaire contains details on completion, submission and reassurance re the 
confidentiality and attribution of responses.  Should you have any questions or concerns re 
sensitive responses please contact me on the e mail address below.  
For the first round can you please complete and return by Monday the 21
st
 December. 
This will then give me time over the Christmas break to analyse the returns and send out 
Round 2 early in the New Year. 
I do hope you can find the time to add your valuable contribution to the research.  Thank you 
for reading this. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Mike Humphrey MSc 
Part Time PhD Student Defence Academy Shrivenham 
m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk 
 
c:\users\mike\documents\phd\thesis commenced feb 2013\chapter 3 methodology\delphi letter amended following peer review 22nd 
september 2015 final.docx 
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Copy of Email text sent to respective CoI’s to then use to forward the Delphi survey  to 
IAAC/IISP/ISO’s 
Once again thank you for allowing your organisation/community of interest to distribute the 
enclosed Delphi questionnaire as part of my research into the reporting of information Security 
Incidents. 
I have enclosed an introductory letter explaining the Delphi study process and the questionnaire 
itself. It is a pdf form that can be completed electronically and returned. Other methods of 
completion are explained in the accompanying letter. 
Could you please now distribute them both to your community and copy me in. 
If you feel willing and able to add some supportive message encouraging your community to 
contribute this would be most welcome. I enclose a possible draft you may wish to base this on 
below. 
Draft intro to any distribution message 
Mike Humphrey is an active member of our community.  He has sought and obtained permission to 
use our community of interest/membership to support his research into the reporting of information 
security incidents.  As security professionals you are well placed to give an accurate insight into this 
subject and your opinion is greatly valued.  The eventual outcome of Mike’s research is to produce a 
set of elements that are considered important to be included in any information security incident 
reporting process. Their inclusion should improve the number of incidents being reported and reduce 
the barriers to such reporting. 
 
Please can you find the time in your busy lives to complete and return the questionnaire to the 
address contained in the instructions.  Mike would appreciate returns by the 21st December to allow 
him time over Christmas to analyse the initial results and identify any emerging consensus before 
sending out a second round for your view on that potential consensus of opinion. 
 
Regards 
 
Mike 
 
 
 
1 
Security Incident Reporting Delphi Study - Round One - Instructions
Section One - Identification of respondent and relevant business sector 
This survey will be conducted in strict confidence and your responses anonymised. I will be the only person analysing the responses. All responses will be 
collated, analysed and any emerging consensus will be sent to you again by email for further comment. As stated in my letter it is likely that only three 
iterations will be issued, each one taking less time than the previous.  You can either complete as a pdf form or, as sometimes there are 
compatibility issues, print it out, complete by hand, scan and return.  If you do not want to email your response but post it instead the address for posting replies 
is:  Mike Humphrey Standards and Security PO Box 8000 London SE11 5EN.   My e mail address for the survey responses is m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk
  You can withdraw from the survey at any time and after the completion of the survey I am happy to provide a de-brief on the results.  
Please be assured all responses will be treated with strict confidentiality and the final analysis and any reporting will not identify individuals or 
companies.   
Section Two – Suggested Possible Critical Success Factors to Improve Reporting of Security Incidents 
This section contains a suggested list of elements considered to be important to the effective reporting of incidents.  Against each one can you state ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
if you believe if it is relevant to information security incident reporting. Then the same again for whether you believe it could be considered a Critical Success 
Factor (CSF).   The elements listed can be very important but not necessarily a Critical Success Factor.   CSF’s have been described as1:  
“Important to achieving overall corporate goals and objectives,  
Measurable and controllable by the organisation to which they apply,  
Relatively few in number – not everything can be critical,  
Expressed as things that must be done not the end point of the process,  
Applicable to all companies in the industry with similar objectives and strategies and hierarchical in nature.”   
Please rank your view of the importance of each of various elements from 1 to 5. With 1 being highly important to 5 being highly unimportant.  Finally if you 
wish you may comment on your answer. If you feel any others are missing please add them and score appropriately on page 7.  Any additional elements 
identified may be incorporated in the second or third round to seek consensus.  
1 Freund, Y,. Planners Guide -  Critical Success Factors (1988, p.20) 
Reference no. 
APPENDIX 6
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SECTION 1 – About you and/or your organisation 
About you or some detail regarding the industry (Govt/ Private Sector/Academia etc.) you work in to assist in identifying any possible differences in these 
groups.  *Note. If self- employed or retired, your experience and views are still invaluable.  Some questions in Section One are not easily answered or 
applicable. Therefore please indicate in the box below if you are self- employed/retired and also which sector your answers are based on from previous 
experience or consultancy.  ALL RESPONSES WILL BE TREATED WITH COMPLETE CONFIDENTIALITY 
  Name 
  Role 
  Organisation  
  Tel/ Mobile                                                                                 E mail 
Please note: To be involved in subsequent rounds in the survey I will need to know how to send it so please include a reply to email or postal address  
 
To assist in analysis of the information can you please complete the following which will assist in identifying the sector or size of your organisation and 
whether this is reflected in any responses?  
Staff size of your organisation; 
0-500          501-1000         1001-5000         5001-10000          10000 +          *Self-employed/retired  
Which Sector do you work in?  
Public Sector  (If one of the boxes below does not describe your sector please tick other and add a description) 
Central Govt             Local Govt          Health            Law Enforcement  Military 
Other (please specify) 
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Private Sector   (If one of the boxes below does not describe your sector please tick other and add a description) 
Finance             Retail  Transport    Manufacturing            Service industry           Communications            Energy              Insurance                                
Consulting                 Other (please specify)              
 
Academia        Other sector (please specify)   
1.1 Where is your organisation based? Tick all that apply 
 
UK              Europe                  Elsewhere              (please specify below)       
 
      
 
1.2 If your organisation is multi-based do you feel your answers given may be different according to the country where the incident occurred? 
 
Yes         No            Add any additional explanation below 
 
 
 
 
 
Which Community of Interest did you receive this survey from?    IISP            CISP          Police     IAAC   Other             please specify below
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SECTION 2 Survey Round 1 
List of elements to improve 
Incident reporting  
Is it relevant to 
information 
security 
incidents -   
 
 
Select as 
appropriate or 
Circle the Yes 
or No 
Is this a 
possible 
Critical 
Success 
Factor - 
 
Select as 
appropriate 
or Circle the 
Yes or No 
Rank the importance of the element to 
improve incident reporting by selecting or 
circling as appropriate one of the below 
numbers as applicable to the key below; 
 
1. Highly important 
2. Important 
3. Neither Important/unimportant 
4. Unimportant 
5. Highly unimportant 
 
Comment (if any) 
1. Separation of collection, 
and analysis from any 
discipline or regulatory 
process 
 
 
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5  
2. Collection of reports of 
‘near misses’ as well as 
actual incidents 
 
 
 
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5 
 
 
3. Rapid, useful, accessible 
and intelligible feedback to 
the reporting community 
 
 
 
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5  
4. Ease of making a report 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5  
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List of elements to improve 
Incident reporting 
Is it relevant to 
information 
security 
incidents -   
 
 
Select as 
appropriate or 
circle the Yes 
or No 
Is this a 
possible 
Critical 
Success 
Factor - 
 
Select as 
appropriate 
or Circle the 
Yes or No 
Rank the importance of the element to 
improve incident reporting by selecting  or 
circling as appropriate one of the below  
numbers as applicable to the key below; 
 
1. Highly important 
2. Important 
3. Neither Important/unimportant 
4. Unimportant 
5. Highly unimportant 
Comment (if any) 
5. Standardised reporting 
systems within 
organisations  
 
 
 
 
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5  
6. A working assumption that 
individuals should be 
thanked for reporting 
incidents rather than being 
automatically blamed for 
what has gone wrong 
 
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5  
7. Mandatory reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5  
8. Standardised risk 
assessment (to determine 
the impact of the incident)  
 
 
 
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5  
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List of elements to improve 
incident reporting 
Is it relevant to 
information 
security 
incidents -   
 
 
Select as 
appropriate or 
circle the Yes 
or No 
Is this a 
possible 
Critical 
Success 
Factor - 
 
Select as 
appropriate 
or Circle the 
Yes or No 
Rank the importance of the element to 
improve incident reporting by selecting  or 
circling as appropriate one of the below  
numbers as applicable to the key below; 
 
1. Highly important 
2. Important 
3. Neither Important/unimportant 
4. Unimportant 
5. Highly unimportant 
Comment (if any) 
9. A common understanding 
of what factors are 
important in determining 
risk 
 
 
 
YES       NO 
 
 
YES     NO 
 
 
1          2           3          4          5 
 
10. A mechanism or process 
for confidential reporting 
 
 
 
YES      NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5  
11. A recognition by senior 
management that  incidents 
will happen 
 
 
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5 
 
12. Incident reporting systems 
that are designed 
appropriately to ensure 
learning is possible 
YES       NO YES     NO 
 
1          2           3          4          5 
 
 
13. Incident analysis that  
considers root causes and 
wider systems/processes 
and not just the initial 
impact assessment  
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please go to page 7 for details of returning the form 
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Thank you for your time.  Please e mail your completed form to m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk    Alternatively if you wish to post it please send to 
Mike Humphrey Standards and Security PO Box 8000 London SE11 5EN 
c:\users\mike\documents\phd\thesis commenced feb 2013\chapter 3 methodology\delphi questionnaire amended following peer review oct 2015 final form style word.docx 
You can add any factor that you think has not been considered and feel worthy of inclusion. It may be included in the next round for your fellow professionals to consider. 
 
Please add any in the format below and score as previous advised 
Additional suggested elements 
to improve incident reporting 
Is it relevant to 
information 
security 
incidents -   
 
 
Select as 
appropriate or 
circle the Yes 
or No 
Is this a 
possible 
Critical 
Success 
Factor – 
 
Select as 
appropriate 
or circle the 
Yes or No 
Rank the importance of the element to 
improve incident reporting by selecting or 
circling as appropriate one of the below   
numbers as applicable to the key below 
 
1. Highly important 
2. Important 
3. Neither Important/unimportant 
4. Unimportant 
5. Highly unimportant 
Comment (if any) 
14.  
YES       NO YES     NO 
 
1          2           3          4          5 
 
 
15.  
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5 
 
16.  
YES       NO YES     NO 1          2           3          4          5 
 
Dear [insert name], 
Firstly, may I thank you again for taking the time to complete round one of my Delphi study 
research questionnaire into Security Incident Reporting.  I had a very positive response, with 
many of you adding valuable comments in the spaces provided next to the elements.   
I did say that once I had analysed the responses I would contact those who did respond with 
details of any emerging consensus, together with a request that you again kindly set aside 15 
minutes of your time to provide your views on these findings.  
The next stage should be quicker to complete.   It contains three sections. Firstly, as you had 
already responded with your full details and sector, size of organization etc. I will not be asking 
for that again. Instead I have allocated you a reference number that will ensure I can marry up 
your response in round 2 to that of round one. This also will save you time repeating your 
details. In addition, I again provide reassurances re confidentiality. You can go straight to the 
questions in section 2 and 3. Your reference number is  
Section 2 contains four elements that scored the highest in round one responses.  These have 
been considered as the Critical Success Factors.  As many of you added valuable comments on 
the elements I have tried to incorporate the main recurring comments into an amended version 
of the original element, which in theory adds more value to the statement.    
I am then asking whether you feel this amended wording improves or reduces the value of the 
element as a Critical Success Factor.   This is a tick box section with the same opportunity to 
comment if you wish. 
The 3rd section is of a similar vein, but includes the next three highest scoring elements that 
could assist in the reporting of incidents. These did not score high enough to be included as a 
Critical Success Factor.  I am asking whether the additional description adds to these elements 
or not and, if it does, can it now be considered as a CSF to join the other four? 
There was an opportunity in round one for you to suggest any element not listed as a potential 
CSF.  A number of you made suggestions and I have incorporated aspects of these views into 
the descriptions of the elements where appropriate.  These comments included aspects of 
governance and education.   
I will enclose two documents, the 2nd round questionnaire as a pdf form and as a word form 
format (whichever is easiest for you to complete). I have sent them separately as some defences do not 
like certain types of pdf form.  Hopefully you will receive one of them. 
APPENDIX 7
Please note some respondents had difficulty where they completed a response but did not save 
it as a separate document and then forwarded the unsaved one to me. With some versions of 
mail and office document management, if you completed the form as it arrived without 
renaming and saving it, when it was sent back to me your response was blank. So please save 
your response and then send that saved version. 
 
Some of you took the option of printing, completing then scanning the response and then 
emailing the scanned version, others printed and completed and then posted it to me.  All these 
options are still open to you in round 2.  
 
I would be grateful if you could return your answers to the above email address or as before if 
you prefer post to me at the address shown in the instructions.     
 
 
c:\users\mike\documents\phd\thesis commenced feb 2013\chapter 3 methodology\round two documents\draft round 2 delphi intro email  
30_03_16 v.2 10_4_16.docx 
Security Incident Reporting Delphi Study - Round Two - Instructions
Section One - Identification of respondent and relevant business sector 
As this section was completed by yourself in Round One I have allocated your response a reference number (top right of this page). This reduces the amount of 
time taken to complete round two.   Again, as in Round One, this survey will be conducted in strict confidence and your responses anonymised. I will be the 
only person analysing the responses. All responses will be collated, analysed and any further emerging consensus will be sent to you again by email for further 
comment. As stated in my original letter, it is likely that only three iterations will be issued, each one taking less time than the previous.  This is the second 
iteration of the Delphi study. You can complete as a PDF form, word document or, as sometimes there are compatibility issues, print it out, complete by hand, 
scan and return by email.  If you do not want to email your response but post it instead the address for posting replies is:  Mike Humphrey Standards and 
Security PO Box 8000 London SE11 5EN.   My e mail address for the survey responses is m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk  You can withdraw from the survey at 
any time and after the completion of the survey I am happy to provide a de-brief on the results.  
Please be assured all responses will be treated with strict confidentiality and the final analysis and any reporting will not identify individuals or 
companies.   
Section Two – Emerging Consensus of Critical Success Factors to Improve Reporting of Security Incidents 
This section contains the emerging consensus of those elements that respondents considered a Critical Success Factor (CSF) and scored the highest amongst the 
choices of elements.  There are four of them (not in any order of preference).   
Element 3.  Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible feedback to the reporting community 
Element 4.  Ease of making a report 
Element 11.  A recognition by senior management that incidents will happen.  
Element 13. Incident analysis that considers root causes and wider systems/processes and not just the initial impact assessment. 
Your Reference no.  
1 
APPENDIX 8
As a reminder, Critical Success Factors have been described as1:  
“Important to achieving overall corporate goals and objectives.  Measurable and controllable by the organisation to which they apply,  
Relatively few in number – not everything can be critical. Expressed as things that must be done not the end point of the process.  
Applicable to all companies in the industry with similar objectives and strategies and hierarchical in nature.”    
 
The CSF descriptions have been added to, based on the responses and comments provided in round one. This section asks your views on whether you feel the 
additional description affects the element as a Critical Success Factor. 
 
There are again five choices available for you to indicate your preference. This time the options ask your opinion whether the amended wording of the element 
either; significantly improves its value as a CSF, improves its value as a CSF, neither improves or reduces its value as a CSF, reduces its value as a CSF and 
finally significantly reduces its value as a CSF.  In addition, please indicate whether this amended element remains a CSF - Yes or No? There is also space for 
any comments you may wish to make. 
Section Three - Elements that could be considered as Critical Success Factors but did not score as highly as those in Section Two above.  
This section contains those elements that scored well, but not as well as the above four elements, but were scored higher than the rest. As in Section 2, the 
descriptions have been added to, based on the responses and comments provided in round one. This section asks your views on whether or not you feel the 
additional description affects the element and improves it to such an extent that it can be considered eligible to be included as a Critical Success Factor amongst 
the four already identified in Section 2. There are three of them (again not in any order of preference).   
 
Element 2.  Collection of reports of near misses as well as actual incidents 
Element 7. Mandatory Reporting 
Element 8.  Standardised risk assessment (to determine the impact of the incident)  
 
Again, there are five choices available for you to indicate your preference. The options are that the amended wording either; significantly improves the element 
such that it should now be included as a Critical Success Factor with the four CSF elements above, improves the element such that it should now be included as 
a Critical Success Factor with the four CSF elements above, neither improves or diminishes the element such that it should remain where it is, it diminishes  the 
element such that it should not be included as a Critical Success Factor with the four CSF elements above and finally it significantly diminishes the element 
such that it should not be included as a Critical Success Factor with the four CSF elements above.   There is also space for any comments you may wish to 
make.  
1 Freund, Y, Planners Guide -  Critical Success Factors (1988, p.20) 
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2 Community being the one that your organisation may belong to law enforcement, finance, healthcare etc. 
 
Section 2.  Emerging Consensus on Critical Success Factors – The four most popular elements considered to be a Critical Success Factor. 
 
Below are the four highest scoring elements that were considered by consensus as Critical Success Factors to improve Incident Reporting.  Further 
descriptions of the element have been added as a result of comments made by respondents in Round One.   The original element number is shown in 
brackets. Please place your view against each of the four elements considered to be a Critical Success Factor by selecting or circling, as appropriate, one 
of the five numbered choices. 
 
1. Original wording (Element 3) 
 
Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible feedback 
to the reporting community 
 
1a. Amended wording:   
 
Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible feedback 
to the reporting community2 recognising: 
 
• People will only continue to report incidents 
if they are acknowledged and, even better, 
can see that reporting has been useful. 
• Feedback need not be detailed, often a 
simple acknowledgement of the report and 
that action is being taken may be sufficient. 
• Staff that have been responsible for a 
security incident can at times become 
extremely anxious, sometimes unnecessarily 
so and it is helpful to discus with them what 
the risk (or otherwise) is and for them to be 
kept up to date and involved. 
 
How do you feel the amendments impact on the 
value of the element as a Critical Success 
Factor? 
 
1. Significantly improves the value of the 
element as a Critical Success Factor 
 
2. Improves the value of the element as a 
Critical Success Factor 
 
3. Neither improves or reduces the value of 
the element as a Critical Success Factor  
 
4. Reduces the value of the element as a 
Critical Success Factor 
 
5. Significantly reduces the value of the 
element as a Critical Success Factor 
 
    1 ☐      2  ☐       3 ☐      4  ☐        5  ☐    
 
In view of the above, does this element remain 
a Critical Success Factor?    YES ☐     NO   ☐  
 
 
 
Comment (If Any) 
 
Click here to enter any comments you may 
wish to make. 
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2.   Original wording (Element 4) 
 
Ease of making a report  
 
 
2a. Amended wording:  
 
Ease of making a report, recognising if incident 
reporting is difficult individuals will be less likely 
to submit them. This may particularly affect the 
reporting of near misses. The reporting process 
should: 
 
• Include a sufficiently clear level of education 
and awareness to all staff in how the 
reporting process works.   
• Describes what an incident is. 
• Describes how to report it and what 
escalation needs to take place. 
• Sets out levels of expected feedback.  
• Be clearly set out as part of any governance 
process. 
 
 
How do you feel the amendments impact on the 
value of the element as a Critical Success 
Factor? 
 
1. Significantly improves the value of the 
element as a Critical Success Factor 
 
2. Improves the value of the element as a 
Critical Success Factor 
 
3. Neither improves or reduces the value of the 
element as a Critical Success Factor  
 
4. Reduces the value of the element as a Critical 
Success Factor 
 
5. Significantly reduces the value of the element 
as a Critical Success Factor 
 
 
    1 ☐      2  ☐       3 ☐      4  ☐        5  ☐    
 
 
In view of the above, does this element remain 
a Critical Success Factor?    YES ☐     NO   ☐     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment (If Any) 
 
Click here to enter any comments you may 
wish to make. 
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3.  Original wording (Element 11)  
 
A recognition by senior management that incidents 
will happen.  
 
3a. Amended wording:   
 
A recognition by senior management that 
incidents will happen and that they must play a 
full and active part in the incident management 
process by. 
 
• Fully accepting that incident reporting is to 
be seen positively and not punitive. 
• Recognising security incidents are part of 
life and business and, like accidents, the 
reporting process is part of the prevention 
strategy. 
• Supporting a culture which encourages 
reporting 
• Recognising an organisation which handles 
an incident well enhances its reputation 
 
 
 
Do you feel the amendments impact on the 
value of the element as a Critical Success 
Factor? 
 
1. Significantly improves the value of the 
element as a Critical Success Factor 
 
2. Improves the value of the element as a 
Critical Success Factor 
 
3. Neither improves or reduces the value of 
the element as a Critical Success Factor  
 
4. Reduces the value of the element as a 
Critical Success Factor 
 
5. Significantly reduces the value of the 
element as a Critical Success Factor 
 
 
    1 ☐      2  ☐       3 ☐      4  ☐        5  ☐    
 
In view of the above, does this element remain 
a Critical Success Factor?    YES ☐     NO   ☐     
 
 
Comment (If Any) 
 
Click here to enter any comments you may 
wish to make. 
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4.  Original wording (Element 13)  
 
Incident analysis that considers root causes and 
wider systems/processes, not just the initial impact 
assessment. 
 
4a. Amended wording    
 
Incident analysis that considers root causes and 
wider systems/processes, not just the initial 
impact assessment.  This is crucial to 
understanding what actually contributed to an 
incident otherwise if the true cause is not 
identified repeat incidents or larger scale impact 
ones can occur.  
It should be recognised: 
 
• The incident may be just a symptom of a 
larger organisational or process flaw. 
• Superficial investigations may be 
counterproductive in the long term 
 
 
 
 
Do you feel the amendments impact on the 
value of the element as a Critical Success 
Factor? 
 
 
1. Significantly improves the value of the 
element as a Critical Success Factor 
 
2.  Improves the value of the element as a   
Critical Success Factor 
 
3. Neither improves or reduces the value of 
the element as a Critical Success Factor  
 
4. Reduces the value of the element as a 
Critical Success Factor 
 
5. Significantly reduces the value of the 
element as a Critical Success Factor 
 
 
 
    1 ☐      2  ☐       3 ☐      4  ☐        5  ☐    
 
 
In view of the above, does this element remain 
a Critical Success Factor?    YES ☐     NO   ☐   
 
 
 
Comment (If Any) 
 
Click here to enter any comments you may 
wish to make. 
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  Section 3 Elements that could be considered as Critical Success Factors but did not score as highly as those above 
The below elements scored well, but not as well as the above four elements but were scored higher than the rest.  Further descriptions of the element 
have been added as a result of comments made by respondents in Round One.   The original element number is shown in brackets.   Please place your 
view against each of the three elements that the emerging consensus scored well, but not as well as the above four elements in Section 2 by  selecting or 
circling, as appropriate, one of the five numbered choices.  
 
 
Original wording (Element 2)  
 
Collection of reports of near misses as well as 
actual incidents 
 
2a. New wording 
 
Collection and review of reports of near misses as 
well as actual incidents.  Recognising; 
 
• Much can be learnt from near misses  
 
• By doing so can identify the required 
preventive measures that need to be in put in 
place to deal with organisational learning 
and/ or a change in policy & procedure to 
ensure that such near misses do not, in future 
            become actual incidents. 
 
Do you feel the amendments impact on the 
value of the element and its potential to join the 
four Critical Success Factors in Section 2? 
 
1. Significantly improves the element such 
that it should now be included as a Critical 
Success Factor. 
 
2. Improves the element such that it should 
now be included as a Critical Success 
Factor. 
  
3. Neither improves or diminishes the element 
and that it should remain where it is.  
 
4. Diminishes the element such that it should 
not be included as a Critical Success Factor. 
  
5. Significantly diminishes the element such 
that it should not be included as a Critical 
Success Factor.  
 
 
 
    1 ☐      2  ☐       3 ☐      4  ☐        5  ☐        
 
 
 
Comments (if any) 
 
Click here to enter any comments you may 
wish to make. 
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Original wording (Element 7) 
 
Mandatory Reporting 
 
7a New wording 
 
The reporting of incidents should be mandatory.  
An organisation cannot mitigate any impact or 
learn from an incident unless there is an 
awareness something has happened. Recognising: 
 
• A true record of incidents can provide 
accurate management information which  
enables amongst other things; trend analysis, 
a greater understanding of actual rather than 
perceived threats and risks and more 
evidence based resource allocation.  
 
• Although the decision to report should not be 
optional the actions taken should be tailored 
to the incidents severity.  For example a 
manager should have some discretion to deal 
locally with minor issues such as not locking 
computer screens or not complying with the 
clear desk policy.  
• Staff need clear guidance on what and how 
to report.  
 
 
 
  
 
Do you feel the amendments impact on the 
value of the element and its potential to join the 
four Critical Success Factors in Section 2? 
 
1. Significantly improves the element such 
that it should now be included as a Critical 
Success Factor. 
 
2. Improves the element such that it should 
now be included as a Critical Success 
Factor. 
  
3. Neither improves or diminishes the element 
and that it should remain where it is.  
 
4. Diminishes the element such that it should 
not be included as a Critical Success Factor. 
  
5. Significantly diminishes the element such 
that it should not be included as a Critical 
Success Factor.  
 
 
 
    1 ☐      2  ☐       3 ☐      4  ☐        5  ☐    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments (if any) 
 
Click here to enter any comments you may 
wish to make. 
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c:\users\mike\documents\phd\thesis commenced feb 2013\chapter 3 methodology\round two documents\delphi questionnaire round 2 april 2016 final  word form version 1  16_4_16.docx 
 
Original wording (Element 8) 
 
Standardised risk assessment (to determine the 
impact of the incident)  
 
8a New wording 
 
Having Standardised risk assessment (to 
determine the impact of the incident) whilst 
recognising: 
• There are advantages to standardise within a 
single organisation or sector but wider 
standardisation can be a challenge. 
• Risk and impact assessment are essential as 
part of post event and incident management 
criteria.  An initial standard approach will 
enable comparison of similar incidents and 
facilitate fact-based resolution. 
 
 
 
 
Do you feel the amendments impact on the 
value of the element and its potential to join the 
four Critical Success Factors in Section 2? 
 
1. Significantly improves the element such 
that it should now be included as a Critical 
Success Factor. 
 
2. Improves the element such that it should 
now be included as a Critical Success 
Factor. 
  
3. Neither improves or diminishes the element 
and that it should remain where it is.  
 
4. Diminishes the element such that it should 
not be included as a Critical Success Factor. 
  
5. Significantly diminishes the element such 
that it should not be included as a Critical 
Success Factor 
 
 
    1 ☐      2  ☐       3 ☐      4  ☐        5  ☐    
 
    
 
 
 
Comments (if any) 
 
Click here to enter any comments you may 
wish to make. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again thank you for your time to complete the second stage of this Delphi study.  Please save your response and as before please e mail your 
completed form to m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk    Alternatively if you wish to post it please send to Mike Humphrey Standards and Security 
PO Box 8000 London SE11 5EN 
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APPENDIX  9   
 Additional Suggestions for  CSF’s 
Private Sector 10 of the total of 43 made additional suggestions (23%) 
Public Sector 34 of the  total of 67  (50%) made additional suggestions. Academia made no suggestions 
Private Sector additional elements 
Respondent Suggestion  Relevant CSF Y/N Importance Comment Include 
Y/N 
56 A mechanism for incident alerting Y Y 2 Covered by element 2,5,  N 
56 Additional Process for incident 
analysis 
Y Y 2 Covered by element 13 N 
15 Feedback on how an incident has 
been managed 
Y  Y 1 Covered by element 3 N 
39 Realistic threat intelligence Y N 2 More of a result of better reporting N 
39 3rd Party certification frameworks Y N 2 Possibly referring to validation of 
reporting mechanisms 
N 
115 Joint incident reporting and 
management processes 
Y Y 1 Covered by 12,5, N 
115 Having a SWG Y No score 2 Using the SWG to review incidents. 
This is after they have been reported so 
not applicable 
N 
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115 Education and awareness re incident 
reporting 
Y N 2 Possible inclusion but not considered 
as a CSF by respondent. Linked to 
others suggesting education linked to 
making a report 
Y  
89 Publication of case studies Y N 2 More of a result of reporting N 
89 Improved enforcement by ICO for 
example 
Y Y 2 Possibly linked to Mandated reporting 
7 
N 
45 Anonymous reporting Y N 2 Covered by element 10 N 
36 Standard input mechanism to enable 
sharing 
Y Y 2 Covered by 5 re common systems and 
possibly 3 re feedback and 12 
N 
34 Technical rigour in risk assessments Y Y 1 Possibly linked to 8, 9, N 
34 Provide a legal and procedural 
framework 
Y Y 2 Possibly covered by 5, 7 N 
34 Better informed business 
justification for conducting an 
investigation proactively 
Y Y 2 Possibly covered by 9,12,13, N 
102 Effective tooling to support incident 
identification, reporting and 
analysis 
Y Y 1 Covered by 12,5,4 N 
102 Integration of incident reporting 
into corporate governance policies 
and processes to reporting to the 
Board 
Y Y 1 Covered by 3,5,9,11 but goes further 
into reporting mechanisms that include 
reporting to the board 
N 
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54 Adapting and learning from event Y Y 1 Definitely covered by 3,12,13 N 
54 Intelligence information Y Y 1 More of use of information gleaned 
from threats and previous incidents 
Ni 
 
Public Sector suggested additional elements 
Respondent Suggestion  Relevant CSF Y/N Importance Comment Include 
Y/N 
87 Reporting bad practice Y N 3 More about non-compliance than 
incidents 
N 
4 Dissemination And analysis Y N 1 Covered by 3,5,12 and 13 N 
95 Resources available Y Y 1 Not  covered  original elements  
95 Involvement of other stakeholders Y Y 2 Possibly covered by 5 and 3 N 
79 Establishment of clear governance Y Y 1 Similar to comment by 102 from 
private sector. Covered by 3,5,9,11 but 
goes further into reporting mechanisms 
that include reporting to the board 
N 
79 Establish clear criteria for external 
notification 
Y Y 1 Possibly an outcome of improved 
reporting part of the conceptual 
framework improvement of outcomes 
then needs further work Part of 7 
N 
28 Linking to corporate mechanisms Y Y 1 As per 79, and 102  N 
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58 Training and education re incident 
reporting that is not linked to witch 
hunting 
Y Y 1 Covered in part by 1, 6 but links to 
115. Include in ease of making a report 
N 
80 Provide added value? Y Y 1 No explanation given N 
86 Defined metric to enable reporting 
effectiveness 
Y N 2 Covered by 5,8,9, N 
70 Clarity of reporting systems (who 
do I tell) 
Y Y 1 4 embellishment of 4 and 10 N 
112 Organisational awareness of process Y Y 1 Covered by 4 and 5 but embellishment 
of ease or reporting and awareness 
communication of its existence 
Add to 
CSF 
112 No blame culture Y Y 1 Covered by 1,6 N 
103 Clear and structured reporting 
process 
Y N 2 Covered by 4 and 5 but again could be 
added to better describe the CSF 
Add to 
CSF 
73 Sharing of trends address issues in 
policy 
Y No score  3,5,12 cover elements of this N 
82 Relationships between teams to 
resolve issues 
Y N 3 Possible covered by 3, 5,12 N 
82 Proof incident has been resolved Y Y 1 Covered by 3,12 N 
59 Wider considerations re onward 
reporting 
Y N 2 Covered by 3,5,7 but possible addition 
to CSF 
N 
83 Weak approach could have adverse Y No score 2 Possibly covered by 1 but 
embellishment to determine accident 
N 
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affect as opposed to reckless 
83 Weak line management by turning 
blind eye resulting in not reporting 
Y No score 2 Possibly covered by 6,7, 11, N 
90 Guidelines on remedial action Y Y 4 Covered by 12, N 
97 Mandatory reporting Y Y 2 Covered by 7 N 
97 Standardisation of reporting Y N 2 Covered by 5 N 
44 Include in incident report the 
measures already taken to prevent 
loss etc 
Y Y 2 Possible embellishment of reporting 
process to ensure format includes 
actions already taken 
N 
77 Probability impact threshold Y N 3 Linked to near misses when is it an 
incident or near miss and when to 
report. Linked to 2 
N 
110 Onward reporting is this covered eg 
to ICO 
No score No score No score Linked to 7 mandated reporting his 
should state who too.18 
N 
18 Understanding of the legal 
implications of incidents and need 
to report 
Y Y 1 Possibly linked to 7 but also to 
education and awareness 
N 
12 As above As above As above As above As above N 
55 Functional area affected 
accountability and reporting lines 
Y N 2 3,4,5,12 N 
55 Early identification of incidents Y Y 1 Linked to 2 near misses N 
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2 Education Y Y 1 Linked to 102, 28,and 79, 91 Y 
75 Risk based approach No score No score No score Covered by 9 N 
91 Training of managing incidents Y N 3 Include education on ease of making a 
resport 
Y 
1 Regular security briefings Y Y 1 Include education  in ease of making a 
report 
Y 
19 Identification of root cause Y Y 1 Covered by 13 N 
19 Knowing a near miss has occurred Y Y 1 Covered by 2  N 
69 Staff awareness re incident 
reporting 
Y Y 2 Include education in ease of masking 
report 
Y 
[ Increase staff skills in use of 
reporting systems 
   Include education in ease of m making 
a report 
Y 
3 Collaboration of other partners in 
organisation HR, ICT etc 
N Y 2 Partly covered by 12,13 N 
20 Encourage to report anything they 
perceive to be a potential security 
weakness 
Y Y 2 Covered as near miss but also 
definition of near miss may be helpful 
N 
67 Publicise standard management 
actions for incident management  
Y Y 2 Linked to education and awareness not 
just for staff but actions on by 
management. Embellishment of 
reporting mechanism 
N 
67 Collaboration of internal teams  Y Y 2 Partly covered by 12,13 N 
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67 Performance metrics and education 
and awareness 
Y Y 2 Include education in ease of making a 
report 
Y 
57 Neutral anonymous impartial 
feedback from management 
Y Y 2 Covered by 1 and 6,11,10 N 
6 Reporting lines (possibly linked to 
governance) 
Y No score 2 Possibly covered by 6,7, 11, N 
6 Should CSO/CRO be on board Y No score 1 Possibly covered by 6,7, 11, N 
 
Key  
Suggested CSF regarding Education  
Suggested CSF regarding Governance  
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 APPENDIX 10   
Comments on the top four CSF and three Possible CSFs from round one and two of the Delphi 
Round one comments 
CSF Comments made (respondent number) Useful wording to consider 
3. Rapid, useful, 
accessible and 
intelligible 
feedback to the 
reporting 
community 
1.Correcting where people went wrong is only possible with honest feedback.  An 
essential element of the OODA loop.   
3. if the reporting community is top of the organisation : visibility of the IM process 
and leaks in the infrastructure 
4. ISOs in police forces are under considerable pressure, reporting needs to be quick 
and easy but with enough info to allow useful communication 
6. Gov is a good example of never feeding back despite all the info sharing bodies 
CiSP, CPNI 
8. Probably depends on the source of reporting 
10. The reporting unit is not necessarily the unit under investigation  
12. If the reporting community do not receive at least acknowledgment and, hopefully, 
some recognition of contribution then there is less impetus for them to spend the time 
doing so. 
17. Users may be discouraged from reporting incidents if it is perceived that reports are 
ignored or are not appropriately prioritised. 
21. Allows other organisations to prepare and respond, particularly with technical 
threats 
26. This is the second most important success factor, after 4. People will only continue 
to report incidents if they are acknowledged and even better can see it has been useful. 
Zero feedback results in no further reporting. 
32. Depends on the context of the incident and related parties and how many it affects 
34. must be actionable and in my experience most won't share 
35. Without it, the reporting community may be inclined to give up and ask: why 
bother? It should also be part of the service’s Continuous Improvement Process.  
37. There is little point in investing time and money to establish a reporting process 
and develop a reporting culture if there is no feedback.  The reporting community will 
soon stop reporting if it is felt that their time and effort is disappearing into a 'black 
• Recognise some incidents 
may require faster feed back 
than others which may be 
less impactive but feedback 
must always be given unless 
in very specific sensitive 
incidents where the feedback 
may just be a thankyou for 
reporting. 
• reporting needs to be quick 
and easy but with enough 
info to allow useful 
communication. 
• If the reporting community 
do not receive at least 
acknowledgment and, 
hopefully, some recognition 
of contribution then there is 
less impetus for them to do 
so again. 
• People will only continue to 
report incidents if they are 
acknowledged and even 
better can see it has been 
useful. Zero feedback results 
in no further reporting. 
• The reporting community 
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 hole'. 
39. Visualisation of attacks, drill down for my organisation but provenance of attack is 
important. 
41. I think that if you used terminology such as 'business language' then it may help the 
question. Reputation is important especially when we are seen as 'black box' in the 
majority of situations. Once the reputation becomes tarnished without justification then 
this leads to mistrust and circumvention. 
43. The lack of 360 feedback relayed to the "coal face" is a continual cause of 
disgruntlement of those charged with defending the enterprise. 
53. Recent experience of CyrptoLocker incidents has required immediate action / 
notification to avoid similar incidents. 
61. What community? Needs clarification. 
63. If there is no feed back reporters cannot be expected to have confidence in the 
reporting system 
67. Feedback and thanks is given automatically to reporting staff via a tool generated 
email/message. This is an important part of encouraging staff to report security 
incidents through the **** Live Incident Assurance Management process. 
70. So they see the value in reporting, particularly if the feedback helps them - then 
they are more likely to report. 
71. Critical to disseminate details of threats, vulnerabilities and mitigations quickly. 
75. It is in the eye of the beholder what rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible is (and 
balacing between legal regulations, (local, national, European, woldwide) impact,... 
77. Feedback about "was this a useful report" more valuable to goal than "and this is 
what we did about what you reported", but both seem a little peripheral 
80. Ifthey do not get added value (in exchange) for their report, they will limit it to the 
minimum (necessity v desire) 
82. Lessons learnt are essential for practitioners to develop, this also impacts staff 
motivation. However, for management I don't see this as a crucial activity for making 
business decisions. 
87. Feedback provides incentive to contribute 
89. Ideally showing successful investigations and detections/prosecutions. Also 
showing that every organisation has a similar experience 
96. Officers that have been responsible for a security incident can at times become 
extremely anxious, sometimes unnecessarily so and it is helpful to discus with them 
what the risk (or otherwise) is and for them to be kept up to date and involved, 
will soon stop reporting if it 
is felt that their time and 
effort is disappearing into a 
'black hole'. 
• If there is no feed back 
reporters cannot be expected 
to have confidence in the 
reporting system 
• Consider auto feed back via 
reporting sysyem as a start 
of the notification process. 
Then some human 
intervention to elicit more 
detail and provide 
expectation of reporter 
• Where necessary provide 
support to the reporter if the 
impact of the incident is 
severe.  
• Feedback provides incentive 
to contribute 
 
 
10-2 
 
 including letting them know when no further action is required. Contrary to this some 
officers have a complacent attitude to what can be quite serious incidents and it is 
important to get the message across quickly to both them and their management as to 
the potential consequences to ensure the incidents are not repeated. 
98. Yes rapid reporting can help contain incidents. 
102. 102. Far too little information-sharing within and across sectors, resulting in 
insufficient timely warning and learning from other orgs' experiences, 
103. It is extremely important to have feedback - one of the most important aspects of 
the incident management process as it helps organisational learning. However, I 
questions the need for 'rapid' - it is more important to provide useful and considered 
advice back to the community, including mitigation actions, rather than just a 'it has 
happened' response. 
107. The feedback could confirm the analysis results of incidents and prevent further 
occurrence.  
110. Reportees like to feel that the effort they are making to report incidents is time 
well spent. 
114. I feel that it is important but not a critical success factor because the reporting can 
still proceed as usual even if the reporting community does not get adequate feedback. 
However if the feedback is lacking too much that might, in theory, affect the behaviour 
the reporting community. 
115. Depending upon the outcome of the following investigation, it may not be 
appropriate to share the results to all concerned.  This is common when I make reports. 
 
4. Ease of making a 
report 
1.The system must be user-friendly by being intuitive, especially with potentially 
technical incidents being reported.  An over-emphasis on the request for information on 
protocols for instance would encourage the reporter to become frustrated. 
3. reports are filled-in by volunteers 
6. Cardinal points 
10. this is vital as the majority of our users might only ever report one incident in their 
career. Plus users are inherently lazy if it is not easy they will not do it. 
12. If it is too complicated or long winded they will simply not be bothered to complete 
it. 
17. If incident reporting is difficult individuals will be less likely to submit reports. 
This may may particularly impact the reporting of near misses. 
18. Easy reporting allows user community to make early and informative reports which 
• system must be user-friendly 
by being intuitive, especially 
with potentially technical 
incidents being reported.  is 
vital as the majority of our 
users might only ever report 
one incident in their career. 
• Particular from the 
perspective of the end user.  
Need to get the balance of 
collecting all data and 
mitigations taken without 
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 in turn assists in determining and auctioning counter compromise measures 
21. Ease of use is a critical factor to determine whether people will act (Foggs 
Behaviour Model) 
24. If it is not easy making report then will discourage from making future reports 
26. People will try once, or if you are lucky, twice to make a report. If it's too difficult 
or slow, you will never hear from them again. Everything else then becomes irrelevant. 
29. In order to increase reporting the process must be easy 
32. Simple reporting mechanisms should be in place that are not too onerous and which 
may thwart coming forward. 
34. anonymity often key 
35. Ease is often proportional to inclination to use. If it were a Critical Success Factor, 
how would you measure it to know it’s done?  
37. The reporting process should be as easy and quick as possible if it is to gain 
acceptance within the workplace.  Todays society is very much a 'three click' culture 
from the ubiquitous web way of life, especially with the Gen Y and Z groups, which is 
encroaching all aspects of life.  Therefore, simplicity and ease of use is the key to a 
successful take-up of a new process. 
43. Reports should be aimed at a specific audience, however it is important the 
subtlety and severity of an incident is not lost on the senior management when 
reporting "up". Painting a picture of "everything is rosy because we've fixed it" is not 
advisable. 
45. If it is difficult, especially with medium to high volume they simply wont  do it.  
50. This is extremely important, if it isn't easy for users to report incidents and events 
then they will probably not be bothered to do so. 
53. Depends on underlying perspective of the question but the reporting mechanism 
is varied and so considered less critical.  The mechanism for early reporting / alerting / 
communication across the organisation is paramount. 
59. Particular from the perspective of the end user.  Need to get the balance of 
collecting all data and mitigations taken without turning them off to the process. 
62. As an example, we have seen the reporting of phishing rocket within the 
organisation when we created a simple Outlook "button" to report the phish in the 
moment of its detection by the recipient. 
63. Action Fraud is not user friendly and does not allow for the reporting of incidents 
which did not result in a loss or at least did not when I last tried to report something. 
turning them off to the 
process. 
• The most important factor is 
knowing who to communicate 
with and how 
• Consider having several 
reporting means available if 
the organisation set up makes 
a one stop shop difficult. 
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 So it is pretty useless as an intelligence gathering tool. 
67. Over the past 8 years HMRC have used an Incident Reporting Tool which 
automates parts of the incident management process. On introduction of the system 
there was a marked increase in reports made by staff as it made the reporting of 
incidents easier. 
70. Mixed feelings about CSF, but on balance I think it is. 
71. Detailed techie bits can follow using other channels 
75. But a requirement is that the report is spread within a selected group  on a need to 
know basis and that they all know how to handle this kind of information. 
77. This should include the follow up activities - if the reporter is suddenly going to 
find their diary full of meeting invites after hitting "send" or the inbox overflowing, 
then that is a negative 
80. Of course the report should not be too complicated. But there is always a different 
view from the reporter (as little as necessary) to the receiver (as much info to asses the 
situation) 
82. The report is crucial to the success of alerting people as to the severity of the 
incident but is not necessarily critical for measuring success. 
96. The most important factor is knowing who to communicate with and how. The 
mechanism thereafter (e.g. complexity of any paperwork) does not seem as relevant as 
some officers seem incapable of completing the simplest of forms yet others will 
produce minute detail including further information such as photos, downloads & scans 
etc. 
101. I think a lot of people are put off reporting cybercrime/incidents because they do 
not know where or how to report it. 
103. Must have a method by which reporting is easy - preferably having several 
reporting means available. 
107. This will allow the security staff to make report promptly.  
114. I feel that all parties involved benefit from a proper report which at a minimum 
concludes the key aspects of the incident and how it was handled. 
115. It is essential to make reporting as simple and straight forward as possible 
otherwise, busy people may avoid reporting. 
 
 
11. A recognition 
by senior 
1. The only factor that this would influence is the blame culture that can exist and 
therefore the "thirst for blood" that can sometimes follow an incident.  Even if senior 
• critical if you want reporting 
to be seen positively and not 
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 management that 
incidents will 
happen 
management did recognise that security incidents were going to happen then would this 
influence people to report them? It probably wouldn't make a difference in my view.  
Slightly facetious but a large share of security incidents are committed by senior 
management anyway (note did not score as CSF) 
4. Yes critical if you want reporting to be seen positively and not punitive. 
And an antidote to  "It wouldn't happen here" syndrome 
6. Management buy in is essential today 
10. Whilst keen to see a reduction in incident we cant say whether any reduction in 
reports is a reduction in incidents or a reduction in reporting. We should be looking at 
eradicating the avoidable incidents and reducing the impact of the inevitable ones 
12. The senior management must have an understanding of the possible incidents and 
the potential impact they could have to ensure the issue is treated appropriately and 
staff see the drive from their management. 
15. Plus the recognition that often no one is to blame, in some cases you simply have to 
accept the attacker was better than your defenses, and the mode of attack could not 
have been predicted with the budget/resource level assigned. 
17. Yes, otherwise there is a danger that insufficient effort and preparation will be 
undertaken by the organisation to support incident reporting and management. 
18. This requirement is supported by ISO27001:2013 
21. It is important to understand that risk can't be reduced to zero. Removing the 
human factor just leads to excessive technical or procedural controls which unduly 
impacts on operational effectiveness and can alienate people. 
32. Top down understanding awareness and the willingness to support the incident 
process is key. This supports a culture which is accepting and where incidents are very 
much handled correctly, learned from and the actions forthcoming from them will 
reduce or mitigate future occurrences. 
35. Important, yes. If it were not a Critical Success factor it would soon come about of 
its own accord. 
37. The security culture of an organisation is a reflection of the security ethos of the 
senior management.  There should not be a blame culture, but a training culture  If an 
incident was internally generated, did the person responsible receive the correct 
guidance beforehand to prevent it? 
Did the incident occur as a result of a previously unknown vulnerability, if so, what is 
being done to remove that vulnerability?  
39. Senior management are fickle and crass. They pay lip-service to security in general. 
punitive. 
• recognition that often no one 
is to blame, 
• It is important to understand 
that risk can't be reduced to 
zero. 
• security culture of an 
organisation is a reflection 
of the security ethos of the 
senior management.  There 
should not be a blame 
culture, but a training culture 
• Mistakes will happen even 
in the best of systems. The 
expectation of perfection is 
counter productive. 
• There must be no fear of 
reprisals when reporting and 
no blindness to the need to 
respond well to incidents. 
An organisation which 
handles an incident well 
enhances its reputation 
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 Greater governance is required with communities of interest being the focus of incident 
management. 
42. People need to be sure they won't be blamed or stigmatized after making a report. 
43. I think expectation management - and a lack of crisis management is key here. 
45. Mistakes will happen even in the best of systems. The expectation of perfection is 
counter productive. 
50. No matter how much technical or procedural security you impose on staff at the 
end of the day staff are only human and incidents will always occur which management 
need to be aware of. It is the response procedure that is important. 
53. This has to be a CSF as any thing else is avoiding the truth.  Sadly experience is 
that they have to experience a "reality" moment, serious incident, before they come to 
this realisation. 
62. Again this is related to the blame culture (question 6) though a slightly different 
aspect. There must be no fear of reprisals when reporting and no blindness to the need 
to respond well to incidents. An organisation which handles an incident well enhances 
its reputation (remember Commercial Union after the St Mary Axe bomb?) while one 
which handles it poorly ... well, think TalkTalk. 
66. get their heads out of the sand to release funds to mitigate risk 
67. Organisationally this has not always been the case, however in recent times there is 
a recognition from the top down that these things do sometimes happen. 
70. Part of the cultural issues around blame and recognising that people are human and 
make mistakes or do stupid things (and often the wrong thing for what they perceive as 
the right reason). 
75. And that they accept and can explain why the accept ( Financial, 100% ia not 
possible, risk based approach,is very important,...etc) 
77. Ought to be obvious, but... 
80. If your management does not understand about incidents they do not want to have 
any reporting. And they should see the added value. 
85. Incidents like accidents are part of life and business. What is important is trying to 
overcome or reduce to zero the impact or chances of an incident occurring, rather 
ensuring that sufficiently robust as well as exercised  procedures are in place to recover 
from an incident when …. (cannot be read as a scanned copy) 
87. If 100% prevention is unachievable, containment/ repair is needed. 
89. Ideally senior managers are engaged in this. More likely they are advised by 
someone. In some cases security stll happens despite senior management. 
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 91. It depends of matter of incidents, It is difrent for whole system incident or incident 
of part of system. 
98. Senior management support is vital to manage incidents. 
103. As stated above -  feedback and learning is fundamental to the incident 
management process. Previous answer re feedback in brackets  (It is extremely 
important to have feedback - one of the most important aspects of the incident 
management process as it helps organisational learning. However, I questions the need 
for 'rapid' - it is more important to provide useful and considered advice back to the 
community, including mitigation actions, rather than just a 'it has happened' response.) 
107.  The senior management should be aware the incidents to prepare necessary 
resources to prevent the incidents.  
115. If senior management do not sponsor and openly demonstrate their support for 
security incident reporting within an organization the risks increase significantly 
 
116. This is the real crux we are seeing.  CEOs are employing CISO level folks on the 
(wrong) presumption that they will solve /address all identified risks - and indeed the 
unidentified ones too and, if they don't, it's the CISO who must fall on their sword - in 
spite of the fact that the business will have been found wanting and will have made a 
risk based decision to not adequately address the identified risk. 
 
 
13. Incident 
analysis that 
considers root 
causes and wider 
systems/processes 
and not just the 
initial impact 
assessment 
3. it's the real plus-value of the IM 
6.The incident may be just a symptom of a larger organisational malaise 
10. This impacts on policy developments and alternative solutions 
12. To some degree this varies depending on the severity of the incident simply due to 
time and resource availability.  More serious issues require consideration of root causes 
and process impact in order to avoid a repeat in the future. 
17. Without an appreciation of the root cause behind incidents, successful prevention / 
avoidance of future incidents will be less likely. 
21. Otherwise the same problem is likely to occur again. 
29. Understand root causes to reduce the chances of reoccurrence 
32. How do you know what the problem actually relates to unless you get to the root 
cause, key to any analysis performed and will hopefully provide the business with 
suitable protections going forward to ensure incidents are not repeated or their impact 
is reduced by appropriate controls being put in place learned from previous issues 
• The incident may be just a 
symptom of a larger 
organisational malaise 
• Without an appreciation of 
the root cause behind 
incidents, successful 
prevention / avoidance of 
future incidents will be less 
likely. 
• Understand root causes to 
reduce the chances of 
reoccurrence 
• Whilst understanding the 
immediate impact of an 
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 35. I have always considered this a “standard” part of problem analysis.  
However this can’t be done for every security incident so perhaps you are looking at 
the higher-risk category?  
37. Whilst understanding the immediate impact of an incident is important, getting to 
the root cause that led to the incident occurring is more important to ensure better 
prevention/mitigation measures are implemented or, at least, the risks are better 
understood. 
39. Consideration is fine - how does that translate into strategy? Without this piece it is 
a futile exercise. 
43. In my opinion, any incident management or impact assessment process which 
doesn't conduct some form of RCA, is simply a papering over the cracks exercise. 
44. The risk assessment results should always be communicated to the Management. 
Most higher level incident reports should be aknowledged to the Management. 
Periodic statistics of incidents should be provided to the Management. 
50. An excellent idea if this can be achieved. 
51. The analysis methodology does not really affect the incident reporting process, 
except where it is perceived as so poor as to be useless and thereby discourages 
potential reporting. 
If the question were broadened to cover critical success factors for incident 
management rather than just reporting then this factor would become substantially 
more important. 
53. Fundamental to any Incident Response service. 
61. In most organisations, incident response teams will be constrained by available 
effort and will not be able to do this for all incidents. 
62. This is crucial to understanding what actually contributed to an incident. Fact, not 
fantasy or assumption. 
66. Root cause analysis essential otherwise repeats can occur as root not found means 
report highly likely 
67. Incident management is not critical to incident reporting. 
75. This is up to the organisation. 
77. Might be drifting outside of scope of topic, if in scope then as stated. 
80. Desirable but most often not shared. Unfortunately obligatory reporting will be 
reduced the minimum. But that information would be helpful to others. 
82. This is a secondary consideration and a business decision depending on whether 
they want to carry such risks. I think a security team needs to be able to articulate the 
incident is important, getting 
to the root cause that led to 
the incident occurring is 
more important to ensure 
better prevention/mitigation 
measures are implemented 
or, at least, the risks are 
better understood. 
• Deal with the disease, not 
just the symptoms. 
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 risk in a way that is understood by the organisation. This might be financial or 
reputational etc... 
87. Deal with the disease, not just the symptoms. 
89. In many cases the early response is dominated by tech issues. (eg an infection from 
a USB stick).Without determined intervention the behaviour of staff and attackers is 
overlooked when that is of central importance 
98. Lessons learnt and post incident reviews will help to ensure continuous 
improvement is implemented to ensure incidents are not repeated and if they are, can 
be managed appropriately. 
107.  The initial evaluation process may need to assess the root causes of incident.  
110. The more incident reports the better because you have an understanding of what is 
going on in your organisation. 
114. In order to establish efficient management of incidents the root causes should 
always be considered and analyzed. I feel that certain incidents can be handled with 
success without analyzing the root causes. Depending on what counter-measures the 
organisation is able to implement the incident might never appear again. However an 
analysis of the root cause is almost always recommended. 
 
 
Possible CSF Comments made (respondent number) Useful wording to consider 
2.  Collection of 
reports of ‘near 
misses’ as well as 
actual incidents  
 
1. Provides the full picture and can be useful to highlight any possible lack of 
knowledge or lack of procedures that individuals or organisations may have. 
4. Psychologically lessons from near misses are often more potent than those after an 
incident and the damage has been done. 
6. Those in charge of risk need to know the whole picture 
10. I struggle to define a near miss;.whilst an incident may have no impact, it usually 
involves a breach of policy and is therefore still an incident. As well as assigning a risk 
rating which asseses impact and likelihood we also apply an assessed breach level for 
sanction purposes which looks at the actions of the person, not the impact of the 
incident. 
12. Near misses can provide useful trend information that may result in action being 
taken to avoid potential actual incidents. 
15. Needed to build a bigger picture, e.g., looking for evidence of a sustained attack. 
17. Provides an opportunity to address near miss incidents such that future real security 
• Near misses can provide 
useful trend information that 
may result in action being 
taken to avoid potential actual 
incidents. 
• collection of near miss data 
provides valuable trend 
information which can result 
in actions being undertaken to 
minimise future incidents. 
• Prevention better than cure, as 
they say. By analysing near 
misses it will hopefully avoid 
a full blown incident. 
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 incidents may be avoided. 
18. collection of near miss data provides valuable trend information which can result in 
actions being undertaken to minimise future incidents. 
21. This helps to inform the lessons learned or could indicate a persistent threat. 
29. Prevention better than cure, as they say. By analysing near misses it will hopefully 
avoid a full blown incident.  
32. For trend analysis, near misses can be grouped across several locations, themes and 
may aggregated be an incident as a whole.  In trends this may show repeated activity 
which needs to be dealt with or rising impact. 
34. much can be learnt from both your own and others near misses. near misses are 
easier to share too. 
35. Lots of places collect violations and other potential incidents, but all too often do 
not do anything with them. Question asked about collection and not review. Had you 
asked about both then it would be a Critical Success Factor.  
37. If anything, this should be considered more important than actual incidents.  This is 
the opportunity to take action to avoid future incidents and real damage. 
39. How is a near miss determined? Subjective and dependent on experience. 
42. Could risk collecting too much information, which would slow down the analysis. 
43. Understanding a "near miss" should promote discussion - and potentially action 
about what could happen in event of an incident. 
44. Reports of "near misses" should only be considered as important if the "near miss" 
was prevented by a man' s will and would not have been auto-prevented by an already 
applied technical measure. 
45. The more data the easier it is to determine a pattern. 
47. Analysis of near misses as well as of actual incidents helps you understand how 
robust (or otherwise) your security systems are. 
50. It is vital to collect this information as it could help prevent any potential future 
major incident occurring. 
53. Identify all potentially critical events to maintain where / what is causing current 
threats are coming from and which measures are effective at mitigating. 
61. Important but not a CSF as not vital. How do you capture this information and can 
you justify the effort? 
62. We have found that collecting and analysing near misses in the safety space is 
crucial to understanding where interventions can be made before a major problem 
occurs. We are still learning how to apply that lesson to security incidents but the 
• much can be learnt from both 
your own and others near 
misses. near misses are easier 
to share too. 
• Question asked about 
collection and not review. 
Had you asked about both 
then it would be a Critical 
Success Factor.  
• If anything, this should be 
considered more important 
than actual incidents.  This is 
the opportunity to take action 
to avoid future incidents and 
real damage 
• Reports of "near misses" 
should only be considered as 
important if the "near miss" 
was prevented by a man' s 
will and would not have been 
auto-prevented by an already 
applied technical measure.  In 
other words a detected virus 
or Trojan is not a near miss 
but a failed signature and a 
member of staff recognising 
strange behaviour in a 
message that prevented 
execution of malware is a near 
miss. 
• The more data the easier it is 
to determine a pattern. 
• We have found that collecting 
and analysing near misses in 
the safety space is crucial to 
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 safety experience suggests it will be crucial to sustainable management of incidents. 
63. It follows from the above (the respondents answer to Element 1. But only up to a 
point. There should not be an automatic default to discipline/regulation but that is not 
to say that some response may be appropriate in the worst cases. It 
might, for example, involve retraining. But disciplinary action, in the first instance, 
should apply to failure to report)  that this is a 1. The aviation industry culture of 
collectiv responsibiity to identify shortcomings is the desirable outcome. 
67. Definition provided includes near misses and operations within **** (name 
removed). 
71. Though difficult to define a "near miss" accurately and has obvious resource 
implications. 
75. These kind of information has to be shared with a specific group for coherency and 
to see the bigger picture ( not only a a small scale but as well for a bigger picture) 
80. Near misses are difficult to determine. They go unnoticed by the outside. It needs 
tremendous trust to report them, as there will be consequences without an incident that 
needed consequences. 
81. I see this as a tool for justifying business cases. Arguably a near miss is not an 
incident and therefore should not broadly reported to avoid knee jerk reactions. But 
being able to highlight numbers in a monthly report might be valuable. 
78. Information security is provided by a series of layers, with no single layer 100% 
penetration proof. 
89. From an attacker’s point of view there is little difference. In one case dealt with we 
suffered tens of near misses before we suffered actual damage.  
96. ear misses in relation to security are as important as near misses in relation to 
Health & Safety and can flag up organisational learning and/ or a change in policy & 
procedure to ensure that near misses do not, on other occasions, turn into major 
incidents. Reporting of near misses also illustrates the level of understanding amongst 
the orgaisation of security issues and therefore acts as feedback on the departments 
ability to communicate. 
98. Useful information for trend analysis and post incident reviews.  Reports of 'near 
misses' can also help identify the required preventive measures that need to be in put in 
place to deal with such incidents before they become actual incidents. 
102. Very few organisations have effective (blame-free) near-miss reporting, but  it is a 
key characteristic of a  mature approach to incident and risk management. 
103. Near misses are just as important - as they could identify potential weakness and 
understanding where 
interventions can be made 
before a major problem 
occurs. We are still learning 
how to apply that lesson to 
security incidents but the 
safety experience suggests it 
will be crucial to sustainable 
management of incidents. 
• Near misses in relation to 
security are as important as 
near misses in relation to 
Health & Safety and can flag 
up organisational learning 
and/ or a change in policy & 
procedure to ensure that near 
misses do not, on other 
occasions, turn into major 
incidents. Reporting of near 
misses also illustrates the 
level of understanding 
amongst the organisation of 
security issues and therefore 
acts as feedback on the 
department’s ability to 
communicate. 
• Reports of 'near misses' can 
also help identify the required 
preventive measures that need 
to be in put in place to deal 
with such incidents before 
they become actual incidents. 
• Near misses are just as 
important - as they could 
identify potential weakness 
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 indicate where a breach may occur again. 
107. The report of actual incident should be considered as important to understand the 
reality of incidents.  
110. Near misses are the misses of tomorrow and tracking and analysing near misses 
can be critical in stopping bad things before they happen. 
114. It would give a good insight in what measures are effective and working and 
which measures are not working as intended. It could also be used to study what 
measures need "tweaking" or improvement and in which way theese tweaks should be 
implemented. 
115. Reporting of near miss events enables lessons to be learned in the interests of 
incident and breach prevention in the same manner as H&S events. 
 
and indicate where a breach 
may occur again. 
• Reporting of near miss events 
enables lessons to be learned 
in the interests of incident and 
breach prevention in the same 
manner as H&S events. 
 
   
7.  
 
Mandatory 
reporting  
 
1. People brushing incidents under the carpet only provides a false picture of the overall 
security culture and can drastically undermine our work to become more secure. 
4. There has to be a fall-back position that says if nothing else you have to report to 
"this" level or when"this" occurs.  This should act as a benchmark that can be raised 
over time but will provide minimum assurance. 
10. Sanction action should be taken at those that do not. Without comprehensive 
reporting trend analysis is meaningless, corporate lessons cannot be identified and 
counter compromise and mediation action may not be taken correctly. We always 
stress that we can’t help if we do not know about it. 
12. Staff should be reporting because of the value of doing so rather than because they 
have to although I acknowledge in some cases that may not always be possible and 
some degree of mandatory reporting may be required. 
17. Whilst it should be made clear all users are required to report security incidents and 
near-misses, other factors such as ease of reporting and the supportiveness of the 
organisation will have a strong influence on whether issues are actually reported. 
18. Staff should report because of the value of doing so, however mandatory 
requirements (‘should’ may be missing here) provide guidance and consistency. 
21. A question I had difficulty with. There are many examples where reporting should 
be mandatory but I also think a manager should have some discretion to deal locally 
with minor issues such as not locking computer screens or complying with the clear 
desk policy.  
I would like the option of a very simple incident report that does require a details 
• brushing incidents under the 
carpet only provides a false 
picture of the overall security 
• Sanction action should be 
taken at those that do not 
report not those who do. 
• Staff should report because of 
the value of doing so not just 
because it is mandated 
• the supportiveness of the 
organisation will have a 
strong influence on whether 
issues are actually reported. 
• There are many examples 
where reporting should be 
mandatory but I also think a 
manager should have some 
discretion to deal locally with 
minor issues such as not 
locking computer screens or 
complying with the clear desk 
policy. 
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 submission or need to identify the perpetrator. They would just be for stats purposes to 
identify patterns, such as challenging somebody that didn't have an access pass 
displayed .   
32. Cannot learn and mitigate unless you know something has happened, preventative 
actions cannot be put in place to learn from this.  
34. while difficulties exist if reporting was made wide spread more learning would 
result in better defences. Not simple to put in place though. 
37. This most definitely should be a key policy.  The difficulty lies in how it can be 
enforced and monitored.  Inevitably, as with all aspects of corporate life, judgement 
calls will be made by individuals and management as to whether a situation is an 
incident or not.  Furthermore, this policy may adversely impact response teams if not 
sufficiently resourced. 
39. The decision to report should not be optional. 
41. It all depends on the frame of reference on mandatory. Over reporting needs to be 
considered on the effectiveness of users to respond if they are having to report minor 
incidents. If there was a way of making the mandatory reporting easier i.e. yes/no 
single answer approach then absolutely. narrative for spam type incidents will only 
hamper efforts unless they are targeted incidents. 
42. If many users were targeted, then only a few need make a report.  Mandatory 
reporting could lead to too much information and slow the analysis process. 
43. I think severity is the key here. Incidents which are localised and can be managed at 
the lowest level may not warrant a mandatory reporting (escalation) process, 
particularly if the wider organisation is not affected. 
44. The importance of an incident is mainly directly decided by the organization's 
administration with respect to the persons involved, the impact it had and the general 
circumstances of the incident. 
The purpose of the reporting is the identification of an incident in order to take specific 
technical measures to rapidly recover the loss or restrain the impact.  
The risk assessment is a procedure which mainly indicates the general (not incident 
specific) technical measures to be taken or remaining risk to be accepted by the 
Organization.  
A standardized risk assessment should exist in any case, in order to give more objective 
aspect of the impact of all risks, and be taken into account in cases where difficult and 
expensive countermeasures, or discipline penalties are to be applied. 
45. You can’t fix what you do not know about. 
• It would be better if reporting 
occurred because it was easier 
and seen of benefit before 
mandation. 
• Incidents which are localised 
and can be managed at the 
lowest level may not warrant 
a mandatory reporting 
(escalation) process, 
particularly if the wider 
organisation is not affected. 
• The purpose of the reporting 
is the identification of an 
incident in order to take 
specific measures to rapidly 
recover the loss or restrain the 
impact. 
• even if the reporting is 
mandatory the actual reports 
will be affected by how the 
staff are met when reporting 
incidents. 
• Mandatory training on 
incident management is 
fundamental to ensure all 
personnel understand and 
adhere to the security 
requirements and are aware of 
the incident management 
process. 
•  
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 47. To be effective, all incidents and near misses must be reported. 
50. Where possible this should be implemented and staff who fail to report on major or 
moderate incidents should be challenged and disciplined where appropriate. 
53. For most organisations this is or will be come a mandatory requirement.  Always 
keep one eye on future requirements and build in to current culture at the earliest 
opportunity. 
55. hum - the mandatory reporting MIGHT be to a very closed stakeholder group. 
61. But difficult to implement unless enforced legally or by a regulatory body. 
Interesting implications with new EU directive. 
63. How would it be enforced? 
67. Essential to **** (name removed). 
70. Mixed feelings on this, not least because just mandating it doesn't mean it will 
happen.  There has to be a reason to report it (and 'because you say I have to' is not a 
reason). 
71. Needs to be a mandatory condition of membership of any community. 
72. Depends on the sector and the effort available. If either all incidents are high 
impact, or you have sufficient resource that handling all incidents won't distract you 
from the high impact ones, then maybe. 
77. Needs to be very clear about what to report, when to report, and the level of 
certainty that actually a security incident needs to have for it to be mandatory. 
80. Voluntary reporting works only in highly trusted working-level environments. As 
soon as the lawyers and compliance officers come in, there is no voluntary reporting. 
82. I don't really understand what this means, if an incident was similar to a prior one 
and occurs regularly I would argue that there would be limited value in reporting more 
than its occurrence. It really depends on the content of the report. 
85. Making something mandatory brings the risk of it becoming perceived as a burden. 
At present where cyber security is not backed up by legislation I think it is difficult to 
make a company’s procedures mandatory. I consider ‘reward’ and ‘cajoling’ a better 
option. 
87. Only of use where the incident cannot be concealed! 
89. Many organisations (most? all??) see a security problem as a threat to their 
reputation. I see this as the primary reason for failing to report.  
96. It's important, and is a requirement in the organisation - potentially it might not be 
100% enforceable. 
98. Mandatory training on incident management is fundamental to ensure all personnel 
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 understand and adhere to the security requirements and are aware of the incident 
management process. 
101. Many victims of cybercrime do not actually perceive themselves to have been the 
victim of a crime and, therefore, do not report it. 
E.g. An individual has their credit card cloned on a website.  They report fraudulent 
payments to their bank, which refunds them the money.  The individual ultimately 
suffers no financial loss and does not consider themselves a victim of crime, therefore, 
not reporting it to the police. 
103. Difficult to define boundaries as to what is and what isn't an incident. If mandated, 
then will show that incident reporting is important to the organisation. 
107. Mandatory reporting could sometimes work since some security staff has a 
tendency to hide the incident due to some reasons.  
110. People rarely do what is mandated and they will spend more time nuancing their 
understanding of the mandation or re-reading guidance to find a reason not to report 
than they will reporting 
114. I believe that #7 is highly related to #6 (individuals should be thanked), even if the 
reporting is mandatory the actual reports will be affected by how the staff are met when 
reporting incidents. 
115. Failure to report means that risk cannot be mitigated and counter compromise 
action cannot be undertaken therefore mandatory reporting is essential. 
116. Likely to be coming with intended regulatory changes anyway....so it's better to 
"be prepared"! 
   
8. 
 
Standardised risk 
assessment (to 
determine the 
impact of the 
incident)  
 
1.See answers 4 & 5.  Again, making the process easier will prevent people from 
become frustrated with the reporting scheme.  The system should be as simple as 
possible. 
4. Yes for the same reason as Q5. (With a diverse community such as Policing you 
need a common set of standards and variables to assess incoming incidents and 
levels of harm involved) 
I have started referring to the level of Harm or Potential Harm, rather than risk. 
10. It is important to rank incidents against each other, but where we struggle is that we 
use the same reporting process for all types of incident (info, cyber, physical, 
personnel etc) and it is pretty impossible to come up with one risk assessment 
process that can be applied to them all.  
12. Certainly in our sector the vast diversity of security incidents would make it 
• With a diverse community 
such as ******** you need a 
common set of standards and 
variables to assess incoming 
incidents and levels of harm 
involved 
• Recognise is pretty impossible 
to come up with one risk 
assessment process that can 
be applied to them all 
• Certainly in our sector the 
vast diversity of security 
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 impossible to standardise a risk assessment covering all types. 
15. The importance should be inherent in the organisation culture, so this is a core part 
of doing business.  Mandating it could act as a reverse incentive, with people turning 
a blind eye to suspect activity. 
17. Not critical though where a number of methods are used it would be undesirable if 
different methods generated very different impact determinations. 
18.diversity of security incidents in our sector (‘Law Enforcement’) would make 
standardisation difficult. 
21. There are advantages to standardise within a single organisation but not more 
widely. 
32. All incidents and their contexts are different and a standard risk assessment applied 
to all may be out of context and all stakeholders and related partners and affected 
systems may not be able to be quickly determined. 
34. Every assessment is different but a standard approach, if comprehensive and 
flexible would make it easier to do well. 
35. Only an experienced professional can do it freeform.  
Done carefully, standardised can reduce the reservation expressed in #5 (A “3” score. 
Standardising helps ensure consistent quality of the sought information. However, it 
can mean omission of important detail if it doesn’t fit on the standard report. ) to a 
reasonable level.  
37. Standardised risk assessment helps to maintain consistency and perspective when 
assessing risks.  This will allow individuals and lower management to understand 
what risks they can tolerate and what risks need to be escalated, terminated or 
transferred.  It also allows senior management to understand their overall risk and 
prioritise activities for risk reduction, or tolerate as necessary. 
39. These turn into box ticking exercises and add little value as staff are seen as 
blockers. 
43. Providing there is sufficient room to accommodate "free text" in which subtle 
nuances can be articulated or clarified. 
50. Again my view would be that for major or medium incidents then "yes" it would be 
beneficial for someone to carry out a risk assessment but probably not worthwhile 
for incidents deemed as a low category. However it may be that unless the RA is 
completed then an incident would not be able to be assessed easily. 
51. The risk assessment methodology does not really affect the incident reporting 
process, except where it is perceived as so poor as to be useless and thereby 
incidents would make it 
impossible to standardise a 
risk assessment covering all 
types. 
• diversity of security incidents 
in our sector (********) 
would make standardisation 
difficult. 
• There are advantages to 
standardise within a single 
organisation but not more 
widely. 
• Providing there is sufficient 
room to accommodate "free 
text" in which subtle nuances 
can be articulated or clarified. 
• Standardized across the 
enterprise, but not necessarily 
the industry,  as numerous 
methodologies are available. 
• Including categorisation into 
"Accidental" or "Deliberate" 
and "Internal" or "External" 
source. Also essential to 
report if the current incident is 
identical or similar to an 
earlier incident. 
•  there are possibly too many 
individual factors and 
situations to be able to fit into 
one standard assessment. 
•  
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 discourages potential reporting. 
If the question were broadened to cover critical success factors for incident 
management rather than just reporting then this factor would become substantially 
more important. 
53. The use of std risk assessment model is required beyond the incident impact.  It is 
the means by which an organisation can measure the current (security) state and plan 
for an ever evolving future state. 
54. Standardized across the enterprise, but not necessarily the industry,  as numerous 
methodologies are available   
67. **** (name removed) has a standardised assessment of customer impact. This 
includes standardisation of serious and non-serious incidents.  
We do not consider these as risk assessments but impact assessments and the more 
serious. The less serious being dealt with by the manager and more serious with 
**** dealing with the incident. 
71. Including categorisation into "Accidental" or "Deliberate" and "Internal" or 
"External" source. Also essential to report if the current incident is identical or 
similar to an earlier incident. 
75. It is up to the specific organisation. They knwo their business  and a baseline for 
RA is not oppertuun (window dressing) 
77. A reasonable effort assessment would be useful, but the "interesting" risks are 
likely to be outside of what any standard envisages. 
80. If not consistent then whats the point... The impact certainly needs to be 
incorporated but to my mind that is different to standardisation. 
85. this will ignore the fact that risk is different and unique to each environment. 
Enterprise and entity. Developing a standard risk assessment would significantly 
impact its effectiveness, potentially negating the very purpose it was created for. 
87. Not quite sure what this means: select from a list of impact ratings or follow laid-
down guidance on what rating to apply. 
89. Difficult to do consistency is almost impossible. HMG impact levels helped but 
still remain vague. National ****** information threat model, looks valid from 
London, and ******** but less so in ******** (smaller locations) 
96. Risk assessment does take place but whilst there are currently risk assessment tools 
that are useful there are possibly too many individual factors and situations to be 
able to fit into one standard assessment. Sometimes the risks are too organic to fit 
into a linear template. 
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 98. Regular risk assessment reviews help to ensure incident can be identified, and 
detected and appropriate preventive controls are in place.  This can be used to help 
with impact assessment.  Also helps to identify/determine what controls are in place 
already and what new ones may be required for reactive mode should incident occur.  
103. It is important that each incident goes through the same assessment so that it can 
be graded on its seriousness and impact, or potential impact, on the organisation. 
110. Yes, but there needs to be a fudge factor, some things just don't fit the formula and 
you need to acknowledge that.    
115. Risk and impact assessment essential as part of post event and incident 
management criteria.  An initial standard approach will enable comparison of similar 
incidents and facilitate fact based resolution. 
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Round two Comments made by respondents relating to the four CSF’s 
 
Critical Success Factors Round 2  
CSF     (suggested changes following comments 
in Red) 
Comments made (respondent number) Notes on comments  P 
= Positive N= Negative   
O=Other general 
comment  
   
 
1. Original wording (Element 3) 
 
Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible 
feedback to the reporting community 
 
1a. Amended wording:   
 
Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible 
feedback to the reporting community1 
recognising: 
 
1. People will only continue to report 
incidents if they are acknowledged and, 
even better, can see that reporting has 
been useful or has ensured compliance 
2. Feedback need not be detailed, often a 
simple acknowledgement of the report 
and that action is being taken may be 
sufficient. 
3. Staff that have been responsible for or 
(2)  Staff in the Police Service can become extremely anxious where they are 
involved in a security incident due to the potential of involving Professional 
Standards Departments and timely feedback is essential to alleviate the 
anxiety 
(6)  
Two points: 
• These are more qualifying points rather than improvements per se. 
• It might have been more useful to score each of the bullets. For 
instance, I would have given the first bullet a 5, second bullet a 3 and 
the third bullet a 2. 
(7) Being available to discuss an issue is important; people tend to focus on 
impact, not always overall risk, and articulating that can be important.  
(8) The constraints are valid, but including them I feel detracts from the 
message that shared information can benefit all 
(12) Not sure the ‘unnecessarily so’ statement is necessary as this may 
demean. 
(13) Bullet points supporting the main wording explain why this is important 
(17) Additional clarification I regard as useful as it will guide implementation 
of any relevant incident reporting process and supporting system. 
(32)  
 Feedback need not be detailed – This depends on the individual concerned, 
(2)P 
 
 
 
 
(6) O 
 
 
 
 
(7)P 
 
(8) O 
 
(12) O  wording 
amended 
(13) P 
 
(17) P 
 
(32) O 
1 Community being the one that your organisation may belong to law enforcement, finance, healthcare etc. 
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 involved in a security incident can at 
times become extremely anxious, 
sometimes unnecessarily so and it is 
helpful to discus with them what the 
risk/impact  (or otherwise) is and for 
them to be kept up to date and involved. 
4. Alternative wording for 3 Staff that have 
been responsible/involved in a security 
incident can become anxious. It is 
helpful to keep them informed and 
provide support where necessary 
 
Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible 
feedback to the reporting community2 
recognising: 
 
1. People will only continue to report 
incidents if they are acknowledged and, 
even better, can see that reporting has 
been useful or has ensured compliance 
2. Feedback need not be detailed, often a 
simple acknowledgement of the report 
and that action is being taken may be 
sufficient. 
3. Alternative wording for 3 Staff that have 
been responsible for or involved in a 
security incident can become anxious. 
It is helpful to keep them informed and 
provide support where necessary 
 
 
there are some who may take personal interest and ownership of the problem 
and like it to be dealt with and regard any corporate involvement as should be 
in tune with their reasons for reporting the first place.  In the context of the 
amended wording, this potentially contradicts the first point. 
 
Staff that have been responsible – If they are at “fault” they may be fearful of 
their position so unsure whether this point fully encompasses and benefits the 
individual concerned and you are concentrating on the risk and not taking into 
account personal side to them. 
(36) Agree with all this. 
 
Not sure if you have come across the NIST Draft Special Publication (SP) 
800-150, Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing - that might be 
something that interests you - more details at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsDrafts.html (see SP 800-150) 
(37) This remains highly important as users tend to be the first observers of 
an incident and as such should be encouraged to raise reports at the earliest 
opportunity.  The provision of feedback both to the individual and the wider 
community demonstrates the corporate benefit of such reporting and that 
follow-up activity to resolve the incident does take place.  This provides the 
reporter with a sense of involvement and of 'doing the right thing'. 
(45) While I agree with the statement, there should also be a mechanism for 
anonymous reporting and anonymous feedback. There are liability issues to 
be considered with regard to reporting. Obviously with anonymous reporting 
and feedback there will have to be a vetting mechanism to ensure that the 
anonymous intelligence is from a reliable source. The reporter of anonymous 
intelligence should also have the ability to rate the reliability of their source 
intelligence. 
(47) I feel the revised wording makes clearer what this element is trying to 
achieve and therefore am happy to amend my original answer to agree this as 
a Critical Success Factor 
(50) It is definitely valuable to feedback to those reporting incidents as to 
what action is being taken to address it and also depending on the nature and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(36) P 
 
 
 
 
 
(37) P 
 
 
 
 
(45) P  Also added 
suggestion for 
anonymous reporting 
 
 
 
 
(47) P  Note previously 
the respondent in 
Delphi 1 said it was not 
a CSF and now as a 
result of the changes 
has indicated they now 
2 Community being the one that your organisation may belong to law enforcement, finance, healthcare etc. 
10-21 
 
                                                          
 severity of the incidents to ensure that the person/s who caused the incidents 
are kept up to date of events. 
(53) An initial simple acknowledgement (thanks) with an outcome feedback 
to all involved is recommended.  Engaging with those responsible will 
happen anyway and it is a matter of corp policy on how softly this is handled. 
(55) I think that the headline wording needs to remain fairly concise.  I am 
happy that it can be qualified (but only when that qualification enhances - not 
dilutes - the headline requirements.   In this case I’m not sure that people will 
only report if acknowledgements/usefulness is recognised: in some sectors 
reporting is mandatory, and may be a regulatory requirement  
(61) I would remove or reword the third bullet. It implies to me that the 
reporter is the person responsible for the incident. I’m not sure this is helpful, 
as often it is the security community or others in the  organisation which 
make the report. 
 (62) Brevity is always good so I would seek to keep the extra sentiments but 
express them more succinctly - especially the third one, which is a tad 
verbose. 
(72) I hadn’t thought of the third bullet, but it’s a good point, directing the 
organisation towards “no blame” reporting. Given that, I don’t think the 
benefits are limited to “staff that have been responsible…”. I’ve come across 
too many occasions where “staff that had been involved in a security 
incident” were reluctant to report because of fears that they’d be blamed. 
Confidence that messengers won’t be shot is important. 
(74) Provides clarity 
(76) Useful for comparison across industry sectors, especially for 
organisations like CERT-UK that may analyse national security posture. 
(77) “ responsible for a security incident” – would adding “causing” reduce 
ambiguity? 
(79) The first bullet is not strictly true (because self-interest in not making the 
consequences worse if no report is made is a compelling factor); but the other 
two are useful. 
(85) Whilst the amended wording does enhance the original wording, the 
additional bullet points are, in themselves, slightly too long. 
(87) This may divide into two streams: 
1. Encouraging reporting within an organisation (all bullets). 
agree it is. 
(53) O 
 
 
(55)O  amended 
wording to include 
suggestion ensured 
compliance 
 
(61) O In line with 
other suggestions 
amended responsible 
and added involved in  
(62) O Third bullet 
reduced in line with 
other comments 
(72) P  Amended as 
above to include 
involved in  
 
 
 
 
(74) P 
(76) P 
(77) O  Amended as 
per previous comments 
 
(79) O 
 
(85) P with comments 
re length of comment. 
Now amended 
 
(87) O 
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 2. Encouraging reporting within a community of organisations (definitely 
bullet 1; bullet 2 to some extent; bullet 3, not so much). 
(89) Extra words don't necessarily add value - in fact they are likely to deter 
readers and create an adverse impression of our profession. 
(92) The additional wording puts the requirement into context. 
 
 
 
 
(93) 
Not sure the 2nd bullet adds anything – mostly covered by 3rd .   
3rd bullet suggest removing word extremely 
(103) The 3rd bullet point I do not believe should be included as part of the 
CSF. 
(107) Feedbacks on action taken could help in preventing further potential 
incidents. 
(113) Third bullet point could be shortened to "Feedback should reduce any 
anxiety felt by staff who report incidents" 
(116) Given everything that is written below – is it risk or impact.  Interesting 
risk (!) of confusing or blurring the terminology usage. 
 
(89) O 
 
(92) P gives contrary 
view to others not so 
keen on changes. 
Demonstrates support 
for the CSF but 
differences of opinion 
in final wording. 
(93) O 
 
103) O Mainly refers 
to bullet 3 which 
attracted most 
comments 
 
(107) P 
(113) O again 
reference to length of 
third bullet – amended 
 
(116)  O Added impact 
to clarify 
 
 
Note in Summary.  
Generally more 
supportive of changes. 
Some observations in 
general and most 
issues raised with 
length of or use of 
some words in bullet 
three which has now 
been amended to cater 
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 for the comments 
made. 
 
   
CSF Comments made (respondent number) Notes on comments 
Element 4  Ease of making a report, 
recognising if incident reporting is difficult 
individuals will be less likely to submit them. 
This may particularly affect the reporting of 
near misses. The reporting process should: 
 
• Provide a sufficiently clear level of 
education and awareness to all staff in 
how the reporting process works.   
• Describe what an incident is. 
• Describe how to report it and what 
escalation needs to take place. 
• Sets out levels of expected feedback.  
• Be clearly set out as part of any 
governance process. 
 
Ease of making a report, recognising that if 
reporting incidents is difficult, individuals will be 
less likely to submit incident reports.". 
 
Re bullets  
Replace include with provide  
Describe no s 
 
 
 
Amended  
 
Ease of making a report, recognising if 
reporting incidents is difficult  individuals will 
(2) Care needs to be taken, if adding guidance to the reporting process, that 
that guidance itself is not too verbose with the risk of alienating those trying 
to submit an incident report 
(6) Incident reporting should follow the same process as any operational 
incident reporting. Start with a simple “Contact Wait Out” which alerts the 
receiving body, presumably now the NCSC UK, then follow up with a typical 
incident report – “What, When, Where, to Whom (with contact details), and 
How or Any Other Comment” Any incident report has to contain these facts 
to be useful. Don’t make it any more complicated. 
(7)There may be many reasons why people do not report an incident; not all 
are covered here but, in my view, the wording is too long and focused to elicit 
a broad response. 
(8) The inclusion of near misses is a useful aspect to include in the factor, but 
the bullets are part of the explanation not the KPI itself 
(16) Without a clear and easy to use process that all personnel are aware of, 
efficient and effective incident reporting is a non-starter. 
(17) As above additional clarification useful in guiding implementation of 
any relevant incident reporting process and supporting interface / forms. 
(24) It clarifies it but does not improve CSF. I am also not sure about the 
reporting to describe what an incident is as by the time one gets to be making 
a report they ought to already be aware that they are making an incident 
report. The awareness should already be in place. 
(25) Describes how to report it and what escalation needs to take place. 
Suggest only “How to report it” as this should cover all and then recipients 
should know how/if to escalate 
Sets out levels of expected feedback.  
Unclear if refers to submission or recipient - &/or acknowledgment of receipt 
of report or final outcome or both etc. Suggest need to acknowledge (where 
applicable - ie not confidential line) but minimise expectation of update to 
submission?  
(2) O 
 
 
(6) O 
 
 
 
 
 
(7) O wording too long 
to be reconsidered 
 
(8) P 
 
(16) P 
 
(17) P 
 
(24) O 
 
 
 
(25) O 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(26) O Refers to 
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 be less likely to submit them. This may 
particularly affect the reporting of near misses. 
The reporting process should: 
 
• Provide a sufficiently clear level of 
education and awareness to all staff in 
how the reporting process works.   
• Describe what an incident is. 
• Describe how to report it and what 
escalation needs to take place. 
• Sets out levels of expected feedback.  
• Be clearly set out as part of any 
governance process. 
 
(26) Consider also allowing anonymity or at least privacy, where appropriate 
or necessary to obtain honest and timely reporting 
(27) Do you want to include as part of the education and awareness what the 
key elements are for reporting an incident in order to have consistent 
language or have them report it in their own words… no right answer here… 
just a question 
(32) What about more on a potential “no blame” culture to learn from 
incidents and instil an open reporting mechanism, which may mean there will 
be no comeback on the individuals concerned. 
(36) The reporting process should also be flexible. If it is too rigid, people get 
frustrated trying to report on unusual incidents that don't typically fit a 
previous incident pattern. 
(37) I agree.  Simplicity, supported by a clear governance structure and 
guidance will ensure that the reporting process will be adopted. 
(42) First sentence reads slightly awkwardly.  It took a while before I 
understood it! 
Perhaps it may be useful to alter the sentence, along the lines of:  
 
"Ease of making a report, recognising that if reporting incidents is difficult, 
individuals will be less likely to submit incident reports.". 
(45) A the end of the day, if reporting is difficult and/or time consuming, it 
will no occur. The more the process can be simplified and automated, the 
higher chance of acceptance and therefor success. 
(50) The bullets are indeed critical otherwise staff will potential miss 
incidents that should be reported and acted upon. 
(53) I think the key points are understanding what an incident is and how to 
report.  By definition this will require some form of training which will be 
forgotten by the time of an incident and so Users need to know they are better 
off making a report if unsure.  The incident evaluation process / personnel 
should then step in with the full procedure as part of the evaluation. 
(55) I agree need to maintain/establish ease of reporting.  I am less convinced 
that reporters should necessarily be visible to any (detailed) escalation 
procedures mechanisms 
(61) I think bullet point 3 from the last page (Element 3) could be better 
placed here. I consider an important part of the KSF to be that that reporters 
anonymity as do some 
others. Need to check  
how many  
(27) O 
 
 
(32) O Refers to a no 
blame culture  
 
 
(36) O flexibility in 
reporting  
 
(37) P 
 
(42) O suggested  re 
wording  
 
 
 
(45) O 
 
 
 
 
(53) O 
 
 
 
 
(55) P +O 
 
 
 
(61) O perhaps clarify 
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 know they will be taken seriously and the report handled in confidence. 
 
I don’t understand “and what escalation needs to take place” means. Does it 
mean how the incident will be investigated and who will be informed? 
(62) As above - I think it depends how the wording will be used. You have 
the “what” (ease of making a report) qualified by the “how”. Sometimes you 
only need the former, sometimes the latter. Five words to describe a CSF is 
pretty digestible! 
(72) This is heading towards “ease of making a high-quality report”. Good  
(74) Provides clarity 
(76) Listing the purpose of the incident report is a good idea as it is a learning 
opportunity 
(77)  
The reduction is due to the text sprawling a little. Present as Element 3, a 
short statement and then bullets giving context. Grammar is wrong in bullets 
“should describes”, etc.  
The education bullet perhaps should be “Provide” not “Include” for clarity. 
Expected feedback doesn’t make submitting a report easier. 
 
(79) Far too wordy to have any significant impact except a negative one 
(83) I am not sure whether bullet 3 is relevant to ease of reporting. Escalation 
is a different beast from reporting, but I might be missing the context. 
(85) Much like my comments above, the amended wording enhances the 
original; however, the bullets are, again, too long and could be refined to 
increase their impact further 
(87) The reporting process needs to be described in a way that is easy to 
assimilate - particularly as it's likely to be consulted under duress.. 
(89) We live in an attention economy: attention is in short supply, and great 
demand.  People are less likely to read something if it is longer.   
 
Careful definition is valuable - but in my view, that is offset by the time 
people have to read it. 
 
The practitioners need to have a good grasp of the detail; it would be nice if 
the users had a good grasp but the price is probably too high. 
escalation to show 
appropriate due to 
seriousness  of the 
incident 
(62) O 
 
 
 
(72) P 
(74)  P 
(76)  P 
 
(77)  O clarity and 
grammar – done based 
on earlier  comments  
 
 
 
 
(79) N re wordiness 
amended as per  other  
comments  
(85) P but with  
comments re length  - 
addressed  
(87) O 
 
(89) O 
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 (92) Mick, doesn't the additional wording relate more to increasing awareness 
around incidents, rather than the ease of making the report? 
As such I have said that it doesn't increase the value orginal wording, but 
rather detracts from it. 
(104) Making it very prescriptive as to what an incident is may mean that 
some are not reported as it may not easily be related to the description. Better 
it is reported and for the ISO to determine whether it is an incident. Remain 
bullets again don't seem to add value. 
(107) Concise and simple report will help staffs submit a report. 
(114) I think that having a good template for the reports would be of great 
value. The template itself could guide the user thus making it easier to file a 
report and decide what is expected to be filled in each field. 
(116) Tricky really – would have assumed all of that to be inherent to the 
process anyway! But of course we know the risks with “assume”... ;) 
 
(92)O observation but 
purpose is to ensure 
staff know what is and 
what is not an incident  
(104) N feels bullets do 
not  help  
 
 
(107) P 
(114) O suggested 
template may help  
 
(116) P 
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 CSF Comments made (respondent number) Notes on comments 
Element 11 
3.  Original wording (Element 11)  
 
A recognition by senior management that 
incidents will happen.  
 
3a. Amended wording:   
 
A recognition by senior management that 
incidents will happen and that they must play a 
full and active part in the incident 
management process by. 
 
• Fully accepting that incident reporting is 
to be seen positively and not punitive. 
• Recognising security incidents are part of 
life and business and, like accidents, the 
reporting process is part of the prevention 
strategy. 
• Supporting a culture which encourages 
reporting 
• Recognising an organisation which 
handles an incident well enhances its 
reputation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A recognition by senior management that 
incidents will happen and that they must play a 
full and active part in the incident 
(2) There will undoubtedly be some instances where incident reporting leads 
to some punitive or disciplinary action on staff and this must be recognised 
by senior management – this is a tricky balance between the positive 
promotion of incident reporting whilst retaining the punitive elements of a 
careless data breach, for example. 
(4) The recognition is in part an indication that Senior Management 
understand the issues 
(6) This is all about management buy in and gets to the nub of modern 
security/risk/governance issues. To whom is an incident reported? The 
organisation’s Security division is a good start but to whom do they report it? 
Time is often of the essence. Most Management won’t want anyone to make a 
decision about external reporting other than the CEO since he is ultimately 
responsible (for loss of value as well as reputation). But if there was a death, 
for instance, the organisation would call for help (an ambulance) and for the 
police. They wouldn’t wait for the CEO to tell them to. Cyber incidents can 
be equally critical – the life or death of the company. Management buy in 
implies trust in their governance sub-organisation (risk or security) to follow 
an internal process. There will be a reluctance by management/Board to call 
the Police/law enforcement. EDPR may help get over this. 
 
(7) There is a balance between not being punitive and taking action where 
incidents could and should have been prevented. Perhaps this could be 
recognised.   
(8) Suggest that this has now become two separate aspects – one that 
incidents will happen (i.e. does that recognition exist) and secondly that 
senior management play a role in resolutions (its not just technical issues) 
(25)  Recognising security incidents are part of life and business and, like H 
and S accidents, the reporting process is part of the prevention strategy. 
• Suggest no such thing as accident (ie RTA are now collisions as 
never a mere accident!??!) Replace with “Near miss”?? 
(27) Wording suggestion… that they play an integral part in the incident 
management process 
(28) Unrealistic expectation – incidents can reveal wrongdoing. There is 
insufficient disciplinary action taken as is without putting senuior managers 
(2) P 
 
 
 
 
(4) P 
 
(6) P with commentary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(7) O include balance 
between not being 
punitive but taking 
action over 
recklessness  
(amended) 
(8) O comment this 
could now be 
considered as two 
aspects Recognition 
they will happen and 
active involvement by 
management 
(25)O good point re the 
reporting process 
should be seen as part 
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 management process by. 
 
• Fully accepting that incident reporting is 
to be seen positively enabling early 
mitigation action. Whilst recognising in 
some cases there will be a need to 
consider action taken where the incident 
should and could have been prevented. 
• Recognising security incidents are part of 
life and business and, like Health and 
Safety accidents, the reporting process is 
part of the prevention strategy. 
 
• Supporting a culture which encourages 
reporting 
• Recognising an organisation which 
handles an incident well enhances its 
reputation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
under pressure not to act appropriately 
(32) There crux of the issue, management have to support and comments in 
amended wording echo my above comments. There is an intrinsic link to both 
points. 
(36) A few comments on this one: 
 
- It is also known colloquially as "Don't shoot the messenger" :-) 
 
- ...the reporting process is part of the correction strategy, or mitigation 
strategy... not the prevention strategy. if it was prevented, it would not have 
occurred and needed to be reported on. 
- the last comment is a double edged sword... recognising an organisation that 
handles an incident well, can also indicate an organisation that is experienced 
in working in incidents (or in crisis!) - that can also harm your reputation if it 
happens too often - but I think the point is you are attempting to provide 
support for the organisations effort. 
(37) I have found that those organisations where senior management take an 
active role generally have a positive attitude to security overall.  A positive, 
and not punitive, approach shows a mature attitude that any incident can be 
used as a learning opportunity to improve the overall security structure.  The 
reporting of 'near misses' really supports this approach, and I believe this 
ultimately reduces the potential for a serious incident. 
(41) I think it is critical to identify and qualify the term 'senior management.'  
Whilst senior management from a line management or operational 
perspective is critical so that incident reporting is seen as the norm and that 
support is required a crucial factor is whether the 'senior management' can 
actually be empowered to do something about it. There is a common scenario 
where IT Security can see the issues arising but are powerless to stop them as 
they are not empowered nor authorised to spend to prevent. Senior 
Management needs to play this part otherwise lessons learnt or prevention of 
re occurrence will not happen. Governenace is critical to the success of 
reporting. 
(45) Management must accept that incidents will occur. Management must 
also accept that a learning cycle is absolutely critical to reducing the 
frequency and severity of incidents. Failure of people and systems if part of 
of the prevention 
strategy 
(27) O suggested re 
wording but minor 
change and current 
wording unchanged 
(28) N unrealistic 
however that is the 
intention of the CSF to 
improve situation 
(32) P 
(36) P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(37) P 
 
 
 
 
 
(41) P 
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 life and often times not controllable. Failure to learn is very controllable. 
 
(50) Agreed – but this would certainly depend on the nature of the incident. 
For those incidents that are considered to be very serious then a full incident 
response Tem should be established to manage and reduce the impact. 
(53) This is a “keeper”, best definition I have seen on this aspect. 
(55) Agree entirely 
(57) recognition of the inevitability of incidents occuring assists the security 
function greatly to follow up on all reports where there may be a feeling that 
all incidents are, at least partially, due to their own failings. 
(62) Same comment as above. I evidently like the snappier approach more but 
the additional clauses certainly help explain. 
(63) very important point which it seems to  me is missing here is that senior 
management (leaders?) need to see incidents and near misses as signiﬁcant 
learning opportunities so that they are not repeated. If they are repeated, 
generally senior managers have failed their organisations. 
Senior managers need to monitor the volume and nature of reports and 
whether subsequent action/feedback has taken place. What you measure you 
change - and this is about changing behaviour and the way things have 
always been done. 
But is this about reporting or leadership and incident mitigation/resilience? 
(74) Again, provides clarity 
(77) Senior management should also be responding personally to incident 
management actions relevant to them, supporting by doing. 
“Fully” and “life and” are unnecessary. 
 
(79) Almost encourages people to think that there will be no disagreeable 
consequences for them personally (as distinct from less severe ones if they 
report incidents and the reverse if they don’t).  The balance between ‘stick 
and carrot’ is difficult to get right, but a too benign management posture is 
likely to encourage the development of a poor compliance culture. 
(85) As above (Much like my comments above, the amended wording 
enhances the original; however, the bullets are, again, too long and could be 
refined to increase their impact further) 
(87) Prompt reporting can result in early and effective mitigation. 
(45)  P 
 
 
 
 
(50)  P 
 
 
(53) P 
 
(55) P 
(57) P 
 
(62) P 
 
(63) P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(74) P 
(77) P plus comment to 
change wording but 
not changed as 
supported elsewhere 
 
(79) P but need to 
ensure there are 
actions taken where 
recklessness comes in  
(wording amended) 
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 (89) We live in an attention economy: attention is in short supply, and great 
demand.  People are less likely to read something if it is longer.  Careful 
definition is valuable - but in my view, that is offset by the time people have 
to read it.  The practitioners need to have a good grasp of the detail; it would 
be nice if the users had a good grasp but the price is probably too high. 
(92) I think the additional wording is important to encourage reporting, and to 
provide additional information for management to respond appropriately. 
(93) 1st bullet – nut punitive is not a good description.  The wording needs to 
reflect that the if the incident is a first offence and/or not malicious it will not 
lead to disciplinary action 
(113) At some point there has to be a punitive element. If I as a security 
manager leave a report on a train I would expect a dressing down. 
(116)  
Rewording required? That they must play a full ... who is the they? Obviously 
it’s senior management but that could be mis-read (deliberately or otherwise) 
– be careful! 
...to be seen positively and not punitively (perhaps??) 
 
(85) O reduce length of 
bullets 
 
(87) P 
(89) P 
 
 
 
 
(92) P 
 
 
(93) again comment re 
not punitive need 
balance re reckless 
(wording amended 
(113) O same again re 
punitive (wording 
amended) 
(116) O rewording 
suggestion and also 
refer to punitive  
(wording amended) 
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 CSF Comments made (respondent number) Notes on comments 
Element 13  4.  Original wording (Element 13)  
 
Incident analysis that considers root causes and 
wider systems/processes, not just the initial 
impact assessment. 
 
4a. Amended wording    
 
Incident analysis that considers root causes 
and wider systems/processes, not just the initial 
impact assessment.  This is crucial to 
understanding what actually contributed to an 
incident otherwise if the true cause is not 
identified repeat incidents or larger scale 
impact ones can occur.  
It should be recognised: 
 
• The incident may be just a symptom of a 
larger organisational or process flaw. 
• Superficial investigations may be 
counterproductive in the long term 
 
 
Incident analysis that considers root causes 
and wider systems/processes, not just the initial 
impact assessment.  This is crucial to 
identifying what actually contributed to an 
incident in order to ensure repeat incidents do 
not occur.  
 
• The incident may be just a symptom of a 
larger organisational or process flaw. 
• Superficial investigations may be 
counterproductive in the long term 
(4)  Root cause analysis is important in deciding if an event or issue is 
systemic, but it should only form part of the lessons learned review. Issues 
can be reoccurring but not systemic. 
(6) Too wordy and doesn’t add much to the original text. 
(8) In my view, the added explanation does not strengthen the view that root 
cause analysis is important 
(16) Consideration of root causes is vital in learning lessons about security 
incidents and prevention of re-occurrence/similar incidents in the future 
(17)  
Yes clarification useful. Not sure about wording of …“or larger scale 
impact ones can occur” 
May be better to replace ones with “incidents”? 
(25) Suggest also add to be recognised: 
“Identify / highlight any training development needs or gaps” 
 (27)Wording suggestion …  Incident analysis that considers root causes 
and wider systems/processes, not just the initial impact assessment.  This 
is crucial to identifying what actually contributed to an incident in order 
to ensure repeat incidents do not occur. 
(32) Amended wording does then not imply what identification of root causes 
will help focus mitigation and education strategies into those areas? 
(35) Without detailed analysis the true means of attack and the motivation of 
the attacker may not be known and so future remedial action may not 
adequately address the treat 
(36) Another area that should be recognised: 
- The incident is often a combination of multiple technologies or processes 
that have built up over time, and only a complex set of coincidences causes 
the incident (i.e. one that was previously unknown because it either had not 
happened previously, or not diagnosed previously). 
(37) I think this adds further clarity to the purpose of incident analysis and the 
fact that it is a deeper investigation to get to the root of the problem and not 
dealing with the obvious symptoms. 
(41) You could equate this to a vanguard attack and concentrating all your 
resources to tackle that threat whilst missing the flanking manouvres which is 
the real killing blow or the surgical strike. 
(4) P 
 
 
(6) N too wordy 
(amended) 
(8) too wordy  
(amended) 
(16) P 
(17) O suggested re 
rewording (amended) 
 
 
(25)  O suggested re 
rewording (amended) 
(27) O suggested re 
rewording (amended) 
 
 
(32) N 
 
(35)P 
 
 
 
(36) P and comments 
 
 
 
(37) P 
 
 
(41) P plus comments 
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 • Identify/highlight any 
training/development needs  or gaps 
 
or 
 
Incident analysis that considers root causes and 
wider systems/processes, not just the initial 
impact assessment.  It must recognise that: 
 
• It is important to identify what 
actually contributed to an incident in 
order to ensure repeat incidents do not 
occur.  
• Analysis may identify/highlight any 
training/development needs  or gaps 
• The incident may be just a symptom of 
a larger organisational or process 
flaw. 
• Superficial investigations may be 
counterproductive in the long term 
 
 
(45) RCA goes to the heart of incident analysis. Knowing the what of an 
incident is only have of the equation. Knowing the why will reduce 
reoccurrence and lead to a better understanding how to prevent similar 
incidents. 
(47) I am not sure if the following: 
 
"otherwise if the true cause is not identified repeat incidents or larger scale 
impact ones can occur." 
 
adds any value to the statement. I think this element is covered by the rest of 
the statement and the two bullet points. 
(49) ITIL deals with Incident and Problem management effectively therefore 
the process should be no different when a security incident is raised if this 
best practise methodology is adopted. 
(50) It is vital that Organisations understand what factors either caused or 
contributed to the incident in the first place so that future incidents can be 
prevented. 
(53)  
The wording is now too long and is covered by my definition of “root cause”.  
I suggest the following is unnecessary, “ This is crucial to understanding 
what actually contributed to an incident otherwise if the true cause is not 
identified repeat incidents or larger scale impact ones can occur.” 
 
(55) Again agree entirely.  Root cause analysis represents a step up the 
maturity scale for a proactive and intuitive incident reporting n methodology; 
it’s a characteristic of embedding it into a culture 
(61) I think the initial bold text is too long. Can you move part of this into the 
bullet points below to make the KSF shorter and snappier. 
(62) This one got too wordy and repetitive for me. 
(63) Again here, I think that it would be useful to make explicit reference to 
the need to identify lessons and the action needed to ensure as far as possible 
that they are not repeated   
(72) I’d prefer to take this in the direction of “Otherwise the organisation will 
learn nothing to help it prevent future incidents 
(74) As before, provides clarity 
(45) P 
 
 
 
(47) O comment re 
wording (amended) 
 
 
 
 
 
(49)  O 
 
 
(50) P 
 
 
(53)  N Too wordy  
(amended) 
 
 
 
 
(55) P 
 
 
(61) N Too wordy 
(amended) 
(62)  N Too wordy 
(amended) 
(63) O  comments 
 
(72) O  comments 
 
(74) P 
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 (77)  
Again, structure to focus on short core statement then supporting text. 
“crucial” may at times be an exaggeration. 
The root cause might just be different to what was expected, rather than 
deeper or wider – and if not identified still wastes mitigation effort. 
“counter-productive” may be too strong – few will make the company worse, 
some will however waste time and effort. 
(79) The additional commentary strikes me as self-evident. 
(85) Overall, the amended wording is too long; however, the additional bullet 
points are worth including.  I would suggest words to the effect of Incident 
analysis that considers root causes and wider systems/processes, not just the 
initial impact assessment.  It must recognise that: 
 
• The incident may be just a symptom of a larger organisational or process 
flaw. 
• Superficial investigations may be counterproductive in the long term 
(87) Some incidents may not merit an in-depth investigation. 
(89) Keep it simple ! 
(91) Differentiate impact between whole system or part of system 
(92) A lack of understanding in identifying the root cause is critcal for 
responding. 
(93)  
Wording could be tidier! In main text 
2nd bullet need to justify statement 
(110) I dislike the word "just" 
(116) This is duplicative again – given the suggested PIIA below – post 
incident impact assessment – that’s what this is already suggesting be done.  
Element 8 and Element 13 therefore need to be revisited with a view to 
reducing duplication. 
 
(77) O comment re text 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(79) P 
(85) O wordy but 
relevant  (wording has 
been amended) 
 
 
 
 
(87) O 
 
(89) O may refer to 
wordiness (amended) 
(92) O 
 
(93) O comment re 
wordiness (amended) 
 
 
(110) O 
(116) O re possible 
duplication on CSF 8 
and 13 (8 not 
considered as a CSF so 
noted) 
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 Possible CSF 
Possible CSF Comments made (respondent number) Notes on comments 
Element 2 
Collection of reports of near misses as well as 
actual incidents 
 
2a. New wording 
 
Collection and review of reports of near misses 
as well as actual incidents.  Recognising; 
 
• Much can be learnt from near misses  
 
• By doing so can identify the required 
preventive measures that need to be in put 
in place to deal with organisational 
learning and/ or a change in policy & 
procedure to ensure that such near misses 
do not, in future become actual incidents 
 
 
 
Suggested re wording 
 
Collection and review of reports of near misses 
as well as actual incidents.  Recognising; 
 
• First bullet removed as superfluous 
 
• By doing so can identify the required 
preventive measures that need to be 
implimented to deal with organisational 
learning and/ or a change in policy & 
procedure to ensure that such near misses 
do not, in future, become actual incidents 
(2) I agree with the second bullet point – I don’t think the first adds any 
value, it is too ambiguous 
(6) What’s a near miss? Won’t be known until well after the event and until 
other ‘near misses’ are analysed. Hence the wording is a non sequitur. All 
incidents should be reported that have clear negative impact on an 
organisation. The fact that later it turns out to be a technical anomaly doesn’t 
matter. Organisations stand alone. They probably have no idea what is going 
on elsewhere. Reporting centres – NCSC UK – do have the breadth of 
scrutiny and analysis to fulfil this function. Hence why NCSC UK (and its 
predecessors) should be joined at the hip with Public and Private sector 
organisations. Perhaps this needs to be rethought – what parameters define 
the threshold for reporting? Much more about impact on the organisation than 
, say, ‘actual’ or ‘near miss’ ctriteria. 
 
(8) Near miss information undoubtedly is useful – I would think that the 
length of explanation is less important than the aspect exists in the full set of 
factors 
(12) Need to be careful do not hold too much data so would need careful 
management. 
(15) Could this be rolled in as an additional bullet point of question 2? 
Meaning element 4 
(27) Wording suggestion..  By doing so we can identify the required 
preventive measures that need to be in put in place implemented to deal with 
organisational learning and/ or a change in policy & procedure to ensure that 
such near misses do not, in future become actual incidents. 
(32) And linking together themes of minor near misses which reported in 
isolation have no enhanced risk but when combined may actually escalate the 
risk and impact to that of an incident? 
(36) Probably another dot point recognising that the business may decide that 
a near miss may be within risk appetite -- i.e. the cost to add extra 
preventative controls may move the organisation to an unacceptable cost 
point. 
       
(2) P but feels first 
bullet superfluous 
(6) O has a point but 
often near misses are 
not considered 
incidents hence the 
inclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(8)  O 
 
(12) O 
 
 
(15) ) not really 
element 4 is about ease 
of reporting 
(27) O suggested 
wording (amended) 
 
(32) P 
 
 
 
(36) O  good point 
(considered for 
amendment but should 
be identified in 
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 Or 
 
• By doing so can identify the required 
preventive measures needed to ensure that 
such near misses do not, in future, 
become actual incidents 
(37) Again, this adds further clarity to the need to report near misses.  I think 
it is important to stress that near misses will continually occur as the threat 
environment evolves in their attempts to bypass defences.  Near misses allow 
the observation of that evolutionary process and can allow the organisation to 
adapt to maintain its protective measures. 
(41) Interesting - I think that a combined near miss reporting log could 
identify a major incident before it happens if used properly. The fear is the 
near miss could be symptomatic of poor education, reporting etc.... 
(42) While this is a great idea and may be a useful tactic in future, at the 
moment, I think the priority (for the limited resources) is probably dealing 
with actual incidents. 
 
I didn't know how to rate this one, because on the one hand,  I think the 
wording significantly improves the element, but on the other hand, I don't 
think it should become a CSF (because it may divert resources away from 
dealing with actual incidents). 
 
If I'm wrong and resources would be available for analysing near misses, then 
I'd rate this element as a "1". 
(45) The US Federal Aviation Administration requires the recording and 
reporting of near misses as well as contact incidents. The data can be used to 
determine changes in processes and procedures that will not only reduce the 
likelihood of a near miss, but also contact incidents. The data for near misses 
in cybersecurity incidents would have similar utility. I do not consider it to be 
a critical success factor, but would rate its utility as high as a non-critical 
success factor. 
(47) I strongly believe that collection and analysis of near misses should be a 
Critical Success Factor for any Security Incident Reporting system 
(50) “Yes” this is important data to collect and monitor especially if the near 
misses are all of a similar nature – however it may be that the processes 
already in place may be preventing the new miss from actually becoming a 
full incident. The processes should be reviewed to ensure thay are still 
appropriate and up to date. 
(53) First bullet unnecessary. 
(55) Back on culture theme it should be recognised that near misses – or 
incident analysis as 
accepted)   
(37) P 
 
(41) P 
 
 
(42) P with comment 
that more important to 
focus on real incidents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(45) P plus comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(47) P 
 
(50) P 
 
 
 
 
(53) O another 
comment re first bullet 
10-36 
 
 Practices Dangerous to Security – are at least as important to identify as 
actual compromises: lessons learned can help to prevent rather than just react 
(57) Near misses are extremely valuable as they can provide insight into 
potential vulnerabilities and allow changes to prevent actual incidents 
occuring. 
(62) I  do believe near miss recording and analysis is important but the extra 
clauses (in fact the second one) detract from the clarity of the original 
wording, in my view. Too verbose - and to be honest not that well written 
(who can identify…?). 
(63)  It follows from my comments above that I  think that it is essential that 
near misses are reported and lessons identiﬁed and applied. The ambition here 
should surely be to mirror the airline industry which loses no opportunity to 
learn from experience 
(72) Slightly tricky to decide whether this should be promoted, as you also 
added near misses to Element 4, so they are already included within the list of 
CSFs! 
(76) Near misses are important as they provide opportunities for learning and 
perhaps procedural changes. 
(77) 2nd bullet is more an explanation of the first than separate. And doesn’t 
include all possible long term measures – e.g. more tech might help in some 
cases 
(79) Intelligent analysis of the metrics on near misses can inform the creation 
of initiatives to address weaknesses in compliance.  An example is personal 
data breaches which may not meet the gravity threshold for notifying the ICO 
but can point to weaknesses in compliance in individual business areas and 
the need for bespoke action. 
(85) Whilst I have scored this Element at 3 (on the basis that it should remain 
where it is and not become a CSF) I think that the amended wording is an 
improvement on the original. 
(87) I'm not sure how helpful this will be. There are likely to be more 'near 
misses' than actual incidents. 
Given the porous nature of layers in a multi-layered defence strategy, each 
event blocked inside the outermost layer is potentially a 'near miss'. 
(89) The extra words don't add enough value. 
(93)  1st bullet adds nothing not covered by the second 
not needed  (bullet now 
removed) 
(55) P 
(57) P 
 
 
(62)  O wordiness 
(amended but not 
directly as a result of 
this comment) 
(63) O another 
comment re mirroring 
air industry 
 
(72) O again reference 
to 4 but this is ease of 
report not type of. 
(76) P 
 
(77) O 
 
 
(79) P plus comments 
 
 
 
 
(85) P 
 
 
(87) O 
 
 
 
(89) N 
10-37 
 
 (96)  
I think it’s actually impossible to separate “near misses” out anyway. 
Sometimes what could be originally reported as an incident is later found to 
be a near miss e.g. an unencrypted disk of sensitive information is thought to 
have been lost in the post resulting in frantic searching involving Royal Mail 
as well as the recipients, calls to the ICO, risk mitigation put in place, 
worsecase scenario Osman warnings when Ooopsy –two weeks later it is 
found to be still in the “out tray” of the post room after all.  
Furthermore, an officer might not realise the full consequences of what they 
might view as a near miss.  
 
(113) Actually I think it improves it, but doesn't make it a CSF. The same 
comment applies to the following two questions also 
(115) possibility of risk that to analyse near misses may create additional 
work.  Always good to add the ‘why’ to the ‘what’.  Sometimes this type of 
analysis falls into the too complicated, too challenging, too expensive box.  
Needs high level recognition to get necessary resource. 
(116) Difficult wording – suggest revisiting to remove clumsiness? 
 
(93) 3rd comment re 
bullet 1 now removed.  
(96) O 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(113) P 
 
(115) P 
 
 
 
(116) wordiness - 
amended 
 
   
  
10-38 
 
 Element 7 Mandatory Reporting 
 
7a New wording 
 
The reporting of incidents should be 
mandatory.  An organisation cannot mitigate 
any impact or learn from an incident unless 
there is an awareness something has happened. 
Recognising: 
 
• A true record of incidents can provide 
accurate management information which  
enables amongst other things; trend 
analysis, a greater understanding of actual 
rather than perceived threats and risks and 
more evidence based resource allocation.  
 
• Although the decision to report should not 
be optional the actions taken should be 
tailored to the incidents severity.  For 
example a manager should have some 
discretion to deal locally with minor 
issues such as not locking computer 
screens or not complying with the clear 
desk policy.  
• Staff need clear guidance on what and 
how to report.  
 
 
 
 
The reporting of incidents and near misses 
should be mandatory.  An organisation cannot 
mitigate any impact or learn from an incident 
unless there is an awareness something has 
(2) The mandatory reporting of incidents will provide an accurate picture of 
the information risk.  Certainly in my organisation I don’t have a clear picture 
of information risk from security incidents as the reporting is not as good as it 
should be 
(6)  Suggests see comment made by (6) and combine the two 
(8) I’m not a fan of mandatory reporting in general – I think it can be a 
disincentive and risk creating too much noise 
(12) Totally agree with the second part and struggle somewhat with the 
mandatory requirement, staff should report as a matter of course and because 
they want to – but I appreciate why it may have to be mandatory. 
(17) Two areas key: 
Recognition by senior management that security incidents will occur 
 
Recognising that staff may be anxious and that feedback and appropriate 
action should be undertaken  
(25) The reporting of incidents should be mandatory. 
Suggest include  The reporting of incidents and near misses should be 
mandatory. 
(26) I don’t consider this to be a helpful or practical stance. It might even be 
counter-productive. You can’t monitor, audit or police it. If reporting is 
encouraged, easy to do and rewarded, then it will be successful. 
(32) Much better break out 
(35) is this in relation to intra-organisational reporting or extra-organisational.  
If we are saying that it is mandatory for external reporting the benefits and 
potential implications must be clear 
(36) Agree with all this. 
(37)  I think this adds more depth to the statement, making it clearer that the 
actions initiated by a report will vary depending on the risk associated to the 
incident. 
(45) Reporting should be mandatory. With regard to cybersecurity and 
reporting in particular, I am always reminded that "absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence". Put simply, we can not fix that which we do not know 
is broken. 
(47) I would add "near misses" to the wording, something along the lines of: 
 
(2) P 
 
 
 
(6) O 
(8) N 
 
(12) P 
 
 
(17) O comment may 
be wrongly placed in 
this section 
 
 
(25) O suggested 
wording change 
(amended) 
(26) N 
 
 
(32) P 
(35) O 
 
 
(36) P 
(37) P 
 
 
(45) P 
 
 
(47) P another 
comment re adding 
near misses (amended) 
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 happened. Recognising: 
 
• A true record of incidents can provide 
accurate management information which  
enables amongst other things; trend 
analysis, a greater understanding of actual 
rather than perceived threats and risks and 
more evidence based resource allocation.  
 
• Although the decision to report should not 
be optional the actions taken should be 
tailored to the incidents severity.  For 
example a manager should have some 
discretion to deal locally with minor 
issues such as not locking computer 
screens or not complying with the clear 
desk policy.  
• Staff need clear guidance on what and 
how to report.  
 
 
 
 
 
"The reporting of incidents and near misses should be mandatory." 
(50) Reporting must be mandatory and that is why it is essential that staff 
have clear guidance as to what is an incident, breach or near miss etc so that 
they can report these with ease. 
(53) Re bullet No 2, this should be tied back to 2a Element 4, i.e. definition of 
an incident and ease of reporting. 
(55) Not sure that the sense of why something is mandatory is reflected here.  
Agree however that response and follow up should be proportionate to  
severity/likelihood of future event/benefit to organisation      
(61) I think this might be a KSF, however, your comment infers that not 
locking a screen needs to be reported. I think this is only practical in some 
environments, not all e.g. commercial / academic. 
 
Making such a blanket statement could reduce the value of the KSF for these 
less security conscious environments. 
 
I also suggest that if a manager really needs to report incidents like this, some 
aggregate reporting like “number of unlocked screens this month” and any 
serial offenders would be sufficient. 
 
(62) I like the additional clarity here. There may be something about a 
severity threshold for reporting though I worry that could be used as an 
excuse not to report something. 
(63) I  do not think that the comments apply to "Mandatory Reporting" which 
I took to mean external reporting. The additional wording suggest that this is 
internal process and is probably covered adequately in the CSFs above. 
 
(72) This is all true, but I don’t think mandatory reporting is as important as 
the factors already on the list 
(74) A process for anonymous reporting for those individuals that feel, for 
whatever reason, they cannot report in person. 
(76) There should be manager discretion regarding the lower grade incidents, 
otherwise we will be inundated with incident reports, the majority of which 
will be minor indiscretions. 
 
 
(50) P 
 
 
(53) O comment 
 
(55) O 
 
 
(61) O  Comment 
suggests not recording 
unlocked screens but 
then refers to how 
many times unlocked. 
If not reported this 
cannot be achieved. 
 
 
 
 
(62) P 
 
 
(63) O comment re is it 
internal or external 
reporting 
 
(72) P 
 
(74) O suggest 
anonymous reporting 
(76) O 
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 (77)  
Certainly an improvement, not fully sure a CSF. 
Some aspects of statement might relate to other than the mandatory nature 
(79) The bullet points are a touch wordy and reduce their impact. 
(83) I am not a big fan of mandatory rules, believing that it is better to win 
hearts and minds 
(85) This is an improvement, sufficient to promote it to a CSF; however, it is 
again too wordy and could be refined. 
(87) This seems to be leaning towards an impact assessment. There could be a 
risk of the incident landscape being dominated by minimal-impact events. 
(89) The extra words don't add enough value. 
(93) On second bullet it should still be reported upwards perhaps just as a 
notification with no names/details as knowing that for instance a lots of 
screens are left unlocked may indicate the need for awareness raising 
(103) I struggle whether this should be a CSF or not, even with the amended 
wording. An organisation should have a culture of reporting, not because it is 
mandatory but because they have awareness of the benefit it will bring to the 
organisation. Mandatory reporting can give a negative perception. Also - how 
can it be enforced? 
(113) (Actually I think it improves it, but doesn't make it a CSF. The same 
comment applies to the following two questions also) 
(116)  Presumably this is deliberately noted separately from “ease of making 
a report”? It feels duplicative to raise the issue again here given that if you’ve 
made incident reporting easier – in doing so, the communication will (or 
should) have included the fact that it’s not optional  
 
(77) P 
 
 
(79) O wordiness 
(amended) 
(83) N 
(85) P   refers to 
wordiness (amended) 
(87) O 
 
(89) N 
(93) O 
 
 
(103) O re whether a 
CSF 
 
 
 
(113) P but not sure if 
a CSF 
(116) O 
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 Element 8 
Standardised risk assessment (to determine the 
impact of the incident)  
 
8a New wording 
 
Having Standardised risk assessment (to 
determine the impact of the incident) whilst 
recognising: 
• There are advantages to standardise 
within a single organisation or sector but 
wider standardisation can be a challenge. 
• Risk and impact assessment are essential 
as part of post event and incident 
management criteria.  An initial standard 
approach will enable comparison of 
similar incidents and facilitate fact-based 
resolution. 
 
 
(2) How would this standard approach work in the current move from 
quantitative risk assessment methodologies.  A risk assessment approach 
based on organisational risk appetite at either a local or national level would 
seem to be sensible  
(6) Don’t re-invent the wheel on risk assessment. Follow the Standard. But 
also, discriminate between risks and issues. Also a CEO should be reporting 
to his Board on the three most important risks to his organisation each Board 
Meeting. Most organisation’s risk registers don’t allow that as they contain a 
mixture of risk and issue, small to major risk, mitigation and control. Risk 
Registers are important but they need to focus more on tactical, operational 
and strategic risk. CEOs will want to know when risks move between 
categories (T,O,S) and will report on that. 
(20) There will be some improvement within an organisation in a 
standardised risk assessment process. However a standardised risk assessment 
process within a whole sector such as the Police Service or even wider, the 
whole of the Public Sector would allow proper comparison between Police 
Forces or Public Sector agencies. That cannot be achieved if each single 
organisation is adopting risk assessment processes which are different and 
therefore not comparable with similar forces or public services.  
(25  
(26) This is certainly helpful but it would be a stretch to call it critical for 
success. 
(28) Here, Here! 
(32) Some things can be dealt with by standard processes, but most incidents 
have their own individual touch points and only a subset of normal processes 
may be prudent to follow.  I would add in tailoring to the environment and 
severity. 
(35) The standardisation must be at a sufficently high level to allow for 
multiple different types of incident or near miss. the danger of a too 
proscriptive assessment may result in a 'one size fits none' 
(36) Probably another dot point recognising that risk appetite is a lever -- i.e. 
the cost to add extra preventative controls to reduce the risk may move the 
organisation to an unacceptable cost point (as above). 
(37)  I agree.  This statement places a boundary for the scope that risk 
management can take.  It is highly unlikely two organisation, even within the 
(2) O 
 
 
 
(6) N 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(20) O Commnets in 
general 
 
 
 
 
 
(25) O Comment re 
whether a CSF or not 
 
 
 
 
(26) O Comment re 
whether a CSF or not 
(28) P 
(32) O 
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 same sector, are likely to view risks in the same way.  Therefore, clarifying 
that the risk management process can only really work at the organisational 
level helps to give that organisation a consistent view of the risks they 
perceive to face.  It also give a clear picture to those throughout the 
organisation as to how it views security and wishes it to be treated. 
(41) Commonality of resolution is important especially with business context, 
the use of which could standardise contingency approaches to the next 
incident whomever takes the incident on. One of the challenges will be the 
availability of the information at the time of decision making. Standardisation 
will rapidly reduce the amount of time of converting data to meaningful 
outputs. 
(45) An RCA should trigger a remedial risk assessment of the systems of 
which failed. Dependent systems should also be a part of the remedial risk 
assessment. This is certainly an area that would be covered by an auditor 
and/or regulator.   
(49) Rather than standardising the RA, a better assessment method would be 
to create an approach that was flexible enough to cope with all aspects of risk 
regardless of the business sector or government organisation and/or their risk 
acceptance levels.  
(50) Again I would state that Risk and Impact Assessments offer good value 
depending on the nature of the incident. So for medim and major level 
incidents “yes” but for minor incidents and breaches “no”. 
(55) Yes re standardised framework – but that framework should be granular 
enough to allow flexibility and pragmatism in response. 
(61) Consider adding that the risk assessment output should be suitable for 
automated analysis e.g. can be easily included in a database or excel file. 
Ideally this would be quantative but in most cases I expect low/medium/high 
type semi-quantative ratings are most practical. 
(62) I don’t even believe that risk assessment does determine the impact of an 
incident. An incident has happened; a risk has not. I don’t think this one 
makes sense. 
(63) is is not a CSF according to my  intepretation of the deﬁnition. 
(72) As with element 7, it’s all true, but I don’t see this as the same level as 
the existing CSFs 
(74) Useful for comparison across industry sectors, especially for 
(35) O 
 
 
(36) O 
 
 
(37) P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(41) O 
 
 
 
 
 
(45) O 
 
 
 
(49) O 
 
 
 
 
(50) O 
 
(55) P 
 
(61) O suggested 
additional wording 
(not taken up) 
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 organisations like CERT-UK that may analyse national security posture. 
(76) The advantage of standardised risk assessments is that the incident 
management should be easier to interpret across the organisation making 
prevention and resolution easier. 
(83) But care must be taken to avoid the ‘tick box’ approach to risk 
assessment which can creep in with standardisation. 
(85) As above (This is an improvement, sufficient to promote it to a CSF; 
however, it is again too wordy and could be refined.) 
(87) The true impact of an incident (eg. punitive fine by the ICO) may not 
emerge for some considerable time after the event. The assessment 
mechanism may need to take this into account. 
(89) Extra words are justifications, and in my view do not add value. 
(107) The standardised assessment helps in increasing awareness and 
improving the quality of incident management. 
(113) Actually I think it improves it, but doesn't make it a CSF. The same 
comment applies to the following two questions also 
(115) Mike, not sure if I am missing a point here about the terminology.  Risk 
assessment is something that should happen before an incident in order to 
reduce or mitigate the potential impact.  This is a proactive activity.  I would 
suggest that the post incident activity is an ‘Impact assessment’, which will 
identify what damage has been done following an event.  A standardised 
impact assessment methodology is essential. This is a reactive activity. 
(116) It seems confusing. Risk assessment of what?  Impact of the incident on 
what? It’s very broad – the whole business? The “bottom line”?  I would 
counsel about confusing risk assessment and impact assessment in this way... 
it’s a post incident impact assessment that’s required (I feel a new acronym 
coming on! PIIA).  There should already be a risk assessment in place that 
would have identified the likelihood and impact of the incident occurring; the 
fact that the incident has now occurred means that the risk assessment needs 
to be revisited to establish whether someone got the scoring wrong or 
misunderstood the purpose of the risk assessment. 
 
 
 
(62) N 
 
 
(63) N 
(72) O not supporting 
it as a CSF 
(74) O 
 
(76) P 
 
 
(83) O 
 
(85) agrees it could be 
CSF but wordy 
(already amended due 
to earlier comments) 
(87) O 
(89) O 
(107) O 
 
(113) P but not a CSF 
 
(115)   N re use of risk 
assessments 
 
 
 
 
(116) N 
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City of London Police HQ 
Address 4th Floor, Guildhall Yard East, London EC2V 5AE 
Telephone +44 (0) 20 7601 2222   Textphone +44 (0) 20 7601 2906 
www.cityoflondon.police.uk 
Cont/ … 
Ian Dyson QPM 
Commissioner 
Direct line 
xxxxxxxx 
19th December 2016 
Dear Colleague, 
Request for support in research into improving the reporting of information security 
incidents 
As the current Chair of the National Policing Information Assurance Board I have been 
supportive of the PhD research into information security incident reporting undertaken by 
Mike Humphrey, Head of Information Assurance at the National Crime Agency. Mike is 
doing his PhD as a part time student at the Defence Academy of the UK, Shrivenham, 
Cranfield University.   
Mike is an active member of PIAB as well as the Incident Analysis Review Group (IARG), a 
sub group of the PIAB that review the results of the central reporting of security incidents 
that you contribute to from your force area. 
I have been keen that the police service understands what security incidents are happening. 
If we do not know what type of incidents are occurring, it is extremely difficult to put in place 
the appropriate and relevant advice, guidance, controls and countermeasures to reduce or 
prevent their reoccurrence.  
During the last year Mike has conducted a series of research surveys into identifying the 
Critical Success Factors required to improve security incident reporting. Security 
professionals from the public and private sector, academia and military across the UK, 
Europe and further afield took part. The respondents included a number of UK police force 
Information Security Officers and other police staff.  
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Mike is now distributing an Incident Reporting Maturity Model to those who have responded 
to that research. This contains the details of the four Critical Success Factors identified as 
most likely to improve security incident reporting within an organisation. The main purpose 
of a maturity model is to identify a gap that can be closed after following improvement 
actions. 
 
He is asking those police force information security professionals who took part in that 
earlier research to also find time to respond to the questions on the Maturity Model.  
I would particularly ask that those of you who were not aware of, or unable to take part in his 
earlier research, to participate this time acting as a control group to review the model.  This 
way he will have views on the maturity model, not only from those who have contributed to 
its formation, but also those exposed to it for the first time. 
 
May I assure you neither he nor I are asking you to score your force and send in the results. 
He is asking that you assess the maturity model for its applicability in determining the 
position of your force in relation to those Critical Success Factors.   You are of course at 
liberty to use it for that purpose for your own benefit. 
 
Mike has attached a short explanatory letter as well as the maturity model and incorporated 
questionnaire.   
 
I would urge that you find the short period of time from your busy schedules to answer the 
questions Mike is asking about that maturity model. 
 
 
 
Ian Dyson 
Commissioner 
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Copy of email text sent to Police Service Control Group sent 27/12/16 17:34 attachments to this e 
mail were the introductory letter and a word and PDF version of the IRMM  
 
Dear colleague, 
  
Please find an explanatory letter from Ian Dyson, Commissioner of the City of London Police, 
regarding my research into the reporting of information security incidents, together with a word and 
PDF version of a questionnaire.   
  
The contact list, which contains your email address, was supplied to me by [Redacted ] with Ian 
Dyson’s permission.  For some forces more than one person is listed.  As I am only interested in 
security professionals views, not a forces perspective, more than one response from a force is not a 
problem.  
  
Some of your colleagues will have already taken part in earlier stages of my research and will shortly 
receive a separate message regarding this final stage.  For those of you who are not aware of what I 
am researching the below should help you understand the short amount of time that I would ask 
that you find to assist me in the final stages of my research.  
  
I am a part time PhD student at the Defence Academy of the UK, Shrivenham, Cranfield 
University.   My PhD research focusses on security incident reporting.  My day job is that of the Head 
of Information Assurance at the National Crime Agency. I am a Fellow of the Institute of Information 
Security Professionals (IISP) and an elected member of the Information Assurance Advisory Councils’ 
(IAAC) management committee.   
  
I had come to a stage in my research where I needed to seek the views from information security 
professionals on what could be considered the Critical Success Factors required to support the 
security incident reporting process. During the last year I conducted a survey of information security 
professionals across law enforcement, central and local government, the private sector and 
academia from the UK, Europe and further afield.  The results of that research have identified four 
Critical Success Factors which are believed to be key in improving the reporting of security incidents. 
  
From this I have created a Security Incident Reporting Maturity Model. The purpose of the model is 
for organisations to be able to judge if, and how well, any or all of these critical factors are 
embedded within their security incident reporting process.  The main purpose of a maturity model is 
to identify a gap that can be closed after following improvement actions.  
  
I am sending the maturity model and questionnaire to those who contributed to that 
research.  However, I also wanted to send the model and questionnaire out to a control group of 
security professionals who had not, for a number of reasons, been able to take part in the original 
research.  This will enable me to gauge its suitability and usefulness from those who have not been 
exposed to the rationale and process of determining the Critical Success Factors which provide for 
the model’s content.   
  
The enclosed maturity model questionnaire contains the four Critical Success Factors (CSF) identified 
through my research that are considered the most likely to improve the reporting of security 
incidents. I have included them within a maturity model and it is your views on the model that I am 
seeking.  There is also the facility within the questionnaire to add any comments. The maturity 
model pages are greyed out to show there are no questions on those pages that require answering 
for my purposes. You can of course use the model for your own benefit. 
  
Completion of the questionnaire should take no more than 15 minutes.  For the purpose of this 
study, as there is no universally accepted definition of a security incident, I am using one I have 
crafted for my thesis:   
  
An information security incident is either, an actual or potential event that has, or is likely to, cause 
harm to the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of data, assets, systems or infrastructure 
whether caused by people, processes or technology.  
  
I would now ask that you view the enclosed maturity model to comment on if this was provided to 
your organisation, or those for which you may be assessing, whether it is: 
  
1. Understandable 
2. Usable  
3. Considered to be of value to asses where your organisation sits regarding the deployment of the 
identified CSFs 
  
The response form is simple to complete and uses a Likert scale of 5 options and some simple yes no 
answers.  There is a facility for you to add any comments or observations you feel can assist in its 
final version. 
  
I appreciate you may have both positive and negative views regarding maturity models.  I would ask 
that for this exercise that you judge the maturity model as a potential benefit to any organization to 
assist in improving the number of incidents that are reported. 
  
The aim of such a maturity model is to identify if the particular Critical Success Factor is in place and, 
if so, to what extent. It is not an iterative maturity model. In other words you do not have to score 
well in one before you can score another. They can be assessed individually with regards to the 
current situation.   
  
I am not asking that you score your organization as part of this survey and send me the response, as 
this may be very sensitive.  You are of course at liberty to do so for your own internal benefit.  I 
recognize that in any template or model the language, terminology and contextual wording required 
may be different and relevant to the sector (e.g. law enforcement, finance, energy etc.).  As a result 
you will notice the maturity level descriptions have been kept to simple descriptions.  Therefore 
please bear this in mind and, of course, you are free to add any comments regarding the level 
descriptions in your response.  
  
In addition, I provide reassurances regarding  confidentiality of any responses. These are set out in 
the maturity model questionnaire.  
  
I have enclosed two versions of the maturity model questionnaire, as a word form and as a pdf form 
(whichever is easiest for you to complete).  
  
Please note; some research respondents had difficulty where they completed previous surveys but 
did not save it as a separate document and then returned the unsaved one to me. With some 
versions of mail and office document management, if you complete the form as it arrived without 
renaming and saving it, when it is sent back to me your response will be blank. So please save your 
response and then send that saved version. 
  
There is an option of printing the form, completing it, scanning the response and then emailing to 
me the scanned version.  Alternatively you can print and complete it and then post it to me.  All 
these options are open to you.  
  
I would be grateful if you could return your answers to my university email address 
m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk or, if you prefer post to me at the address shown in the questionnaire 
instructions.     
  
May I thank you in anticipation of your participation. I am really grateful for your valuable 
professional input into my research. 
  
Please can you complete and return the questionnaire by Sunday the 15th January 2017.  
  
I do hope you can find the time to add your valuable contribution to the research.  Thank you for 
reading this. 
  
  
Regards,  
   
Mike  
   
Mike Humphrey MSc. F.Inst.ISP 
 
APPENDIX 13 
 
Copy of email message sent to Delphi group  regarding participation in the Validation 
Study  
 
 
Dear [insert name], 
  
Firstly, may I thank you again for taking the time to be involved in my Delphi study research 
questionnaire into Security Incident Reporting.  I had a very positive response, with many of 
you adding valuable comments in the spaces provided next to the elements.  A large number 
of respondents also completed round 2 (74%) and equally provided a quality range of 
supportive comments, suggested alternative wording and other observations. 
  
Your comments, both from round one and round two of the Delphi survey, have been taken 
into account to assist in the formulation of the final wording of the elements identified as 
Critical Success Factors (CSFs).  As a result I believe I now have a consensus as to the 
Critical Success Factors to improve security incident reporting and the wording of them.   
  
I did say that once I had analysed the responses I would contact those who did respond with 
details of my findings. I am now asking that, whether you completed round one or both 
rounds that you look at the outcome - A Security Incident Reporting Maturity Model.  
  
The aim of such a maturity model is to judge if the particular CSF is in place and, if so, to 
what extent. It is not an iterative maturity model. In other words you do not have to score 
well in one before you can score another. They can be assessed individually with regards to 
the current situation.  The main purpose of a maturity model is to identify a gap that can be 
closed after following improvement actions 
  
I am not asking that you score your organization as part of this survey and send me the 
response, as this may be very sensitive.  You are of course at liberty to do so for your own 
internal benefit.  Also it is recognized that in any template or model local relevant language, 
terminology and contextual wording would be of benefit to make it more applicable to the 
relevant sector or organization.  Therefore please bear this in mind when commenting.  
  
This maturity model incorporates the top 4 elements of the Delphi survey together with the 
amended descriptions taken from your valuable comments.  Many of you will recognize some 
of the amendments as being taken from your suggestions.  
  
I would now ask that you view the enclosed maturity model to comment on if this was 
provided to your organisation, or those for which you may be assessing, whether it is: 
1. Understandable 
2. Usable  
3. Considered to be of value to asses where your organisation sits regarding the deployment 
of the identified CSFs 
  
The response form is simple to complete and again uses a Likert scale of 5 options.  As 
before there is a facility for you to add any comments or observations you feel can assist in its 
final version. 
  
I appreciate you may have both positive and negative views regarding maturity models.  I 
would ask that for this exercise that you judge the maturity model as a potential benefit to any 
organization to assist in improving the number of incidents that are reported. 
  
As in round two I will use an allocated reference number that will ensure I can marry up your 
responses in round one/two. This also will save you time repeating your details. In addition, I 
again provide reassurances re confidentiality.  These are set out in the maturity model 
questionnaire.  Your reference number is xxxx 
  
I have enclosed two versions of the Maturity Model, as a pdf form and as a word form 
(whichever is easiest for you to complete). I have again sent them separately as some 
defences do not like certain types of pdf or word formats, hopefully you will receive one of 
them. 
  
Please note; some respondents had difficulty where they completed a response but did not 
save it as a separate document and then forwarded the unsaved one to me. With some 
versions of mail and office document management, if you completed the form as it arrived 
without renaming and saving it, when it was sent back to me your response was blank. So 
please save your response and then send that saved version. 
  
Some of you took the option of printing the form, completing it, scanning the response and 
then emailing to me the scanned version.  Others printed and completed it and then posted it 
to me.  All these options are still open to you.  
  
I would be grateful if you could return your answers to my university email 
address  m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk  or, as before, if you prefer post to me at the address 
shown in the instructions.     
  
Again may I thank you for participating and would be really grateful for this last request for 
your valuable professional input into my research. 
  
Please can you complete and return the questionnaire by Sunday the 15th of January 
2017.  
I do hope you can find the time to add your valuable contribution to the research.  Thank you 
for reading this. 
  
Yours faithfully, 
  
  
  
  
Mike Humphrey MSc  F.Inst.ISP 
Part Time PhD Student Defence Academy Shrivenham 
m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk 
 
APPENDIX 14 
Validation of a Suggested Security Incident Reporting Maturity Model 
Confidentiality, completion and return of the completed questionnaire 
This survey will be conducted in strict confidence and your responses kept secure and not shared. I will be the only person analysing the 
responses. You can either complete as a word document, pdf form or, as sometimes there are compatibility issues, print it out, complete by hand, 
scan and return.  If you do not want to email your response but post it instead the address for posting replies is:  Mike Humphrey Standards and 
Security PO Box 8000 London SE11 5EN.   My e mail address for the survey responses is     m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk 
You can withdraw from the survey at any time and after the completion of the survey I am happy to provide a de-brief on the results.  
Please be assured all responses will be treated with strict confidentiality and the final analysis and any reporting will not identify 
individuals or companies.   
Please look at each of the Critical Success Factors (CSFs) which make up the maturity model set out on pages 2-5. (These pages are greyed out 
to indicate they are not part of the questionnaire).  There are four of them.  The identification and wording of these Critical Success Factors have 
been compiled through consensus of a number of security professionals across the public, private sector, academia in the UK and across the 
world.  There is a description of the CSF, a level which sets out the position within the maturity model and finally a description of what that 
level might represent in relation to that CSF.  The level descriptions have been kept to simple descriptions rather than being proscriptive which 
may not be universally relevant to all sectors and organisations. Please bear this in mind and, of course, you are free to make suggestions 
regarding the level descriptions in your response.  
The intention is that you look at the CSF then, using the description, decide what level you would allocate to your organisation or one for which 
you may be reviewing or providing guidance to. 
Then please go to page 6 and complete the questions that relate to each CSF and, where you wish to make any comment, use the space provided.  
Each CSF question has a rating between 1 and 5. There are also further questions relating to the maturity model itself which are a mix of ratings 
of 1-5 or a more simple yes no option. The layout of the model is not being scored. It is your views on the description of the Critical Success 
Factor and level descriptions to support the maturity levels that I am interested in.   You are of course welcome to make any comments on the 
layout.   
To assist if I have any need to clarify any of your responses it would help if you include a contact email address below.   
Reference no. 1 
 1 
 
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS MATURITY MODEL TABLES (Not part of the questionnaire) 
Critical Success Factor 
 
1.   A recognition by senior management that 
incidents will happen and that they must play a full 
and active part in the incident management process 
by. 
 
• Fully accepting that incident reporting is to be seen 
positively enabling early mitigation action. 
• Recognising in some cases there will be a need to 
consider action taken where the incident should 
and could have been prevented. 
• Acknowledging security incidents are part of life 
and business and, like Health and Safety accidents, 
the reporting process is part of the prevention 
strategy. 
• Supporting a culture which encourages reporting 
• Recognising an organisation which handles an 
incident well enhances its reputation 
 
Maturity Level  Description 
(Feel free to amend by suggesting alternative wording) 
1. Initial No recognition by senior management  that incidents will 
occur or of their role in the process 
2. Established Aware of the fact they will happen and they are to 
actively participate but only evidence of partial  
involvement 
3. Business 
enabling 
Recognised by management as important but not 
consistent across the organisation 
4. Quantitatively 
managed 
The majority of management accept incidents will happen 
and there is good evidence of regular involvement by 
managers but not firmly embedded. 
5. Optimised Considered as part of day to day management 
responsibilities with strong evidence of consistent active 
participation across the organisation with proactive rather 
than reactive involvement of managers 
Organisation Score:       Level         1     2     3     4     5 
Reason for score 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
2 
 
Critical Success Factor 
 
2.  Ease of making a report, recognising if 
reporting incidents is difficult individuals will be 
less likely to submit them. This may particularly 
affect the reporting of near misses. The reporting 
process should: 
 
• Provide a sufficiently clear level of education and 
awareness to all staff in how the reporting process 
works.   
• Describe what an incident/near miss is. 
• Describe how to report it and what escalation 
needs to take place. 
  
 
Maturity Level  Description 
(Feel free to amend by suggesting alternative wording) 
1. Initial No recognised reporting mechanism in place 
2. Established A reporting process in place but not well known or used. 
3. Business 
Enabling 
A  reporting mechanism is in place and used by most but 
still has challenges in its use 
4. Quantitatively 
managed 
Well understood processes with majority completing the 
process as described 
5. Optimised Second nature to staff on how to report. 
Organisation Score:       Level         1     2     3     4     5 
Reason for Score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Critical Success Factor 
 
3.  Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible 
feedback to the reporting community1 recognising: 
 
• People will only continue to report incidents if 
they are acknowledged and, even better, can see 
that reporting has been useful or has ensured 
compliance 
• Feedback need not be detailed, often a simple 
acknowledgement of the report and that action is 
being taken may be sufficient. 
• Staff that have been responsible for or involved in 
a security incident can become anxious. It is 
helpful to keep them informed and provide support 
where necessary 
 
Maturity Level  Description 
(Feel free to amend by suggesting alternative wording) 
 1. Initial No feedback provided to anyone who reports an incident. 
No support offered 
2. Established Limited feedback to reporters and some support 
3. Business 
enabling 
Feedback provided but not consistently. Some support 
provided but ad hoc 
4. Quantitatively 
managed 
Feedback in most circumstances. Recognition that 
support needed for reporters 
5. Optimised Feedback is consistently given; reporters are kept in the 
feedback loop. Support mechanisms embedded  
Organisation Score:       Level         1     2     3     4     5 
Reason for score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Community being the one that your organisation may belong to law enforcement, finance, healthcare etc. 
4 
 
                                                          
Critical Success Factor 
 
4.  Incident analysis that considers root causes and 
wider systems/processes, not just the initial impact 
assessment.  It must recognise that: 
 
• It is important to identify what actually contributed 
to an incident in order to ensure repeat incidents 
do not occur.  
• Analysis may identify/highlight any 
training/development needs  or gaps 
• The incident may be just a symptom of a larger 
organisational or process flaw. 
• Superficial investigations may be 
counterproductive in the long term 
 
Maturity Level  Description 
(Feel free to amend by suggesting alternative wording) 
1. Initial No analysis taking place 
2. Established A process in place but there is limited analysis of 
incidents 
3. Business 
Enabling 
Analysis is taking place but not fully investigated to 
understand root cause and tackle the identified issues 
4. Quantitatively 
managed 
Analysis and learning taking place and lessons learnt in 
the majority of cases and changes to 
policy/procedures/process put in place to prevent 
reoccurrence 
5. Optimised Full root cause analysis in place for incidents. Learning 
outcomes adopted  to ensure business improvement and 
future prevention of that type of incident’s recurrence 
Organisation Score:       Level         1     2     3     4     5 
Reason for score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
  
QUESTIONNAIRE STARTS HERE (Pages 6-12) 
Critical Success Factor 1 
A recognition by senior management that incidents will happen and that they must play a full and active part in the incident 
management process 
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
1.1 Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy was it for you to interpret the 
maturity position of your/another 
organisation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Very easy to understand  ☐ 
2. Easy to understand   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult  ☐  
4. Difficult to understand  ☐ 
5. Very difficult to understand  ☐         
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
1.2 Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy would it be to use to judge your 
or another organisations position in 
the maturity model? 
 
 
1. Very easy to judge   ☐ 
2. Easy to judge   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult to judge ☐  
4. Difficult to judge   ☐ 
5. Very difficult to judge  ☐         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Critical Success Factor 2 
Ease of making a report, recognising if reporting incidents is difficult individuals will be less likely to submit them.  
 
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
2.1 Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy was it for you to interpret the 
maturity position of your/another 
organisation?  
  
 
 
1. Very easy to understand  ☐ 
2. Easy to understand   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult  ☐  
4. Difficult to understand  ☐ 
5. Very difficult to understand  ☐         
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy would it be to use to judge your 
or another organisations position in 
the maturity model? 
 
 
1. Very easy to judge   ☐ 
2. Easy to judge   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult to judge ☐  
4. Difficult to judge   ☐ 
5. Very difficult to judge  ☐         
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Critical Success Factor 3 
Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible feedback to the reporting community 
 
 
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
3.1. Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy was it for you to interpret the 
maturity position of your/another 
organisation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Very easy to understand  ☐ 
2. Easy to understand   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult  ☐  
4. Difficult to understand  ☐ 
5. Very difficult to understand  ☐         
 
 
 
3.2. Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy would it be to use to judge your 
or another organisations position in 
the maturity model? 
 
 
1. Very easy to judge   ☐ 
2. Easy to judge   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult to judge ☐  
4. Difficult to judge   ☐ 
5. Very difficult to judge  ☐         
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 Critical Success Factor 4 
 
Incident analysis that considers root causes and wider systems/processes, not just the initial impact assessment.   
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
Q 4.1 Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy was it for you to interpret the 
maturity position of your/another 
organisation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Very easy to understand  ☐ 
2. Easy to understand   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult  ☐  
4. Difficult to understand  ☐ 
5. Very difficult to understand  ☐         
 
 
 
 
  
 
Q 4.2 Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy would it be to use to judge your 
or another organisations position in 
the maturity model? 
 
 
1. Very easy to judge   ☐ 
2. Easy to judge   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult to judge ☐  
4. Difficult to judge   ☐ 
5. Very difficult to judge  ☐         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
9 
 
 
General Questions on maturity models 
It is recognised that not all organisations use maturity models and there are varying views on them. For the purpose of this survey can you please 
judge the potential use of this maturity model to identify if and how well each of the four identified Critical Success Factors is adopted within an 
organisation.  
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
Do you use maturity models in 
your organisation or one for 
which you have reviewed or 
assessed   
 
 
 
 Yes    ☐   
 No     ☐ 
 
 
 
Do you personally feel maturity 
models are useful tools to assist 
an organisation understand where 
they sit regarding to a particular 
situation.   
 
 
 
Yes   ☐  
No    ☐      
No strong view either way  ☐     
 
Some maturity models set out a 
larger number of elements to 
measure against. Is just listing the 
critical elements a better 
approach.    
 
 
         
  
Yes   ☐  
No    ☐      
No strong view either way  ☐     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
10 
 
 
Specific questions on the Critical Success Factor Maturity Model 
The four Critical Success Factors and their wording have been developed through the consensus of a number of security professionals.  They 
have now been set out in a maturity model together with a brief description of the level of maturity appropriate to that CSF. The following 
questions ask your opinion on the model; it is understandable, useable and whether or not you feel it could be of value. 
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
Overall would you consider 
this maturity model to be of 
value to your organisation to 
assess how security incident 
reporting is handled and 
managed against the identified 
Critical Success Factors 
 
 
Extremely valuable                     ☐  
Valuable    ☐ 
Neither Valuable or of no value   ☐ 
Not very valuable    ☐ 
Of no value at all    ☐ 
 
 
 
 If other organisations used the 
same model would this assist 
when determining the ability of 
that organisation to handle 
incidents? (for example if 
exchanging data with them or 
contracting them as a third 
party supplier) 
 
 
Extremely valuable                     ☐  
Valuable    ☐ 
Neither Valuable or of no value   ☐ 
Not very valuable    ☐ 
Of no value at all    ☐ 
   
 
 
Once refined would you 
consider using this maturity 
model in your organisation or 
one you would be assessing 
  
Yes   ☐  
Possibly  ☐  
No   ☐  
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Specific questions on the Critical Success Factor Maturity Model (continued) 
The four Critical Success Factors and their wording have been developed through consensus of a number of security professionals.  They have 
now been set out in a maturity model together with a brief description of the level of maturity appropriate to that CSF. The following 
questions ask you opinion on the model. Whether it is understandable, useable and whether or not you feel it could be of value. 
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
Would just knowing what the 
Critical Success Factors are 
and using an internal method 
of ensuring a gradual move to 
ensure they were embedded be 
a better approach for your 
organisation 
 
 
Yes   ☐  
Possibly  ☐  
No   ☐ 
 
Thank you for your time if you have any other comments on the Critical success Factors, level descriptions or other matter relating to this 
questionnaire please feel free to add them below. 
 
 
Thank you for your time. Please e mail your completed form to; m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk    Alternatively if you wish to post it 
please send to Mike Humphrey Standards and Security PO Box 8000 London SE11 5EN 
c:\users\mike\documents\phd\thesis commenced feb 2013\chapter 3 methodology\validation of irmm\incident reporting maturity model table questionnaire delphi group version 3 24_12_16.docx  
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APPENDIX 15 
Validation of a Suggested Security Incident Reporting Maturity Model 
Confidentiality, completion and return of the completed questionnaire 
This survey will be conducted in strict confidence and your responses kept secure and not shared. I will be the only person analysing the 
responses. You can either complete as a word document, pdf form or, as sometimes there are compatibility issues, print it out, complete by hand, 
scan and return.  If you do not want to email your response but post it instead the address for posting replies is:  Mike Humphrey Standards and 
Security PO Box 8000 London SE11 5EN.   My e mail address for the survey responses is     m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk 
You can withdraw from the survey at any time and after the completion of the survey I am happy to provide a de-brief on the results.  
Please be assured all responses will be treated with strict confidentiality and the final analysis and any reporting will not identify 
individuals or companies.   
Please look at each of the Critical Success Factors (CSFs) which make up the maturity model set out on pages 2-5. (These pages are greyed out 
to indicate they are not part of the questionnaire).  There are four of them.  The identification and wording of these Critical Success Factors have 
been compiled through consensus of a number of security professionals across the public, private sector, academia in the UK and across the 
world.  There is a description of the CSF, a level which sets out the position within the maturity model and finally a description of what that 
level might represent in relation to that CSF.  The level descriptions have been kept to simple descriptions rather than being proscriptive which 
may not be universally relevant to all sectors and organisations. Please bear this in mind and, of course, you are free to make suggestions 
regarding the level descriptions in your response.  
The intention is that you look at the CSF then; using the description, decide what level you would allocate to your organisation or one for which 
you may be reviewing or providing guidance to. 
Then please go to page 6 and complete the questions that relate to each CSF and, where you wish to make any comment, use the space provided.  
Each CSF question has a rating between 1 and 5. There are also further questions relating to the maturity model itself which are a mix of ratings 
of 1-5 or a more simple yes no option. The layout of the model is not being scored. It is your views on the description of the Critical Success 
Factor and level descriptions to support the maturity levels that I am interested in.   You are of course welcome to make any comments on the 
layout.   
To assist if I have any need to clarify any of your responses it would help if you include a contact email address below.   
Control Group version 
 1 
 
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS MATURITY MODEL TABLES (Not part of the questionnaire) 
Critical Success Factor 
 
1.   A recognition by senior management that 
incidents will happen and that they must play a full 
and active part in the incident management process 
by. 
 
• Fully accepting that incident reporting is to be seen 
positively enabling early mitigation action. 
• Recognising in some cases there will be a need to 
consider action taken where the incident should 
and could have been prevented. 
• Acknowledging security incidents are part of life 
and business and, like Health and Safety accidents, 
the reporting process is part of the prevention 
strategy. 
• Supporting a culture which encourages reporting 
• Recognising an organisation which handles an 
incident well enhances its reputation 
 
Maturity Level  Description 
(Feel free to amend by suggesting alternative wording) 
1. Initial No recognition by senior management  that incidents will 
occur or of their role in the process 
2. Established Aware of the fact they will happen and they are to 
actively participate but only evidence of partial  
involvement 
3. Business 
enabling 
Recognised by management as important but not 
consistent across the organisation 
4. Quantitatively 
managed 
The majority of management accept incidents will happen 
and there is good evidence of regular involvement by 
managers but not firmly embedded. 
5. Optimised Considered as part of day to day management 
responsibilities with strong evidence of consistent active 
participation across the organisation with proactive rather 
than reactive involvement of managers 
Organisation Score:       Level         1     2     3     4     5 
Reason for score 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
2 
 
Critical Success Factor 
 
2.  Ease of making a report, recognising if 
reporting incidents is difficult individuals will be 
less likely to submit them. This may particularly 
affect the reporting of near misses. The reporting 
process should: 
 
• Provide a sufficiently clear level of education and 
awareness to all staff in how the reporting process 
works.   
• Describe what an incident/near miss is. 
• Describe how to report it and what escalation 
needs to take place. 
  
 
Maturity Level  Description 
(Feel free to amend by suggesting alternative wording) 
1. Initial No recognised reporting mechanism in place 
2. Established A reporting process in place but not well known or used. 
3. Business 
Enabling 
A  reporting mechanism is in place and used by most but 
still has challenges in its use 
4. Quantitatively 
managed 
Well understood processes with majority completing the 
process as described 
5. Optimised Second nature to staff on how to report. 
Organisation Score:       Level         1     2     3     4     5 
Reason for Score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Critical Success Factor 
 
3.  Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible 
feedback to the reporting community1 recognising: 
 
• People will only continue to report incidents if 
they are acknowledged and, even better, can see 
that reporting has been useful or has ensured 
compliance 
• Feedback need not be detailed, often a simple 
acknowledgement of the report and that action is 
being taken may be sufficient. 
• Staff that have been responsible for or involved in 
a security incident can become anxious. It is 
helpful to keep them informed and provide support 
where necessary 
 
Maturity Level  Description 
(Feel free to amend by suggesting alternative wording) 
 1. Initial No feedback provided to anyone who reports an incident. 
No support offered 
2. Established Limited feedback to reporters and some support 
3. Business 
enabling 
Feedback provided but not consistently. Some support 
provided but ad hoc 
4. Quantitatively 
managed 
Feedback in most circumstances. Recognition that 
support needed for reporters 
5. Optimised Feedback is consistently given; reporters are kept in the 
feedback loop. Support mechanisms embedded  
Organisation Score:       Level         1     2     3     4     5 
Reason for score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Community being the one that your organisation may belong to law enforcement, finance, healthcare etc. 
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Critical Success Factor 
 
4.  Incident analysis that considers root causes and 
wider systems/processes, not just the initial impact 
assessment.  It must recognise that: 
 
• It is important to identify what actually contributed 
to an incident in order to ensure repeat incidents 
do not occur.  
• Analysis may identify/highlight any 
training/development needs  or gaps 
• The incident may be just a symptom of a larger 
organisational or process flaw. 
• Superficial investigations may be 
counterproductive in the long term 
 
Maturity Level  Description 
(Feel free to amend by suggesting alternative wording) 
1. Initial No analysis taking place 
2. Established A process in place but there is limited analysis of 
incidents 
3. Business 
Enabling 
Analysis is taking place but not fully investigated to 
understand root cause and tackle the identified issues 
4. Quantitatively 
managed 
Analysis and learning taking place and lessons learnt in 
the majority of cases and changes to 
policy/procedures/process put in place to prevent 
reoccurrence 
5. Optimised Full root cause analysis in place for incidents. Learning 
outcomes adopted  to ensure business improvement and 
future prevention of that type of incident’s recurrence 
Organisation Score:       Level         1     2     3     4     5 
Reason for score 
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QUESTIONNAIRE STARTS HERE (Pages 6-12) 
Critical Success Factor 1 
A recognition by senior management that incidents will happen and that they must play a full and active part in the incident 
management process 
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
1.1 Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy was it for you to interpret the 
maturity position of your/another 
organisation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Very easy to understand  ☐ 
2. Easy to understand   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult  ☐  
4. Difficult to understand  ☐ 
5. Very difficult to understand  ☐         
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
1.2 Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy would it be to use to judge your 
or another organisations position in 
the maturity model? 
 
 
1. Very easy to judge   ☐ 
2. Easy to judge   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult to judge ☐  
4. Difficult to judge   ☐ 
5. Very difficult to judge  ☐         
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Critical Success Factor 2 
Ease of making a report, recognising if reporting incidents is difficult individuals will be less likely to submit them.  
 
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
2.1 Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy was it for you to interpret the 
maturity position of your/another 
organisation?  
  
 
 
1. Very easy to understand  ☐ 
2. Easy to understand   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult  ☐  
4. Difficult to understand  ☐ 
5. Very difficult to understand  ☐         
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy would it be to use to judge your 
or another organisations position in 
the maturity model? 
 
 
1. Very easy to judge   ☐ 
2. Easy to judge   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult to judge ☐  
4. Difficult to judge   ☐ 
5. Very difficult to judge  ☐         
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Critical Success Factor 3 
Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible feedback to the reporting community 
 
 
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
3.1. Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy was it for you to interpret the 
maturity position of your/another 
organisation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Very easy to understand  ☐ 
2. Easy to understand   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult  ☐  
4. Difficult to understand  ☐ 
5. Very difficult to understand  ☐         
 
 
 
3.2. Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy would it be to use to judge your 
or another organisations position in 
the maturity model? 
 
 
1. Very easy to judge   ☐ 
2. Easy to judge   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult to judge ☐  
4. Difficult to judge   ☐ 
5. Very difficult to judge  ☐         
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 Critical Success Factor 4 
 
Incident analysis that considers root causes and wider systems/processes, not just the initial impact assessment.   
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
Q 4.1 Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy was it for you to interpret the 
maturity position of your/another 
organisation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Very easy to understand  ☐ 
2. Easy to understand   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult  ☐  
4. Difficult to understand  ☐ 
5. Very difficult to understand  ☐         
 
 
 
 
  
 
Q 4.2 Based on the Critical Success 
Factor and the level description how 
easy would it be to use to judge your 
or another organisations position in 
the maturity model? 
 
 
1. Very easy to judge   ☐ 
2. Easy to judge   ☐  
3. Neither easy nor difficult to judge ☐  
4. Difficult to judge   ☐ 
5. Very difficult to judge  ☐         
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General Questions on maturity models 
It is recognised that not all organisations use maturity models and there are varying views on them. For the purpose of this survey can you please 
judge the potential use of this maturity model to identify if and how well each of the four identified Critical Success Factors is adopted within an 
organisation.  
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
Do you use maturity models in 
your organisation or one for 
which you have reviewed or 
assessed   
 
 
 
 Yes    ☐   
 No     ☐ 
 
 
 
Do you personally feel maturity 
models are useful tools to assist 
an organisation understand where 
they sit regarding to a particular 
situation.   
 
 
 
Yes   ☐  
No    ☐      
No strong view either way  ☐     
 
Some maturity models set out a 
larger number of elements to 
measure against. Is just listing the 
critical elements a better 
approach.    
 
 
         
  
Yes   ☐  
No    ☐      
No strong view either way  ☐     
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Specific questions on the Critical Success Factor Maturity Model 
The four Critical Success Factors and their wording have been developed through the consensus of a number of security professionals.  They 
have now been set out in a maturity model together with a brief description of the level of maturity appropriate to that CSF. The following 
questions ask your opinion on the model; it is understandable, useable and whether or not you feel it could be of value. 
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
Overall would you consider 
this maturity model to be of 
value to your organisation to 
assess how security incident 
reporting is handled and 
managed against the identified 
Critical Success Factors 
 
 
Extremely valuable                     ☐  
Valuable    ☐ 
Neither Valuable or of no value   ☐ 
Not very valuable    ☐ 
Of no value at all    ☐ 
 
 
 
 If other organisations used the 
same model would this assist 
when determining the ability of 
that organisation to handle 
incidents? (for example if 
exchanging data with them or 
contracting them as a third 
party supplier) 
 
 
Extremely valuable                     ☐  
Valuable    ☐ 
Neither Valuable or of no value   ☐ 
Not very valuable    ☐ 
Of no value at all    ☐ 
   
 
 
Once refined would you 
consider using this maturity 
model in your organisation or 
one you would be assessing 
  
Yes   ☐  
Possibly  ☐  
No   ☐  
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Specific questions on the Critical Success Factor Maturity Model (continued) 
The four Critical Success Factors and their wording have been developed through consensus of a number of security professionals.  They have 
now been set out in a maturity model together with a brief description of the level of maturity appropriate to that CSF. The following 
questions ask you opinion on the model. Whether it is understandable, useable and whether or not you feel it could be of value. 
 
Question Please rank your answer by selecting as 
appropriate one of the below boxes as applicable 
to the key below; 
Please use the space below if you wish to comment regarding your 
answer 
 
Would just knowing what the 
Critical Success Factors are 
and using an internal method 
of ensuring a gradual move to 
ensure they were embedded be 
a better approach for your 
organisation 
 
 
Yes   ☐  
Possibly  ☐  
No   ☐ 
 
Thank you for your time if you have any other comments on the Critical success Factors, level descriptions or other matter relating to this 
questionnaire please feel free to add them below. 
 
 
Thank you for your time. Please e mail your completed form to; m.humphrey@cranfield.ac.uk    Alternatively if you wish to post it 
please send to Mike Humphrey Standards and Security PO Box 8000 London SE11 5EN 
c:\users\mike\documents\phd\thesis commenced feb 2013\chapter 3 methodology\validation of irmm\incident reporting maturity model table questionnaire  control group version 3 24_12_16.docx  
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APPENDIX 16 
IRMM Survey Responses Comments 
CSF 1 Comments and reference number of respondent 
1.1 Based on the Critical Success Factor and the level description how easy was it for you to interpret the maturity position of your/another 
organisation?  
 
(12) I would suggest changing the wording from ‘ Health and Safety accidents’ to ‘ Health and Safety incidents’ in order to match the terms used 
elsewhere and not, potentially, raise a belief that security incidents may all be ‘accidents’. (1)  
(21) suggest including more information or examples about the role of managers, such as regular conversations with staff about security incidents, 
briefing the team as well as the individual to reduce the risk of it  ha[ppening again, or evidence that managers promote honest and full reporting. 
(2) 
(29) Purely down to the size of the organisation, evidencing level 5 could prove hard (1) 
(37) I liked the fact that there are general CSF descriptions to further explain the CSF itself, as well as a brief description against each level.  The 
descriptions are clear, allowing me to make a judgement regardless of sector the organisation is in. (1) 
(42) It was very easy to understand the distinctions between the 5 Maturity Levels. (1) 
(45) I recommend using, “Recognising there will be a need to consider action(a) taken where the incident should and could have been prevented.” 
Instead of, “Recognising in some cases there will be a need to consider action taken where the incident should and could have been prevented.” If 
an incident is reported, this consideration is a critical part of the RCA (2) 
(49)  The organisation has a well-defined and established incident management policy with supporting procedures  (2) 
(50) The Organisation has a well-defined reporting system, there is also a very good educational process in place to prevent security incidents. 
However senior management do accept that incidents will occur and when major or critical incidents occur then Gold groups are established to 
ensure appropriate action is taken. (2) 
(61) I feel emphasis on the “no blame” part of the process has been somewhat lost and is harder to draw out. The explanatory bullet points are 
long.  (2) 
(63) You might want to include "that" after "Recognising" in 
the fifth CSF descriptive bullet. (1) 
(70) Level 4 might be better as “… not firmly or consistently embedded”. (2) 
(72) All at least 2, except for the second bullet, which I can’t make sense of, so 5. “…incident could and should have been prevented” implies that 
action was *not* taken, but “consider action taken” suggests that it was?  (3) 
(87) Lack of experience of the incident reporting process implies lack of evidence of the extent of management involvement. (3) 
(89) “positively enabling…mitigation” may be capable of causing confusion: I would suggest more direct language.  Similarly 
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“Recognising…prevented”.   (3) 
(92) The wording is clear, but I found it difficult to score.  Probably because I was thinking along the lines of CSF 4 when I was trying to assess 
the maturity.  (3) 
(93) Subject to some wordsmithing!  (2) 
(103) A simple statement that will be interpreted correctly. (1) 
(107)  Suggestion to change the description of initial maturity is to :  
No recognition by senior management that incidents will occur or incident handling will be of their role in the process  (2) 
(115) Questions are simple and unambiguous with defined maturity statements.(1) 
(CG7) Clear and explicit but provided you now your subject matter.  Not sure that this would be of use by Internal Audit as they would not have 
the breadth of knowledge required. (2) 
 (CG11) Easy for my own organisation because I am involved in the process however if auditing another organisation I would need evidence to 
support the scoring. (2) 
(CG12) The description suggests a smaller organisation. I would not expect all senior management to have an involvement only relevant 
individuals. (2) 
(CG13) There needs to be some sort of recognition that there may be a turnover could be an inhibitor so I’d like to see some reference to 
induction/training. The ICO would also be interested in this aspect in the event that an incident required notification to that regulator. Size/scale of 
the organisation is also a factor that needs to be considered here. (2) 
 
1.2 Based on the Critical Success Factor and the level description how easy would it be to use to judge your or another 
organisations position in the maturity model? 
 
(7) Not sure there is a clear distinction between 3 & 4 as both talk about either a lack of consistency or not being firmly embedded. (2) 
(8) The difficulty I think will be on what to base a judgement on – you could ask an organisation and get one answer but whether they had 
documented processes or auditable evidence might be another question. 
Any assessment of awareness can be coloured by the presence of the question.  So if you ask a CEO “Are you aware of the risk of security 
incidents?” then they immediately have a level of awareness simply from being asked the question. 
However I don’t think its necessary to create an audit checklist – BUT it may be useful to think about, list or include the kinds of evidence you 
would expect against each answer. (2) 
(17) Need to be either involved in the incident reporting process or interview appropriate management personnel.(2) 
(29) Very easy to judge our own, perhaps slightly less easy to judge the level of in another organisation without sufficient evidence (2) 
(37) Same comment as given for CSF1 (I liked the fact that there are general CSF descriptions to further explain the CSF itself, as well as a brief 
description against each level.  The descriptions are clear, allowing me to make a judgement regardless of sector the organisation is in. (1)) 
(38) To judge any organisation including you own a high degree of familiarity must exist or the output will be inaccurate. (2) 
(40)  Easy to judge as a security practitioner, less easy for a senior manager to accept, especially at the lower end. (2) 
(42) Maturity Levels 1 and 5 will be easy to judge. The intermediate levels will take more work, to establish how much IM activity takes place and 
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how it is distributed across the organisation. (3) 
(52) Difference between the two questions 1.1 and 1.2 (and for the other CSFs) is rather subjective - had to read it twice and then I can't really 
differentiate my answers.(1) 
(55) I think there will always be some room for “interpretation” – aka an ability to err towards what might be seen as an acceptable score.  This is 
of course inevitable; can be tempered by having an element if independence/moderation is assessing scores/position.  Example: when we scored 
ourselves against IAMM our result ranged from a healthy(?) 2 to a more realistic 0.7!  (2) 
(63) It would depend on the consistency with which the 
assessment is made but the requirement is explicit. (2) 
 (70) Basically easy, but it will depend on the complexity of the organisation, and there could well be a difference of perception between senior 
managers themselves and other in the organisation of their level of recognition – but of course that is the point of having a model like this, but it 
does highlight the importance of getting the right person to assess.(2) 
(72) All at least 2, except for the second bullet, which I can’t make sense of, so 5. “…incident could and should have been prevented” implies that 
action was *not* taken, but “consider action taken” suggests that it was? (3) 
(73) In theory should be easy but MoD are not good at being clear about what needs to be reported.   (2) 
(74) Senior Management do not have a uniform set of values or characteristics. Those closer to the organisation’s security team tend to get it. (4) 
(86) Having an understanding of the approach taken by the organisation reviewed, in conjunction with a clear maturity scale and associated level 
definition, I feel it would be easy to judge. (2) 
(87) As per previous box (3)  Lack of experience of the incident reporting process implies lack of evidence of the extent of management 
involvement. 
(89) In my experience the main difficulty is in expressing the maturity of a large and complex organisation – that has thousands of members, 
dozens of sites, tens of specialisms, ten ranks, sworn and unsworn staff, volunteers and almost as many cultures.  It is not easy to take an overall 
view, or should one consider worst case, or best outcomes ?  (2) 
(92) As 1.1, easy to understand but levels are not so clear cut.  I wonder if this question should actually be asked last?  It can then be reviewed in 
context. (4) 
(96) The reporting/ recording process may have to factor in to what extent senior management (as opposed to line management) have been 
involved in the management process. Whilst the critical success factor might be at the optimal level it might be difficult to judge this in an audit-
able way unless senior management were copied in to incidents or summaries on a regular basis. (3) 
(103) All of the examples are subjective...which is difficult to evidence. It would perhaps be useful if there were ways of evidencing the score...i.e. 
Senior managers take a proactive role in the incident management process by have a standing agenda item on their weekly executive meetings' or 
something similar? (4) 
(115) This would be dependent upon the security culture and attitude of the organisation being assessed.  (3) 
(CG7) Ditto (2) Clear and explicit but provided you now your subject matter.  Not sure that this would be of use by Internal Audit as they would 
not have the breadth of knowledge required. 
(CG9) Would require the responder to have genuine knowledge and probably wide experience of the organisation to answer accurately (3) 
(CG11) It would be difficult to determine another organisations maturity based on the questions alone. It would need a full evidence based 
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assessment to be carried out to determine the senior management involvement in incident management.  (2) 
CG12) As above – that said I would take it as the senior management I thought would need to have an involvement and judge accordingly. (2) The 
description suggests a smaller organisation. I would not expect all senior management to have an involvement only relevant individuals.  
(CG13) same comments fro previous answer 1.1 There needs to be some sort of recognition that there may be a turnover could be an inhibitor so 
I’d like to see some reference to induction/training. The ICO would also be interested in this aspect in the event that an incident required 
notification to that regulator.Size/scale of the organisation is also a factor that needs to be considered here. (3) 
 
 
 
CSF 2  Comments and ref number of respondent 
2.1 Based on the Critical Success Factor and the level description how easy was it for you to interpret the maturity position of 
your/another organisation?  
  
(8) As an observation, as I work in the security industry I can easily make sense of this – the survey probably needs input from non security 
practitioners (1)  
(12) I would suggest the sentence ‘Describe what an incident/near miss is’ has the phrase ‘in non-technical terms’ in order to clarify the need for 
ease of use and common understanding. (1)  
(21) Just a suggestion to include in the bullet point list that the incident reporting process and the form required should be easy to find (2) 
(29) As with Factor 1, evidencing of level 5 could be difficult in our large organisation (1) 
(37) Same comment as given for CSF1 (I liked the fact that there are general CSF descriptions to further explain the CSF itself, as well as a brief 
description against each level.  The descriptions are clear, allowing me to make a judgement regardless of sector the organisation is in. (1)) 
(42) It was very easy to understand the distinctions between the 5 Maturity Levels. (1) 
(49) Templates and reporting guidelines are well publicised.  (2) 
(50) There is a well-defined security incident/breach process in place backed up with policy and procedures. (2) 
(55) Yes: I’ve used this table to match against an internal scoring mechanism we used last year to compare ourselves at different points along our 
road to implementing an internal/BT-partnered SOC. (1)  
(63) Is "second nature" universally understood? Might this 
be expressed as: "Reporting is fully embedded in the 
culture and processes of the organisation and its people (1) 
(70) But I felt there were a couple of missing points: 
- consistency of reporting of different types of incident. 
- need for ‘no blame’ culture in incident/near miss reporting to encourage openness. (2) 
(72) A proof-reading comment that you switch from talking about “reporting processes” and “reporting mechanisms”. If that was supposed to 
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have some significance then I missed it, if not it’s a distraction by making me think it might have some significance!  (1) 
(86) The levels of maturity may be take into account the reporting mechanism itself, i.e. manual form filling may deter individuals from reporting 
given the effort required (relatively speaking).  More automation e.g. Intranet based web reporting forms may aid uptake and are likely to indicate 
greater levels of maturity. (2) 
(87) Reporting criteria, forms and details of where to send them to are readily available on the intranet. There are also phone  points of contact. (1) 
(89) Again, I would suggest the use of very direct language.  Particularly my attempt would be “Ensure that staff are aware of the reporting 
process and how it works”.  (3) 
(107)  
Suggestion to change the description of optimized maturity is to :  
Well understood processes reporting recognized incidents as described  
Reason) to understand clearly. (2) 
(115) See 1.1response  Questions are simple and unambiguous with defined maturity statements(1)  
(CG5) The ability of the individual to report incidents in a simple and straightforward manner is critical to the success of the reporting mechanism 
and this CSF is probably the key tenet of the maturity model, sadly one that has been overlooked in this organisation.  (1) 
(CG7) Ditto (2) Clear and explicit but provided you now your subject matter.  Not sure that this would be of use by Internal Audit as they would 
not have the breadth of knowledge required. 
(CG11) Easy for my own organisation because I am involved in the process however if auditing another organisation I would need evidence to 
support the scoring.  (2) 
(CG12) I found I needed to read the CSF (bit in bold) a couple of times before I understood it fully (3) 
(CG13) I found it very easy to understand.  The descriptions would benefit from recognising that hopefully users would at best only be occasional 
users so the focus ought to be on awareness of what to do in the event of recognising that a security incident has occurred and what they need to do 
next ie report the incident on the intuitive reporting tool. (1) 
 
2.2. Based on the Critical Success Factor and the level description how easy would it be to use to judge your or another 
organisations position in the maturity model? 
 
(8) The issue above would be less of a problem as a reporting process and evidence of its use is more likely to be tangible and present or not.  The 
only issue might be that if there hadn’t been many incidents (or “detected incidents”) the volume of data might be low. (1) 
(17) Need to be able to review appropriate material and processes.(2)  
(29) Very easy to judge our own, perhaps slightly less easy to judge the level of in another organisation without sufficient evidence  (2) 
(37) Same comment as given for CSF1 (I liked the fact that there are general CSF descriptions to further explain the CSF itself, as well as a brief 
description against each level.  The descriptions are clear, allowing me to make a judgement regardless of sector the organisation is in. (1)) 
(38) An intimate understanding if the organisation is essential to use these scales and I can confidently use it for my own organisation but would 
be concerned using it to judge another organisation that I did not know as well. (2) 
(40) As with all incidents reporting schemes it is difficult to judge the take up as you 'don't know what you are not told'. This would be easier in 
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smaller organisations based in a couple of buildings, potentially in the same country.  Difficulties when numbers increase into the 1000's, buildings 
into the 100's and potentially global organisations. Not sure if there is any other research concerning differences socially across a global 
organisation with some cultures being more open and some more secretive?  (4) 
 
(42)  This will be easy to judge, as it will be possible to examine the entries into the reporting process/mechanism, to assess how widespread its 
use is.  If an area of the organisation is under represented, it will be easy to investigate that area.   
Incidentally, I’ve assumed that there’s no difference between an IM Process and an IM Mechanism.  If the use of different words is important and 
intended to enable distinctions between Maturity Levels to be made, more explanation will be required.(2) 
(45) This could be more quantifiable than subjective if you describe year on year reporting statistic using some defined KPI’s. (2) 
(49) Sometimes the need to just raise a report overshadows the quality and content of the actual report. This can hamper any investigation and also 
skew any analysis being conducted. (4) 
(50) As above. There is a well-defined security incident/breach process in place backed up with policy and procedures. (2) 
(54) Can be a selective judgement, as to ‘what good’ looks like, or the nature and extent of documentation (4) 
(72) At any level above 1 there should be evidence/records to support the judgement (1) 
(74) It must be difficult just now because we now have a behaviours team to understand culture around policy breach and reporting. (4) 
(103) How can this be judged? I would like to think my organisation is quantatively managed, but the reality may be different. Again it would 
perhaps be good to have some metrics to quantify the scoring (but acknowledge this is very difficult to achieve!).(Not scored) 
(115) This is easier to judge as the questions in the CSF can be asked of several staff at different levels in an audit. (2) 
(CG7) Ditto (2) Clear and explicit but provided you now your subject matter.  Not sure that this would be of use by Internal Audit as they would 
)not have the breadth of knowledge required. 
(CG8) For our organisation, we would need to canvas the opinions of all staff before we could judge our own MM position.  I do believe that 
unfortunately there will also be a number of staff who would prefer to try and “brush the incident under the carpet” then of course we may never 
get to hear about the incident (4) 
(CG9) Measuring the ease of reporting would still need to be followed by people actually using it. (2) 
(CG11) Easy for my own organisation because I am involved in the process however if auditing another organisation I would need evidence to 
support the scoring (2) 
 
 
   CSF 3     Comments and ref number of respondent (score in brackets) 
3.1. Based on the Critical Success Factor and the level description how easy was it for you to interpret the maturity position of 
your/another organisation?  
 
(1)Subjectivity with this section may be an issue as 'useful' is difficult to perceive to another organisation.(3) 
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(15) It was not entirely clear what the word “accessible” means in this context in the question. (2) 
(17) Need to be either involved in the incident reporting process or chain or allowed to review the reporting process and reported incidents (and 
associated information) and interview appropriate personnel. (2)   
 (24) Normally the person reporting an incident is owns the incident and so is in the loop of its status. So in some cases this CSF may not be 
applicable.(2) 
(25) As per suggested amendments above - unclear as to whether aimed at individual person reporting incident or holistic awareness to units/teams etc 
or both  (4) 
(26) The headline question uses the term “community” yet the explanation and the answers are all about the reporter? Feedback to the community is a 
different process from feedback to the reporter. The reporter should always be given feedback, but there are many good reasons that feedback to the 
community is not necessary or appropriate, so should remain a choice, not a requirement. (4) 
(29) Given those involved in providing incident support would likely be the ones who provide the feedback to the reporting community, this would be 
easier to evidence than the other factors. (1) 
(37) Same comment as given for CSF1 (I liked the fact that there are general CSF descriptions to further explain the CSF itself, as well as a brief 
description against each level.  The descriptions are clear, allowing me to make a judgement regardless of sector the organisation is in. (1)) 
(42) It was very easy to understand the distinctions between the 5 Maturity Levels.  (1) 
 (45) Solid definitions of what is meant by “Rapid, useful, accessible and intelligible” Regardless of definition, I would replace “rapid” with “timely”. 
(3) 
(49) The feedback and reporting loop to the incident manager is very immature and inconsistent. (2) 
(50) This would very much depend on the nature of the security incident/breach. Providing early feedback can help to calm or inform the reporter that 
action is being taken. However if it is a major or critical incident then sometimes more facts will need to be gathered before any feedback can be 
provided.  (3) 
(61) Intuitively, to me “reporting community” means organisation. I wouldn’t expect incidents to be routinely shared outside of my organisation except 
in a summary/aggregated format, or useful details e.g. threat signatures. I’m not sure if you are suggesting that incident details should be routinely 
shared with the wider industry base, or if you mean a CISP-style sharing community partnership (3) 
(63) I am not sure whether this is a comment on CSF 2, 3 or 4 but the sense that an essential pre-requisite for staff 
to report incidents and near misses is confidence that they will not be blamed may not come through as clearly as it should. Rather, it is failure to report 
that will be penalised. The organisational culture should view helping others to avoid similar situations as commendable behaviour. This is fundamental 
to aviation safety where anonymous reporting arrangements, often through third parties, have proved themselves. (2) 
(70) And this largely answers my points at Q2.1 above. (2) But I felt there were a couple of missing points: 
consistency of reporting of different types of incident. 
need for ‘no blame’ culture in incident/near miss reporting to encourage openness. 
(87) No experience of using the reporting process - lack of reportable incidents. (3) 
(115) See 1.1 response (1) Questions are simple and unambiguous with defined maturity statements  
(CG7) Ditto (2) Clear and explicit but provided you now your subject matter.  Not sure that this would be of use by Internal Audit as they would not 
have the breadth of knowledge required. 
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(CG11) Easy for my own organisation because I am involved in the process however if auditing another organisation I would need evidence to support 
the scoring (2) 
3.2. Based on the Critical Success Factor and the level description how easy would it be to use to judge your or another organisations position in the 
maturity model? 
 
(8) There are a couple of factors here – if the feedback/support is given (auditable) – you would ideally also want to measure whether it was understood 
or even acted upon by the recipient (i.e. would it change behaviour or increase vigilance).  
The other distinction you probably need is between specific and general feedback.  Its very easy to give an overly standardised or general message 
“Thanks you for your report. We are dealing with it” might be counter productive and appear like an unattended mailbox of there is no case-specific 
feedback. (2) 
(17) As above - Need to be either involved in the incident reporting process or chain or allowed to review the reporting process and reported incidents 
(and associated information) and interview appropriate personnel (2) 
(29) Very easy to judge our own, perhaps slightly less easy to judge the level of in another organisation without sufficient evidence (2) 
(37) Same comment as given for CSF1 (I liked the fact that there are general CSF descriptions to further explain the CSF itself, as well as a brief 
description against each level.  The descriptions are clear, allowing me to make a judgement regardless of sector the organisation is in. (1)) 
(40) I would suggest there is an issue here of risk assessment.  You may be at level 2 for low risk incidents, but at level 4/5 for high risk incidents.  A 
large number of similar low risk incidents should be picked up in Factor 4 below, but may not need to be dealt with individually. (4) 
(42) Assessing feedback directly will depend on whether and how the feedback is provided and recorded.   
Feedback may be provided electronically and so be recordable (e.g. emailed to individuals or groups, or disseminated to all employees via Intranet or 
newsletters).  Alternatively, it may be delivered face to face, in which case examining it afterwards will not be possible.   
The amount of feedback provided may also vary widely.  It may be a simple email acknowledgement or a series of face to face meetings (if support is 
required). 
In order to judge the Maturity Level, rather than assessing feedback directly, it may be easier to interview staff who have been involved in incidents, to 
get their opinion on the feedback they received. (3) 
(54) Use of metrics would assist the process, so established for example would mean x events are reported on and managed by the business, based on 
what are the important success criteria as defined by the business (4) 
(55) Similar comments re consistent use/trust in who had carried out the assessment/when/etc (2) 
(72) As above, these processes should create their own evidence (1) At any level above 1 there should be evidence/records to support the judgement 
(74) I would need to dip sample responses from a number of teams to make a value assessment. Although we have a relatively new and common case 
management system I am not confident that all case notes would necessarily detail feedback. Not straightforward. (4) 
(87) As per previous box (3) No experience of using the reporting process - lack of reportable incidents. 
(115) Again I see this as dependent upon the culture and attitude of the assessed dept.   (3) 
(CG7) Ditto (2) Clear and explicit but provided you now your subject matter.  Not sure that this would be of use by Internal Audit as they would not 
have the breadth of knowledge required. 
(CG9) Should be able to quite easily evidenced by production of incident records (2) 
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(CG11) Easy for my own organisation because I am involved in the process however if auditing another organisation I would need evidence to support 
the scoring. 
 (2) 
CSF 4       Comments and ref number of respondent 
4.1 Based on the Critical Success Factor and the level description how easy was it for you to interpret the maturity position of 
your/another organisation?  
 
(26) I would question the wording of Answer 2 (“A process is in place”). This response belongs in Answer 4 or 5. An immature organisation which 
does not analyse incidents well is unlikely to have a process in place to do so. (4) 
(37) Same comment as given for CSF1 (I liked the fact that there are general CSF descriptions to further explain the CSF itself, as well as a brief 
description against each level.  The descriptions are clear, allowing me to make a judgement regardless of sector the organisation is in. (1)) 
(42)  It was easy to understand the distinctions between the 5 Maturity Levels. (2) 
(45) Spot on  (1) 
(50) I would add that based on evidence I have seen and been involved in at my Organisation for major/critical incidents of a data loss or similar type 
event, a senior gold group is established under the Deputy SIRO to look into root cause analysis and wider system processes to ensure improvements 
are put in place. (2) 
(54) For the company this was straightforward as a lot of time has been invested in the processes.  However, for other organisations this may prove 
challenging  (2) 
(63) Again here, it is essential that it is failure to report and therefor to risk situations repeating themselves that 
should be unacceptable and the subject of censure. It is right to focus on training and development needs and to organisational or process flaws but 
these must be seen 
as failings of management and leadership - which takes one full circle to CSF 1! I am also very wary of language like "lessons learnt" and which 
suggests that anything 
can be prevented (level four). The proof of whether they have been learned is whether or not they are repeated. "...lessons identified...and changes made 
to policy/ 
procedure/process to reduce the risk of reoccurence" might  (3) 
(70) Understandable and clear – yes – but this is likely to be the hardest area to assess. (3) 
(72) In three places you imply that the aim is for incidents to be “prevented” or “not recur”. That may be too absolute for many business risks – e.g. loss 
of laptop can only be prevented by not issuing laptops and insisting that staff only work in the office. I tend to talk about reducing risks to the 
acceptable level for that business. But there’s probably an official ISO etc. phrase. (2) 
(87) The intranet offers a Security Breach Matrix that allows line managers to assess the impact of an individual breach. I have no indication of the 
extent of its use. (3) 
(89) Only the sophisticated and mature practitioner is likely to have much idea of what analysis is called for, and how output might be useful.  Case 
studies are a useful tool for briefing users and management; statistical facts are also useful for briefing (4) 
(92) In my thinking, this was tied in with CSF 1 (1) 
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(115) See 1.1 response  (1) Questions are simple and unambiguous with defined maturity statements  
(CG7) Ditto (2) Clear and explicit but provided you now your subject matter.  Not sure that this would be of use by Internal Audit as they would not 
have the breadth of knowledge required.  
(CG11) Easy for my own organisation because I am involved in the process however if auditing another organisation I would need evidence to support 
the scoring.  (2) 
(CG13)   Whilst easy to understand it is complicated by the fact that we adopt a risk based approach whereby certain incident types are subjected to a 
very detailed investigation.  (2) 
 
Q 4.2 Based on the Critical Success Factor and the level description how easy would it be to use to judge your or another 
organisations position in the maturity model? 
 
(8) One would hope that for a given incident, the root cause/issues leading to it/contributing factors had either been identified or not.  There would be 
some use in making sure that trends were also captures – i.e. data across incidents that indicated recurring problems or common origins (1) 
(17) Need to be either involved in the incident analysis, investigation and remediation process or chain or allowed to review the supporting evidence 
and information for those events where analysis was required. (3) 
(29) Very easy to judge our own, perhaps slightly less easy to judge the level of in another organisation without sufficient evidence  (2) 
(37) Same comment as given for CSF1 (I liked the fact that there are general CSF descriptions to further explain the CSF itself, as well as a brief 
description against each level.  The descriptions are clear, allowing me to make a judgement regardless of sector the organisation is in. (1)) 
(40) This would all depend on the competence of your analyst and potentially their security knowledge.  There may be a split here with specialist 
security professionals carrying out risk assessments, and specialist analysts carrying our analysis.  Again the risk assessment process is critical together 
with your risk appetite. (4) 
(42) Root cause analysis will almost certainly be documented, in order to capture lessons learnt that can be followed through.  It should be easy to look 
at the results and check what’s happened, in order to assess the Maturity Level. (2) 
(45) Spot on (1) 
(47) I have answered every question at 1. Very easy. This may be because I have been involved in this evaluation process from the beginning. I expect 
you will have considered, but you may obtain more useful feedback from people who have not seen the Critical Success Factor matrix before (1) 
(54) For other organisation, as stated earlier, what are you comparing it to? Your own standards? Or defined metrics which can be quantified?    (4) 
(70) As above. (3) Understandable and clear – yes – but this is likely to be the hardest area to assess. 
(72) Assessing the completeness of investigation might involve a bit of work to partly re-analyse and work out whether the conclusions reached/actions 
taken were reasonable (2) 
(73) Difficult to judge due to complexity of organisation and lack of robust commercial arrangements.    (4)  
(74) Post Incident Review is embedded into our processes for major incidents.   (2) 
(89) There is room in our world for a more detailed guide on the analysis of incidents.  I would rather have a superficial investigation than none; and a 
superficial investigation could well indicate that there is nothing to be learned from this one.  Sometimes we have to prioritise.  I remember when we 
used to investigate all crimes – no matter how much they were non-starters.  Now we investigate almost none.  The knack of it is picking the winners !  
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(4) 
(103) This will always be difficult to judge as it is more about understanding long term change as to how an organsiation is learning from its mistakes. 
There perhaps should be something in here around evidence that the business has adopted the change. (4) 
(115)  This may be a complex analysis process based upon the type and complexity of the incident.  An organisation may be well versed in dealing with 
a specific type of incident or range of incidents, but when something comes in from left field, it may cause problems.  (4) 
(CG7) Ditto (2) Clear and explicit but provided you now your subject matter.  Not sure that this would be of use by Internal Audit as they would not 
have the breadth of knowledge required. 
(CG9) In depth knowledge of incident records, actions taken, changes to processes etc would all be involved. Assessing overall performance would 
therefore require research and then a yardstick to measure what ‘good’ looks like.  (3) 
(CG11) Easy for my own organisation because I am involved in the process however if auditing another organisation I would need evidence to support 
the scoring.  (2) 
(CG12) In some cases I believe there may be difficulties in enforcing actions that come out of lessons learned. So even though the process is completed 
it may not be effective.  (4) 
(CG13) Need awareness of the business risk appetite.  (3) 
 
 
 
 
General Answers   on Maturity Models          Comments and ref number of respondent 
Do you use maturity models in your organisation or one for which you have reviewed or assessed   
 
(8) Not so much in current role, but have in the past. (Yes) 
(12) Maturity models are used sporadically and as a supplemental tool rather than a required assessment method. (Yes) 
(17) Have provided advice on the choice of available maturity models and the content of assessment mechanisms to HMG organisations. (Yes) 
(20) We use maturity models for Information Assurance. (this appears to be 2 different questions and I am not sure that the question makes sense. Is 
there a word missing?)  (yes) 
(37) My own organisation is an SME and as such we do not use MMs as they tend to be too cumbersome and rigid in their application.  Equally, I have 
not had the opportunity to apply MMs during an assessment of another organisation .(No) 
(40) We have in the past they became far too complicated and were not able to be accurately used by large and small teams. (No) 
(42) I have some experience of using Maturity Models (did not score) 
(49) Although an IAMM is not formally used, its context and content has been adopted in various aspects of risk assessment and management. (Yes) 
(50) In all honesty I am unsure whether or not a maturity model is in place for security incident reporting, but there is a well defined process. (Yes) 
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(52) BT, GCHQ spring to mind - both large organisations with time and staff to spare who do this sort of thing (Yes) 
(54) As we are ‘accredited’, we are subjected to a number of independent audits by the MOD accreditor which happens on an annual basis. 
Of course the success ‘criteria’ are clearly defined as compliance requirements are clearly laid out. (Yes) 
(74) SIM3 (Yes) 
(77) Not personally, but I’ve seen discussions of others using them (Yes) 
(86)  Maturity modelling, with well defined definitions of each level, are a good method of highlighting the delta between the now and the future. 
(Yes) (87) [Redacted] is effectively a lodger unit within [Redacted]. Although involved in infosec across the police community, we are seldom 
involved with it in Home Office. (No) 
(89) Maturity models have been mandatory for the police service for at least five years. (Yes) 
(93) IAMM and DIAN (Yes) 
(96) Not as far as I'm aware (No) 
(103) Originally used the IAMM - however are no longer using this. This Incident Maturity will be useful to gauge our current standing and how we 
can improve. (Yes) 
(107) In Korea, there is a certification scheme for information security readiness assessment that is to measure maturity for an organization. Please see 
at http://www.kfict.or.kr/board/index.html?board_id=business2&action=list. Sorry for being written in Korean. (Yes) 
(116) One client is currently using ISF – but the Information Security team are answering the questions without full recourse to the experience of the 
business themselves and are thus positively responding irrespective. Marking one’s own homework is never a guarantee of security nor success. (Yes) 
(CG7) The College uses ONE3M [HO model] and have and do use IAMM as a point of reference. (Yes) 
(CG9) The principles described for security incidents are all known and aspired to. Other IA areas where maturity models could feasibly assist have 
been broadly covered through the previous IAMM, but which finally outlived its usefulness as a constructive tool. It is hard to see where such models 
could have significant value in the future.(No)  
(CG10) Previously used the IM Maturity Model when it was an accreditation requirement from [Redacted] (No) 
Do you personally feel maturity models are useful tools to assist an organisation understand where they sit regarding to a particular situation 
(1) Mixed with this one.  I have known organisations to  massage figures to score more highly than perhaps they should.  This, of course, is an integrity 
issue, and one that is difficult to allow for, but is noteworthy nevertheless (No strong view) 
(4) As long as in addition to defining requirements they provide a vehicle for submission of supporting evidence (Yes) 
(8) Normally they work best if there is some comparative data from the wider industry or same sector upon which to compare.  An organisation might 
have medium maturity, but be streets ahead or behind other similar business – hence for a give rating is the action to strive to improve, or accept that 
you are relatively OK. (Yes) 
(12) If they are short, sharp and simple to follow – as per this example here I feel they can be very useful.  (Yes) 
(15) I think it is dependent on the organisation size and maturity! 
As an SME with relative mature internal processes, then I do not find them useful. However, as a tool where the level of maturity is lower, then they are 
good at helping set priorities (No view either way) 
(21) I believe how organisations deal with security incidents are integral to an effective security culture and in some cases maybe one of the few times a 
member of staff engaged with the security team, so a maturity model is most welcome. (Yes) 
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(36) Maturity models, baselines, etc. are a good way for measuring, maturity, compliance, etc. especially where you work in large organisations that 
rely on third parties to provide managed services i.e. it enables all parties to converse with the same terminology, thereby ensuring consistency, 
repeatability, & traceability. (Yes) 
(37) I personally believe that MMs have a use so long as they are used within the wider context of the operating environment to provide an internal 
understanding of the organisation's current capability within that environment.  From anecdotal evidence, I understand that organisations have a 
tendency to use a MM assessment as a 'scorecard' to deliver a security goal or to achieve a particular 'standard', which once achieved results in no 
further improvement. (Yes) 
(40) If they are simple they can be more use than if they are complex.  They can give an indication of an area of concern, but not necessarily pinpoint 
the exact issue.(No strong View) 
(49) As long as the model used is relevant to the organisation’s business and stated risk outcomes. (Yes) 
(50) Yes, I believe that the use of a maturity model would very much assist the Organisation is dealing with major and critical security incidents and 
breaches. (Yes) 
(52) Depends how seriously the outcomes are taken - eg: Board or Audit Committee level, Harder for SMEs. (No strong views) 
(54) Yes, organisations should understand where they sit with peers, so in the market segment should they spend more of less? 
Of course, also driven by regulatory requirements (Yes) 
(70) Actually my personal view is Yes with a strong caveat, hence the tempering of response.  They are very useful where they are used properly, but 
there is a danger of them being used either as confirmation of perceived goodness or as sticks, rather than as genuine assessments to inform activity. (no 
strong view) 
(73) They are a good benchmark but only as good as on that day and area you assess (Yes) 
(89) They are helpful in generating a little self appraisal; they are flawed by the lack of objectivity.  And there is a competition for effort/resources – 
between doing the day job (in my case Policing), dealing with the practicalities of IA, and reporting IA.  I would suggest that one report/return 
annually, or even biannually, does the trick.   (Yes) 
(94) I am an advocate of maturity models. For me one of the key elements of any maturity model is that the results lead to an action plan (as a result of 
a gap analysis) so that improvements can be made where the model shows weaknesses. It is also important that the model may be applied iteratively to 
demonstrate progress, or the lack of it(!), and that comparable analysis with previous results can be shown to management. (Yes) 
(107) Definitely, the maturity model is very important to improve the posture of organization for the information security.  (Yes) 
(116) Only because it is usually a self-assessment response and one provided in isolation so there is little measurable value to be gained.  Years of 
experience breeds scepticism unfortunately. (No) 
(CG4) Senior management need to take the lead and push outstanding issues through. Should be done independently (No strong views) 
(CG6) As long as they are direct, concise and do not take up a disproportionate amount of time to complete. The effort cannot outweigh the desired 
outcome.(Yes) 
(CG7) They are incredibly important to review your maturity and take out the personal factors which can distort views. (Yes) 
(CG8) Personally, my first review of a MM, one that I found both useful and informative.  It gives confidence that the critical elements that need to be 
considered are just that, considered. (Yes) 
(CG10) As long as it is understood what the maturity model is there to do for the organisation and ensure there is a consistent understanding across the 
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profession if they are using it for a common purpose (Yes) 
(CG11) It is a useful tool to show senior managers where they sit within the maturity model and provides the information needed to support future 
progress and strategy. (Yes) 
(CG12) I believe they can but you can easily interpret the question to make you sound more or less mature than you are. Or you may score highly but 
there are still issues which are then ignored due to the score being high. (No strong views) 
(CG13) They can be beneficial provide the benefits are recognised at a senior level. They also need to be used over a period of time to identify the 
organisation’s direction of travel/trajectory.  (Yes) 
Some maturity models set out a larger number of elements to measure against. Is just listing the critical elements a better 
approach.    
 
(1) Subjectivity is limited as much as possible by using only critical elements. (Yes) 
(7) This prevents the model becoming a ‘tick list’ and requires greater understanding to implement a system. (Yes) 
(8) The shorter any questionnaire/survey/assessment is the easier and more likely it is to be adopted.(Yes)  
(12) More complex and complicated models take more time and in most organisations this a much valued resource. (Yes) 
(17) Critical elements should be concentrated on. However a more granular approach may enable an organisation to better show progress (or lack of 
progress) in addressing identified gaps. (No strong views) 
(20) Listing the critical elements is a good starting point to achieving a base line minimum standard as quickly as possible. However, when that is done 
there may be opportunity to increase the number of elements to seek to achieve thus enhancing the standard above 'base line' (No strong views) 
(21) The key to any good model is to keep it simple. I believe four is about right. (Yes) 
 (26) Both approaches have merits, depending on how much detail is required and how much time the participants have available  
(No strong views) 
(29) In my opinion just listing base line critical elements, with yes/no answers, provides a narrower less helpful view  (No) 
(36) Too many elements leads to complexity, variability & so on. Listing the critical elements is a common-sense approach that is not overly draining 
(Yes) 
(37) On the whole I would say 'Yes', as this would make it easily scalable for different sized organisations.  For example, you have covered the 4 key 
aspects of incident management and any size organisation should have these in place.  An SME could use this MM with little worry, or drain on 
resources, and still achieve a managerial understanding of its capability just as a larger organisation could. (Yes)  
(40) However, you may wish to go down to the lower level if you are scoring low (1.2 in your example), but there would be no need if you were at 4/5.  
3 would always be a discussion based on appetite. (Yes) 
(42)  Listing the critical elements is a better approach for organisations at the lower maturity levels, as it will enable them to focus on the most 
important factors.  
Including further elements may be useful for organisations that are already at a medium or higher level.  I would expect the law of diminishing returns 
to effectively determine a level, beyond which is not cost-effective to go, for each organisation. (no strong views) 
(45) That very much depends on the individual situation and what benefit you are looking to derive out of the CMM. (Yes) 
(49) Many organisations only have appetite or resources to manage the critical elements however they need to be cognisant of the wider elements and 
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impact in order to fully understand where they sit within the scale. The key is how this is presented and in what order. i.e. critical elements first with the 
remainder as an appendix for reference as necessary.  (Yes) 
(50) Again this would depend on the nature of the security incident/breach, maybe there should be different variations of the maturity model. (No 
strong views) 
(51) complete listing of detailed elements allows a maturity model to form the basis of a workplan for improvement, but the critical elements approach 
allows a rapid comparison against best practice and/or other bodies. (No strong Views) 
(52) Interest can be hard to sustain doing a mega-questionnaire with similar but not identical questions (Yes) 
(54) Time is money, so all automation of processes is beneficial, as well as the ability to complete compliance statements via the intranet supports the 
process and buy in  (Yes) 
(55) I think you need some substance behind the headline statements – certainly for lay, non-expert practitioner use 
(Ticked No strong views and No ) 
(57) Previous iterations of security related maturity models have been very long and laborious with organisations choosing to move away from their 
use.  Whilst the overall results and assessments can be very useful in providing indications of areas for improvement, the complex models tend to be 
avoided. (Yes) 
(61) Measuring against sub-criteria adds value but also complexity. (No strong View) 
(72) Number of elements depends on the scope of the model, and the extent to which factors are common to all organisations. E.g. the Security Incident 
Management Maturity Model (https://www.trusted-introducer.org/SIM3-Reference-Model.pdf) has more factors because it covers a wider area. I 
suspect that incident reporting is both a narrower area and one where you’ll get into more-than-one-way-to-do-it if you dig much deeper.  (No strong 
View) 
(74) A common standard for maturity models may be useful where security teams from disparate organisations need to interact for the common good of 
security. Each team may then know what to expect in terms of capability from others, where each has been accredited against a particular model.  (No) 
(85) I think it is important to understand the client or audience involved and adapt accordingly. (No strong view) 
(86) Simplicity is important, but as mentioned above, clear definitions for each level (which may itself include a number of measurements) will enable 
more specific assessment.(No strong view) 
(89) More than two A4 sheets of questions starts to feel oppressive.  May well outreach the attention span of senior management. 
 (No strong view) 
(92) Definitely, otherwise there is a danger of focusing on the process and losing sight of the main goal.  (Yes) 
(93) Many maturity model are too complex and hence resource intensive. (Yes) 
(115) It’s the same as lessons learned vs lessons logged. If all that happens is a list if events is listed, nothing changes and an organisation will 
consistently fail to improve (No) 
(116) I want a “sort of” option! Looking at one element in isolation ultimately only means more work to pull together all the other elements that should 
be being considered. (No) 
(CG4) Time consuming but the Force would have a better understanding. 
(No strong views) 
(CG5) I think that it very much depends on the criticality of the matter under review, any maturity model should be designed to focus on analysis of a 
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known (desired?) maturity level by use of a consistent set of questionnaires and scoring.   (No strong views) 
(CG6) See answer above. There is a balancing act between being too generic and being too granular. Getting that element right is the key to making a 
Maturity Model work for an organisation. 
(No strong views) As long as they are direct, concise and do not take up a disproportionate amount of time to complete. The effort cannot outweigh the 
desired outcome. 
(CG7) Possibly!  Listing can be bland but with the IAMM there is an opportunity to expand.  Personally the IAMM is an excellent tool with both 
listing and comment.   (Yes) 
(CG8) Absolutely, if only the critical elements are considered then I would suggest this would give some clarity to organisations, the less critical 
elements would, in some cases, be unique to that business and can be considered separately if required. (Yes) 
(CG9) Setting out, or even in some case prioritising, principles could add value in some cases – and perhaps benefit people who are new in some 
business areas. (Yes) 
(CG10) As an initial measure to build on – once embedded you may wish to identify priority areas that require more specific elements to measure 
against (Yes) 
(CG11) Some maturity models can be very bureaucratic therefore critical elements is a good way forward. However it may require additional evidence 
column to support scoring.   (Yes) 
(CG13) Yes but senior management need to see that there are real benefits to any such review. Also not everyone would wish their results to be 
publicly available. (Yes) 
 
Specific questions on the Critical Success Factor Maturity Model 
 
Comments and ref number of respondent 
Overall would you consider this maturity model to be of value to your organisation to assess how security incident reporting is handled and managed 
against the identified Critical Success Factors 
 
(8) Current company is quite small, but the model looks useful based on past clients I’ve worked with (2) 
(12) Carrying out this in my own organisation, perhaps even required by our national accreditors, would be a good way of highlighting any 
shortcomings to senior management.(2) 
(15) … but limited value. 
We have an incident response plan, and are aware of the frailties. 
Also, having answered the questions, it lacks the “so what” factor. (2)  
(17) The criteria set out are very clear and easy to interpret – good piece of work Mike :-) (2) 
(21) is that a mature incident reporting model needs some 'teeth' at times. Whilst recognising that the 'open hand' approach usually works better than the 
'closed fist', I feel there needs to be clearly defined  strategy for dealing with people that are ambivalent or seek to disrupt the security programme. (2) 
(37) I like the straightforward nature of this MM, in which it describes the key elements of incident management that can be easily understood by non-
technical management and can be evaluated in real-world terms.  It is concise which can give a quick look overview that would be applicable to most 
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sizes of organisation.(2) 
(42)  An assessment could point towards areas that could be improved.  These could then be assessed, to determine whether improvements may be cost-
effective for the organisation. 
It would also be useful to have information on how other companies are distributed among the Maturity Levels, although I realise that this research 
isn’t aiming to provide this information. (2) 
(49) It clearly and simply defines what success factors are relevant and why and how they are to be scored. (2) 
(50) Yes, I could definitely see the benefit of using this or a similar maturity model. (2) 
(52) I'm thinking of [Redacted](where I am a NED) - an SME - as an easy way to help them start thinking about maturity. (2) 
(55) Although, if we hadn’t already done it, then it would have been v useful – we had to create our own metrics (2) 
(61) I see how this is useful as a talking point to management but believe that a sample process/checklist would be more useful to guide 
implementation. (3) 
(63) This depends entirely upon what is done with the output and whether it informs the delivery of better outcomes. If it is not used by senior 
management, and communtiacted to the wider organisation as a vital metric, it will decay into just a box ticking exercise.(3) 
(72) As below, I hope these points are already included in our ISO27001 processes, so main value would be to check we’ve not missed anything and as 
evidence that we’re not being unreasonably demanding. (3) 
(74) Because it is relatively brief, unlike SIM3, it is more likely to gain the attention and engagement of the seniors. It may also be a catalyst for further 
exploration of the organisation’s security posture and readiness for dealing with incidents. (2) 
(77) After a strong mechanism and campaign round its introduction, we have effectively got to roughly the right place on incident reporting, and these 
CSF don’t particularly help with the final polishing. 
They would have been useful five years ago for us, or for any company who had not been on this journey. (3) 
(86) Assessed the majority of the questions above as Easy to Understand, but overall, the approach would be extremely valuable. (1) 
(87) The unique position of [Redacted] in [Redacted]means that I'm less able to assess this question. (3) 
(94) Where I would find this model and the 4 CSFs particularly helpful would be in highlighting to the SIRO where I see vulnerabilities in our current 
incident reporting mechanisms. In some quarters in my organisation there seems to be a belief that, “We’re the Police. We’re good at responding to 
incidents.” Unfortunately that doesn’t always play out in practice but I have no concrete method to showcase my concerns except by risk briefings and 
anecdotal evidence. This model would give me a tangible vehicle to highlight where I see immaturity and where we could improve (2) 
(103) would look to use this model to understand how Incident Management is embedded into the organisation and what areas I need to improve to 
have a more efficient process. (2) 
(115) When can I start using it? (2) 
(116) As a lone consultant, it depends on the projects and organisation as to what is already in existence.  In a great many organisations, incident 
management is handled outside of the remit of security and traction is extremely difficult. (2) 
(CG2) Once I started thinking about the critical success factors, it prompted me to think about small changes to improve our current process. (2) 
(CG6) It fills the space between the Security Policy Framework requirements for incident reporting and the desired outcomes. (2) 
(CG7) Allied with ONE3M and IAMM this could be used to influence in and point out that the others may be HO but this is broader. (2) 
(CG10) We are currently looking at Tri-Force Collaboration and a model such as this could make identifying the stage each force is at easier (2) 
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(CG11) Once finalised it will be valuable. (2) 
(CG12) I don’t think that it would pull out the issues we have with our reporting process. (4) 
 
If other organisations used the same model would this assist when determining the ability of that organisation to handle incidents? 
(for example if exchanging data with them or contracting them as a third party supplier 
(7) This would depend on the level of understanding and detail behind the reason for the scores.(2) 
(8) Definitely, but also it would allow cross-industry/cross-sector comparisons to be made which would really focus attention. 
I think a measure of “relative maturity” is possibly more useful than just “maturity”(1)  
(12) We rely heavily on some third party organisations for handling some areas where security incidents would be included and knowing where they sat 
in relation to this would be extremely useful to compare, contrast and gain confidence. (1) 
(15) We’d look towards 3rd party audited 27001, and not the specifics in this area.(Neither /nor) 
(20)  As your example suggests, exchanging/sharing information with partner agencies (not contractors) is often 'accepting' of a notion that the partner 
has a suitable structure to handle data. Few would have time to put that to a test!  (1)  
(22) A lot of the scoring is subjective and open to interpretation.  Whilst this is of value to me internally in my organisation it would be insufficient to 
make any judgement on another organisation. (4) 
(29) Our information sharing agreements ask that any external organisation we share with has incident management processes but we do not (usually) 
go any deeper than that at present. Knowing the maturity level of an organisation would be helpful in some sharing cases (particularly those where 
more sensitive data is being exchanged) but not necessarily a deciding factor in some of the less sensitive arrangements. (2)  
(36) Yes – as per my comments in the General Questions table above  (1) 
(37) I think there is value in understanding the current capability, so long as it is not looked at in isolation of the wider operating environment.  MMs 
should be used in context to provide a 'part' of a balanced view of the operating capability of an organisation.  (ie an organisation may score low on a 
CSF, but it may not be critical to its operation or ability to recover from a situation). 
(38)  If it were answered honestly and by someone who knew the organisation well.(2) 
(40) Only in areas with a similar appetite and physical make-up (numbers, buildings, locations) (4) 
(42)  The value of using the model would depend on whether findings had been independently assessed.  If findings were independently assessed, an 
organisation's use of the model would be valuable to other organisations.  If not, an organisation's use of the model would not be very valuable to other 
organisations  e mail 10/1/17 0948 gives above amendment to answer and replaces sentence below  
The value of the model would depend on whether findings had been independently assessed.   
It would not be wise for an organisation to rely on another organisation’s self assessment. (did not score) 
(49) A common approach across all organisations is the nirvana of maturity models. However, with the SPF based on outcomes this is becoming less 
likely. (1) 
(50) As above. If Organisation used the same or a similar model then yes this could certainly prove beneficial to Organissations. (2) 
(55) Yes – if it became a standard comparison? (1) 
(61) Difficult to assess simply as part of an assessment (e.g. ISO27000 series) as many of the criteria require a lot of data to validate. For example we 
conduct around 50 supply chain audits a year and cannot spend the time to understand how many staff know of the existence of a reporting process. We 
16-18 
 
would have to rely on data from the audited company. (3) 
(63) See comment above. It should be of assistance but it takes two to tango.  This depends entirely upon what is done with the output and whether it 
informs the delivery of better outcomes. If it is not used by senior management, and communtiacted to the wider organisation as a vital metric, it will 
decay into just a box ticking exercise (3) 
(70) My concern is the difficulty of consistency of assessment, even with a relatively clear and simple model like this.  Although it is clearly worded, 
how do I know that your assessment of your organisation has been as honest as mine of my organisation?  Or even, as one MM response I once saw 
suggested, that you had even understood the question!  An independent assessment would offer more value here.(3) 
(72) Of more value when assessing software/service vendors. At present we informally assess what their approach to vulnerability handling is, but this 
could make that more formal (as well as giving those tendering a clearer idea of what we expect). (2) 
(74) As per my comments earlier about a common standard. (2) A common standard for maturity models may be useful where security teams from 
disparate organisations need to interact for the common good of security. Each team may then know what to expect in terms of capability from others, 
where each has been accredited against a particular model. 
(77) It’s more we want our partners to have good incident handling processes, and if this model helped them, it would be good. (2) 
(86)  At a minimum it would highlight the areas for improvement. (1) 
(89) Yes but consider also some dynamics of reporting – some of us report low, with the intention of obtaining funding/resources; while others report 
optimistically for reasons of ego and reputation.  I think that the top of the league table is a tricky place to be – because others want to knock you off, 
and management see yours as a problem that is no longer needy, and promote a more needy problem for the purposes of allocating funds/resources. 
I tend to be pragmatic – a perfectionist would be disgusted by my reporting !  Standards are a problem with self assessment. (2) 
(115) Standardisation is always beneficial (2) 
(116) There are already too many questionnaires and assessments required in order to evaluate the performance of third party suppliers therefore the 
likelihood of value being realised from asking for this to be completed is potentially reduced. (3) 
(CG6) Anything that helps a partner organisation understand and interpret another’s IA Maturity is to be welcomed. More commonality would reduce 
risk. (2) 
(CG9) In my experience, the tool could be of value to some partner organisations where IA principles are not sufficiently followed, or understood. (2) 
(CG10) It would give you some baseline evidence and you could ask further questions or not dependant on the risk level (2)  
(CG11) It would be valuable however from experience it is very difficult to get partners or suppliers to engage in the process unless it is specified in 
the contract. (2) 
(CG12) It would act as a level of confidence and if the classification of information was OS and below I think this would be perfectly adequate. (2) 
(CG13)  I would however be sceptical about whether or not other organisations would be prepared to be as candid as they might be if they knew the 
information/results were published. (2) 
Once refined would you consider using this maturity model in your organisation or one you would be assessing 
 
(12) I would need to get the cooperation of the organisations senior management and a commitment to working with the results.(Possibly) 
(15)  Possibly, tending toward no. (Possibly) 
(17) Consistency regarding the choice of model is necessary if an organisation is to measure its’ own progress or rank its’ maturity against the maturity 
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of other organisations.  If this model where appropriately adopted I would be perfectly happy to use it. (possibly)  
(37) I would definitely consider using a version of this MM as part of any wider evaluation as I like the concise nature, simplicity of use and the focus 
on the key requirements of the capability.  (Yes) 
(45) This would be a good model to use and develop. I would be interested in developing it further for use in our consultancy practice. (Yes) 
(52) As above – [Redacted]  I'm thinking of [Redacted] (where I am a NED) - an SME - as an easy way to help them start thinking about  
maturity. (Yes) 
 (72) I suspect it’s already covered by our ISO27001 processes, but would suggest that our Quality Manager compare ours with yours to see if we’ve 
missed anything (Possibly) 
(74) We have used SIM3 recently. (Possibly) 
(77) Not my role to do this sort of thing, and as above “we’ve made most of the journey already”  (No) 
(85)  I am not in a position to authorize adoption  (possibly) 
(89) I am just a contractor – I will do whatever my customers want me to do, within ethical parameters. (no answer given) 
(115) I have already started to apply some of the knowledge that I have learned through the review of this model. (Yes) 
(CG2) But only at my level, in order to make slight adjustments/improvements to the process. (Possibly) 
(CG6) Yes. See above two answers. (Yes) It fills the space between the Security Policy Framework requirements for incident reporting and the desired 
outcomes. Anything that helps a partner organisation understand and interpret another’s IA Maturity is to be welcomed. More commonality would 
reduce risk 
(CG7) I can never predict what senior managers will do.  That said this would be a good step forward. (Possibly) 
(CG9) I would only see as adding value in non-policing organisations 
 (Possibly) 
(CG11) I am a supporter of MM therefore would use this to promote better reporting and management of incidents. (Yes)  
(CG12) It feels that the maturity model is aimed at small organisations. I feel it would be beneficial re third parties. (Possibly) 
Would just knowing what the Critical Success Factors are and using an internal method of ensuring a gradual move to ensure they 
were embedded be a better approach for your organisation 
(1) My organisation is very change resistant.  Slowly but surely would definitely be an advantage. (Yes) 
(7) They would be a good basis to develop systems and understanding further but on a risk/return scale ‘optimised’ may not be seen as the desired level 
when considered against the wider security needs and tasks.(possibly) 
(8) Sadly, it is often the case that the adoption of any given improvement (or model in this case) is often driven by a past issue, by a mandated 
compliance driver or by peer comparison – rather than actual business need or value.  (possibly) 
(12) This is more likely to succeed in my organisation but, again, I would need to ascertain buy in from senior management.(Possibly)  
(21) There should always be scope for organisations to adapt models to meet their needs, but this is certainly a good starting point. (possibly)  
 (26) I didn’t fully comprehend this question. For example, “...be a better approach” than what? (possibly)  
(36) I think accepting these as the definitive CSFs is a better approach. Using an internal method & gradually moving to the CSF’s has the potential to 
create the worst possible outcome for all organisations. I have seen time & time again where project managers have “invented” CSF’s that lacked 
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consistency, were bloated (i.e. too many CSFs), catered for the project specifically & not the organisation overall, such that they became unusable on 
the next project or elsewhere in the organisation. 
As an example, these 4 CSFs could be thought of like the ISO31000 5x5 Risk Matrix – well known throughout many organisations. (No) 
(37) I think that identifying the CSFs provides focus on the areas to concentrate efforts, especially for less resourced organisations such as SMEs, 
whilst level descriptions helps management to understand their current capability and assess their risk.  I do not think a MM should describe 'how' (or 
even 'if') an organisation should develop their capability but provide evidence towards an informed view and so allow informed decision-making to be 
made on future development within their operational environment.(Possibly) 
(40)  Form filling is fine for collecting information (maybe for benchmarking), I'm not sure it does a lot to focus future actions. Completely depends on 
the culture of the organisation. (Possibly) 
 (42)  I think a commitment to self assessment and improvement, where necessary, would encourage actual improvement.  
Just knowing what ought to be done probably wouldn’t help enough.  It wouldn’t necessarily reveal exactly where the problems are. (possibly) 
(45) Securely sharing aspects of the data and lessons learned external would allow for better implementation, use and maturation of the model.  
(Possibly) 
(49) This would provide the end state for an organisation to achieve but allow them the flexibility and their own choice in how they might achieve it. 
(Yes) 
(50) I could certainly see the benefit of a more gradual implementation and ensuring that it is properly understood and implemented correctly, rather 
than just playing lip service which often happens when teams, managers and staff are under pressure. (Possibly) 
(52) Will test on [Redacted] as the year progresses (Possibly) 
(57) Would be more likely to use the maturity model as is rather than extracting the CSFs and assessing against them independently using other criteria.  
The CSFs themselves could be useful in providing high level Input to board briefings on this subject and security more widely to indicate areas of 
focus. (No) 
(61) I think the most benefit would be combining this model with some implementation guidance, whether a process map, checklist or similar.(No) 
(63) See comments above. Simply having a maturity model and a score is of no value unless it is acted upon and reflected in behaviour at every level in 
the organisation. Absent committed and visible leadership from the top - 
including all members of the Board - the CSF Maturity Model will be of no more than academic value.(Possibly) 
(70) I have answered not necessarily as better than implementing the model (question above) but as an alternative approach which I think is of value. 
(Yes) 
(72) Useful to have specific targets, rather than just “more embedded” (No) 
(77) I suspect many organisations would prefer to do things according to their internal culture, so adapting any given model (rather than just accepting 
as given) is common. (Possibly) 
(89) If management are allowed much discretion, they can be expected to exercise it by reducing costs/efforts. (No) 
(92) But senior management may be better persuaded by the standard IRMM tool. (Possibly) 
(93) I would suggest that some examples of what good looks like for each would assist the development of an improvement plan. (Possibly) 
(94) I’m not sure how “ensuring a gradual move” could be measured. If (as regularly happens to me in other contexts) I’m challenged by senior 
management with, “Is there a risk?” and I answer “Yes, sir” then invariably the next question is, “How big is it and what do we need to do about it?” If 
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I were to highlight a vulnerability in our incident reporting mechanisms a maturity model approach gives me a means to measure, evidence and qualify 
my concerns then demonstrate progress to address any identified gap. (No) 
(CG6) It is preferable to have a line in the sand to work towards and measure against. This also helps towards commonality between third parties and 
the understanding of IA Maturity. (No) 
(CG8) Yes, Having sight of the CSF’s would give us strong foundations that we could use to develop our internal processes and procedures, one 
particular area that springs to mind is staff awareness training, both initial, and ongoing training.(Yes) 
(CG10) But I strongly believe that a consistent approach that enables organisations to know that they are comparing themselves to others on a  like-for-
like basis helps all parties understand the ir own and others positions. (Possibly) 
(CG11) The MM can be used to identify current level then used as a strategy model to reach the next level based on resources and risk appetite. 
Experience also tells me that organisations don’t like to be bottom of the league therefore are encouraged to progress. (Yes) 
(CG12) I think that would allow you to ask the right questions for your organisation. (Yes) 
Additional comments 
(1) My only comment is the subjectivity of incident management itself.  Commercially, if contracts rested on a high level of maturity (as they may do 
in supply chain protection) then there may be a natural bias, probably at board level, so interpretation to play a part in the scoring.  As mentioned 
above, the integrity of the scheme will always be difficult to ensure so if, from an implementation point of view, the scheme was used by external 
auditors (in the same way as ISO27001) to gauge maturity rather than internal to the organisation then this may produce better results.  From a scheme 
point of view however, I think that limiting to the CSFs is perfect for both brevity and clarity.  People can get quite bored with endless streams of 
questions especially if they are similar in appearance.    
(6) Finally got round to this. My response is attached. Hope it can be read. My one main criticism of Maturity Models – and I used to use and like[ 
redacted] IAMM which got fairly wide adoption but use has now tailed off – is that the output is too textual. Boards like data in simple to absorb forms. 
This means pictures. In [redacted] we used [redacted] BEATO tool. This was a stack of spreadsheets seamlessly integrated by some simple BASIC 
software which could absorb IAMM (and therefore your MM as well) but was mainly configured for ISO 27K stuff and assessed people/organisations 
using KPIs in much the same way your MM does. The difference is that the output was a chart/charts, immediately generated, that showed where the 
organisation was on its own and also compared to others (Department by Department). [xredactedx] only ever used it in [xredactedx] but I tried (and 
failed) to get [xredactedx] Services to use it. That’s when I came across in depth inertia in many of the Boards who talk the talk but shy away from 
doing anything, mainly because of auditors anal devotion to the ISO 27K process (two year cycle). Hence getting auditors to provide instant outputs 
illustrating the Cyber/IA maturity is not just ‘game changing’ for a Board but can also make them more competitive as they can demonstrate their 
cyber security awareness at the top as a selling point (as opposed to ISO27K and similar reports that only happen every two years or so).   
(17) One minor comment is that I find the “Times New Roman” font not the clearest font where used to on-screen documentation. 
(20) Please let me know if this hard work of yours gains acceptance. I would be happy to use it to bench mark our 'as is' maturity and then use it further 
to improve the standards in an attempt to achieve 'optimised' in all CSFs 
(26) I expected to be asked something about presence or absence of formal methods and systems for capturing, responding to and learning from 
incidents. For me that is also part of the maturity of the organisation. An immature organisation fails to capture, store and learn from this information, 
because there is no application or system. A mature organisation has a system which prompts for the necessary information at each stage and prompts 
the analysts for learnings, then makes the whole body of knowledge searchable and allows management reporting.  
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(36)  Please see the visualisation I included in my email (Note respondent sent a colour coded version of the IRMM in his email to show it in another 
possible format) 
(63) Mike - this is a great initiative but it will be apparent from my comments above that without a genuine commitment from the top of 
any organisation and evidence of impact on the culture and on behaviour at all levels, its impact will inevitably be limited. 
(77) Your statements and scales look sensible and credible, and consistent with each other, so I ranked them equally rather than trying to tease out 
differences. 
(79) I am an experienced user of maturity models in the IA sphere, and have contributed to ther content of a number of them.  My responses are perhaps 
influenced by my enthusiasm for this sort of mechanism to establish clear benchmarks by which organisations can assess and decmonstrate their 
standing. 
(86)  A really useful approach; which I feel my organisation would definitely benefit from to improve its approach to security incident reporting. 
(107) I personally believe that four Critical success factors identified in the study could be valuable for organizations.  
(CG6) Mike, really good work IMO and I can see a real benefit for policing and partner organisations in adopting this. It strikes the right balance in 
effort and outcome and this has not always been the case in some Maturity Models (the IAMM being a prime example). 
(CG7) A very useful exercise.  Thank you. 
(CG8) Very useful document Mike, will prove to be a real asset for measuring our own MM position. 
(CG11) I think similar organisations could use the score information in a league table to assist in promoting their security profile and for partners to 
develop sharing protocols. 
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APPENDIX 17 
List of Security Conferences where the incident reporting research was socialised. 
 
Econique Information Security and Risk Management Conference November 2011 
IAAC Symposium September 2012 Poster Session (This lead to request to present to 
National Audit Office by the Chair of NAO) 
NISC (National Information Security Conference) May 2012,  
SUAC (Sunningdale Accreditors Conference) September 2012, 
SASIG October 2012,  
SUAC (Sunningdale Accreditors Conference) October 2013  
Nuclear Inspectorate Infosec Forum   January 2014 
CISO Security Summit Singapore November 2014  
Sofia East West Defence and Security Co-operation conference April 2015  
IISyG Quarterly Special Interest Group presentation House of Lords July 2016 
IAAC Symposium - Poster - September 2016 
Defence Academy Symposium – Poster November 2016 
CISO 360 Barcelona July 2017 
 
APPENDIX 18   
On line poll of CISO’s at Barcelona CISO Conference July 2017 
 
 
